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The topic of the dissertation is the reference of proper names. It 
criticizes the amalgam of the current standard theory, the direct-
causal theory of reference and defends the Fregean sense theory of 
reference. In addition, the Fregean view is neuronaturalized by 
Gerald Edelman's idea of recurrent networks, combined with 
temporal synchrony of neural processing, which is generalized in 
the dissertation to explain conceptual information.  
 
The direct-causal theory's main arguments - modal, epistemological 
and semantic - are all shown to be weak and based on mistaken 
presuppositions, like synonymies between proper names and 
descriptions. Causal communicative links are shown to be too weak 
for reference retention; it is also argued that intentions to retain the 
original referent are too weak. Moreover, it is suggested that the 
"intuition arguments" invoked by direct-causal theorists are 
misguided. They are shown to be based on a basic schema of 
reference, a postulation proposed in the dissertation to explain the 
precondition of referential use of language. 
 
Reference is grounded on information transmission and its 
embodiment in neurocognitive processes, mainly having to do with 
neural memory systems. So contrary to the direct-causal theorists' 
view, reference is cognitive through and through, as Fregean theory 
maintains. Classical problems in philosophy of language, like the 
informationality of identity statements, propositional attitude 
contexts, de re vs. de dicto, among others, are solved. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
"Having disregarded irrelevant objections they ought then to proceed to 
the most rewarding task of developing their point of view in detail, to 
examine its fruitfulness and thereby to get fresh insight, not only into 
some generalities, but into very concrete and detailed processes. To 
encourage such development from the abstract to the concrete, to 
contribute to the inventions of further idea, this is the proper task of a 
philosophy which aspires to be more than a hindrance to progress." 
(Feyerabend 1981: 161) 
 
 
????????????????
 
 
Consider an utterance made by David: "Saul is hilarious". It is a simple utterance in 
surface, by which David refers to Saul and says something about him. But if the 
utterance and the multitudes of its likes really were simple ones, we would not be 
likely to prompt a simple question "Saul who?" To whom, or what, David refers, 
among all those who are named "Saul"? To answer this question is, in its barest, what 
the theory of the reference of proper names is all about. The proposed answers have 
been many and varied, which is a firm indication that there is nothing simple about the 
reference of proper names. But the current received view seems to be, at least within 
the analytic philosophy of language, that the direct-causal theory (as I call the 
theoretical package, see chapter 3) is superior to the Fregean sense theory of reference 
(the description theory of reference understood to be part of the latter). According to 
the former theory a proper name refers because there are causal links from the naming 
event of the referent to the later communicative uses of its name. The latter theory 
explains reference of proper names with senses, cognitive representations that 
characterize the referents uniquely. But having said this it must be immediately noted 
that the matter is not so clear-cut. The neo-Fregeans, beginning with Michael 
Dummett’s studies, have put forward their accounts of the reference of proper names 
(as well as demonstratives and indexicals) which differ to varying extents from the 
direct-causal theory, both with respect to the presuppositions and details. And that is 
not all, for some neo-Fregeans accept some of the central tenets of the direct-causal 
theory (for instance Gareth Evans and Francois Recanati). As to myself I will be 
finding a niche towards the Fregean end of this continuum, but I also acknowledge the 
few sound points of the direct-causal theory, albeit mostly in attenuated forms. But on 
the whole, to lay open the dialectical situation, currently the proponents of the direct-
causal theory of reference form the majority of the reference theorists. We can say that 
the direct-causal theory of reference has become the paradigm of reference research in 
analytic philosophy. 
 
But as we will see that consensus is hardly anything else than an illusion, albeit firmly 
believed one. Accordingly I have two main aims in this work. The first is divided into 
two further subaims. The first of these is to argue that the arguments the direct-causal 
theorists have given against the sense theory are not sustainable; the second is to 
argue, meshed with the former arguments that the direct-causal theory will not do as 
an explanatory theory of the reference of proper names. This is the promised 
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disillusionment. This argumentation will also show that the common way of speaking 
about “the Fregean description theory of reference” that the direct-causal theorists 
haplessly cultivate is improper and has only contributed to its own widespread 
acceptance. (Though there is one recent exception: Howard Wettstein writes “In 
Naming and Necessity, Kripke criticizes the ‘Frege-Russell description theory,’ which 
perhaps neither Frege nor Russell held precisely in the form described…” (Wettstein 
2004: 97); maybe the tide is turning from expository convenience to accuracy in 
substance?) To my view this is mildly put: one corollary of my argumentation is that 
neither Frege nor Russell held Kripke’s version of the “description theory” at all. 
Plainly, Obviously, Frege held sense theory that is not equivalent to any version of the 
description theory. Russell’s theory is different in its tenets from the version of the 
description theory Kripke found fault with, which is Searle’s (or Searlean) cluster 
theory. As to the second main aim of this study, it is to develop the Fregean 
perspective into a neuroscientific framework, or neurocognitive theory of the reference 
of proper names (and by obvious implication, a framework for reference in general). 
At this point it must be mentioned that the neo-Fregeans have never equated the 
Fregean senses with definite descriptions. As Harold Noonan remarks, mentioning 
Dummett’s and Evans’ works (Dummett 1973, 1981), (Evans 1982), “…we must not 
suppose that [Frege] thought that sense must be descriptive, and in so far as modern 
critics assume this they are attacking a straw man.” (Noonan 2001: 180) So am I 
merely wasting my efforts and time in rearguing an old hat? The answer is no because 
the assimilation of Frege´s (and the Fregean) view to the description theoretic view is 
still widely held by the direct-causal theorists. Moreover, and as Noonan has also 
pointed out, it is still much debated issue whether or not Kripke’s and the other direct-
causalists’ arguments really hit on the assumed Fregean target (Noonan 2001: 214). 
And because the direct-causal theory is the prevailing paradigm in the current 
reference research the argumentative misconceptions that have led to the widespread 
assimilation of that view need to be disentangled. (It also seems to me that many of the 
misconceptions have not been uncovered before.) The second and related point is that 
the actual situation, the tug-of-war between the direct-causal theory and the (neo-
)Fregean theory is much more dramatic and detrimental to the former theory: as I will 
argue at length the direct-causal theory is at most, and at best, only a subtheory of the 
Fregean theory; Frege already had all the makings the direct-causalists have claimed to 
be their innovations. 
 
Let me also mention right here some of the more specific conclusion I will arrive at. It 
turns out that the causal connections from naming of the referent to the later uses of 
that name do not make up the main explanatory factor behind the reference of proper 
names; the neurocognitive information that the causal links carry is what explains 
reference. Likewise the intentions to co-refer, the intentions to keep on referring by the 
hearer to what the speaker is referring – reference borrowing - by his use of a proper 
name as such, are explanatorily forceless. The reason is again that the cognitive and 
informational factors are left crucially out of the picture. And the intuitions used in the 
direct-causal theorists’ arguments, i.e. that there still is a genuine reference when all 
the information about the bearer of the name in question is incorrect, are explained 
away by showing that they are misconceived: they are not primarily referential-
semantic at all but indicate a neurolinguistic-cum-perceptional-cum-functional 
structure underlying all referential uses of language (“the basic schema of reference”). 
As for the positive contributions of this work I argue that the information that explains 
the reference of proper names is tailor made for the Fregean sense theory of reference - 
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as the neo-Fregeans have realized. In developing my version of the general Fregean 
approach I need only to correct some faults in the most promising neo-Fregean 
attempts along my way towards the neuroscientific framework of the reference of 
proper names. It is in order to point out already here that the usual charge launched by 
the direct-causal theorists to the effect that the Fregeans have missed the 
communicative factor in reference retention is also an unfortunate misconception. The 
Fregean sense theorists just have not emphasized the communicative factors in so 
many words, thus not the causal factors on which the direct-causal theorists have 
focused. That is mainly because the neo-Fregeans have thought that the 
communicative factors are obvious to the referential use of language. (I think that that 
should have been evident from the examples they have used. But obviously it has not.) 
In a nutshell my general argument against the direct-causal theory of reference is that 
it has seemed to be the correct theory - hence has become widely accepted - because 
what explanatory power it has it in fact owes to the Fregean sense theoretic factors 
inherent in it but not recognized as such so far. As I said at most the direct-causal 
theory is a subtheory of the Fregean sense theory of reference. There is an irony here, 
which is that although the direct-causal theorists have stressed the general point, they 
have largely remained silent on the very particular factors that retain the references of 
proper names in the communicative exchanges, i.e. the informational-cum-cognitive 
factors. 
 
Once we get rid of the simplified picture and assumptions behind the direct-causal 
theory and bring forth the neural and cognitive dynamics of the brain, we are well on 
our way to developing a unified theory of reference. So in addition to presenting a 
rather long critical examination of the direct-causal theory this work attempts to give 
us such a general but sufficiently detailed theory of the reference of proper names, my 
other main aim. The theory I propose is an interdisciplinary one. The reason is that I 
do not see how otherwise we could have any hope of explaining the reference of 
proper names (and reference in general). After all the referential use of language is 
what we are immersed in frequently; it is a form of human communicative action. And 
just as other forms of human actions it depends on the many different structures and 
functions of our brains, in relation to our surroundings that are informationally 
represented in our brains. Consequently it seems to me that it is hopeless to believe 
that we could have an adequate explanatory theory of reference without taking into 
account the relevant pieces of knowledge ranging from neurobiology to cognitive 
sciences. This obviously implies that no "purely philosophical" theory of reference has 
any chance. Reference is an empirical phenomenon, consequently it should be studied 
also with the methods of science and not only with the methodological preconceptions 
prevalent in philosophy (like “intuitions” and folk semantically charged examples). 
Among the latter I also count in the Kripkean assumption that a philosophical theory 
proper is only such an account that gives necessary and sufficient criteria for the 
phenomenon it studies; or put in other words, that the Fregean sense theory of 
reference is committed to giving synonymy analyses of proper names by the definite 
descriptions providing necessary and sufficient conditions for the senses, conceived of 
as meanings, of proper names. (As is well known Kripke himself doubted the 
prospects of purely philosophical theory of reference, i.e. necessary and sufficient 
conditions theory. A hypothesis as to why he demanded that methodology from the 
Fregean and description theories, thus violating the argumentative parity, will be 
offered in section 4.1.) Contrary to all that the interdisciplinary perspective is the big 
picture from which my attempts spring forth. 
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The ism that is usually given to this kind of orientation is naturalism. Briefly, 
naturalistic philosophy uses scientific results and theories quite extensively in its 
attempts to provide answers to philosophically conceived problems. This involves 
giving up some old-fashioned projects, for example epistemology that tries to justify 
knowledge claims by basing them on some undeniably secure foundations. Or, as just 
alluded to and more relevant to our subject, demands such as strong semantic 
equivalences like synonymity between proper names and the senses as (linguistic) 
meanings (expressed by the definite descriptions). Still, the philosophical and the 
scientific endeavours proceed in parallel and in interactive manner in our quests for 
ever better descriptions and explanations of the natural phenomena. In a way the 
kernel of this naturalistic approach can be expressed concisely by the slogan that good 
philosophy is not philosophy. That is, not only philosophy, and in some cases not even 
mainly. 
 
??????????????????????????????????????
 
According to the Fregean sense theory of reference referential expressions have senses 
(Sinne) related to them such that those senses determine uniquely their referents. It is 
true that Frege was rather niggardly in his explication of the senses of proper names – 
even though proper names - Eigennamen - is a wide category for him: it includes what 
we take to be the ordinary proper names, but also the definite descriptions as well as 
declarative sentences, or assertions for Frege) Ontologically speaking Frege’s view 
was clear, however. Senses are abstract “third realm” entities that all competent 
speakers of a language can "grasp". They are not subjective entities like psychological 
ones, though the graspings are psychological acts. This assures us of the objectivity of 
the senses, hence of the objectivity of communication and science, i.e. the efforts to 
find out truths. But we will see later that the common assumption by the direct-causal 
theorists that Frege equates the senses of proper names with the definite descriptions is 
seriously mistaken. I say “seriously" because that assumption has led to a bunch of all 
too easily refutational arguments against the Fregean sense theory. It seems that the 
misconception can be mainly explained by the fact that Bertrand Russell proposed a 
theory of the definite descriptions that holds that the ordinary proper names are 
disguised (telescoped, abbreviated) descriptions. Consequently it has been easy to 
assimilate Frege´s theory to Russell´s because Russell’s views were well known to the 
later generations of the analytic philosophers of language. By the same token this 
explains the primary place given to the "cluster view" proposed by John Searle. But 
the assimilation is mistaken. It should be kept firmly in mind that for Frege the senses 
are the ways the referents are presented and singled out (to be thought and talked 
about). As Frege says, metaphorically, senses "illuminate" the referents, and, not so 
metaphorically, they are the modes of presentation of the referents. Hence there is no 
exclusive commitment to the definite descriptions as totally equivalent to the senses. 
Still it is as obvious that the definite descriptions express in most cases at least 
partially the senses of proper names. That was evident also to Frege: among the few 
examples he gave of senses there are descriptional expressions (as in the famous 
"Aristotle note" (Frege 1997a: 153, n. B)). 
 
As I argue Frege’s senses, and my neurocognitive Fregean senses, are not exclusively 
descriptive, even though it is obvious that parts, or elements, of them can be 
linguistically expressed by the descriptions. (I will be saying more on this in places 
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throughout this work.) Just because of this and because – as Frege held – we could not 
grasp the senses except by the help of language, the danger of mutual assimilation of 
the sense and the description theories has loomed large. (To that testifies the rather 
common way of talking about “Fregean description theory” and, indeed, assimilating 
the versions of the latter to the former.) The reason I dwell on this is that I realize that 
along the way I have become to take it as obvious that Frege’s approach and the 
Fregean approach (as it is partly exemplified also in the neo-Fregean studies) are not 
description theoretic, with the consequence that I have not taken sufficiently literally 
the common view of “Fregean description theory”. (But nevertheless I also defend the 
description theory indirectly as well as directly (chapter 5).) That is, my arguments 
against the direct-causal theorists’ counterarguments to Frege’s and the Fregean 
theory, understood as perhaps inadvertent sorts of the description theories, attempt to 
show that they fail one way or another. And because the direct-causal arguments were 
intended to sink the description theory also – to repeat: the distinction between 
Frege’s, the Fregean and the description theory (and its versions) were not clear and/or 
much cared about (and still do not seem to be) – it obviously follows that my defence 
of Frege’s and the Fregean views subsumes the defence of the description theory in the 
appropriate places. 
 
?????????????????????????
 
A rival to the sense theory of the reference of proper names came to market in the late 
1960s and in the beginning of the 1970s. The proponents of that theory argue against 
the Fregean theory, i.e. what they think is Frege’s theory, that descriptions are neither 
necessary nor sufficient in determining the referents of proper names they are related 
to. (These arguments have been extended to the natural kind terms, but I have to 
restrict my sweep here.) In particular the direct-causal theorists have argued that 
proper names are not synonymous with the definite descriptions associated to them, 
i.e. that the descriptions do not give the meanings of proper names. At most the 
descriptions can be used to fix the referents, but later on they might become 
semantically irrelevant to the referential function of the very names. (As a foretaste of 
my criticism this assumes that the Fregean senses are meanings, but that is only partly 
correct. (See section 4.2.4.).) Moreover it assumes a very stringent conception of the 
purpose of semantics: meanings as giving synonymy relations. That assumption 
becomes non sequitur the way the direct-causal theorists have used it, as we will also 
see. According to the direct-causal theory proper names are mere "tags" and 
"nonconnotative appellations" and they refer without the semantic mediation of any 
Fregean senses. Another way to express this general tenet of the theory is that proper 
names are rigid designators: contrary to the definite descriptions they refer to the same 
actual individual in all counterfactual, or modal, contexts (possible worlds). Because 
the definite descriptions do not function exactly as proper names do, they are neither 
referentially, nor in general semantically, equivalent to proper names. So the direct-
causal theorists argue that the directness of reference of proper names amounts to there 
being no Fregean referent-determining senses. Instead according to the causal 
component of the theory the referent is given a name and all (or most) of the 
subsequent uses of that name, with the intention to co-refer, refer to that “target” 
because of the causal-cum-communicative links mediating the connection from the 
target to the very uses of that name. The causal-cum-communicative component of 
that theory purports to provide the explanatory mechanism, and the minimum of 
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physicalistic respectability to the view (for there is no direct reference; that would be a 
metaphysical oddity).1 
 
It should be mentioned at the outset that because this is a work on the reference of 
proper names I am not going to discuss demonstrative and indexical expressions. But I 
see no obstacles to developing a neuroscientific theory of reference of indexicals and 
demonstratives in the spirit of the Fregean approach. One result that these studies 
should support is that the often-advertised arguments to the effect that the Fregeans 
could not account for the demonstratives and indexicals are not sound. The arguments 
are based on the assumption that it almost defines a Fregean that according to him all 
referring expressions must be given descriptional equivalents. But in fact the very anti-
Fregean arguments (from the "essential indexical" á la John Perry) are admirably 
Fregean in showing that there are more to the senses than what meets the descriptional 
eye. 
 
?
?????????
 
In chapter 2 I will present Frege´s theory of sense and reference; not all of it but those 
elements that are relevant to this study. No new observations are made with respect to 
that theory; only few remarks in places where I have thought that something needs to 
be said of correcting little misunderstandings, or to shed a light on some direction that 
has been neglected so far. In chapter 3 the same is done to the direct-causal theory of 
reference, except that I say even less anything new. The main arguments against the 
Fregean sense theory of reference are also presented there: the modal, epistemological 
and semantical argument, and the arguments from Twin Earth and content variance of 
the senses. 
 
The critical stance against the direct-causal theory is launched in chapter 4. every one 
of the first three main arguments is shown to be a failure. The modal and the 
epistemological arguments are refuted quite quickly. They have to do with the 
assumption behind the direct component of the direct-causal theory, according to 
which proper names are not semantically equivalent to the definite descriptions 
expressing the Fregean senses. But the semantic assumption, synonymity, and the 
epistemological assumption, aprioricity, which are behind the arguments, are not part 
of the Fregean sense theory and never were. The semantical argument, which has 
mainly to do with the causal element, has grown quite intricate during the years, so the 
counterargumentation takes the main portion of the chapter. I will argue that the use of 
the causal-cum-communicative links, or chains, could not explain the reference of 
proper names; only information about the referents can do that. I also argue that the 
intentions to co-refer are forceless in referent retention; and that the referential 
"intuitions", commonly invoked when the descriptions about the purported referent 
that are shown to be false in the counterexamples the direct-causal theorists have 
amassed, are misinterpreted by the proponents of the theory. The plain consequence of 
this is that when a sense of a proper name does not apply to a unique individual that 
proper name does not refer uniquely, which is just the verdict of the sense theory. 
During the course of the argumentation I will also defend the Fregean theory, 
especially with respect to the particular nature of the Fregean senses. We will see that 
they are not nearly as "conceptually pure" as the anti-Fregeans have made them look 
like. On the contrary, we will see that the senses are so rich that the direct-causal 
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theory, in places where it does have some explanatory adequacy, has already been 
presubsumed by the Fregean theory. 
 
The Twin Earth argument fails because it involves too strong an epistemic assumption: 
it violates what I call "the epistemic symmetry principle". In short, and in general, the 
Twin Earth scenarios violate that principle because they take different epistemic 
perspectives to be semantically equivalent, our current perspective and that of the 
Twin Earthians. But that needs to be argued for, not assumed. The content variance 
argument states that the senses the speakers associate with a single proper name vary 
to the extent that they could not be part of the semantic values of proper names, 
therefore the modes of presentation of the referents are not semantically relevant. But 
this argument presupposes a relativization of the uses of proper names, and that 
presupposition amounts to the individuation of the referents of proper names in 
question. And that individuation can be attained only with the Fregean means, not by 
causal ones. From this it also follows that the notion of rigid designation is sound but 
argumentatively impotent one because it in fact presupposes the individuation of the 
referents of the rigid designators in question (contrary to Kripke’s claim that 
transworld identity, i.e. individuation, puts the individuative cart before the referential 
horse). So all in all, if all the arguments are correct, the direct-causal theory is at best 
only a subtheory of the Fregean theory, for the former theory fails in all other respects 
than those having to do with the preconditions of reference, which obviously the 
Fregean theory contains. The direct-causal theory is surprisingly empty of substantial 
explanatory and referential content of its own. 
 
In chapter 5 the actualized descriptions view is defended. I will argue that it is the 
most natural reading of the description theory and that Frege, Russell and Strawson 
(but not Searle, it seems) held it at least tacitly. Moreover I argue that if this 
reconstruction is correct, Kripke’s modal argument involves a crucial slip of failing to 
distinguish between two readings of the definite descriptions, the actualized one from 
the predicative. The result is that, contrary to the almost unanimously held belief, the 
description theory of reference interpreted correctly has also been immune from the 
direct-causal attack all along. 
 
In chapter 6 I take up some problematic features of the current neo-Fregean views, 
especially their reliance on what I call “secretarial analogies”, i.e. “files” and 
“dossiers” as the reconstructions of the Fregean senses. I correct some of the most 
promising ones and in this way lead the neo-Fregean approach to the domains of the 
cognitive and the neurosciences, which are put in full use in chapter 7. In chapter 6 I 
also explain in the Fregean terms the distinction between proper names as rigid 
designators and the definite descriptions as non-rigid, i.e. when they are not used as 
actualized-rigidified devices of reference. (The ground for this is already laid in 
section 4.5.) In constructing a framework for reference of proper names I use two 
seminal explanatory notions in the current theoretical neuroscience, i) re-
entrant/recurrent network architecture, after Gerald Edelman´s theory of neuronal 
group selection, and ii) the binding of information by temporal synchrony in those 
networks. I also reconstruct in neurocognitive terms the old notion of individual 
concept by (reductively) identifying it with the notion of the schema about an 
individual. These I explain by a further reduction to the neural level entity in 
Edelman’s theory, a global mapping. Naturalistic as my perspective to philosophy and 
the theory of reference (and semantics) is, the framework is an exercise in 
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neuronaturalizing the reference of proper names. In chapter 8 I put the framework into 
use and offer solutions to the classical and most pressing problems in the philosophy 
of language and mind. In the last chapter I discuss the general features and aspects of 
the neuronaturalistic theory of reference, and also counter some skeptical arguments 
from the indeterminacy of reference. 
 
Why I defend not just the Fregean theory or just the description theory but both – 
albeit the latter, so to say, as a by-product of the defence of the Fregean theory? Have 
not both of the theories been decisively refuted? Well, if I would believe that, I would 
not defend them, would I. The only diagnostic answer that the question deserves, to 
my mind, apart from the obligatory detailed argumentation to be given in this essay, is 
that the question is only based on a misguided consensus. For the situation is seems to 
be the following. The original arguments by Donnellan and Kripke, and by Putnam to 
some extent, were good, but as I will show, they were such only because they were 
based on such alleged assumptions and conceptions about the theories they attacked 
that the arguments could not have shown their case. And because the misconceptions 
have passed unnoticed and in effect have become accepted by the majority, the 
consensus has been formed. Contributing factor has been also that the occasional 
papers noticing the serious weaknesses of the direct-causal theory – like the early ones 
(Loar 1976) and (Schiffer 1978) – have been mostly ignored, so the consensus has 
grown (in good faith in most cases, no doubt), the result obviously being that the 
Fregean and the descriptive theory have not really received the re-hearing they 
deserve. So my primary aim is to defend and develop a modern version of the Fregean 
view. 
 
In concluding this introduction I want to take up shortly an issue I have quite often 
been confronted with. The neuroscientific framework I develop has, for some people, 
seemed quite out of place in a work that is supposed to belong to philosophy. But that 
seems to me to be an erroneous opinion. The motivation for the neuroscientific (and 
cognitive scientific) approach is very philosophical indeed: as I see it no adequate 
explanatory account could be achieved without taking relevant sciences into account. 
This is metaphilosophical motivation for it seems to me that the reference research has 
been too much in the grip of the old-fashioned philosophical methodology (for 
instance counterexamples and strong semantic presuppositions in conceptual 
analyses). To offer an alternative to this in action, a neuronaturalistic account of 
reference as a representative of philosophical naturalism, is what this essay is 
premised on. 
 
Moreover I do not see how my approach differs from that kind of analytic philosophy 
in which tools from mathematics and logics as special sciences are used (sometimes 
very heavily). Science is science, formal or substantial. That kind of approach is 
wholly accepted as a methodology to try to solve philosophical problems, so what 
argument could there be to the effect that the neuroscientific approach is not just as 
acceptable? And, mind you, the most common way of practising even analytical 
philosophy by giving examples as evidence from everyday situations – especially in 
reference research – belongs to that kind of practice. The data is not from science but it 
is offered as data anyway, so what could be supposed to be the difference here? I do 
not see any. Keeping philosophy “pure” is what suits old-fashioned philosophers but 
not those of us seeking explanations of foundational problems, philosophical 
included.2 I see my neuronaturalism as one specimen in the recent science-informed 
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philosophical studies of virtually all kinds: for example philosophies of matter, of 
space and time, of the status of species, of thinking and perception and, indeed, of 
consciousness have all received remarkable boosts by opening up to what scientists are 
saying about those subjects. It is time we heed what the relevant sciences are saying 
about reference. 
 
Notes 
 
1. Some writers speak about "causal-historical reference" or "historical explanation theory" 
of reference (for example Donnellan). But this reflects the difference of focus on the 
particular level or components of the direct-causal theory, not a difference in explanatory 
substance. 
 
2. I have always thought that there is something profoundly unphilosophical in the demand 
for only “purely” philosophical answers – and ways to handle – philosophical problems. 
(See note 2 in chapter 6.) To my experience much of that kind of philosophy – conceptual 
analysis – tends mostly to be a waste of time – though some of it presents admirable as 
specimens of intellectual exercises. But even then one gets the impression of clever tricks 
without passion and vision of a larger background; nothing of worth could be built on that, 
I surmise. The most extreme, or to my mind preposterous, claim I have encountered is that 
it is all very well to explain with the help of science how information is processed in the 
brain, but that does not answer the “philosophical” problem about what makes the neural-
cum-cognitive structures and processes represent the external objects. But on what 
grounds is it presupposed that the scientific theories do not explain precisely that 
problem? When the scientific story of the processes from external stimuli through neural-
cognitive representations to behavior have been told, what room is there left for any 
genuine “philosophical” answers? I see none. In other words I could not see anything 
distinctively philosophical about the problem of representation and reference to external 
objects. Traditionally the problem has been philosophical but that was so only because the 
scientific means were not yet in any very advanced state. (If one means, or conflates this 
to, the problem of skepticism about the external world, he is in different ball park, for then 
the scientific story could not be accepted to begin with, for it more or less presupposes the 
existence of the external world.) But conceptual analysis is not the only villain here. In 
addition to its influence there has prevailed also the epistemic-ontological one, the old 
hankering for “transcendental” perspective. It has quite much to do with the “pure 
philosophy”. According to this line of thought for every empirical domain of study there 
are non-empirical preconditions of its soundness and validity. These have to be non-
empirical for otherwise they would be only contingent and incapable of having the desired 
a priori status. The misconception behind this view is that it does not see that empirical 
disciplines, working as interactive parts of the whole enterprise of knowledge, could be 
self-reflective in the way that their methods and concepts can apply to themselves and be 
checked by both more general and specific disciplines (and these checked in their turn as 
they develop). In contrast to this I hold that philosophical reflective activity can be caught 
up with scientific and empirical means. 
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2.THE FREGEAN SENSE THEORY AND THE DESCRIPTION THEORIES 
OF REFERENCE 
 
????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????
 
In addition to his interest in formal logic Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege was also 
deeply interested in thoughts (Gedanke) and senses (Sinne). His interest in language 
was only of derivative nature, but, as he pointed out more than once, it is mainly 
through language that we are able to investigate thoughts and senses. The obvious 
reason is that linguistic expressions are the primary vehicles of expressing thoughts 
and senses. This is all evident in Frege´s writings (but it is also convincingly argued by 
Tyler Burge (Burge 1979)).1 
 
Consequently it is only natural that one of the targets, and at the same time test cases, 
of Frege´s theory were some puzzling linguistic statements, especially the puzzles 
created by identity statements.2 The most famous of them is that which manifest 
differences in the cognitive content or cognitive significance (Erkenntniswert) of the 
respective expressions. In most cases it is trivial to state that "a is a" (in the formal 
mode), but it may be informative to state that "a is b" even when the referent of "a" is 
the same as the referent of "b" (that is, when they have the same Bedeutung). Thus it is 
usually trivial to say that Hesperus is Hesperus, meaning that the planet called 
"Hespherus" is self-identical (or something as trifle as that). But to state that Hesperus 
is Phosphorus is informationally valuable in that the statement asserts that the two 
expressions refer to the same object (the planet Venus, as it happens). The ancient 
astronomers were most likely somewhat surprised to discover that the star (the planet, 
as it happens) in a particular place and route across the evening sky is in fact the same 
star as that with the particular location and route in the morning sky. The identity 
statement "Hesperus is Phosphorus" was not a piece of linguistic triviality or tautology 
for them. 
 
The notion of cognitive significance needs to be explained, especially when we are 
concerned with the reference of proper names. The Millian theory, of which the direct-
causal theory is the representative, and which is the current main competitor of the 
sense theory, takes the sole meaning, the sole semantic value, of a referring expression 
to be the referent of that expression. In the case of proper names the meaning of the 
name, the semantic value, is that individual to whom it refers, be that a person, an 
animal, a city, or whatnot. On the Millian theory the identity statements have the same 
meaning, the same semantic value, if their referents are the same. (This is a curious 
way to express the point, for there is in that case only one referent; but the point is 
clear.) In the above example from the domain of the ancient astronomy the meaning of 
the identity statement "Hesperus is Phosphorus" is that the planet Venus is Venus. But, 
as is widely acknowledged, this view has the consequence that it is unable to explain – 
without quite drastic changes of what is considered  to be only semantically relevant - 
why, for instance, a person might not believe that Hesperus is bright although that 
same person believes that Phosphorus is bright. The reason for this heavy theoretical 
hedging is that according to the prevailing Millian view – or neo-Russellian with 
singular propositions - the person does also believe that Hesperus is bright (Salmon 
1986). But this just flies on the face of the obvious cognitive fact that when asked the 
person himself would be likely to deny this belief. Thereby the epicyclic moves by the 
Millians. 
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???????????????
 
Frege´s aim was to develop a theory that both solves the puzzles and reveals the 
primary role of the thoughts and the senses over the natural language expressions 
expressing them more or less accurately. To this end Frege introduced the distinction 
between Sinn and Bedeutung in his famous paper Über Sinn und Bedeutung (Frege 
1997a). The theory is based on quite a rich semantical framework, but those aspects of 
it that relate to the puzzles are so well known that we can present them in a compact 
way. Frege distinguishes Sinn and Bedeutung for three categories of linguistic 
expressions. In general Sinn is the sense of an expression (its content or meaning in the 
current jargon); Bedeutung is its referent (denotation, designation). Sense is a 
functional as well as a cognitive-epistemic notion. To further specify the nature of the 
sense Frege says that it involves the way or the mode of presentation of the referent 
(die Art des Gegebenseins). Thus in particular the sense of an assertoric sentence (or a 
statement, an utterance) is the thought (Gedanke) it expresses. Thought in this sense is 
what is meant by the current notion of proposition a sentence or an utterance 
expresses. For example the sentence "the velocity of light is constant in vacuum" 
expresses the thought that light has constant velocity in vacuum. It is a different 
thought from the one the sentence "light travels 299 792 458 meters per second in 
vacuum" expresses, which states the precise value of the velocity of light in vacuum. 
The thoughts are similar in content but not the same because their respective senses 
differ, but Bedeutung is the same, the constant value of the velocity of light in vacuum. 
The important point to realize is that for Frege thoughts as senses of assertoric 
sentences are the guarantors of the objectivity of communication. This requires of the 
thoughts that they form the common stock for all competent users of (a particular) 
language. Frege did not hold the view that thinking always requires language. He 
thought it possible that there could be creatures that can grasp thoughts and senses 
without the mediation of any language, but we humans are incapable of grasping and 
communicating thoughts without the mediation of language. Thoughts as well as 
senses are third realm entities in Frege´s framework. That is, they could not be 
perceived, neither are they subjective ideas (Vorstellungen) in the consciousness of a 
thinker. Because of this abstract nature of the thoughts and senses, and their being 
available for all competent users of language, they are fit for objective scientific 
theorizing and semantics; ideas, images and such occurrents are not because of their 
subjectivity. Neither are the latter entities in any way involved semantically in senses 
and thoughts: in contrast to a subjective idea an objective thought "needs no owner" 
(Frege 1997b: 337). 
 
The sense of a proper name is, then, the way the referent is given or presented to a 
thinker. For example the expression of a sense of the name "Aristotle" may be "the 
pupil of Plato and the teacher of Alexander the Great" (Frege 1997a: 153, n.B). This 
sense gives the referent of the name "Aristotle" (in contrast to the sense, say, "the 
famous Greek shipping magnate", which refers to Aristotle Onassis). It should be 
strongly emphasized that in this same place Frege admits that different persons may 
have different senses of the same proper name. In regard of the sense of "Aristotle" 
just mentioned, Frege continues that "Anybody who does this will attach another sense 
to the sentence 'Aristotle was born in Stagira' than will someone who takes as the sense 
of the name: the teacher of Alexander the Great who was born in Stagira." The 
possible multitude of different senses of one and the same proper name (syntactically 
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or formally individuated not to beg any semantic questions) is a characteristic feature 
of these expressions in natural languages. But that the variance of the senses ought not 
to exist in the ideal scientific language was one strong motivation of Frege´s studies. It 
is easy to be inclined to think that, as the senses are intersubjectively shared "meaning 
entities" in Frege´s theory, people share all the senses of a particular expression. But 
that need not be so. It is better to allow that senses are shareable, not that they are all 
actually shared. For example if we shared all the senses of a particular proper name, 
there would not arise any doubts as to what or who is the referent of that name. But 
such doubts do arise occasionally, so the view that the senses are shared rather than 
sharable would seem to lead to the conclusion that we are infallible in our knowledge 
with respect to individuals (because we would also have access to all true thoughts 
about individuals). But this does not follow from Frege´s view either, and he in fact 
denied any such consequence: "The sense of a proper name is grasped by everybody 
who is sufficiently familiar with the language or totality of designations to which it 
belongs: but this serves to illuminate only a single aspect of the Bedeutung, supposing 
it to have one. Comprehensive knowledge of the Bedeutung would require us to say 
immediately whether any given sense attaches to it. To such knowledge we never 
attain." (Frege 1997a: 153; emphasis mine). 
 
The third category of expressions with the senses is the concept (or predicate) words. 
They are somewhat more complex semantically in that they have senses but their 
Bedeutungen are the concepts themselves. That is because Frege countenanced 
concepts (functions in general) in addition to objects in his ontology. Concepts have 
extensions in their turn. These are the object or objects falling under the particular 
concepts. In this essay I am not concerned with the Fregean concepts, neither with the 
distinction between concepts and objects, so I will not continue on this matter further 
(but see (Frege 1997c,d) for details). 
 
?????????????????????????
 
Let us see how Frege´s theory solves the well-known puzzles mentioned above. The 
puzzle of informational identity statements is solved in the following way. The sense 
of a proper name is that which gives or singles out the referent of the name. This is to 
be understood as a specification of the way the particular sense a speaker grasps 
represents the referent, so that one person can refer to the planet Venus by invoking 
the sense, i.e. the thought, expressed by the sentence "the star at the morning sky", and 
another person by the sentence "the star at the evening sky". As this example shows 
one and the same entity can be referred to by many different senses. And it can also be 
referred to with a not wholly correct sense: the star in question is a planet, Venus. This 
explains why the identity statement "the Morning Star is the Evening Star" is 
informative and not trivial. The Morning Star/Evening Star example shows also that 
the Fregean approach is not a version of the description theory, for – as just pointed 
out - the respective descriptions expressing the respective senses are incorrect, but the 
senses are still about the same object. So there is at least one more element implicit in 
the senses because they pick up the correct referent. 
 
One can also be oblivious as to the sameness of the referent because one has at one´s 
disposal only senses, and the two senses expressed by "the Morning Star" 
("Phosphorus") and "the Evening Star" ("Hesperus") are different. In general the 
senses explain the cognitive fine-grainedness of the thoughts. In contrast the coarse-
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grainedness that characterizes the Millian approach, just because of that coarseness, is 
not able to explain the different cognitive significances of the trivial and informative 
identity statements. (It has been argued, for example by Nathan Salmon (1986) that the 
Millian approach, or in effect the Russellian theory, does not wreck on the rock of the 
informative identity statements. But all these kinds of solutions need to postulate 
something that accounts for the different cognitive roles of the thoughts expressed by 
the identity statements, therefore in effect they only work because of the Fregean 
nature of those postulations, like the guises under which something is believed in 
Salmon’s theory; see section 4.3.2, note 20.) 
 
Frege´s theory works also well in solving the puzzle the propositional attitude contexts 
are prone to manifest. (Here I use believing as the representative of the large class of 
the propositional attitudes.) One may believe that Hesperus is not bright even if he 
believes that Phosphorus is bright. The reason is that the senses (the thoughts) the two 
sentences express differ from each other. As there is nothing in the sense of 
"Hesperus" that would indicate that it has the same referent as "Phosphorus", it 
becomes natural that one may believe something about Hesperus without believing 
that same thing about Phosphorus - and vice versa for the sense of "Phosphorus". 
 
Frege elaborated this solution a little further. Expressions in the propositional attitude 
contexts refer to their customary senses, not to their customary referents 
(Bedeutungen) that are the objects they refer to in direct speech, like the planet Venus 
in our example. The customary senses become the indirect Bedeutungen in the 
propositional attitude contexts. In other words, in contrast to the direct speech 
contexts, we are talking primarily about the thoughts of the persons, not about the 
referents that are specified by the senses that are parts of those thoughts. 
 
In the same manner we can also explain why two central principles of extensional 
logic fail in the propositional attitude contexts. Substitutivity of identicals states that 
co-referring terms can be substituted salva veritate for one another, i.e. without a 
change in the truth-value of what the sentences say of which the substitutable terms are 
parts. In the propositional attitude contexts the referents are not the same because the 
referents are the senses (or thoughts), and they may differ from one another. The other 
principle, existential generalization, states that from "a is F" can be inferred "there is 
an individual such that it is F" (formally: "Fa" => "∃x Fx"). However one may believe 
that Santa Claus is an old man (=Fa) without Santa Claus existing. This apparent 
violation of the existential generalization is explained in the same vein: one´s belief is 
about the sense expressed by the sentence "Santa Claus is an old man", but it is not 
about any existing object, about any customary Bedeutung.3 
 
Frege´s theory is not restricted to what we currently understand by proper names. 
Among them (Eigennamen) Frege included also the definite descriptions. But, as we 
saw, the theory is designed to work as well with sentences: a thought has a sense, or 
more precisely, the thought is the sense of the sentence expressing it. The truth-value 
of the thought (True or False, tertium non datur), thus derivatively of the sentence that 
expresses it, is its Bedeutung (as the object a proper name refers to is the Bedeutung of 
the name). Frege´s treatment of sentences differentiates those sentences that are 
involved in finding out truths about reality from those sentences that are of an epic or a 
fictional nature – or “mock thoughts” as they are usually called. The latter do not have 
truth-values as their Bedeutungen because some (or all) of their constituents lack 
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Bedeutungen. Thus "Odysseus was set ashore at Ithaca while sound asleep" is such a 
sentence, and accordingly it does not have truth-value because "Odysseus" has no 
referent in reality. The sentence expresses a sense, though. (For how else could we say 
that it belongs to the domain of epic?) But in spite of these type of sentences Frege 
held that proper names in our current sense, as well as definite descriptions and 
sentences are proper names with senses, even if they do not always have Bedeutungen 
(Frege 1997a: 157; 1997e). 
 
It should be mentioned already here that it has become common to take the Fregean 
sense as that factor which determines the referent. There has been some controversy 
over the alleged incoherence in Frege´s terminology related to this issue. If sense is the 
mode of presentation of the referent, then there presumably is no sense when there is 
no referent if the slogan "sense determines referent" is taken at its face value and 
modus tollens is applied. But to argue this way is to rely on the unlikely premiss that 
Frege would not have noticed the incoherence. I take it simply that this assumption 
amounts to a pragmatic reductio of the argument itself. Moreover, Frege himself is 
explicit on the point that proper names lacking Bedeutungen still have senses (Frege 
1997a: 156-8). It seems to me that David Bell, Michael Beaney and Gideon Makin 
have already resolved the issue (Bell 1990:274-5; Beaney 1997: 22-4; Makin 20001: 
112-17). They all argue against Gareth Evans´ interpretation of Frege´s approach with 
respect to empty names, i.e. senses that do not have referents. Evans charges Frege on 
inconsistency because Evans takes it that to speak about sense as the mode of 
presentation will not do if there is no referent. But as both Bell and Makin easily show 
such charge is groundless. Frege himself explicitly states in Über Sinn und Bedeutung 
(and elsewhere) that sentences have senses even when they have parts that have no 
referents. Frege also says that one is not assured of the referent of the sense. To my 
view this seems to be equivalent to holding that senses are genuine even when they do 
not have referents. And as Bell says "for Frege the sense of an expression is the 
condition that must be met by anything that is the reference of that expression…the 
possession by a sign of a determinate, coherent, and intelligible sense is entirely 
compatible with that sign´s lacking a reference." (Bell 1990: 275; emphasis mine) 
According to Beaney senses as the modes of determination of the referent are the 
routes by which the referent is arrived at, the conditions that the referent must meet to 
be that very referent. This does not demand that there will always be a referent. It is 
true that the talk about the modes of presentation of the referents tends to be talk about 
those senses that do have referents. But that should not lead us to the hasty Evansian 
conclusion, for it is just that Frege tended to employ this latter explication of the 
senses because of his interest in truth and in the foundational logical matters where the 
senses have a central role and their Bedeutungen are guaranteed. Makin makes 
essentially the same point with the implication that we should not take the “route” 
metaphor too seriously here. At any rate “…no grave consequences for Frege’s 
position ensuing from admitting that conceiving of sense as ‘mode of presentation’, 
though heuristically valuable, and true whenever there is a referent, cannot serve as a 
general characterization.” (Makin 2000: 117) In short, then, it seems that Evans’ 
argument is only a claim based on a too literal reading of “determining the referent”. It 
is another question why Evans committed such a mistake. And here we have, I think, a 
deeper undercurrent to be uncovered. For it seems to be not very likely that Evans 
would have made such a mistake without a certain background conception. This 
conception might be what also determined his insistence on the “Russellian 
thoughts”/”de re senses”, i.e. that when there is no object of the (purported) thought, 
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there is no thought. We see this same pattern here: the existence of the object – to be 
determined by a sense and to be thought about – is a precondition for Evans’ views. 
But here I cannot try to argue for this hypothesis. 
 
?????????????????????????????????????
 
Frege did not say too much about what senses are (except, of course, that the sense of 
a thought is composed of the senses of its constituent senses). Frege used some 
metaphors occasionally to enlighten the nature of senses, for example that sense 
illuminates, beleuchtet, the referent from one side. We saw above one of the few 
occasions when Frege characterizes the senses of proper names: the senses of the name 
"Aristotle". Ontologically senses are abstract entities, hence not sensible objects and 
not objects of consciousness, what Frege called Vorstellungen. But of course there has 
to be some connection from sensibilia to the senses, for how otherwise could they have 
any role in thinking and language use (as well as in perception (Frege 1997b)). Frege 
left us little concrete clues as to how the connection is effected. He talked about 
"grasping" and "apprehending" senses and thoughts (verb: ergreift, erfassen; noun: 
Auffassung). He said that grasping or apprehending is a psychological act: "How does 
a thought act? By being grasped and taken to be true. This is a process in the inner 
world of a thinker which may have further consequences in his inner world, and which 
may also encroach on the sphere of the will and make itself noticeable in the outer 
world as well." (Frege 1997b: 344) This still leaves us very much in the dark because 
psychological acts are subjective but senses and thoughts are objective in Frege´s 
view. (Although as such this does not yet help much, but it is understandable because 
Frege was not interested in psychological matters; he rather abhorred them, for he 
thought that psychologizing the issues was a sure way to perdition in any semantic and 
logical matters.) 
 
Anyway we should dispel right here the rather common belief that Frege was a 
description theorist. He did hold that we humans could grasp and express the senses 
only with the help of language, but that there could be creatures that grasp the senses 
(and thoughts) directly. So it follows that the senses should not be equated with the 
definite descriptions. Moreover Frege held that both proper names (in our sense) and 
the definite descriptions are Eigennamen with their own senses. So equating the senses 
of the ordinary proper names with the senses of the definite descriptions (let alone the 
senses of the former with the descriptions themselves) is out of place. The direct-
causal theorists may have failed to appreciate this point about the subsidiary role of 
language and consequentially been led to presume the equivalence of the senses and 
the descriptions because of their predetermined agenda in semantics. I will argue in 
section 4.1 that this indeed is so. Undoubtedly they were misled by the few examples 
of the senses Frege gave; but how else could he have given them other than by the 
linguistic means, by descriptions, when he held that we grasp and describe the senses 
only by linguistic means? However, it could be argued that the senses are weakly 
descriptive because parts of them, or elements of them, could be expressed by 
descriptions. And that is true, for – again - how else Frege could have given his few 
examples of the senses like the sense of “Aristotle” being “was born in Stagira and 
taught Alexander the Great”. But this is trivial in light of what was just said: we 
humans could not access the senses but with the help of language. Moreover it can be 
argued that the senses are only partially expressible: they have elements that do not 
“yield” to specific linguistic characterization (in contrast to quantifying over those 
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elements and mentioning them by general terms). This will be argued in section 4.3.5 
(Ateb-Afla example) and in the chapters 6 and 7 (and with the example of the twin 
blondes in section 8.1.1). Note by the way that I am not claiming that every sense of a 
proper name is such that it could not be completely linguistically articulated by 
descriptive means. No doubt there are, or at least could be, such senses, like 
descriptive names envisioned by Gareth Evans (“Julius” = “the one who invented the 
zip”). 
 
It is evident from Frege’s writings that the senses have cognitive function and explain 
the cognitive significance of expressions. It should be noted that despite the current 
looseness in meaning between "psychological" and "cognitive" one should not be led 
to think that the psychological grasping of the senses and the cognitive contribution of 
them are epistemically or semantically related in Frege´s view. The difference in the 
cognitive values between, for example, the trivial and informative identity statements 
is a semantic fact that is explained by the difference of the senses the different 
referential expressions occurring in them – even though that only manifests itself in 
the linguistic and behavioral level. By the same token we can also explain what one 
knows: the total knowledge of a person is formed by the totality of the true thoughts he 
grasps. In other words Frege´s semantic theory of sense and reference is closely related 
to epistemic matters. But the psychological acts involved in “apprehending” and 
“grasping” thoughts and other senses are strictly distinct from these semantic, 
epistemic and cognitive aspects. 
 
What was just said about thoughts and senses is rather compact presentation of that 
part of Frege´s theoretical apparatus. However it is more or less all there is to be said 
about the nature of the senses. However I will bring up couple of striking features of 
them later when I answer arguments directed against the general nature of the senses 
by the direct-causal theorists (sections 4.3.4 and 4.3.5). The barrenness of Frege´s 
elucidation of senses is disturbing, to be sure, but it is also a rewarding tenet. That is 
because it leaves one with an opportunity to try and develop both a more detailed and 
wider theory of senses in relation to a theory of reference. From this perspective the 
rather negative result of Frege´s elucidations become a motivating boost to modernize, 
to naturalize, the notion of Fregean sense. It also explains the seemingly different 
attitude that for instance Michael Dummett expresses when he says that "Frege tells us 
much about what senses are" and then goes on to give all the same formulations from 
Frege as were given above (Dummett 1981: 80). Presumably whether one is an 
optimist or a (qualified) pessimist on the issue of the sufficient characterization of the 
nature of the senses depends on one´s theoretical aims. It is true that Frege could have 
been even more silent on the issue. He might have left it just to mentioning that the 
senses of, say, "Morning Star" and "Evening Star" differ from each other in spite of the 
fact that they have the same referent. But from my perspective Frege´s 
characterizations of the senses are not sufficiently specific. I think that the notion of 
the sense is of utmost importance in semantics and in the theory of reference (as well 
as in the philosophy of mind). Because I am in this study after a modernization and 
neurocognitive naturalization of the senses with respect to the theory of reference, I 
welcome the opportunity to seize the senses in service of a scientific account of them. 
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There are two strands that motivated Bertrand Russell´s celebrated theory of the 
definite descriptions (Russell 1905). It is a theory, or we should perhaps say, as is 
common, a representative piece of path-breaking philosophical methodology, which 
has since been emulated hundreds of times in analytic philosophy. The story is 
therefore a familiar one, but let me review it shortly. First motivation for Russell was 
that he became deeply dissatisfied with proposals like the one put forth by Alexius 
Meinong, which postulated (or hypostatized) all kinds of entities which "subsist" in 
order to explain the meaningfulness of statements, even incoherent and contradictory 
ones like "there is a square that is round". The ontological extremity of this approach 
can be readily seen from that very statement, for it presupposes some thing to deny the 
existence of that same thing (which most likely lies behind Meinong’s motivation to 
postulate the mode of subsistence for entities). Generally speaking this Meinongian 
line is ready to postulate any kinds of entities and modes of being (sic?) to explain 
anything, not just semantic and linguistic puzzles. The ontological carelessness that 
Meinong´s approach brings with it became not to suit Russell´s ontological taste. He 
wanted instead to get clear about the workings of natural language by the use of formal 
logic, not to take natural language at its face value in order to make ontological leaps. 
In essence Russell wanted to show that if a linguistic expression can be given a 
paraphrase, or some such semantical formulation, the expression could be dispensed 
with without any ontological crimes being committed. 
 
The second motivation was primarily epistemological. Russell maintained that there is 
a distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. 
Roughly, the former knowledge is about entities that are the direct objects of one´s 
experience. Although there has been debate about whether sense data or common 
material objects are the primary direct objects, I think that for Russell both are 
included (if not, nothing depends on that here). Thus one´s sensations, emotions, 
perceived objects and such are known by acquaintance. Also included were at least 
some memories and awareness of oneself, and presumably universals as the referents 
of common nouns, predicates and relation words. In natural language there are 
expressions that refer to these items of knowledge by acquaintance, expressions what 
Russell called "logically proper names". They refer directly to the entities they are 
about; thus their meanings are the very entities they refer to. The class of logically 
proper names consists of expressions like "this X", "that X", "now", "here", "I", and 
such; expressions for one´s sensory contents and perceived objects ("this dog").4 
 
Russell’s claims that the sentence “X exists” is a tautology and sentence “X does not 
exist” is a contradiction might seem a little hard to understand. But if we keep in mind 
Russell’s epistemic view and its accompanying thesis that only immediate sensory 
“objects” can be acquainted with, the claims become fathomable. When “X” is a 
logically proper name of such an object it is about a particular element of one’s 
experience. Therefore it is indeed tautologous to say that X exists, for “X” is the name 
of that non-recurring element of one’s experience; “X” as a logically proper name 
occurs only once and is tied once and for all to that experiental element. Or, if it 
recurs, its name would still be “X”: “X” is permanently undetachable from that 
experience. (This includes the memory of X because as a memory item it still could 
not be renamed, even if that seems so. The reason is that one would be naming the 
experience of remembering X.) In the same vein to say that X does not exist is a 
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contradiction because at the moment “X” is said it refers to an unique experiental 
element. (There could not have been a name for that experience any time before it 
occurred.) Maybe an analogy helps also. The utterance “I do not exist” is a 
contradiction because it could not be uttered without its utterer existing. Likewise “I 
exist” is tautology (in most cases at least) because there is no need to utter it when the 
utterer - obviously - exists. 
 
If we accept the idea of logically proper names as expressions that could not fail to 
refer directly, the idea of the theory of the definite descriptions in its Russellian 
version is the following. What are called ordinary proper names, or just proper names 
in the current jargon, do not belong to the class of logically proper names. The 
ordinary proper names and the definite descriptions are incomplete symbols: they are 
meaningful only in a context. In contrast logically proper names are capable of 
standing alone because they cannot fail to refer: there is always an item to which such 
an expression refers. This idea opens up a way to analyze the statements that deny the 
existence of something, the negative existentials ("X does not exist"), without any 
need to postulate suspect entities allegedly to be the referents of the expressions. 
Russell´s theory of the definite descriptions maintains that the ordinary proper names 
are "disguised" ("abbreviated", "telescoped") definite descriptions. This way to 
analyze them shows that they have quantificational structure. The reason for this 
treatment is that if the subject X in the statement "X does not exist" were a logically 
proper name, the statement would be contradictory because "X" as a logically proper 
name would have its referent as its very meaning, but by assumption there is not such 
referent (that is what the negative existential says). The statement is, however, 
perfectly understandable and does not commit its utterer to any contradictions or 
incoherences, therefore "X" is not a logically proper name. 
 
To present the crux of Russell´s theory in a compact form, let us analyze the statement 
"the round square does not exist" the way Russell encourages us. "Round square" is 
not a logically proper name, for presumably no one is acquainted with any round 
squares. This leads us to analyze the statement in a way that enables us to preserve its 
meaningfulness. The analysans that Russell would offer is "it is not the case that there 
is one and only one entity which is both round and square". Because there is no such 
entity that is both round and square (at the same time), the original statement is 
meaningful and true. 
 
Expressions like "round square" are not the most likely expressions in the everyday 
discourses, so let us also see how Russell´s theory analyzes a meaningful expression 
that has no referent (at the moment of its utterance). The famous example of the king 
of France will do here. How to analyze the statement "the present king of France is 
bald"? The problem is of course that there is no current king of France, therefore the 
expression is not a logically proper name. Because we are not allowed the easy way 
out of postulating a "subsistent" king of France, we have to find another way to 
explain the meaningfulness of the statement. This is offered by Russell´s analysis that 
is based on the contention that the grammatical surface form is not the logical form of 
the statement. The latter form reads, after the analysis, "there is one and only one king 
of France, and he is bald". And this is false just because there is no present king of 
France at this moment. This way the analysis also preserves the law of excluded 
middle, i.e. that any declarative sentence is either true or false, tertium non datur. As 
Russell says, if you go through the bald entities you will not find the king of France 
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there, neither among the non-bald entities. This creates a threat to the law of excluded 
middle, but the analysis evades it and moreover does that by showing why the 
statement is meaningful: it has the form of a quantificational sentence. (The same 
analysis also handles the negative existential "the king of France does not exist" the 
same way as it dealt with the round square.) 
 
The king of France example analyses a definite description, but what about the 
ordinary proper names? If the expression "Scott" were a logically proper name, thus 
always unfailingly referring, it would not be even meaningful to express doubts about 
Scott´s existence by saying that "Scott does not exist". Let us look at the sentence 
"Scott is the author of Waverley", where "is" is the is of identity and not the is of 
predication. This sentence is not a tautology because it clearly expresses something 
that one may not have known before. The reason for this is, according to Russell, that 
"the fact that the one is a name and the other a description. Or they might both be 
descriptions." (Russell 1956: 247) If that were not the case, that is, if the description 
"the author of Waverley" were semantically equatable with a name, akin to a logically 
proper name, the sentence would be expressing a tautology because both "Scott" and 
"the author of Waverley" would refer to the same individual. To reveal this argument 
more completely let us suppose that "the author of Waverley" is a logically proper 
name. This means that there must be an individual, say X, such that the expression 
refers to it. From this it follows that the whole expression is then equivalent to "Scott 
is X". Now this leaves us with the alternatives: either "Scott is X" is false, in which 
case Scott is not identical to X and "Scott" and "X" do not refer to the same individual; 
or "Scott is X" is true and Scott is identical to X, in which case the statement is a 
tautology. Consequently the whole statement "Scott is the author of Waverley" is false 
or tautologuous. But it is neither, so the assumption must be rejected. That is, "the 
author of Waverley" is not a logically proper name.5 
 
It is rather seldom noted (or maybe even noticed) that the standard examples of the 
Russellian analysis of definite descriptions are incomplete. For example the analysis of 
"the present king of France is bald" is stopped at the stage of "there is one and only 
one king of France, and he is bald". But the whole intent of the theory of the definite 
descriptions is to analyse all denoting expressions to only quantifiers and predicate 
expressions (and identity sign plus logical connectives). Therefore "the king of 
France" should receive further analysis. (This point is clearly presented by Salmon 
(Salmon 1989).) But this full intention of the theory has proved difficult to fulfill. Or 
rather that it could not be fulfilled has been one of the charges the direct-causal 
theorists use against the description theory. I will come to that issue later. Here it must 
be mentioned that Russell supposed that the analysis does go through in all stages 
down to the logically proper names. i.e. with respect to all the ordinary proper names 
and descriptions. This supposition stems from one of his metaphysical views that he 
seemed to have held throughout his whole philosophical career. He argues that 
ordinary proper names embody a false metaphysics, the substance metaphysics 
(Russell 1948: 95-9). Russell argues instead for metaphysics in which the function of 
proper names is to name complexes of qualities and spatiotemporal relations that make 
up an individual. This characterization of Russell´s view makes it evident that he did 
not give up, or that at least he kept coming back to, the doctrine of knowledge by 
acquaintance and the logically proper names being about the direct items of 
experience. The relationship of predicate expressions, many of which Russell took to 
express universals, to qualities is of course problematical, but to the extent there exists 
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such a relationship it becomes natural to suppose that the analysis of descriptions can 
be followed through. The motivation is that the completion of Russell´s theory and its 
harmonization with his epistemology both require that. That is because according to 
Russell’s view all linguistic expressions, a fortiori definite descriptions, must be 
reducible to constituents with which we are acquainted in experience. 
 
It is not altogether clear that Russell´s theory can solve all the puzzles he considered as 
its objectives (see note 5). But that is quite beside the point for my purposes because 
the main thrust of Russell´s theory has survived to our days in one form or another. 
The crux of that theory has always been that proper names are abbreviated (or 
disguised) definite descriptions, when the descriptions individuate one and only one 
referent, i.e. are unique in their reference-determining function. If we drop both the 
atomistic metaphysics and epistemology of knowledge by acquaintance, a move 
unanimously adopted by the subsequent theorists, and as a consequence focus on the 
ordinary proper names, the main idea of the theory of the definite descriptions remains 
viable. It has been extended, so we better turn next to the most famous of the post-
Russellian versions. 
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 
After Russell´s original theory of definite descriptions the most important extension of 
the description theory was the so-called "cluster theory". Especially John Searle has 
argued for this view (Searle 1958). Peter Strawson is sometimes mentioned as a 
proponent of that view because of his account in his book Individuals (Strawson 
1959). I do not concur with this – as we will see in places in chapter 4, so I will here 
discuss only Searle´s position. The cluster theory is an extension of Russell´s theory in 
that its central claim is that a proper name is typically associated with many different 
descriptions, not just one or several which are uniform across all the speakers. The 
theory states also that it may happen that not all of those descriptions contribute to the 
reference of proper names they are associated to, but only those descriptions contribute 
that best fit the referent, or those that are most important to the characterization of the 
referent. (Though Russell´s theory can also be taken to imply quite naturally that the 
descriptions form conjunctions, not disjunctions.) 
 
In the mentioned paper Searle takes an issue with the argument – later much used by 
the direct-causal theorists - that once a proper name is learned with the help of 
descriptions, the subsequent uses of it will be independent of those descriptions, and 
that they will not form part of the sense of the name in question because the name does 
not have a sense but the name only refers. This Searle finds implausible because, were 
we to discover that the factual knowledge about, say, Aristotle would turn out to be 
false, we would rather say "for this reason that Aristotle did not exist after all, and the 
name, though it has a conventional senses, refers to no one at all…" (Searle 1958: 
168). Searle then continues by asking what is the difference between proper names and 
other singular referring expressions, definite descriptions in particular? His answer is 
that in contrast to the definite descriptions proper names do not specify any 
characteristics of the objects they refer to. But there has to be some connection 
between a proper name and its object. This Searle finds in the feature that the referring 
uses of proper names presuppose that their objects have certain characteristics, and 
they are expressible by descriptions. "Therefore, referring uses of 'Aristotle' 
presuppose the existence of an object of whom a sufficient but so far unspecified 
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number of these statements are true." (Searle 1958: 170-1) It is almost always left open 
which of these descriptional criteria, or characteristics, are those the speaker is relying 
on in a particular use of a proper name. But that is so because that is the very point of 
the difference between proper names and the definite descriptions: if the 
characteristics could be decided once and for all for all uses of a particular proper 
name, the resulting definite descriptions would take the role of the proper name. But 
because this is not so, the looseness of the connection between proper names and the 
characteristics of their bearers expressed, or expressible, by the definite descriptions is 
not only an acceptable but a desirable feature as well. As Searle himself puts it: "…the 
uniqueness and immense pragmatic convenience of proper names in our language lie 
precisely in the fact that they enable us to refer publicly to objects without being 
forced to raise issues and come to agreement on what descriptive characteristics 
exactly constitute the identity of the object. They function not as descriptions, but as 
pegs on which to hang descriptions." (Searle 1958: 172) 
 
The looseness of the relation between proper names and the definite descriptions 
allows, then, not any strict characterization (except, maybe, in some very simple and 
secure cases like the above mentioned descriptive names). That explains it why one 
has to have recourse to such expressions as "best fit" to characterize that relation. But 
this should not give rise to any serious argumentative clashes because the expression 
"best fit" that I used above is in fact taken from an antagonist to the cluster view (and 
to the Fregean sense theory): it is used by Nathan Salmon in his presentation of the 
cluster view (Salmon 1982: 10). 
 
In this connection it is in order to mention for comprehensiveness´ sake that 
Wittgenstein had a very similar view in relation to the looseness of the descriptive 
criteria associated with proper names. Though he did not propose anything like a 
sufficiently developed account of the reference of proper names (that would 
presumably have been distasteful to him, judged from the general tone of his later 
philosophy), it has become a sometimes habit to quote what he says about the negative 
existentials. So I habituate myself also: 
 
"If one says 'Moses did not exist', this may mean various things. It may 
mean: the Israelites did not have a single leader when they withdrew from 
Egypt-or: their leader was not called Moses-or: there cannot have been 
anyone who accomplished all that Bible relates of Moses-…But when I 
make a statement about Moses-am I always ready to substitute some one 
of these descriptions for 'Moses'? I shall perhaps say: by 'Moses' I 
understand the man who did what the Bible relates of Moses, or at any 
rate, a good deal of it. But how much? Have I decided how much must be 
proved false for me to give up my proposition as false? Has the name 
'Moses' got fixed and unequivocal use for me in all possible cases?" 
(Wittgenstein 1953: 36-7) 
 
 
Leonard Linsky draws from this quotation what seems to me to be its adequate 
referential moral (Linsky 1977: 86-7, 104-5). According to it proper names do not 
have a fixed senses for all cases of their uses (let alone for all possible cases). Still, 
they function well in our everyday communication in spite of the looseness, the lack of 
fixed overall senses. If I may add, Frege´s famous Aristotle note is, in effect, another 
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way to highlight this when the looseness stems from the intersubjective variance of 
senses. So it seems to me that the looseness has nothing to do with the nature of senses 
but, so to say, with the variability of their ranges for different thinkers and speakers. 
Frege’s view involves a natural generalization of the variability of the senses, for these 
ranges vary also intrasubjectively from an occasion to an occasion with respect to the 
same name. Empirically this can be understood that a person may forget some senses 
(or in modern terms: information) about the referent; or he may remember different 
senses at different occasions. (I am not indicating, let alone saying, that Frege would 
not have accepted this as a matter of course. He just did not mention the point – maybe 
because psychological acts were something of secondary interest to him at best.) 
There, then, Searle´s and Wittgenstein´s views meet each other and with Frege´s. 
When someone says that "Moses does not exist" that simply means that he says that 
Moses does not exist, but there is no preconceived, or prefixed, set of descriptions 
related to "Moses" such that they would not change in any way when someone else 
says that “Moses does not exist” (in a different occasion, and maybe with different 
concerns). 
 
When that is put in epistemic terms, as Linsky does (Linsky 1977: 105), it means that 
normally there are no facts, fixed in advance, which would lead us to state that NN 
does not exist. And sometimes it is left open whether NN exists or not, or did exist. (I 
think that such cases of undecidedness can be found in history.) The relevance of the 
emphasis on the epistemic matters is that it brings out in the open the parting of the 
ways of the sense (as well as the description theory) and the direct-causal theory of 
reference. The reason is that one main tenet of the latter theory that the reference of 
proper names does not depend on anything epistemic, or cognitive. Consequently even 
the looseness of the relation between the descriptions and proper names to which the 
former are related is an anathema to the direct-causal theorists. But to jump ahead a 
little, we will see that the direct-causal theory fails on the score of the empirical facts 
of the referential uses of language, even on its own terms (intentions to co-refer, 
abilities to refer explaining reference borrowings), and the crux of the failing is the 
disregard of the very epistemic and cognitive factors in the referential use of proper 
names. The lack of epistemic interest together with the empirical inadequacy leaves 
the theory with only (allegedly) intuitively supported arguments. But I will argue that 
even these are based on misunderstandings. 
  
But let us go back to Searle´s version. He claims that between a name and the 
description associated with it there is a logical connection: it is "necessary" that, for 
example, "Aristotle has the logical sum, inclusive disjunction, of properties commonly 
attributed to him: any individual not having at least some of these properties could not 
be Aristotle" (Searle 1958: 172). So it is not usually sufficient that one description 
singles out the referent, but a collection of them is sufficient to do that. Aristotle was 
the one and only one person who taught Alexander the Great, was Plato´s most famous 
pupil, was born in Stagira, wrote Nichomachean Ethics, Poetica, and so on. However 
it seems to me that the necessity Searle invokes here is of rather innocent sort. 
Especially it is not a representative of any essentialism with respect to the properties of 
individuals. That not any essentialist consequences are intended is quite evident from 
Searle’s characterization of the difference between proper names and the definite 
descriptions. Searle just leaves it open what descriptions could be involved in any 
particular use of a proper name. But even if Searle´s notion of necessity is so strong 
that it implies some kind of essentialism then let it be so. Any untoward consequences 
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that this might have do not affect the Fregean theory that is the focus of my interest 
here. 
 
Searle does not discuss the Fregean puzzles in his paper, but only gives the solution 
the cluster theory delivers to the negative existential statements "X does not exist". 
According to Searle the statement "Aristotle never existed" says, not that the proper 
name "Aristotle" has never referred to anyone, but that the statement asserts that a 
sufficient number of conventional presuppositions and descriptive statements 
associated to the proper name "Aristotle" are in fact false. However, we do not know 
precisely which of these are false because the precise conditions that constitute the 
criteria for the correct uses of "Aristotle" are not given by language (Searle 1958: 173). 
 
It seems to me that the positive existential statements can be explained in the same 
way. Remember that the alleged problem with them was that according to Russell´s 
account if a proper name "X" is a name, in the sense of being a logically proper name, 
it becomes tautologuous, or trivial, to say that "X exists". According to the Searlean 
explication, as I see it, the statement "Aristotle exists" asserts that a sufficient number 
of the presuppositions and descriptions that are associated to "Aristotle" are in fact 
true, but which ones is not yet decided once and for all and presumably could not be, 
either. Therefore the existential statement is not a tautology. 
 
To continue with my reconstruction of the deliverances of the cluster theory, the 
informationality of some identity statements is explained in a straightforward way 
also: some descriptions from the cluster are not either uniformly shared between 
different speakers, or one particular speaker does not relate them as characterizing the 
same referent. Thus it may come as a surprise to someone that Saloth Sar was Pol Pot 
because the descriptions he relates to "Saloth Sar", if he relates any, are different from 
those he relates to "Pol Pot", and the descriptions themselves do not say or imply that 
Saloth Sar was Pol Pot. And vice versa with "Pol Pot". Instead his presuppositions are 
most likely different, i.e. he takes the different sets of descriptions to characterize 
different referents. This same explanation takes care of the propositional attitude 
contexts, for a person may believe that Pol Pot was a cynical dictator but not believe 
that Saloth Sar was a cynical dictator, despite the fact that the names refer to the same 
person. 
 
Before continuing any further it must be pointed out, to remove possible 
misunderstanding, that the textbook account of the cluster theory is too restricted in 
part (Devitt & Sterelny 1987: 43). Michael Devitt and Kim Sterelny allow that some 
descriptions may have greater weight than others, but they do not consider the fact that 
the weights of the distinct descriptions do change in different contexts. Thus when the 
topic is logic, "the systematizer of syllogistic logic" presumably weighs more than "the 
son of the court physician Amyntas II", with respect to “Aristotle”. But when the topic 
is, say, history it may be that the second description weighs more. As far as I can see, 
this sort of contextual looseness is one factor contributing to the looseness between 
proper names and the definite descriptions that Searle emphasized. In light of this it is 
not an acceptable move to argue against the cluster theory by claiming that it is 
"committed to selecting some descriptions that define the name and rejecting others 
that express merely accidental properties of its bearer." (Devitt & Sterelny 1987: 44) 
Moreover, as Searle said and as certainly seems to be the case, we do not give 
definitions of proper names in ordinary practice of speaking (Searle 1958: 166). 
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To conclude this section I want to point out that the cluster version can be made even 
more loose than that only best fit or such notions are allowed. For it seems that even 
false descriptions can be used to refer to a certain individual, i.e. to the individual they 
are false about. For example the description "the first man who sailed around the 
globe" commonly refers to Fernao de Magalhaes. That this is false does not matter for 
the reference: Fernao de Magalhaes died at the island of Mactan in Cebu 27.4.1521, 
and the rest of his crew sailed with the last ship and arrived eventually at San Lucas in 
Spain 6.4.1522. Because of the many other facts known about the adventure and 
because the chief captains used to be in such esteemed positions in those days the 
reference of the description "the first who sailed around the globe" is taken to be 
sufficiently uniquely referential to F de M. (Otherwise we would state that the first to 
sail around the globe was Juan Sebastian de Cano, the captain of the remaining ship, 
but we, usually, do not.) So it seems that the cluster can allow even some false 
descriptions used referentially within it as long as there are other descriptions known 
and true of the referent. (That Columbus found America is perhaps the most common 
instance of the reference by false description.) I think that in general this proposal 
might deserve a further study, but I eschew from that study here. 
 
???? ?????????????? ???????? ???????? ?????? ???? ???????????? ????????? ???
??????????
 
There are similarities and dissimilarities between Frege´s and Russell´s theories, as 
well as with the main extension of the latter, the cluster theory. In this section I will 
discuss some of them, albeit quite shortly. My motivation for the discussion is that it 
will turn out to be of utmost importance later in this work to have a clear picture of the 
crucial relationships between the sense and the description theories. This is especially 
so because it has become almost invariably accepted that the two theories are 
essentially the same in their content and so of their explanatory status. But this claim is 
incorrect, as I will argue. 
 
We can begin with an underlying similarity between the Fregean sense and the 
description theories. Both Frege and Russell were motivated by a background 
conception, or interest, in constructing their respective theories. Frege´s theory is 
largely based on his interest in thoughts coupled to his lifelong urge to construct the 
formal logic by which all true thoughts, in effect the whole of science, would be 
expressed. Tyler Burge has argued, and convincingly to my mind, that Frege´s primary 
interest in developing his semantic theory was epistemological; Michael Dummett has 
also argued for this view in his works on Frege. Contrary to what is usually assumed, 
then, Frege was not a philosopher of language, except so to say derivatively. Natural 
language was of secondary importance to him but investigating thoughts and their role 
in finding out truth was his primary goal. This explains why Burge can focus on 
Frege´s epistemological perspective: only the true thoughts matter, not their particular 
expressions in linguistic terms (when we are not in the domain of logic and idealized 
languages). 
 
Russell also had a deeper interest behind his theory of the definite descriptions. That 
interest was also epistemological: Russell differentiated between knowledge by 
acquaintance and knowledge by description, in that the former type of knowledge is 
the basic one and the latter secondary or just distinct type of knowledge. This doctrine 
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led him to claim that the linguistic expressions relating to the first type of knowledge 
are the only really referring expressions ("this", "that", "I", and such). Other 
expressions by which we talk about entities have at most denoting power, including 
the ordinary proper names and the definite descriptions (as the abbreviations of the 
former). This view amounts to an extensive reconsideration of the workings of natural 
language in the service of knowledge-seeking activities. Similar reconsideration was 
involved in Frege´s perspective. As pointed out, Frege held that thoughts are grasped 
with the garment of the expressions of natural language, but that the latter tend to be 
rather defective; they can be ambiguous, for one thing. The primary interest should 
therefore be focused on the logically "healthy" expressions in the service of finding 
out the true thoughts. In this respect the empiricism behind Russell´s theory of the 
definite descriptions and Frege´s (platonistic) realism with respect to the senses and 
thoughts led, in effect, to the same result, that of emphasizing the role of logically 
perspicuous investigations. (Which fact obviously explains in large part why both are 
considered as the founding fathers of analytic philosophy.) 
 
What about the dissimilarities, or even contraries between the two perspectives? The 
most important of them lies within the very epistemological and ontological views and 
their implications. The most striking one is that Frege considered the ordinary proper 
names, definite descriptions and sentences all to be proper names (Eigennamen), thus 
all of them being referring expressions with Bedeutungen. For Russell the logically 
proper names were the only referring expressions, from which it follows that not any 
of the three of Frege´s subcategories of proper names are referential for Russell. In a 
sense the situation is neat because the Russellian referring expressions are mainly 
indexicals and demonstrative expressions. In contrast Frege did not say much about 
these types of expressions (though there is the often-discussed piece about the I-sense 
in (Frege 1997b)). The common opinion among the philosophers of language is that 
Frege´s theory fails with respect to the demonstrative and indexical expressions. But 
the arguments that are offered to support this conclusion all presuppose that the senses 
and thoughts must be given by linguistic expressions, that all them are linguistically 
articulatable without a remainder. And that is not true, not even by Frege´s own lights 
(see the paper just mentioned about I-sense). Here I will not go into the issue, but as 
will become clear later when I develop my own Fregean neurocognitive theory of 
reference, the semantic equivalence between the senses and the definite descriptions 
expressing them could not be achieved, but neither need it be achieved: the senses 
enable proper names to be used to refer without that requiring completely linguistically 
expressible conceptual contents. Anyway, the main difference between the logically 
proper names and Frege´s conception of proper names derives mainly from Russell´s 
adherence to the Millian account that the sole meaning of a referring expression is its 
referent. 
 
The first similarity between Frege´s and Searle´s views is that both allow there to be 
more than one definite description attached to a certain proper name by a speaker. 
Frege also allowed that senses differ intersubjectively with respect to one referring 
expression (as is evident in the earlier mentioned Aristotle note). Judged from Searle´s 
explicit statements it seems not to be clear whether or not he thought likewise. But 
with what I argued above about the differing weights the descriptions assume in 
different contexts one can argue further that also Searle allows the intersubjective 
variance of the descriptions (expressive of the senses of proper names). The obvious 
reason for this is that in some context some description related to a proper name may 
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possess zero weight, and some other description, or more, may acquire a weight 
greater than zero (even if it possessed zero weight in some other context). 
 
In relation to Russell´s view the situation is not as clear. It is sometimes held that he 
maintained "one description per name" view, but at other times the tenor of the 
discussion seems to be that Russell allowed many descriptions to be associated to a 
name, and even intrasubjective variance of them. I take it that the second interpretation 
is correct. My reason is simply that it undeniably fits the textual facts. As seems to be 
the common view I also assume, with respect to all three theorists considered, that the 
number of the senses and the descriptions associated to a particular proper name can 
be left open; nothing crucial hinges on that matter. This follows from what is already 
said: if the topic or the context affects the senses and the descriptions, it is empirically 
unlikely that any fixed exact number of them would be a reasonable option to hold. 
 
The second similarity between Frege´s and Searle´s views is epistemological. 
Although it is true that nothing very explicit is said about the epistemological features 
of the cluster theory, we can give voice to a cognitive-cum-epistemic perspective 
operative behind the scenes. In Searle’s theory the descriptions associated with proper 
names are the guiding factors in the referential uses of those names. And to the extent 
that proper names have a role in our (mostly non-scientific) dealings with reality, in 
finding out what reality is like, they are of utmost importance to us. Therefore the 
senses and the descriptions are the primary cognitive and epistemic factors. Searle 
does not say this in so many words, but the cognitive perspective is evident in his 
discussion. For how otherwise than by observing the epistemic relevance could we 
understand his statements that if the properties related to a (purported) referent did not 
apply to it, the referent could not be taken to exist. Furthermore the obvious truth is 
that just as Frege´s theory is cognitive because that is what the postulation of the 
senses amounts to in effect, so is Searle´s theory because the descriptions assume the 
role they do. In general it can be maintained that both the Fregean theory and the 
description theory are cognitive-cum-epistemic theories of reference because they 
explain the referring power of proper names by other factors than by (the use of) the 
mere name. 
 
It is arguable, however, that what interest the above comparisons may have it is by 
itself too general and therefore hides from the view the basic semantic and epistemic 
differences between Frege and Russell. Strictly speaking Russell was suspicious of the 
very coherence of the senses (Russell 1905). It is widely acknowledged that this seems 
to be due to a misunderstanding of the nature of Frege´s senses on Russell´s part, but 
the claim still stands: Russell did not countenance senses at all, not for semantic 
neither for epistemic purposes. However the difference between Frege and Russell can 
be alleviated easily, and that is what has been done (as the discussion above also 
shows): the function of the definite descriptions in respect of the ordinary proper 
names is the same as the Fregean senses expressed by the descriptions. They both try 
to explain the referential role of proper names. But what about Frege and Searle? I 
think it is evident in that case too that there is no problem; affinities are clear, Searle 
just focuses on the descriptions. Searle is explicit in stating his aims, viz. to "show in 
what sense a proper name has a sense" (Searle 1958: 167). It seems to me that if 
anything it is just this statement that has led to the widely accepted opinion, bolstered 
most notably by Kripke, that the Fregean sense theory and the Searlean description-
cluster theory are in effect equivalent theories, or at any rate that there are not any such 
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differences between them that would force us to keep them apart as substantially 
distinct theories of reference. But that is not correct as many studies by the neo-
Fregeans have shown. And to say it once more, Frege was interested in thoughts; in 
Searle´s paper we do not detect such interest, but only the elaboration of the 
descriptions as expressive of the senses of proper names. (Or the descriptions identical 
to the senses - for there seems to be an ambiguity in Searle´s paper over this 
possibility.) However it is Frege´s, and by implication Fregean, general cognitive 
framework that I adopt in this study and not the description theoretic, i.e. the language-
restricted view. In short, I take proper names as condensations of the thoughts that 
give rise to the uses of proper names. Another way to conceive of the referential 
linguistic expressions in relation to the thoughts and senses is to take them as compact 
reports of the multitude of the neurocognitive elements and processes that make up the 
thoughts and senses. Of course it does not follow that the descriptions would be 
irrelevant to the study of reference. Because the descriptions are condensed reports of 
what is going on inside our skulls within the wet informationally driven biological 
engines, arguments that take descriptions as their point of departure do hit at least in 
part also the thoughts and senses. That is, the arguments given by the direct-causal 
theorists against the description theory, which they take to be equivalent to the senses 
theory of reference, must be taken at their face value. The reason for us not being able 
to completely evade those arguments is that we could not yet estimate in any generally 
viable manner the amounts of information that the descriptions express of the thoughts 
and senses. That is left for a mature neurocognitive theory to do, towards which I hope 
I will be able to take some important steps in this work. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1. Burge´s paper still seems to have gone unheeded to a large extent among the direct and 
causal referentialists. This is especially embarrassing because one of Burge´s aims in that 
paper is to show that Kripkean arguments from proper names being rigid designators have 
no force against Frege. (Though they may hit Russell´s view that proper names are 
disguised definite descriptions, because that view is overly linguistic.) 
 
2. Nathan Salmon argues that Frege´s puzzle about the identity statements is not just a 
puzzle about identity (Salmon 1986: 12). Other linguistic constructions give rise to the 
same problems, for example definite descriptions. Thus, claims Salmon, the sentence 
"Shakespeare wrote Timon of Athens" is informative, whereas the sentence "The author of 
Timon of Athens wrote Timon of Athens" is not. This observation is correct, but the 
argument betrays a misunderstanding of Frege´s theory. Frege held that in the class of 
proper names, Eigennamen, belong proper names as we understand them currently as well 
as the definite descriptions. So there is a difference without a distinction in Salmon´s 
argument. 
 
3. Of course the senses and thoughts can become the objects of one´s focus, thus amenable 
to the use of the two extensional principles in their full force. This happens when we talk 
about what a person believes, as for example when we compare the beliefs of two persons 
and claim that A´s belief that p is the same that B´s belief that p. (Frege apparently held 
that the "realm of reference" and the "realm of senses" are disjoint ontologically. But I 
concur with David Bell when he argues that they could not be, i.e. that the senses and 
thoughts can become objects, hence referents (Bell 1979: 109-10).) 
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4. It is not relevant for my purposes whether the epistemological view preceded that of the 
logically proper names or it was the other way around, or that they both might have 
worked in parallel in Russell´s thinking leading to the theory of definite descriptions. If 
the doctrine of the logically proper names is based on the epistemological view, then one 
can argue forcefully that it is a bankrupt view. The reason is that since the days of British 
empiricism and the phenomenalism co-occurrent with it we have advanced. Shortly, there 
are no primitive self-identifying items in our experience; our experiences and their objects 
are cognitively mediated. So it is implausible that there are any items we are directly 
aware of (sense data or whatever). This may be one main reason why the direct-causal 
theorists have substituted the ordinary proper names for the logically proper names in 
their arguments. 
 
5. About the technical details of primary and secondary occurrences of descriptions, and the 
problems with them, and Russell´s analysis in general, especially in relation to 
propositional attitude contexts, see (Linsky 1967: 56-76). 
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3. THE DIRECT-CAUSAL THEORY OF REFERENCE 
 
???????????
 
The counterattacks to the Fregean sense theory and the description theory emerged 
during the late 1960s and in the early 1970s. The general theory these arguments 
brought with them is called, somewhat carelessly, by a variety of names, like "direct 
theory of reference", "causal theory of reference" and "new theory of reference". 
Without any carelessness, however, it is better to see these different labels as 
pinpointing the different tenets the general framework embodies. The theory is new, at 
least in relation to the sense and the description theories. "Direct" comes from the core 
claim of the framework according to which proper names do not refer with the help of 
any mediating Fregean senses expressed by the definite descriptions. Quite the 
contrary it is held that proper names refer directly to their targets. The attribute 
"causal" characterizes the mediating link between proper names and their referents. 
Consequently the notion of directness should not be understood in any very strict 
literal sense; it is only meant to deny that the involvement of any cognitive factors, like 
the Fregean senses, would suffice or even be needed for the determination of the 
referents of proper names. (The absence of any mediating factor would be a surd and 
inexplicable metaphysical quirk, amounting to a magical theory of reference (Putnam 
1986a: 5, 46).) In a more general way the direct component of the theory states what 
the semantic values of proper names are, namely their referents; and the causal 
component provides the way, at the level of individual speakers and the linguistic 
community, how the particular referents become the semantic values of their names. 
 
But why I seem to add to the possible confusion with the labels? Why call the theory 
"direct-causal theory"? The reason is simple. "Direct-causal" captures the thrust of the 
theory comprehensively, as just described. There is also a substantial reason for my 
choice of that label. In the actual practice the arguments and points in favour of the 
theory and against the Fregean sense theory, and the description theory, have become 
rather meshed. That is only to be expected because there has to be some reference-
mediating link between referents and their names, even if the Fregean senses are not 
accepted, i.e. even if the non-cognitive directness of the reference of proper names is 
insisted on. Consequently I do not think that my label creates any confusion. 
 
The causal links (connections, chains, networks) are constituted by the situations of 
referential communication in which proper names are used. The links underlying a 
particular proper name start in what Saul Kripke has called "baptism", and David 
Kaplan "dubbing". These events are just name-giving acts like "This is Oscar" or "Let 
us call that limping brown rat of ours 'Edgar'". As these examples show descriptions 
can be used in the naming "ceremonies". That is not denied by the direct-causal theory. 
But the proponents of the direct-causal theory argue that the descriptions used serve at 
most to fix the referent. That is, the descriptions may not even be true of the referent, 
or they may cease to be true of it without the result that the name in question ceasing 
to refer to the initially named individual. 
 
I will concentrate on the causal component later, so let me start with the direct 
component first and review the most important arguments against the sense theory and 
for the direct theory of reference. 
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According to the direct component of the direct-causal theory proper names do not 
refer by the mediation of the Fregean senses, or by any such cognitive factors that 
uniquely pick out the referent in all cases. Proper names are mere "tags" and 
nonconnotative appellations. This view has a strong predecessor in John Stuart Mill: 
"…proper names are not connotative: they denote the individuals who are called by 
them; but they do not indicate or imply any attributes as belonging to those 
individuals." (Mill 1961: 20) The contemporary version of that theory was originated 
mainly by Ruth Barcan Marcus (1961), and after that Saul Kripke added some new 
notions and argumentative depth (Kripke 1972, 1977). (There has been a somewhat 
heated debate over the issue of primacy, see (Smith 1995a,b) and (Soames 1995).) 
According to Marcus: "But to give a thing a proper name is different from giving a 
unique description…an identifying tag is a proper name of a thing…This tag, a proper 
name, has no meaning. It is not strongly equatable with any of the singular 
descriptions of the thing.” (Marcus 1961: 309-10) The expression "strongly equatable" 
I take to express the demand for synonymies and/or analyticities between proper 
names and the definite descriptions. So proper names, as tags, have no meanings in 
that strong sense. This leaves it open whether Marcus intends to say that proper names 
have no meanings that would be relevant to their function as referring signs, or that 
proper names have no meanings at all. I think that we may safely adopt the first option. 
At least Nathan Salmon points out that the direct theory of reference does not deny 
that there could be senses related to names. According to his formulation the direct 
theory only denies that there are no "full-blown Fregean senses" which could serve at 
the same time all of three referential and cognitive functions of the senses (to be taken 
up later) (Salmon 1982: 11-14). 
 
When we look at the issue from the perspective of the liberal cluster version of the 
description theory we get a more coherent picture of the direct component because 
both Marcus and Kripke (as well as the followers) admit that descriptions have a role 
in singling out, in fixing, the referent of the name in question. Marcus is quite 
categorical over the point, in fact, for she emphatically maintains that entities are 
singled out only with the help of descriptions, though names differ semantically from 
descriptions (Marcus 1961: 309). After an entity is singled out and the referent of an 
expression is determined, the descriptions may not have any referential role to play 
any more in the later referential uses of the name. Kripke is somewhat ambiguous, for 
he seems to hold this view also, but then sometimes he says that descriptions are not 
used in fixing the referent (Kripke 1977: 93-4). Be that as it may, the direct component 
claims that proper names have no such meanings, or cognitive senses, which would be 
relevant to their referential functions - not that there are no meanings or senses related 
to proper names at all. 
 
The direct component of the theory was constructed mainly through counterexamples 
to the cluster version of the description theory, which Kripke took to be a Fregean 
theory also. The most precise characterization of the direct component is to be found 
in Nathan Salmon´s book Reference and Essence (Salmon 1982). As mentioned the 
direct theorists take singular terms, especially proper names, to be nonconnotative 
appellations. This feature of proper names is intended to make evident the comparison 
to the definite descriptions when these are taken to be expressing the Fregean senses 
that provide the identifying factors of the referents of particular proper names. In 
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particular the direct theorists take senses to be concepts, so that the referent of a proper 
name is the object that uniquely fits the concept  that characterizes it (Salmon 1982: 9-
10). Moreover Salmon clearly assumes that the orthodox Fregean theory is committed 
to assimilate singular terms to the model of the cluster theory. As we recall, in this 
theory the sense of an expression supplies a set of descriptions that the referent best 
fits and therefore uniquely satisfies (Salmon 1982: 10). 
 
??????????????????????????
 
At this juncture we need to discuss the partition of the Fregean sense to subcategories, 
or rather subfunctions. As was pointed out in the first chapter Frege could have 
characterized the senses in a more detailed manner. Fortunately Michael Dummett 
took up the task and argued for different ingredients of Frege´s notion of sense 
(Dummett 1973); see also (Dummett 1981: ch.6). But also somewhat ironically the 
matter advanced in the 1970s in the wake of the direct-causal theory by some of the 
theory’s proponents and writers sympathetic to it. It seems that Tyler Burge was first 
to introduce the tripartition of Fregean sense on the other side of the theoretical fence 
(Burge 1977).1 Salmon also uses Burge´s tripartition of the Fregean sense operative in 
Burge´s concise presentation of the counterarguments to the Fregean sense theory of 
reference (Burge 1977: 356). The purpose of these arguments is to show that there is 
no full-blown Fregean sense which could simultaneously fulfill all the tasks imposed 
to the Fregean subsenses. It should be noted that the arguments allow that there are, or 
could be, even all the three subsenses related to proper names without that amounting 
to the full-blown unified notion of the Fregean sense (Salmon 1979: 443). As Burge 
and Salmon conceive of the issue the first subsense, sense1 is a purely conceptual 
presentation of the object. It is what a fully competent speaker associates in a 
particular way to the proper name (in general, to a referring expression). Sense1 is a 
psychological or a conceptual notion. (It should be noted that both Burge and Salmon 
allow images and such occurrents to be included in sense1, contrary to the categorical 
denial of their semantic and cognitive relevance of them by Frege.) Sense2 is the 
mechanism which secures the referent of a proper name and semantically determines 
it: "for singular terms, senses serve as 'routes' to singling out the unique object, if any, 
denoted by the term." (Burge 1977: 356) So sense2 is a semantical notion. And sense3 
is the information value of a proper name, the contribution it makes to the information 
content of the sentences in which it occurs. Sense3 is a cognitive and an epistemic 
notion (Salmon 1982: 12). This third subsense explains the puzzles arising in the 
propositional attitude contexts: being cognitive and epistemic notion sense3 relates to 
what a speaker believes or knows. Taking into account the differences in beliefs and 
knowledge is what any adequate explanation of the puzzles manifested by the 
propositional attitude contexts requires (that is, the failures of the substitutivity of 
identicals and existential generalization). A concise formulation of the Fregean sense 
theory, which unifies the three subsenses, is that proper names have senses that are 
"simultaneously the conceptual content, the semantical method of determining 
reference, and the cognitive content, all at once." (Salmon 1982: 23) 
 
Frege held that the sense is a uniform notion in its functioning as a cognitive entity in 
providing the Erkenntniswert for the referential expressions (as well as thoughts made 
up of sense elements). Consequently he did not make any very reflective 
differentiations within that notion. But it seems to me that the subsenses can be 
defended by comparing them with some statements by which Frege characterized the 
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notion of sense. Sense1 most likely corresponds to the sense as the mode of 
presentation of the referent. In fact that is Burge’s view (Burge 1977: 356). Sense2 is a 
more problematical for it would seem that the way of presentation of the referent is 
also what secures the referent, especially when it is demanded that the presentation is 
uniquely identifying. As an argument for the differentiation between sense1 and sense2 
Burge notes that often a complete account of the mode of presentation may be 
insufficient to determine a unique object. The reason is that the individuation may also 
depend on nonconceptual but contextual relations to the object (Burge 1977: 357-8). 
As a general observation this point is well taken, and it is also widely assumed as we 
will later see. But the assumption on which it rests and which is also widely accepted 
is quite problematical. The assumption is that for Frege the senses were thoroughly 
conceptual in being, indeed, non-contextual. I will argue in sections 4.3.3 to 4.3.5 that 
this is not so at all. Sense3 corresponds to Frege´s notion of indirect Bedeutung 
(customary sense) in propositional and oratio obliqua contexts. Burge´s argument 
against the identification of sense3 with sense1 is that the descriptions that express the 
senses of proper names for different persons may differ from one another to the extent 
that there is no shared sense to function as the object of their respective beliefs (with 
respect to the proper name in question) (Burge 1977: 359). However this interpretation 
of the shared indirect referent, i.e. the customary sense, may not be required of the 
senses. Frege allowed intersubjective variation of the senses related to proper names as 
is evident in the famous Aristotle note; as long as the referent is the same it does not 
matter if the respective senses of the speakers are not the same. 
 
In this connection it is in order to note again that the characterization of sense1 as 
psychological or conceptual is not wholly correct, if it is intended to remain faithful to 
Frege´s notion of sense. As is well-known Frege denied senses any psychological 
aspects and relevance. Grasping the senses and thoughts is a psychological act, but in 
this act we do not as it were create or construct the senses, we only get in cognitive 
relation to them. Moreover it also seems to me that it is not an altogether happy move 
to take sense1 to be a conceptual notion, if one intends this to conform to Frege´s 
notion of concept (Begriff). The reason is that in his logic and semantics Frege made a 
distinction between objects and concepts (functions in general). The senses can be 
taken to be objects also, as I mentioned earlier. For example they are capable of 
assuming the role of indirect Bedeutungen as customary senses. But here we may give 
the opponents the benefit of doubt and allow that the senses are only conceptual. Still 
we can argue, in conformity to my proposal, that this conceptual interpretation of 
sense1 can be justified on the Fregean grounds. Take for instance the sentences "the 
pupil of Plato and the teacher of Alexander the Great". Now "the pupil of Plato" and 
"the teacher of Alexander the Great", which express concepts (the pupil of Plato and 
the teacher of the Alexander the Great) and even the functional expressions "pupil of 
_" and "teacher of _" can be taken as concept expressions in the sense that their 
Bedeutungen are not objects. They are in need of arguments to "saturate" them, i.e. to 
make them expressions of whole truth-evaluable thoughts. I think that this is in line 
with Frege´s logical semantics, so the conceptual interpretation can be sustained, at 
least for the sake of the direct-causal theorists´ arguments. However the senses of 
proper names need not be purely conceptual in the sense of being purely qualitative. 
This is easily seen for they contain parts having other individuals as their referents 
("the pupil of Plato" and "the teacher of Alexander the Great"). But the argument for 
this will be postponed till chapter 4. 
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Salmon adopts the Burgean taxonomy of the subsenses, as i) the mode of presentation 
of the referent, ii) the determiner of the referent as the mechanism by which the 
referent of a proper name is secured and iii) the information value (or the object of 
thought) of an expression. With this taxonomy the core claim of the direct component 
receives an accurate formulation. As a consequence the direct-causal theory does not 
deny that the senses are associated with singular terms. What it denies is that there is 
such a thing, the Fregean sense proper, which fulfills all the three functions of the 
subsenses (simultaneously). In particular the direct component can allow that proper 
names have associated with them any of the three subsenses (or even "the ordered 
triple consisting of all three" (Salmon 1982: 14, 23)). It is evident in many writings of 
the direct-causal theorists that they take the Fregean theory to be a theory that 
assimilates proper names to the definite descriptions and makes the former 
descriptional through and through, the function of which is to express the properties 
the referent satisfies. For example still recently Scott Soames has maintained that, 
according to the sense theory, speakers associate different descriptive contents to 
proper names they use. Soames elaborates on that phenomenon (Soames 2002: 72-86), 
but not surprisingly, as the direct-causal theorists as Millians are wont to do, he denies 
that the association of the descriptive contents has anything to do with the semantic 
contents of proper names. Those contents are solely the referents of those names (or 
the singular propositions expressed). When this view is combined with the denial of 
the existence of the full blown Fregean senses, the direct component is given a positive 
edge: certain singular terms are entirely non-descriptional. The way they refer is by an 
assignment of a value (like one does with free variables) and by not satisfying any 
conceptual condition given by the descriptions (Salmon 1982: 16, 22). 
 
Indeed, Salmon claims that proper names are "thoroughly descriptional" according to 
the “orthodox Fregean” account. This means that they do not include any constituents 
that indicate a further individual. Thus only thoroughly descriptional terms express 
purely conceptual senses, and the properties involved are supposed to be purely 
qualitative and/or general in that they do not involve a direct reference to any other 
individual (Salmon 1982: 17-20). For example the sentences "the wife of Socrates" 
and "the mother of Jesus" are not thoroughly descriptional because they both include a 
name of an individual. (Though these examples are not very convincing at all, for 
presumably the senses they express can be given by the descriptions "a wife of the 
most famous ancient philosopher who drank hemlock as a punishment for 
philosophically corrupting people" and respectively "the mother of the savior of the 
humankind".) As Salmon says explicitly "…the orthodox theory of reference claims 
that names refer to someone or something entirely by way of associated general 
properties leaving no room in its account for either the linguistic or the extralinguistic 
context." (Salmon 1982: 32) and that Frege "seems to have held a particularly strong 
version of this theory…it seems that he held that all proper names are thoroughly 
descriptional." (Salmon 1982: 21) (see also (Salmon 1979: 444-5)). Here we should 
note that in this latter quotation Salmon seems to hesitate in his categorical attribution 
of the view to Frege, but a few pages later he has made the transition and made his 
mind up firmly, for he generalizes and claims without any hesitation that "Fregean 
theories involve the strong thesis that singular terms are not only descriptional, but 
thoroughly so." (Salmon 1982: 23) Consequently it is this interpretation of Frege´s 
theory of the sense and reference that we will assume to be the target of the arguments 
given by the direct-causal theorists. For if the weaker interpretation is accepted it is 
left open that proper names might not be “thoroughly descriptional” after all. (Which 
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is precisely what the neo-Fregeans have argued time and again, and which will be 
newly argued in sections 4.3.4 and 4.3.5.) But before we deal with all these arguments 
we must discuss one crucial notion that the direct-causal theory has brought with it. 
 
??????????????????
 
Kripke introduced the notion of rigid designator (Kripke 1972) (see also (Stanley 
1997: 555-6)). A proper name is a rigid designator if it refers to the same individual in 
every possible world where that individual exists. It is to be understood that the actual 
world is what I call the "primary referential source": the proper name in question refers 
to the same individual in every possible world to which the name refers in the actual 
world. Hence "Josif Stalin" refers to Stalin, the dictator of the Soviet Union, in all the 
possible worlds where he exists, even if his name in some, or all of them, is different 
in those worlds – and even if he were someone totally different individual by his 
deeds, like an Ukrainian peasant near Kiev.2 Kripke´s favourite type of argument for 
the rigidity of proper names goes along the following lines. Take a description (or a set 
of descriptions). Assume that it refers to someone or something in the actual world via 
the proper name to which it is associated. Now take another possible world or a 
counterfactual situation, distinct from the actual, and inquire to whom or to what the 
description refers there. As an example let us use the sentence "the dictator of the 
Soviet Union could have been shot during 1930s". The referent of the description 
could be different from the one it is in the actual world, but that the proper name, 
"Josif Stalin", associated with the description still refers to the same (actual) 
individual, Stalin. (Or that the actual Stalin exists there but has some other name.) 
Hence "the dictator of the Soviet Union" may refer to Trotsky in some possible world, 
or even to Ordzhonikidze in some other one. But "Stalin", or whatever his name is in 
the possible world, would still pick up the actual Stalin in that world (if he exists in it). 
Notice, by the same token, that in this example it is to be understood that "Trotski" and 
"Ordzhonikidze" also refer to actual Trotski and Ordzhonikidze. So in a way it might 
seem that Kripke´s setting of his argument already presupposes the notion of rigid 
designator he argues for. But that does not follow, for all that is required is that the 
description does not necessarily refer to (actual) Stalin in those other possible worlds - 
as it does not seem to, intuitively. 
 
The above example is a modal one in that it has to do explicitly with alethic modalities 
concerning actual world individuals. But modal, or intensional, contexts in general are 
not required for the argument from rigidity. Non-modal sentences, or what Kripke 
calls "simple sentences", will do as well. To give an instance of them take the 
sentences "Frege had moustache" and "the most renowned logician of the 19th century 
had moustache". The first sentence is true with respect to a world w, if and only if, 
Frege (himself) had moustache in that world. The second sentence is true in a world if 
the person who is the most renowned logician of the 19th century in that world had 
moustache; and that person need not be Frege himself (although he might have been 
called “Frege”). This short example reveals that the point of rigidity, as Kripke has 
emphasized, has to do with the truth-conditions of the sentences with singular terms, 
not, as is sometimes thought, with the distinctions among the scopes the rigid 
designators and the descriptions assume in the modal contexts. 
 
As said the important semantical feature of the rigid designators is that, where and 
when a rigid designator does refer at all, it refers to the actual individual, the 
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individual we use it to refer to. Kripke states that it is to put the cart before the horse if 
one assumes that we must antecedently make sense of the criteria of transworld 
identity of individuals, rather than being able to talk about them, to refer to them, quite 
unproblematically as the very individuals they are actually (Kripke 1972: 270). It is 
because we refer by proper names that are rigid designators that any transworld 
identity criteria are spurious: the referents remain the same actual individuals. The 
actuality of the individual and the focus on the truth-conditions is made clear also in 
another place where Kripke says that "…we begin with the objects, which we have, 
and can identify, in the actual world. We can then ask whether certain things might 
have been true of the objects." (Kripke 1972: 273) 
 
One central consequence of the direct referentiality and the rigidity of the singular 
terms is that identity statements, both trivial and informative, are necessary if true. 
When "a" and "b" refer to the very same entity, and are both rigid designators, they 
refer to that very same entity in all the possible worlds where that entity exists. Hence 
"a is b" is necessary if true. But that a is b is not known a priori (see the 
epistemological argument below). So "a is b" is a posteriori truth also. To my mind 
Quentin Smith has argued convincingly that Marcus already had the epistemological 
argument and in effect the notion of necessary a posteriori identities (Smith 1995b: 
232-4). Smith also explains the relevant metalevel-object level distinction involved. 
When "a" and "b" have the same referent and are directly referential rigid designators, 
then "a is b" is a posteriori identity. That is a metalevel fact, for the referents of "a" 
and "b" could have different names than they do have (i.e. “a” and “b” here). The 
necessity of the statement is an object level fact: that a is b (or that a is a, or b is b, for 
that matter) is not an empirical fact because an entity’s being identical to itself is a 
priori fact and true in every world. 
 
One more point about rigidity. It has sometimes been thought that definite descriptions 
could not be rigid. But it is commonly noted that some definite descriptions are rigid 
designators. For example the description "the only even prime number" is such. The 
reason is of course that 2 is the only even prime number, i.e. the description is true in 
all (mathematically accessible) possible worlds. In Kripke’s terminology this is de 
facto rigidity in that the referent happens (as a mathematical necessity in this case) to 
be the self-same in all possible worlds. But proper names are rigid de jure: the 
semantical rules related to proper names and manifested in their referential uses 
account for the fact that any proper name refers to the same individual in all possible 
worlds irrespective of any descriptional content related to it. Or so the direct 
component of the direct-causal theory also states. 
 
What is the relationship between rigid designation and direct reference, or direct 
referentiality? If directly referential term is a term which refers without the mediation 
of the Fregean senses, or an associated cluster of descriptions (expressing the 
properties of the referent), and it contributes to the singular propositions only the 
object it is the name of, there is not a sufficient distinction between directness and 
rigidity. Francois Recanati argues that rigid designation is not the same notion as 
(type) referentiality (Recanati 1988). The main reason is that it is not necessary for a 
referential term that its referent exists. Recanati goes on to draw a distinction between 
rigidity and direct referentiality with the help of the notion of singular truth-conditions. 
A directly referential term is one that indicates that the truth-condition of the utterance 
S(t), in which the very term occurs, is singular. Truth-condition is singular if and only 
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if there is an object x such that the utterance is true if and only if x satisfies S( ), i.e. 
what is attributed to x (Recanati 1988: 113-4). As Recanati says a referential term is 
such that it indicates its own rigidity. He postulates that the means by which this 
condition is achieved is a general feature "REF", a part of the linguistic meaning of 
directly referential terms (Recanati 1988: 114-5). But note that the feature "REF" is 
not intended to be any kind of conceptual component of the sense of any proper name, 
even if it functions as a part of the linguistic meaning of a term (the linguistic mode of 
presentation of the referent in Recanati´s framework). The semantical force of "REF" 
is that it indicates that the term is directly referential (and rigid), and this has the 
consequence that the important property of directly referential terms, especially proper 
names, so to say their referential nonconceptuality, is preserved here. 
 
Recanati´s explication of direct referentiality is “in principle” type argumentation; he 
says in fact that he is defining the notion of referentiality. This follows from the fact 
that although some definite descriptions are rigid de facto, in general the definite 
descriptions are usually not taken as being referential devices in their (Donnellanian) 
attributive use. But it seems to me that for my argumentative purposes I can keep the 
looser characterization of direct reference as reference that is not mediated by any full 
blown Fregean senses, with the result that proper names as rigid designators are 
directly referential expressions, unlike (most non actualized) definite descriptions 
which can be taken to express (at least parts of) the Fregean senses. (On this see 
section 4.5.) 
 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????
 
???? ??????????????????????????????????????????????
 
Kripke used three main arguments against the Fregean sense-cum-description theory, 
as he understood it at the time. These versions are aptly summarized by Salmon, both 
in the book mentioned above and in his review article (Salmon 1989). The three 
arguments are i) modal, ii) epistemological and iii) semantical. Let us take a short look 
at them in turn. It should be noted that the focus of them all is on Fregean assimilation 
of sense1 and sense2; sense3 is left out of consideration for the time being. 
Argumentatively this is straightforward, for if sense1 and sense2 can not be assimilated 
to each other, there are no full blown unified Fregean senses, consequently no need to 
be concerned with sense3 (however see (Salmon 1979: 449-50)). 
 
The modal argument is based on the presupposition that proper names and the definite 
descriptions are synonymous with one another and the descriptions are definitionally 
true of the bearers of proper names. Thus according to Salmon statements like 
 
"Shakespeare, if he exists, wrote 'Hamlet', 'Macbeth', and 'Romeo and 
Juliet', then he is Shakespeare." 
and 
"If anyone is an English playwright who is the sole author of 'Hamlet', 
'Macbeth', and 'Romeo and Juliet', then he is Shakespeare." (Salmon 1989: 
446) 
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express logical truths and are analytic sentences and so true in every possible world 
when the descriptions are substituted for proper names. (Obviously the descriptions are 
to be understood as expressions of the corresponding senses, as mentioned above. As 
Salmon says the "wrote" part is taken to consist of any and all descriptions purported 
to be about Shakespeare.) But it is easy to imagine a possible world in which 
Shakespeare, the actual man, did something else than write the plays. So the 
statements are not true in every possible world, hence the description theory is refuted 
because the synonymity between the proper name "Shakespeare" and the descriptions 
fails: synonymy does not effect a change in the truth-values. 
 
The epistemological argument is a close kin to the modal one. Assuming still with the 
direct-causal theorists that the statements above should be analytic, they should also be 
knowable a priori, based only on the concepts involved (or expressed). But again with 
only a little help from imagination and circumstances will emerge in where 
Shakespeare did not write the plays. Since this possibility is not ruled out by the 
contents of the concepts involved, it follows that the respective statements are known 
only a posteriori. 
 
The demand of the modal argument that there must be synonymies between the 
descriptions and proper names can be readily understood when it is realized that the 
direct-causal theorists have taken the Fregean sense theory to be a theory of the 
meanings of proper names. (It seems that this is inferred from the label "sense" in the 
sense theory. But more of this in section 4.1.) But where does the demand of a priori 
knowledge come from? The only answer I have been able to fathom from the direct-
causal literature is that once the equivalence of Russell´s theory of the definite 
descriptions and Frege´s theory of sense and reference has become assumed, it has 
been easy to import the knowledge demand from Russell´s side. In his theory there 
could not arise any doubts as to whether or not two expressions are co-referential if 
they are logically proper names. Now if one loosens the search for the logically proper 
names and turn to the ordinary proper names, as the direct-causal theorists have done, 
the epistemological argument follows naturally. (Jason Stanley has also lately stated 
that according to the description theory of reference we possess a priori uniquely 
identifying knowledge about the referents of proper names (Stanley 1997: 565). But he 
gives no argument for this statement, and it is hard to see what argument would force 
upon the description theory such demand. What comes to Frege, he denied any such 
demand (see section 4.1).) 
 
The semantical argument is different in type from the first two. It derives from Keith 
Donnellan´s paper "Proper names and Identifying Descriptions" (Donnellan 1972). 
Take the description "the Greek philosopher who held that all is water" and equate it 
with the name "Thales". Suppose, however, that the man from whom the use of 
"Thales" originated never held such a view, but that there was other fellow philosopher 
who put forth such wet metaphysics. Now it is natural to ask to whom does "Thales" 
refer, and according to Salmon this is a clear semantic question with a clear semantic 
answer: the name would refer to the first individual, but not to the water 
metaphysician. The semantic question is supposed to probe the notion of reference 
simpliciter (Salmon 1989: 449). (Of course this argument presupposes that our 
semantical and referential "intuitions" are uniformly valid, otherwise the talk of 
reference simpliciter does not make much sense anyway.) 
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The first two arguments are the same in type as we saw Kripke´s general 
argumentation for the rigidity to be. They are designed to show that the (Fregean) 
description theory fails if it is supposed that proper names are synonymous (mean the 
same, have the same senses) as the associated descriptions. This view of the 
relationship between proper names and the definite descriptions is evident in Kripke´s 
essay Naming and Necessity. He states there quite a few times that the description 
theory is best understood as the theory of meaning of proper names. This involves that 
proper names are analyzed by the descriptions to give synonymies (and thereby 
definitions) of the former (Kripke 1972: 277, 281). (I use the 1972 version of Kripke 
together with the 1980 version rather indiscriminately. The reason is that there are no 
substantial differences between them, except for the Preface in the 1980 version.) 
 
As was pointed out above, Kripke invokes the notion of fixing the referent, or 
determining the referent - as did Marcus earlier (Kripke 1972: 258-9). He admits that 
the description theory can be understood in that sense also. A referent can be fixed by 
a description, or descriptions. But it must be allowed that the description(s) used is 
(are) not true of the referent, or that it (they) might become false of it later.3 One may 
fix the original referent of "Thales" by giving a description that says that he put forth a 
watery metaphysics, but as the semantic argument purports to show, this description 
might not enable us to refer to the original individual named Thales because it is false 
about him and we may not know anything nontrivial about him. But, according to the 
claim behind the semantic argument, the name does refer to the original Thales in spite 
of that. 
 
Salmon takes the semantical argument to be the strongest one both against the 
description theory and for the primary thesis of the direct component (Salmon 1982: 
29). He also claims that the semantic argument reveals that contextual factors are 
involved in the constitution of sense2, i.e. the way the referent is determined. I take it 
that that is because of some reference conducing features in the naming situation, and 
not the description, that the original Thales remains the referent. Moreover that 
happens in such a way that it becomes clear that sense2 is not a purely conceptual 
entity. He finds the moral of the semantic argument to be that it shows that the 
surrounding settings of the speakers are crucial in determining the referents of proper 
names. In particular this contextual involvement "is true not only of the extralinguistic 
setting, in which the referent is to be found, but also of the linguistic setting in which 
the term is used or was learned by the speaker, i.e. the history of the use of the name 
leading up to the speaker´s acquisition of it." (Salmon 1982: 31) 
 
Salmon´s diagnosis of the modal argument is that its force comes from an underlying 
intuition according to which a proper name continues to refer to the same person or 
object in counterfactual situations, even if he or she or it has not a single one of the 
properties by which we actually identify him or her or it (Salmon 1982: 26, 32). (I take 
it that this does not concern about the essential properties of an individual, if such 
there were, and if such are used in the descriptions.) This intuition, or at least 
something very similar to it, lies also behind the epistemological argument. But what 
about the semantical argument: what kind of evidence can it claim to possess as 
support? Remember that it is taken by Salmon to be the most persuasive of the three 
arguments, so presumably it is reasonable also to assume that the evidential base it has 
should be stronger than those of the first two, something stronger than a mere modal 
intuition.4 But, again, let us postpone the treatment of these arguments and their 
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evidential bases to the next chapter. There are two further arguments that Salmon gives 
in another occasion against the Fregean theory, and by implication against the 
(Fregean-cum-)description theory. 
 
?????????????????????????????????????????
 
In addition to the three previous arguments there are two other types of argument that 
are quite frequently given against the Fregean theory. In his book Frege´s Puzzle 
Salmon formulates them concisely ((Salmon 1986: 66-8; but see also (Salmon 1989: 
448-9)). The first is a variant of the Putnamian Twin Earth argument and purports to 
show that the purely conceptual content is not the information value of a proper name. 
However there is one crucial presupposition behind the Twin Earth scenario. It is that 
one´s internal psychological or cognitive state determines the senses one is grasping 
(to put it in Fregean terms) or the concepts one is entertaining (to put it in modern 
terms). From this it follows that when the psychological or cognitive states are the 
same, the grasped or entertained concepts are the same. Now suppose that Hubert´s 
wife has a physically identical Doppelgänger in Twin Earth. Hubert himself weighs 
165 pounds whereas his Doppelgänger weighs 165.000000001 pounds. The wives of 
both Huberts assert that "Hubert weighs exactly 165 pounds". As the wives are exact 
replicas of each other, their respective psychological or cognitive states are also the 
same (by hypothesis). Therefore the conceptual contents of the states are the same. But 
the information encoded by the two respective statements is different. The statement of 
the Earth wife about Hubert is true, but the statement of the Twin Earth wife about 
Twin Hubert is false. It follows that the information values of the two names "Hubert" 
differ from each other. Therefore the conceptual content of a proper name is not 
(uniformly) the same as its information value. This argument is often put in terms that 
the Twin Earth examples confirm the case against the Fregean view that sense 
determines reference (although the case is usually given with respect to the natural 
kind terms). The reason is evident: the contents interpreted as the senses of the two 
wives are the same but the referents are not. 
 
Salmon’s second argument I call, for the want of a better label, "the content variance 
argument". It is directed against the proposal that conceptual content is one ingredient 
of the information value of a statement, the other ingredient being the referent. The 
argument receives its rationale from the subjective aspects of the conceptual contents 
of proper names. Conceptual contents vary from person to person because different 
persons have different conceptions of the bearer of the proper name in question. You 
may think of Aristotle primarily as the teacher of Alexander the Great, and I may think 
of him primarily as the most famous pupil of Plato. Moreover the way the conception 
is acquired differs from a person to another: some may be well acquainted with the 
referent of the name, some others may have only heard of some of his features, others 
still may have seen him but forgotten about that, and so forth. In general from these 
kinds of facts it follows that the information value of a proper name, or a sentence 
containing that proper name, will vary from person to person because, if conceptual 
content is a part of it, the content varies from person to person. But this "clashes 
sharply with the original, natural idea of a sentence-for example 'Socrates is wise'-
encoding a single piece of information (the information that Socrates is wise). The 
sentence…encodes the same information for you as for me…it does not encode a piece 
of information for someone." (Salmon 1986: 68). The reason is, according to Salmon, 
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that the relation of encoding information between sentences and information itself is as 
objective as the semantic attributes of truth and falsehood. 
 
Salmon points out two caveats to the content variance argument. The first requires that 
the encoding relation must be relativized to a particular type of use of the sentence. In 
other words the proper name the sentence includes is understood to refer to an 
individuated person or object. "Aristotle wrote Metaphysics" encodes the true 
information about Aristotle, the Greek philosopher, and false information with respect 
to the Greek shipping magnate Aristotle Onassis, or the 15th century master builder 
Rodolfo "Aristotle" di Fioravanti. As Salmon correctly points out it is necessary to 
relativize the encoding relation to the types of use to achieve nonambiguous references 
for proper names to begin with. However this relativization is not the same as the 
relativization to a particular conceptual content because on Salmon’s view the 
conceptual associations are not relevant to the semantic attribution and it is the latter 
what the relativization of use is all about. After the relativization to the types of uses of 
a proper name the encoded information is the same for everyone and with a single 
truth-value. Salmon´s second caveat is that, once the relativization has been made, 
there are still left the different conceptual contents that the different speakers possess. 
But here Salmon invokes the distinction between information that is semantically 
encoded and information that is (only) pragmatically imparted. Typically a sentence, 
or an utterance, imparts more information than it semantically encodes. "Aristotle 
wrote Metaphysics" encodes the information, roughly, that Aristotle, a Greek 
philosopher, wrote the book that is called "Metaphysics". But it imparts pieces of 
information that depend, in a case of a particular speaker, on the conceptual 
associations of the pieces of knowledge he possesses, for example that the author of 
Metaphysics was a prolific writer and lecturer, and did not like Plato´s theory of 
Forms. 
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 
Kripke has also given arguments with a strong empirical bent in addition to the modal 
and epistemological ones against the Fregean description theory. Those arguments 
were devised to show that proper names and the definite descriptions do not have 
exclusively equivalent modal profiles therefore they could not have the same senses, 
or meanings. That leaves open the option of the Fregean description theory being a 
theory of reference. Kripke’s empirical (-cum-intuitive) argument from the causal and 
communicative links (beginning from the fixings of the referent) is designed to show 
that the “Fregean description theory” fails even in that case. So while the definite 
descriptions do not provide synonymies or other such strong semantic equivalences for 
proper names, it is allowed by the direct-causal theorists that the referents could be 
fixed with the help of the descriptions (expressing senses) and that these are associated 
with proper names, it is denied that they could secure the referents in the long run; 
only the causal links are able to do that. 
 
Kripke is explicit in saying that the arguments are directed against the Searlean cluster 
version of the theory – but there is certain, so to say, explicit undecidedness in 
Kripke’s overall view, especially in the 1980 book edition, as we will see. So it is in 
order to give here the Kripke´s characterization of the cluster version  because that is 
his official explication of the theory he attacks (Kripke 1972: 280-2, 285; 1980: 71). 
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(1) To every name or designating expression X, there corresponds a 
cluster of properties, namely the family of those properties Φ such that 
A believes 'ΦX'. 
(2) One of the properties, or some conjointly, are believed by A to pick out 
some individual uniquely. 
(3) If most, or a weighted most, of the Φs are satisfied by one unique 
object y, then y is the referent of 'X'. 
(4) If the vote yields no unique object, 'X' does not refer. 
(5) The statement, 'If X exists, then X has most of the Φ's' is known a 
priori by the speaker. 
(6) The statement, 'If X exists, then X has most of the Φ's' expresses a 
necessary truth (in the idiolect of the speaker). 
(C) For any successful theory, the account must not be circular. The 
properties which are used in the vote must not themselves involve the 
notion of reference in such a way that it is ultimately impossible to 
eliminate. 
 
The points (1) and (2) make it evident that Kripke takes the cluster version being a 
theory for an individual speaker reference. (3) states the core claim of the cluster 
version according to which the descriptions single out a unique referent, i.e. the 
individual that the descriptions apply to or are believed to be true of. (4) just adds the 
corollary that the descriptions must single out only one referent. (5) and (6) spell out 
the (alleged) epistemic and metaphysical relations between proper names and the 
definite descriptions, namely aprioricity and necessity (on which the modal and 
epistemological arguments focus on). And finally the condition (C) can be taken to 
express an obvious and minimal, demand that any proper theory of reference must 
satisfy. 
 
It must be noted already here that the inclusion of (5) and (6) to the cluster version is a 
very debatable move. Without any specific arguments the cluster version, let alone the 
Fregean, should not be burdened with the strong claim that a speaker knows that there 
is (or even should be on the theory´s count) any a priori or necessary connections 
between proper names and the definite descriptions related to the former. I think that 
this demand simply betrays a misconception on Kripke’s part of the intents of the 
Fregean description theory of reference - even if we ignore the fact that the notions of 
aprioricity and necessity, as well as their close relatives, synonymy and analyticity, are 
very problematical notions indeed. At least I do not know any place where the cluster 
theorists, and description theorists in general, have voiced any such strong demands to 
be fulfilled by their theory. Consequently I will drop the desiderata (5) and (6) from 
now on.5 
 
Kripke´s first argument takes an issue with the desideratum (2). According to (2) a 
speaker must have some beliefs as to what properties the referent possesses such that 
individuate it as the unique referent of the proper name in question. Kripke´s argument 
purports to show that these kinds of beliefs are not required for the speaker to be able 
to refer to the individual with that proper name. Take for instance the name 
"Feynman", as used by a person who does not know anything else about Richard 
Feynman than that he was a famous physicist. Still the speaker "uses the name 
'Feynman' as a name for Feynman." (Kripke 1972: 292). (Of course this assertion has 
to be understood as saying that the speaker uses the name "Feynman" to refer to 
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Feynman, and not only that “Feynman” belongs to the linguistic category of proper 
names.) There is also the danger of circularity lurking behind the innocent looking 
desideratum (2). One may be able to refer to Cicero only by the description "Cicero 
denounced Catilina". But this description involves another name that has to be 
accounted for. Because this piece of information is all that the speaker may possess, it 
is easy to propose that the reference to Catilina goes via the description "a man 
denounced by Cicero", the result being referential vicious circle. Another version of 
this difficulty given by Kripke concerns the name "Einstein". One may describe the 
referent of that name as the discoverer of the theory of relativity, but be completely 
incompetent to tell anything about the theory to back up his reference by the 
description, except that it is Einstein´s theory. 
 
These arguments purport to show that knowledge or beliefs – that is, Fregean thoughts 
and the definite descriptions expressing them - about the bearer of a proper name are 
not necessary for the reference of that name. Kripke offers also examples by which he 
aims to show that knowledge or beliefs are not even sufficient for a successful 
reference with a proper name. The argument these examples are designed to support is 
directed against the desideratum (3). In short, let us assume that some person named 
"Schmidt" proved the incompleteness of arithmetics, but that due to some mishap 
Gödel (that is, Kurt Gödel, the renowned logician with paranoia) got hold of that proof 
and has since been taken as the man who proved the incompleteness of arithmetics. 
Now Kripke states that it is clear to him that despite the malicious circumstances the 
name "Gödel" is not used to refer to Schmidt; it is used to refer to Gödel (Kurt Gödel) 
himself (Kripke 1972: 294). Also Einstein comes back to back up Kripke with respect 
to the insufficiency argument. For someone who believes that Einstein (the Albert 
Einstein) invented the atom bomb is, according to the description theory, not referring 
to anyone in particular, for no one invented the bomb single-handedly - or at least is 
not referring to Einstein (for he did not invent the bomb, he merely derived the 
formula which later played a part in the revolution of the elementary particle physics, 
with the well known ramifications; and he signed the famous letter to Roosevelt 
recommending that A-bomb should be produced). But to claim that that use of 
"Einstein" does not refer to Einstein is according to Kripke "… simply…false." 
(Kripke 1972: 295) 
 
So these are the main types of arguments that the direct-causal theorists have given to 
show that the sense and the description theories are false to the core, and that proper 
names are directly referential expressions. As said above, the directness has to be 
understood in a loose sense: references of proper names are mediated, but not with 
such cognitive factors like the Fregean senses expressed by the definite descriptions 
that would function as the referent determiners once and for all. Reference of proper 
names is mediated instead by causal-cum-communicative relations. It is to this 
component of the direct-causal theory that we now turn. 
 
???????????????????????????????????????????????
 
??????????????????????????????
 
Kripke sketches his “picture” of causal reference basing it on his arguments purporting 
to show that descriptions (expressing speaker´s beliefs about the properties of the 
bearer of a proper name) are neither necessary nor sufficient for successful reference 
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with the related proper name (Kripke 1972: 298-300). I shall first sketch Kripke´s 
sketch. Then I will review the improvements Michael Devitt has proposed in 
investigating the communicative and causal factors that are central to the causal 
component. I hope that this gives us sufficiently comprehensive account of both the 
developmental course and the substance of the direct-causal theory in order for me to 
be able to engage the critical stage of this work. 
 
Kripke´s picture of the causal chains of reference begins with naming situations 
("baptisms") where for instance a baby is given a proper name by the parents or 
caretakers. (Baptisms should be taken in a loose sense: a name is a name of any kind 
of an individual; it can be given even unintentionally as long as it sticks; also 
nicknames are included.) Those who have given the name are the primary users, at 
least before they have told anyone else what the name of the baby is. To whom they 
tell the name along with other things, like "Paul babbles a lot", catch on with the name 
and can then use it to talk about the little Paul to other people. So the causal chain is 
started and it is weaved on from one occasion to another when the name "Paul" is used 
(with descriptively given information in most situations). That is why the ignorant 
speaker will eventually be able to use the name "Paul" as the name of Paul Joseph 
Goebbels, even if he knows only that Goebbels was a German propagandist. In the 
same manner the innocent speaker can refer to Richard Feynman the physicist, 
because he is in the receiving end of the causal chains from the baptism of that Richard 
Feynman. The speaker does not have to remember from whom or where or when he 
got the name: the causal chains take care of the reference to a unique individual. It is 
easy to see that this is only a general characterization of the causal reference relation, 
indeed more of a picture than a theory. What Kripke specifically means by his talk of 
picture is that he is not offering any philosophical theory of reference that should be 
given by stating necessary and sufficient conditions for reference (excepting the 
minimal condition (C)), conditions which would be immune to all counterexamples. 
This is evident when he points out that his picture would need to be given further 
conditions to be satisfied because "of course not every sort of causal chain reaching 
from me to a certain man will do for me to make a reference" (Kripke 1972: 300). 
 
The causal referential chains in question are mainly constituted by communicative 
situations in which the name is used. They start in "baptisms", and descriptions can be 
used ("let us call this limping brown rat of ours 'Edgar'"). After the baptisms everyone 
who uses the given name has inherited it via the causal links from the baptism event to 
the current uses. Moreover it is claimed that the current user intends to continue to use 
the name the same way, to refer to the same entity that the previous user did (from 
whom he caught the name). It is common among the direct-causal theorists (and the 
Millians in general (Soames 2002)) that these intentions suffice to retain the original 
referent. For otherwise the causal links may get meshed and changed without us even 
noticing it: the hearer may think that the name the speaker uses would be a perfect 
name for his pet aardvark instead and consequently continue to use it so breeding 
referential confusion. Kripke also realizes that because of the need for the co-
referential intentions his picture of reference will not do as a theory (according to his 
stringent conception of a philosophical theory), for were he to offer it as such, it would 
violate his own condition (C). (Unless, of course, the notion of intention to co-refer 
could be eliminated, or explained by other notions not invoking further referential 
notions.) 
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Michael Devitt has made a quite thorough work in providing many of the missing 
pieces of the causal theory (Devitt 1981). Let us take a look at his version of the theory 
and see how it improves on Kripke´s rather plain picture. As we saw the first version 
of the direct-causal theory of reference were inspired by modal considerations (related 
to the notion of rigid designator). This is understandable because Marcus and Kripke 
had been doing some seminal work in modal logic earlier. But much more empirical 
and naturalistic versions of the theory has been put forth since and Devitt´s theory is 
the most thoroughly developed of them. Devitt is also explicit with respect to his 
background assumptions. He takes language to be a natural phenomenon without 
giving to it any privileged place in the scheme of things. Consequently reference has to 
be explained on naturalistic grounds using the best tools that the related scientific 
disciplines provide. (In this respect I share Devitt’s stance wholeheartedly.) However 
Devitt does not endorse the modal and epistemological arguments because he is 
suspicious of the explanatory value of (the notion of) possible worlds (Devitt 1981: 
212-3; Devitt & Sterelny 1987: 31-2). This leads him naturally to emphasize empirical 
arguments against the description theory and in favour of the direct-causal theory.6 
(But also Devitt takes the description theory to be Fregean.) 
 
Devitt gives three arguments against the description theory (Devitt 1981: 14-23). They 
are only slightly different from the ones that Kripke have given, but for 
comprehensiness’ sake I will present them here. According to Devitt there are cases in 
which the sense theoretic reference fails because i) we do not or can not associate an 
appropriate description, expressive of the sense, with a name, ii) where the description 
identifies a wrong object, and iii) the description identifies no object, although the 
name is not an empty one (i.e. it does refer). As to argument of type i) Devitt states 
that it is no use to offer descriptions if they contain information (or names) which 
needs to be referentially specified in their turn. As an example Devitt also gives the 
description "Einstein = the discoverer of the theory of relativity" of which he claims 
that one does not make a referential use with it if one could not tell independently of 
the very description what the theory of relativity is. What about the cases in which a 
description (or descriptions) pick(s) out a wrong object? Devitt claims that people 
usually have many false beliefs about various objects and persons. But whether this 
really is so seems to me very doubtable: it seems to me that usually people are not that 
ignorant. (Do people really usually have many false beliefs?) And how false the beliefs 
have to be to bring about a referential failure? But let us let these problems pass for the 
sake of the argument. Then it is an empirical fact that people at least sometimes do 
identify the wrong object by their beliefs (expressed by descriptions) but the names 
they use seem to refer to a definite object To illustrate the third type of argument, 
when a proper name is not an empty one but no description is true of its referent, 
Devitt discusses the case of Jonah from the Bible. Think about the biblical descriptions 
of Jonah. Most likely all the non-trivial of them are wrong, or we may suppose so 
(being eaten by a whale and surviving?!). Still there may have existed a man named 
"Jonah", but all we have at our disposal are the false descriptions about him. The 
traditional description theory predicts that in this case no one has referred to that 
Jonah, at least not before the hoax was discovered and it was (supposedly) also 
discovered that there was a man about whom the biblical stories are told. But that 
result is absurd, claims Devitt. For surely the name "Jonah", as it has been used 
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through centuries, has always referred to that Jonah about, and around, who the legend 
was weaved. 
 
The causal component in Devitt´s theory is very much the same as Kripke´s, but Devitt 
spends a little more time in the details. He discusses reference borrowing, multiple 
groundings of names and various indirect forms of naming besides other issues. He 
even applies his theory to modal and propositional attitude contexts (Devitt 1981: 207-
74). In short, Devitt has done more than anyone else in bringing the potential of the 
direct-causal theory to the fore. 
 
Devitt calls baptisms and other naming situations "causal groundings". The primary 
form of the grounding of a proper name is perceptual contact (Devitt 1981: 133-6). For 
example Devitt´s wife gave their cat the name "Nana". Subsequent groundings for 
other speakers took place when the Devitts told those people that their cat´s name is 
"Nana", or, in the presence of Nana, they said that "this is Nana" (and presumably also 
pointed to the cat). By these different ways of grounding people get "grounding 
thoughts" about the object. The grounding thoughts are then the basis on which are 
built all other thoughts that involve the referent of the singular term in question. 
Identity beliefs help in passing on the grounding thoughts to non-demonstrative, and 
non-perceptual, situations. Thus if one thinks "that cat is Nana", this identity belief is 
likely to lead later to other beliefs and thoughts involving Nana. The person in 
question can also assert further statements to other people that then gain the benefit of 
the grounding thoughts in the absence of Nana. 
 
Devitt explicitly adds to the direct-causal theory a component that purports to explain 
the continuous retention of a referential chain from an object to the subsequent uses of 
its name. This component is reference borrowing (Devitt 1981: 137-8). (I do not mean 
to imply that Kripke´s picture does not have the notion of reference borrowing; of 
course it does, because without it the whole picture would be not a causal at all. I am 
only saying that Kripke did not dwell on the details of reference borrowing, so that 
Devitt´s contribution is important.) Reference borrowing, via a proper name, from an 
earlier speaker is possible because the name belongs to the designational chain that 
originated in the grounding event. The notion of designational chain marks the causal 
links between a singular term and its referent such that the term is grounded 
perceptually in the referent. In reference borrowing the hearer acquires both i) the 
ability to refer to the object or a person that is in the starting point of the designational 
chain, and ii) thoughts about that object or a person. (The ability because on Devitt’s 
view there is a distinct ability with every proper name the speaker possesses.) The 
designational chain, and networks of them, plays the primary explanatory role in 
Devitt´s theory. Reference borrowing is, consequently, intended to supply the specific 
mechanism that is lacking in Kripke´s rather cavalier talk of a name being connected 
to the original referent. 
 
Devitt also concurs with Kripke and argues that the description theory is unable to 
invoke reference borrowing. - alleged appearances notwithstanding (see Strawson´s 
discussion in Individuals (Strawson 1959)). Devitt´s reason is that there is no 
guarantee that this would not lead to a circle in where speaker A has borrowed a 
description from speaker B, who have borrowed it from speaker C who have borrowed 
it from speaker A in his turn. Related to this point the plausibility of the direct-causal 
theory also increases when multiple groundings are taken into account (Devitt 1981: 
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56-7, 136). That is, typically a proper name gets linked to its referent perceptually and 
demonstratively, but also by someone acquiring new information about it in other 
occasions after the naming event by the help of different speakers. In these 
communicative events the possibilities of the designational references increase. 
 
Another fruitful addition that Devitt makes is the notion of partial designation, 
although as Devitt mentions it was originally proposed by Hartry Field (Field 1973). 
There is no doubt that sometimes it is not clear whether a name refers to an entity X or 
to an entity Y. For example there was a time when "Madagascar" was used to refer 
both to the African mainland and to the island in the east coast (which is the name´s 
current sole referent) (Evans 1977: 202). The evident explanation for this phase of 
mixed reference is that the causal chains were then ubiquitous and grounded in two 
different events (and most likely also later became multiply grounded). In this case it 
seems appropriate to say that "Madagascar" referred partially to the main land and 
partially to the island. It is easy to see that in this way the notion of partial designation 
can help in explaining reference change: the "first" part of the reference have later 
become “dropped “(forgotten, ignored) during the communicative encounters, thus 
leaving only the "second" part left as the sole referent of the name (Devitt 1981: 138-
51). 
 
In Kripke´s picture the retention of the causal referential-cum-communicative chain 
intact, thus preserving the referent, is explained by the intentions to co-refer. 
Equivalently in Devitt´s theory this is explained by the intentions to use the borrowed 
name by the hearer to refer to the individual the speaker refers to with the name. In 
light of the Madagascar example this general explanation is much too weak, however. 
The reference change may have taken place no matter how hard the speakers have 
intended to keep on co-referring. And as Devitt dos realize, the intentions "seem as 
much in need of explanation as designation itself" (Devitt 1981: 138). But he does not 
try to explain them in any way. (I will take up this issue later.) 
 
It should be realized that there seems to be no reason why the reference change 
through partial reference would not work for the (Fregean) description theory as well. 
If the causal account leads to occasional indeterminacies and relaxings of the demand 
of the uniqueness of the referent, the description theory must be allowed that 
possibility too, by parity of reasoning. This is all for the good: it happens that some 
descriptions are not specific enough to single out one particular referent, but few 
instead (but not too many, like in Kripke´s Feynman example with the description "a 
famous physicist"). There is the "pragmatic side" of it also. Sometimes it may be 
preferable to leave it open, or not to disclose the referent. This usually happens when 
discreteness is required but it is still left to the hearer to single out the most likely 
referent. 
 
To get a more adequate picture of how Devitt´s theory of causal reference works, let us 
take a short look at how he handles the puzzles of reference, first the problem of 
existential statements (Devitt 1981: 186).7 Devitt states that both of the existentials "X 
does exist" and "X does not exist" are meaningful, contrary to what Russell claimed. 
The first existential is meaningful because there is an object or a person on which the 
causal links are grounded, namely the object or a person on which the designational 
chains originate. The second existential is meaningful because there exists a causal 
network which is grounded on an "imaginative act" (for instance a story).8 Taken at 
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face value these proposals are obviously acceptable; and I do not see that neither the 
proponent of the Fregean nor the description theory would disagree at all with them, 
provided the groundings are explained by descriptional fixings at least partly 
expressive of the sense of the referent, including the perceptual information gathered 
in pointing to it. 
 
The puzzles of the trivial and informative identity statements receive the following 
explanation. Devitt recognizes that the direct-causal theory does need some kind of 
notion of sense as a mode of presentation of the referent. He proposes that that sense 
consists of the types of designational chains that originate from the referent of a proper 
name (Devitt 1981: 152-4, 236; Devitt 1989: 227-31). Accordingly the difference 
between the two types of identity statements is explained by the different designational 
chains underlying the two distinct singular terms in them respectively, both grounded 
in the same referent. In general the epistemic difference between the respective 
statements is explained by the speaker exercising two different designational abilities 
that are related to the two expressions "a" and "b" in the informational identity 
statement. 
 
Lastly, Devitt understands the problem of the propositional attitude contexts to be that 
of exportation, i.e. under what conditions singular terms appearing in the scope of an 
attitude verb can be said to refer to a definite entity. Another way to express this is that 
the exportation goes with the validity of the existential generalization: under what 
conditions can we infer from the fact that X believes that a is F to the statement that 
there exists a particular individual such that it is F. Why is it that in some conditions 
exportation is in order, as when someone believes that the author of Über Sinn und 
Bedeutung had moustache, but it is not in order when anyone believes, say, that Santa 
Claus has moustache? Devitt´s answer is that exportation goes through when the 
singular term in question, descriptions included, is non-empty and designational. That 
is, when the singular term has a definite referent and the causal chain that underlies it 
is grounded in that referent (Devitt 1981: ch.9; Devitt 1989: 229). But this is not 
sufficient, as Devitt himself acknowledges. A thinker or a speaker has to have the 
referent "in mind". This notion Devitt spells out along the by now familiar causal lines. 
There must exist a designational causal chain from the referent to the particular use of 
the singular term in question. Moreover, he tries to preserve Frege´s "functionality 
principle" which states, according to Devitt, that the meaning of a statement or a 
thought depends on the meaning of its components. In relation to the propositional 
attitudes this means that the sense of a belief is made up by the "customary senses" of 
its components. So according to Devitt if you believe that Cicero was an orator, the 
senses are the (subsets of the) designational chains underlying the use of "Cicero" and 
"orator", and are grounded in them, respectively. As Devitt says "Cicero" and "orator" 
specify the modes of their reference (Devitt 1989: 238). In short, Devitt take senses to 
be whole causal chains, or at least parts of them. 
 
Notes 
 
1. Dummett also charges Frege not keeping the different ingredients sufficiently distinct 
from one another (Dummett 1981: 128). The ingredients that Dummett distinguishes are 
in effect the same as Burge´s. But in addition Dummett introduced a fourth subnotion of 
sense. That is sense as significance, the public meaning of a term used in communication. 
(I must add that it seems to be an open question if there is such a meaning, i.e. how 
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intersubjectively uniform it is – and/or how uniform it is required to be to serve 
communicative purposes.) 
 
2. This is "persistent rigid designation" in Salmon´s terminology, whereas "obstinate rigid 
designation" means that a name refers to the same individual in every possible world, 
whether the individual exists there or not (Salmon 1982: 33-4). 
 
3. Another related distinction is that between meaning and reference fixing of proper names. 
According to it the meaning of a proper name can be spelled out at the level of linguistic 
meaning. It follows that the substance of the distinction becomes that of saying that the 
meaning of a proper name "NN" is that of "the bearer of 'NN'" (Recanati 1993: 155). This 
view is called “the metalinguistic view” by Francois Recanati and “the nominal 
description theory” by Kent Bach (Bach 1987). The theory of the reference of proper 
names is differentiated from this view simply because it would be circular to try to 
account for the reference of a proper name by the above metalinguistic formulation, or 
some of its equivalents like "who is called 'NN'" (Recanati 1993: 159-60). (See Kripke´s 
condition (C) in section 3.5.3.) But it seems to me that the metalinguistic view is only a 
general theory pertaining to characterize proper names as a class of linguistic expressions 
qua referential devices. The Fregean sense theory of reference of proper names is not 
thereby affected, because it maintains that the referent of any particular proper name is 
determined, in some way or another, by the sense of that name. The linguistic meaning 
has nothing to do with this. 
 
4. Pace those philosophers who take intuitions as sufficiently strong evidential base. I will 
not go here into the discussion of the status of intuitions as evidence for philosophical 
theories (but see note 29 in chapter 4). (Though there are many very problematic features 
of intuitions, beginning obviously from the questions are there intuitions, and if there are, 
are they sufficiently uniform at all for the purposes some philosophers insist using them?) 
 
5. Searle seems to assume necessity in some form when he states that it is necessary that an    
inclusive disjunction of properties characterizes the bearer of the proper name in question; 
if the bearer does not satisfy at least some of those properties, there is no individual 
(called by that name) (Searle 1958: 172). If the necessity here is meant in some strong 
sense (maybe even implying some kind of essentialism), then I should advice that it be 
dropped from Searle´s theory. 
 
6. This ban on modal considerations is problematical. It does not distinguish possible worlds 
discourse from the common counterfactual talk in our language (for instance "I could have 
done that"). Therefore the accusation of the metaphoricalness of possible worlds discourse 
(though no doubt being to the point in some issues) does not rule out the counterfactual 
discourse, which suffices for making Kripke´s points about rigid designators. But I let that 
slip pass here. 
 
7. Devitt discusses many problematic cases of designations of proper names (Devitt 1981: 
138-60). I do not go into them here for the reason that in all of them (sometimes 
explicitly, sometimes clearly between the lines) Devitt is forced to invoke the sense or the 
description theoretic factors in answering the problematic cases. Especially clear this is in 
the case of attributive terms. Another is the partial designation and possible reference 
change in the case of the Liebknechts (Devitt 1981: 140-1). It is of relevance just because 
the description theoretic factors can be seen to play a strong, even if somewhat tacit, part 
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in it. Ignorant Joe hears some of the politically acute among his friends talking about 
Liebknecht. Ignorant as he is, he has keine Ahnung that there are two relevant referents for 
that same name in reality as well as in those discussions, Wilhelm and Karl (father and 
son). When Joe then picks up the name "Liebknecht" and happens to use it, it refers 
partially to Wilhelm and partially to Karl. But this explanation shows that the causal 
chains themselves do not have the sole referential role. For consider this: if Joe were 
interrogated about Liebknecht, he would immediately run into troubles in being unable to 
give any correct answers, excluding trivial ones like "Liebknecht is a man".  I want to 
claim that this is as firm form of evidence as we can get about the referential substance 
that "Liebknecht" enjoys in Joe´s mouth, with the plainly negative verdict. In other words, 
it is the informational impact that contributes to the referential use of a proper name, not 
the causal links themselves. 
 
8. This account is very similar to Donnellan´s "block" explanation (Donnellan 1974). 
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4. CRITIQUE OF THE DIRECT-CAUSAL THEORY OF REFERENCE 
 
???? ??????????????????????????????????????
 
Without any further ado let us take up the main arguments marshaled by the direct-
causal theorists against the Fregean sense theory of reference (still with understanding 
that the talk of the descriptions and the description theory is also a form of the Fregean 
sense theory because it is held in effect by all parties that descriptions express the 
senses of proper names). Irrespective of the differences in the particular versions of the 
Fregean description theory the direct-causal theorists have assumed them to belong to 
the domain of what they have called “the traditional theories of meaning” that are 
thought to consist of analyticities between the predicates expressing the properties of 
the individuals (and the natural kinds) and proper names of those individuals (and the 
natural kind terms) (Putnam 1987a: 140). For example it is supposed to be analytic 
that, say, Aristotle was the most famous pupil of Plato. Kripke claimed in effect that 
“Frege-Russell view” is about the meanings in the sense of synonymies, and resulting 
in tautologies, when for example the meaning (i.e. what Kripke equated with Frege’s 
notion of sense) of “Aristotle” is expressed by “the man who taught Alexander the 
Great” (Kripke 1980: 30, 32, 58). Sometimes he also seems to presuppose that the 
Frege-Russell view requires only one particular description expressing the 
meaning/sense of a particular proper name, and saying that Searle’s cluster view is the 
locus classicus of the more adequate description theory (Kripke 1980: 31). And related 
to the semantic point of view, Kripke says explicitly that Searle’s view “…may seem, 
as an analysis of ordinary language quite a bit more plausible than that of Frege and 
Russell.” (Kripke 1980: 31; my emphasis) But why then, in the Preface in (Kripke 
1980), does he concentrate on Russell’s view as a single-description per name view? 
That is strained practice, even if not incoherent. I have no firm answer to that question; 
it might be that Kripke was only careless in his 1980 formulation for the reason that 
meanwhile, since 1972, it became a common view not to draw any distinctions 
between the various versions of the description theory and Frege’s original account; 
hence the general label “Frege-Russell theory”. 
 
However I suggest resolving this discrepancy by simply assuming that there just is no 
relevant difference between what Kripke calls “Frege-Russell theory” and the cluster 
version when it comes to the theory of the meaning as well as theory of the reference 
of proper names. At least Russell never held the view that there is only one description 
for a particular ordinary proper name; and Frege explicitly denied that view in his 
famous Aristotle note where he says that to a particular proper name relates various 
senses. Another important point is that even if Searle held his cluster theory 
responsible for involving analyticities and synonymies, but because neither Frege nor 
Russell did so, the latter views remain sound and viable even if Searle’s cluster version 
succumbs. 
 
Kripke introduces the distinction between giving the meaning of a proper name and 
fixing the referent of that name (though he mentions Paul Ziff’s account of proper 
names in this connection). He points out correctly that if a name could not be analyzed 
by a description, because they are not synonymous, but only “determined” by a 
description, proper names are in general only “materially equivalent” to the 
descriptions (Kripke 1980: 33). But Kripke leaves it open whether or not material 
equivalence amounts to the description theory being an empirical theory about the 
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functioning of proper names. In pages 53-4 Kripke states that the contrast is between 
the theory of meaning of names and “merely” the theory of the reference of proper 
names. This would seem to indicate that Kripke understands the theory of reference to 
be an empirical theory, or an account at least (“picture”), not a philosophical theory - 
which he denounces and proposes instead his causal picture of the reference of proper 
names. But, again, he does not say much such that would enable one to state firmly 
that a picture of reference is an empirical theory by his lights. However I propose to 
take it that way, for what Kripke says about his picture is what anyone explicit in his 
intention would say if he were to offer an empirical theory of reference. Consequently 
I also take it that the Fregean theory of sense and reference – because it is not a 
philosophical theory, i.e. it does not attempt to analyze proper names by the definite 
descriptions or give necessary and sufficient conditions for reference (except trivially 
that if there is an individuating and identifying sense, there is reference) – competes 
with the direct-causal theory in that both are offered as empirical accounts of the 
reference of proper names. 
 
As we will now see the modal and the epistemological arguments can be ruled out as 
attacks on the Fregean straw man. Although it has become almost unanimously 
accepted that according to the Fregean description theory proper names and the 
definite descriptions are synonymous with one another and that the identity statements 
in which they appear are analytic statements (and definitionally equivalent), such 
demands were not part of Frege’s theory. It is true that Frege wrote about defining 
non-primitive terms, especially mathematical ones, and the analyticities between them 
through definitions. But then his focus was on mathematical objects and on the 
concept of number. His logic and Begriffsschrift were to provide the base for 
mathematics and also to be the format for the ideal scientific language, in which no 
expressions occur which have no Bedeutungen (although they have senses). Frege 
himself pointed out not a few times that the expressions of natural language are ill 
suited for such treatment, for, among other things, natural language contains 
expressions which do not have Bedeutungen. And when it comes to the description 
theorists recall Searle’s correct observation that we do not define proper names in 
natural language (Searle 1958: 166). In addition we find from the neo-Fregean camp 
David Bell’s clear maintenance that the sense of a proper name is “the condition which 
something must meet if it is to be the referent of ‘a’, i.e. if it is to be a…It does not, 
however, follow from this theory…that the proper name in question is synonymous 
with any expression which applies to the appropriate condition.” (Bell 1984: 184-5) 
(see also (Dummett 1981: 341-2)). In light of these remarks the direct-causal theorists, 
in particular, could not complain about the lack of synonymies between proper names 
and the definite descriptions because their main focus is on expressions of natural 
language, not on ideal scientific constructions. (And it would be open to debate 
whether or not synonymy should be demanded of the relevant expressions in an ideal 
language of science either.) 
 
Moreover the demands for synonymities and analyticities are such strong semantic 
demands that clearly the burden of establishing them as reasonable requirements on 
the sense theory of reference is on the direct-causal theorists. But all that they have 
done is to have claimed and assumed that the Fregean description theory is committed 
to such strong semantical equivalences between proper names and the descriptions. 
For example Putnam did not give any textual evidence; he only says that Rudolf 
Carnap formalized these traditional theories, and that the theories Jerrold Katz and co-
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workers have produced share the defects of the traditional theories (Putnam 1987a: 
139). He also includes Plato and Frege in that tradition (Putnam 1987a: 150). But if 
there were many such “traditional theories” one would have thought that textual 
evidence would have been easy to amass. Concerning this lack of textual evidence 
Salmon writes that Linsky, who denies that Frege and Russell had any synonymy 
demands (see note 1) and criticizes Kripke for not giving any textual evidence for his 
contrary claim, fails himself to give any supporting textual evidence for his claim 
(Salmon 1979: 445, n.7). But I claim that strictly this charge from the lack of textual 
evidence is out of place here. I suggest that because Frege and Russell did not say that 
the ordinary proper names are synonymous to the definite descriptions that itself is 
evidence that they did not demand such synonymy relations. That they did not say 
anything like that is most likely explained by the fact that back in those days no such 
semantic approaches were practiced in the philosophy of language and thought; so 
Frege and Russell needed not to deny explicitly any such demands. (That would have 
been curious indeed.) 
 
Russell’s theory did not demand or imply any synonymy or analyticity demands either. 
He held that the ordinary proper names are abbreviated ("truncated", "telescoped") 
descriptions, but that does not imply - let alone entail - synonymies or analyticities 
between the descriptions and the ordinary proper names. As we saw Russell said that 
propositions like "Scott is the author of Waverley" are not tautological, hence 
presumably not analytical and not expressing synonymies. 
 
"If you understand English language, you would understand the meaning 
of the phrase 'The author of Waverley' if you had never heard it before, 
whereas you would not understand the meaning of 'Scott' if you have 
never heard the word before because to know the meaning of a name is to 
know who it is applied to." (Russell 1956: 244) 
 
If Russell held that the sentence is still somehow analytical and/or expresses a 
synonymy relation between "Scott" and "the author of Waverley", most likely he 
would have said so, and would have elaborated this in relation to his theory of the 
definite descriptions. But that seems not to have been the case.1 
 
It is true that in “On Denoting” Russell wrote that “…when there is anything with 
which we do not have immediate acquaintance, but only definition by denoting 
phrases…” (Russell 1956: 55). But it is clear that for Russell “definition” did not mean 
synonymous paraphrases, or any such constructions. Rather “definitions” is to be 
understood as a characterization given by the definite description(s) used, no matter 
how many or few of them are needed for a unique characterization of the object of the 
denotation to obtain. Uniqueness is the point, not semantical relations like synonymies 
or analyticities. Neither did Russell say anything about such strict semantical relations 
as holding between the ordinary proper names and denoting phrases in “On Denoting” 
or elsewhere. Moreover the general perspective in the place from where the above 
quotation is drawn is epistemic: the issue is knowledge by acquaintance – knowledge 
by description. So not even here it is required by Russell’s theory that the “definition” 
by the descriptive phrases is once and for all locked in with the proper name in 
question; only that what is known about the “terms”, i.e. the referents, with the help of 
the phrases could change (because as far as the epistemic issue goes, we could be in 
error with respect to the denoting phrases). 
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It is also true that Russell says, when talking about “non-entities” like round squares, 
Apollo and Hamlet, that “A proposition about Apollo means what we get by 
substituting what the classical dictionary tells us is meant by Apollo, say the ‘sun-
god’.” (Russell 1956: 54) But, again, “means” coupled with the casual “say the son-
god” makes it evident that meaning is not meant in the strict sense of synonymy. 
“Means” just means that the denoting phrases (from dictionaries and encyclopedias, 
and other such information sources, like plainly hearing someone telling something 
related) give us information about the denoted objects, descriptions with which we 
come to know what the objects are (as they are characterized by that information). In 
particular Russell does not say that the ordinary proper names are defined to be 
synonymous with the descriptions found in the dictionaries and such sources. (Though 
I have come across with such extreme interpretations – deliberate misreadings?) It is 
true that Russell speaks of defining propositions like “the author of Waverley was 
Scotch” by clauses amounting to “at least and most one person wrote Waverley, and 
that person was Scotch” (Russell 1993: 53). But again this is just that: defining 
propositions, not proper names with one description per name. A similar “definition” 
can be given by any property of the person in question. (If one likes one could take all 
true propositions of that person to constitute, then, the definition of the name, but that 
would amount to the Leibnizian perfect individual concept.) 
 
The view that Russell is not restricted in his theory to strict definitions receives further 
support – maybe even conclusive evidence – in a passage where he discusses the 
distinctions between the ordinary proper names and the descriptions which is 
motivated by his metaphysics and epistemology of logical atomism (Russell 1956: 
200-1). The logically proper names are words for particulars with which we are only 
acquainted, and the ordinary proper names are abbreviations for the descriptions 
because we use those names for objects we are not acquainted with. At least not 
always: “Socrates” could not be but an abbreviation for us since we could not be 
acquainted with him for the obvious reason. Our thoughts about Socrates can be 
rendered by any common phrase like “The Master of Plato” or “the philosopher who 
drank hemlock”. That Russell is neither giving nor demanding any strict definitions 
but only “renderings”, i.e. loose relatedness of the descriptions with the names, should 
make it plain that Russell’s theory of descriptions has nothing semantically essential to 
do with synonymies and such equivalent notions. 
 
Besides, when Kripke argues for the difference between proper names and the 
descriptions he compares statements like “Aristotle is Aristotle” to statements like “the 
most famous pupil of Plato is Aristotle” and says that the former is necessarily true but 
the latter is not. Apart from the general modal emphasis in Kripke’s way of arguing, 
how does this differ from what Russell argues for example that “the author of 
Waverley” is different from “Scott” because if it were not, “Scott is the author of 
Waverley” would express the same proposition as “Scott is Scott” – which it obviously 
does not (Russell 1956: 252-3). So it can be argued that Kripke’s view is not so anti-
descriptivist at all in this respect. (Except with respect to Searle’s theory, but even that 
is not quite clear because what Searle really means by “necessary conjunction of 
propositions” is unclear. Though Searle writes in another place in a way that seems to 
commit him to analyticities: “it is a necessary condition for an object’s being Aristotle 
that it satisfy at least some of these descriptions. This is another way of saying that the 
disjunction of these descriptions is analytically tied to the name ‘Aristotle’.” (Searle 
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1967: 490; emphasis in the original) If the difference between proper names and the 
descriptions is there even in Russell’s theory, one is left to ask what is the issue about 
the rigidity of proper names, as something that the description theory of reference (or 
the Fregean theory for that matter) could not contain in its theoretical tool kit. 
However I will postpone this issue for a while and discuss it more thoroughly in 
section 4.5 and in chapter 5. 
 
At this point I conclude that with respect to the Fregean sense theory of reference there 
are no grounds for the modal argument: whatever semantical relations there are 
between proper names and the descriptions associated to them, they are not relations of 
synonymy, neither of analyticity nor of logical truth. The epistemological argument 
could be expected to be without such grounds also because it is a close kin to the 
modal one. And indeed that is so, and for similar reasons. It is quite correct as Salmon 
states that the sentence "Shakespeare wrote Hamlet" is not knowable a priori by the 
concepts involved in it, for by themselves only they do not make it the case that only 
Shakespeare wrote the plays and did what he did (in all possible worlds actual world 
obviously included). But then this has been claimed by neither the sense nor the 
description theorists. One does not find evidence for this strong view in the writings of 
those theorists. On the contrary Russell held, just like Frege did, that it is precisely 
because we can not attain a complete knowledge of the referents, such that would 
enable us to have Leibnizian complete individual concepts of them and turn the above 
type of identity sentences into logical truths, that the ordinary proper names are 
truncated descriptions and incomplete symbols. (See (Frege 1997a: 153) that was 
mentioned in section 2.2.) Moreover the epistemological argument seems confused. 
Note that its conclusion is just that what forms the starting point of Frege´s puzzle 
about trivial and informational identity statements. Because "a is b" is informative, i.e. 
it is not known a priori by the concepts involved in the names and the descriptions 
used, there is something in it that is in need of explanation. The identity puzzle itself 
shows that the Fregean theory of sense and reference has nothing to do with any a 
priori demands between proper names and the descriptions.2 
 
In analogy to the familiar distinction between the semantic reference and the speaker 
reference we may adopt the distinction between semantic sense and speaker sense. The 
direct-causal theorists have uniformly assumed in their critiques of the Fregean theory 
the former perspective, that of the semantic senses, the senses associated uniformly to 
a proper name in the linguistic community as a whole. But that is a mistake for it is the 
perspective from the speaker senses that is relevant: remember again Frege´s Aristotle 
note where it is allowed that different persons have different senses associated to the 
same proper name. Within this perspective the senses can be taken as synonymous to 
descriptions (expressing the senses). But then it should be realized that this move is 
also inconsequential because it is temporally relativized to the particular occasions of 
the uses of proper names by individual speakers. For in another occasion the same 
speaker may invoke other senses associated to the name. Of course this 
temporalization means in effect that proper names are not synonymous uniformly with 
the same senses from an occasion to another. Idealizingly, though, one could argue 
that the set of all the senses the speaker invokes (consciously as well as tacitly) in all 
occasions he uses the name, the total "sense set", is synonymous to the proper name 
for that speaker. But the sense theorists need not assume that. 
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Argumentatively the issue can be left here. But it seems to me that because the gap 
between the demands imposed by the direct-causal theorists on the sense theory and 
the actual substance of that theory is so wide, an explanation of the gap is in order. I 
will make only a suggestion here and not pursue it any further. (Though of course I 
think that it would make an interesting case for both a substantial and a 
sociopsychological study of the history of the analytic philosophy of language 
(especially in US) during the latter part of 20th century.) It seems to me that back in the 
1960s there was very much in force a presupposition, common and therefore mostly 
tacitly accepted, about the general methodology in philosophy and in semantical 
studies particularly. According to that presupposition meaning relations were taken to 
amount only to synonymities, analyticities, meaning postulates, definitions, 
explications (in the Carnapian style) and other such strong semantic notions. The 
general methodological atmosphere in the analytic philosophy in those days, after the 
"linguistic turn" effected by the logical empiricists, presumably was such that 
philosophers were trying to offer conceptual analyses of many interesting notions and 
providing definitions of the central terms in the manner that would preserve the 
meaning of the definiendum by the definiens, and analysandum by the analysans, i.e. 
to provide synonymy-preserving analyses. The analyses were to give the conditions of 
application for being (the extension of) the concept in question.  The conditions given 
by the analysans and definiens were supposed to give the meaning both of the concept 
and the term that linguistically expresses the concept. The prevalence of this 
methodology in those years is representatively evident in Arthur Pap’s book with a 
telling name Semantics and Necessary Truth. An Inquiry into the Foundations of 
Analytic Philosophy (Pap 1958). Pap writes about the relationships between proper 
names and the descriptions and maintains that proper names are defined by the 
descriptions, and that for proper names one should find such description which is 
synonymous with it 
 
"…any proper name is synonymous with a definite 
description…("individual concepts", in the present terminology of 
Carnap): for if it makes sense to speak, say, of the concept of Caesar, then 
it ought to make sense to speak of defining the proper name "Caesar", but 
this can only mean to produce a definite description with which the name 
is synonymous." (Pap 1958: 18) 
 
But still as recently as 2002 and 2005 the direct-causal theorists, or the Millian 
theorists, work under the misconception of synonymity. An instance of this is Scott 
Soames in his two recent books on the issues of semantic values and references of 
proper names versus the definite descriptions (Soames 2002, 2005). Soames explicitly 
assumes that it is the core claim of the description theoretic version of the sense theory 
of reference that proper names are intersubjectively invariantly synonymous with the 
definite descriptions related to them semantically. 
 
I argued above that there is no textual evidence for the synonymy interpretation. In 
case the reader thinks that I need more substantial or systematic argument to show my 
case against synonymies, I offer the following. Frege held that the referents of the 
number expressions – “1”, “2”, “3” and such – are the values of the different functions 
having them as the results of the applications of the functions. For example “2+2=4” 
and “22=4” involve two different functions (2+2=and 22=) but one and the same 
number as the result. In other words, for any number being the referent, there is many 
  56 
(even possibly infinitely many) ways it can be “grasped” via the corresponding 
functions (analogous to the senses). So it would be very odd to claim that any 
linguistic expression of one of these functions gives the synonymous expression 
(description) for that number. That “2+2” is, perhaps, the most often used function for 
representing 4 is only because it is just that: most often used expression for 4. There is 
nothing more to it semantically, so “2+2” is not synonymous for “4”. In the same way 
a single description, expressing the sense, can be often used to characterize a certain 
individual, but it does not follow that that description is the synonymy expression for 
the proper name of that individual. Neither needs the sense that description expresses 
be intersubjectively the sole sense related to the individual as a mode of its 
presentation. Therefore I conclude that the synonymy demand for proper names has 
always been a (harmful) mistake made by the direct-causal (and Millian) theorists. 
 
That Kripke endorsed the synonymy approach, and assumed that it is the core of the 
Fregean sense theory, or at least should, becomes clear when he differentiates between 
the theory of the meaning of proper names and the theory of the reference of proper 
names (Kripke 1972: 258-9). He also implies that definitions and analyses of proper 
names is the business of the theory of meaning, and attributes this aim also to the 
Searlean cluster version of the description theory (Kripke 1972: 276-8). Of Frege and 
Russell he claims that they "certainly seem to have the full blown theory according to 
which a proper name is not a rigid designator and is synonymous with the description 
which replaces it."3 Hence the motivation behind the modal and epistemological 
arguments against the sense theory of reference become comprehensible. From this 
conception it was also a short step to considering the senses of proper names as their 
meaning conditions. Therefore the Fregean senses which have not just semantical tasks 
to perform as intensional entities, but also epistemological and cognitive tasks, were 
immediately put within the confines of that restricted conception of semantics. In other 
words the direct-causal theorists ignored the rich cognitive and epistemic roles that the 
senses (and the thoughts) became to assume in Frege´s overall view. Nowadays, when 
the notion of meaning, or content, has become to be taken as cognitively and 
epistemically respectable notion, we have got used to the idea that meanings, and 
semantic matters in general, can not be restricted in the manner that was the 
dominating approach still in the 1960s. It was also part of the methodology of the 
conceptual analyses to give such conditions for concepts that could be immune from 
any counterexamples. That is, the conditions for being X should apply not just to 
actual cases but to any possible cases also. This largely explains the use of the 
possible-world counterexamples since Kripke. 
 
Kripke claimed that if the sense theory is taken as a theory of the reference of proper 
names, but not as a theory of their (synonymous) meaning, it loses much of its appeal, 
especially in relation to the negative existential statements like "Moses does not exist". 
But how so? The very supposition that the direct-causal theorists have of the sense 
theoretic solution to the negative existentials is something that the sense theorists need 
not accept (and have not done so, excepting Searle), let alone that it would imply that 
solution. Rather it is a straw man constructed by the former theorists. The negative 
existentials are only one problem case, and the sense theory can provide an adequate 
solution to them, a solution that allows that it can turn out that an individual NN has 
not any (nontrivial) properties it has been thought to have. This only requires that 
some new and true information be found out about that individual. But still, according 
to the Fregean sense theory proper names have meanings through their senses, only 
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those meanings do not provide synonymies between the descriptions that express the 
senses and proper names of which they are the senses. The most general form of this 
argument is that the sense theory is independent from the notion of synonymy: one can 
be a "synonymy nihilist" and still a whole hearted Fregean with respect to proper 
names. In other words there is no conceptual connection from the sense theory to the 
synonymy properties of proper names - unlike it seems to be the case with the 
conception of semantics the direct-causal theorists have adopted. 
 
We will see in section 4.4 that the modal, epistemological as well as the semantical 
argument are all based on a presupposition about the individuation of the referents of 
proper names which the direct-causal theorists always make but which in fact destroys 
the whole notion of proper names as rigid designators independent of the Fregean 
senses as the factors which individuate their referents. This is not to deny that proper 
names and the definite descriptions sometimes behave differently in the intensional 
contexts. But this will disarm at large the direct-causal theorists and will no more 
enable them to provide any modal arguments against the sense theory of reference via 
the notion of the rigid designation. (I will also explain the differential behavior of 
proper names and the definite descriptions in chapters 5 and 6.) 
 
As I already pointed out Kripke belittles the sense theory when it is taken "only" to be 
a theory of the reference of proper names and not of their meanings. His main reason 
is that as a theory of reference the sense theory loses much of its appeal in dealing with 
the negative existential statements. He also seems to maintain that as a theory of 
reference the sense theory is equivalent to the account in which descriptions fix the 
referents of proper names. According to Kripke the negative existential statements (“X 
does not exist”) can not be analyzed to mean that if the descriptions are not true of 
anyone the proper name in question has no referent. But this charge is hard to take 
seriously, and it seems to me to be incorrect. The reason is that surely the sense theory, 
as a theory of reference, is not to be diminished to offering mere fixing role to the 
senses. The sense theory of reference is an empirical theory, not an old-fashioned 
semantical theory offering synonymies and other such stringent semantic relations. 
Therefore ridding it of the philosophical interpretation (the methodology of meaning 
analyses) leaves it every opportunity to explain the mechanisms and factors effective 
when proper names are used referentially. Moreover the sense theory of reference does 
explain the negative existentials. The statement "X does not exist" simply states that 
"X" does not refer to any actual individual. But “X” has sense, and that accounts for 
the fact that we did believe that it referred until the referential emptiness of "X" was 
discovered. Consequently Kripke´s charge from the weakness of the sense theory as a 
mere theory of reference should not be taken at all seriously (neither should any 
Fregean theorist with an empirical bent take it so). 
 
To continue a little more on the issue of analyzing the meaning versus referring in 
relation to the account of fixing the referent, the latter option fulfills the functions of 
the three subsenses described earlier. For in fixing the referent by a description (or 
descriptions) the speaker associates the sense(s) the description(s) express(es) with the 
proper name, this being the conceptual representation of the referent. The speaker also 
determines the referent by the description(s) just because he uses it (them) to fix the 
referent. And finally the sense the speaker expresses with the fixing description(s) is 
the information content which he contributes to the sentences in which the proper 
name occurs, also in the intensional contexts.5 No intersubjective sameness of content 
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is required, pace Burge and Salmon Therefore what is left for the sense theorist to be 
concerned about the direct-causal theorists´ arguments is the possibility that the 
description (or set of descriptions) turns out to be false, but that the proper name still 
allegedly refers. I will also deal with this residual argument later. But here we can 
conclude that the charge from the distinction between the theory of meaning and the 
theory of reference fails with respect to the Fregean theory of sense and reference. 
 
So the modal and the epistemological arguments fail as arguments against the Fregean 
and Russellian theories because they are not committed to any stringent semantic 
demands like synonymy and analytic meaning equivalences or a priori knowledge 
between proper names and the definite descriptions. But there is another way to read 
the arguments, and it seems to be the real intention in Kripke’s discussion. Or at least 
the arguments could be taken this other way. The stringent semantic desiderata can be 
dropped but the modal argument can still be used in its essentials. We made 
acquaintance with that way when the notion of rigid designation was explicated. To 
rehearse it, take any individuating sense expressed by a definite description, for 
instance “the most famous pupil of Plato”. This refers to Aristotle. But in some 
counterfactual situation (a possible world) the referent of that description might not be 
the actual Aristotle but some other individual altogether. Still, the proper name 
“Aristotle” refers to the actual Aristotle in those circumstances. In other words proper 
names and the descriptions behave differently in modal contexts. But this argument 
can be rebutted – and it was rebutted by Alvin Plantinga only a few years after the 
publication of Kripke’s 1972 published lectures (Plantinga 1978). The rebuttal goes by 
the name “actualized descriptions” (or some such equivalent). According to this view 
the definite descriptions related to proper names become rigidified when an “actually” 
operator is attached to them. However I shall postpone that issue until the next chapter. 
The reason is that there I will offer a new look at the actualized-rigidified theory as 
well as on Kripke’s modal argument. 
?
?
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The semantic argument receives a long treatment in the following sections. Therefore 
it is in order to present the general course of my argumentation. First I argue, using the 
well-known case of Madagascar that the causal links by themselves are not sufficiently 
powerful to guarantee reference such that the original referent of the name would be 
guaranteed to remain retained through the subsequent exchanges. After that I argue 
that the intentions to co-refer that the direct-causal theorists have realized they need to 
postulate do not engender sufficient referential force either. Furthermore the usual 
types of examples used by the direct-causal theorists – the plausible Feynman case and 
the counterfactual Gödel case – are defective in that they seem to invoke tacitly 
informational elements in a way that the correct diagnosis drawn from the examples is 
not what the direct-causal theorists claim it to be. This does not leave those theorists 
totally disarmed, however. They can still claim that the sense and description theories 
fail because there are cases when the descriptions (expressing the senses) are false of 
the referent of the proper name in question but despite that being so the name still 
refers successfully. Indeed when the misconception about the senses are put aside and 
Kripke’s argument is interpreted this way it presents the core claim of the direct-causal 
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theory: proper names do refer “on their own” if the communicative causal links are 
there. This can be put in general terms along the lines that Robert Stalnaker has 
presented the theoretical situation: the direct-causal theory involves a semantic claim 
and a metasemantic claim. The semantic claim is that the sole semantic value of a 
referring expression is its referent; the metasemantical claim, or the metatheoretical 
claim, is that the referent being the semantic value is explained by it standing at the 
starting point of the appropriate causal links to the subsequent uses of its name. This 
leads me to scrutinize the much-used intuitive pull behind such claims. Consequently I 
will argue that the intuitions behind the direct-causal claim are misconceived: they are 
not semantical, a fortiori not substantially referential, but relate to the preconditions of 
all referential language use. Dialectically the situation is as follows. We begin with the 
current consensus according to which the Fregean and the description theories are 
false, but the direct-causal theory is correct (at least more clearly so than the former 
theories). Then along the course of my argumentation I strip the latter theory of its 
causal clothes, the result being almost the total reverse of the current consensus: the 
direct-causal theory is left with only the defensive move of charging the Fregean and 
the description theory that they could not handle the case where the descriptions are 
false but the proper name in question does refer. But even that straw breaks in the end, 
as we will see. 
 
The semantical argument does not presuppose any synonymy or analytic demands 
between proper names and the definite descriptions. Instead it is directed against the 
idea that the descriptions give the necessary and sufficient conditions for the referent 
of a proper name. Searle´s cluster version has been the main target but the argument 
generalizes obviously to the Fregean sense theory. To rehearse the argument in its 
general form a proper name refers to that individual from whom the uses of that name 
originated and are derived via the causal communicative chains. The name does not 
refer to any occasional individual to whom the description applies. 
 
As I already pointed out Salmon emphasized that this is a clear answer to a clear 
semantic question: to what we would refer were the envisaged situation to occur? In 
stating this question Salmon relies on a notion he calls "reference simpliciter", which, 
as judged from his example and wording, presumably relates only to proper names but 
not to the descriptions. It seems to me that in this respect it is similar, if not even the 
same, as Recanati´s notion of REF that we already encountered and by which the latter 
tries to account for the referential directness of proper names (again in 
contradistinction to the descriptions, other than the rigid ones). So I suppose that 
Salmon´s argument is intended as some kind of conceptual argument about the 
intrinsic nature of the concept of reference. (However, and contrary to what I just 
surmised, about Recanati´s intentions with REF I am not sure.) 
 
I am not happy with Salmon´s interpretation of the semantical argument, neither with 
the notion of reference simpliciter. It seems to me that the intuitive appeal that Salmon 
claims on behalf of the exclusive referential success of the name "Thales" just is not 
there. Or if it is there, it is relative to a given speaker. For example my intuitive grasp 
of the Thales case gives the contrary verdict, for it seems to me that if "Thales" refers 
to anything in the situation envisaged, it does refer to the water metaphysicist, not to 
the Thales from whom the name originated. For me it is obvious that the description 
that expresses what the metaphysician believed (and what I and, by large, we believe 
of that chap) outweighs the origin of the name, with respect to referential intuitions. As 
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for me I believe that Thales lived in the 6th century before Christ; was from Miletos; 
traveled in Egypt; predicted an eclipse of the Sun; held, indeed, that water is the 
Urstuff; that Diogenes Laertius and Aristotle wrote about him; that he is said to have 
fallen into a well while gazing stars. To this adds the fact, which Salmon does not rule 
out but to which he in fact seems implicitly committed in his endorsing to achieve the 
alleged contrast effect of the example that "Thales" has been used with discussions and 
informational exchanges the topics of which have been mainly, I suppose, metaphysics 
and Greek philosophy. In other words, "Thales" has become so tied to this 
informational, cognitive and epistemic background that the supposed original Thales 
has dropped out of the picture very early on. (That is, were there such an individual the 
example envisions to make its point about.) 
 
We need not be restricted to my contrary intuitions to show that the Salmonian 
reference simpliciter is not a uniform notion. Let us take a well-known case in 
addition. Linsky discusses "the Homeric question", the problem whether one person 
wrote the Homeric Poems or are they perhaps a compilation from different writers 
(Linsky 1977: 96-7). Now if the Poems were written by a single person, we could 
construct a case in which the name "Homer" derives from an ancient Greek with that 
name but who did not write anything. Even so the Homeric question, because it has 
been pondered over so long, have created a strong “epistemic surrounding” to the 
effect that when we use "Homer" we are intending to talk about the writer of the 
Poems, whoever he or she was, and whatever his or her name was. It seems to me that, 
unless one is thoroughly immersed in the direct-causal picture, one realizes even after 
a quick reflection on this example that "Homer" is used in the way that its referent is 
the individual who wrote the Poems, irrespective whether or not there was some other 
individual named “Homer”. 
 
A contrary intuition is recorded in (Evans 1982: 395-6). (But see also (Evans 1982: 
378, n. 6) on "Jack the Ripper" and "Deutero-Isaiah", as well as Evans´ famous 
"Julius", the whoever invented the zip, all of which seem curiously incompatible with 
Evans’ own intuition.) In explaining his intuition, which he takes to be the uniformly 
accepted one, Evans denies that we are using "Homer" as the name of whoever was the 
author of the Iliad and the Odyssey. But because we are so using it, or some of us (at 
least some of the historians) really are so using it, I maintain that Evans´ contrary 
intuition, supported by the alleged uniformity, so to say counts itself out. Evans also 
defends his view that "Homer" is not our name for whoever was the author by 
maintaining that upon the possible discovery of that individual, i.e. that individual 
having been so-and-so and named "Homer" (or rather the ancient equivalent), we will 
be in a position to justify that we have been using "Homer" as the name of that very 
individual and not the writer. But that is not denied by anyone concerned - or the very 
least it should not be denied. Of course if such a discovery will be made, we may 
disambiguate "Homer" to refer to the discovered individual also, or we may begin to 
use "Homer" exclusively as the name for that individual. These are possible moves just 
because we currently seem to lack any definite and specific information about the 
actual author, apart from that he or she wrote the Homeric poems, and therefore we 
use "Homer" as the name of whoever was the author. In a way “Homer” has become a 
placeholder for the person whoever wrote the Poems (if such there is). It functions as a 
placeholder because it depends on the information, expressed by the descriptions we 
associate with it. 
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Let us take one more example, this time from the nearer history. Petrarca first met 
Laura morning 6.4.1327 at the church of St. Clara in Avignon, and fell in romantic 
love with her at once. After that Petrarca wrote the famous sonets to Laura (Rerum 
vulgarium fragmenta). But as a matter of fact we do not know whether Laura´s name 
was "Laura" or not. Let us suppose that there was some other woman named "Laura" 
from whom the later uses of "Laura" derive causally. Still it seems that this Laura has 
not been referred to when the scholars and literature people have talked about Laura, 
Petrarca´s love. All that has been said of Laura, mainly on the basis of the contents of 
Petrarca´s sonets, is about that woman Petrarca first saw in Avignon. Here our 
intuitions overrule any original causal contact with some now unknown “Laura” in 
favour of the descriptive information individuating Petrarca´s “Laura”. (The “causal 
Laura” here plays the role of the “Thales” in the original example, and “Petrarca’s 
Laura” the role of the water metaphysician to whom the descriptions apply.) 
 
The general conclusion I draw is, then, that it is very problematical to base one´s 
argument on an allegedly uniform notion of reference simpliciter, for there clearly is 
no uniformity with respect to the referential intuitions.6 The issues has to be decided 
on empirical grounds, not on conceptual grounds backed up by one´s intuitions 
concerning examples. That the intuitions are much too varying and weak can be shown 
also by the following argument. Let us suppose that we have ignored any contrary 
intuitions to the direct-causal view. When we use a proper name to refer to an 
individual that to all intents and purposes we take to exist (or to have existed), we can 
detect the same referential intuitions simpliciter as in the Thales example. But what are 
the direct-causal theorists to say when it eventually turns out that the name used is 
nevertheless an empty one, i.e. that there is not, and has never been, any individual to 
whom we used the name (purportedly) to refer? And this is so especially when there is 
no causal link from the purported individual to the uses of its name, simply because 
that individual does not exist. The referential intuition is there, and it is as strong as 
any such Salmonian one, but the very theory that intuition is used to support must be 
denying its force. The obvious irony here is that the sense theory explains the 
referential practice and the intuition: we believed that the individual exists, or existed, 
because we associated senses, expressed by descriptions, with that name. 
 
I think that we can conclude that proper names do not have any distinctive function of 
being referential devices simpliciter such that the descriptions do not have or could not 
become to acquire, depending on the informational situations in which they are used. I 
maintain that the descriptions about the water metaphysician are as strong referential 
devices, even intuitively, as proper names. I will argue this more thoroughly in section 
4.2.5. As I already stated, another important conclusion that can be drawn from this 
moral is that the semantical argument is not purely conceptual argument, but an 
empirical one.7 This can be seen more clearly if we consider the point of the moral I 
drew according to which proper names and the descriptions do not differ from each 
other with respect to their indications of the referential "modes" they are capable of 
assuming. Accordingly to claim referential advantage for the proper name in the 
Thales example must, then, involve something else than the mere conceptual notion of 
reference simpliciter. And it is easy to see that this is the case. The additional factor by 
which the name gets to the subsequent uses is evidently causal in the example, so the 
notion of reference simpliciter is not so simple a thing at all; it is a causal notion. 
Therefore it is very much open to debate whether the Thales example (and others like 
it) can be used as part of a conceptually disguised argument against the sense theory of 
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reference. The reason is that in the form the example is given and interpreted as 
exhibiting a conceptual element in the notion of reference it assumes the correctness of 
the direct-causal account. However it should be noted that the argument is not outright 
question begging because the causal involvement is not spelled out in any detail, not in 
the example neither in the ensuing argument. Therefore we need to provide further 
arguments on behalf of the Fregean sense theorist (and the description theorist) and 
against the direct-causal picture. But to take a dialectical stock: the modal and 
epistemological arguments are inadequate because they have presuppositions that 
neither the Fregean sense theory nor the Russellian description theory are committed 
to, and the semantical argument will fail also if the causal determination of the 
referents of proper names will turn out to be too weak. 
 
???????????????????????????????????
 
Kripke formulated the Searlean cluster version of the description theory in the way 
that it concerns the perspective of an individual speaker. As we remember the first 
argument tries to show that the senses expressed by the descriptions are not necessary 
for successful reference; this is the Feynman example. If someone knows only that a 
person called "Feynman" is a famous physicist, then according to the sense theory he 
is not referring uniquely to Richard Feynman because there are many famous 
physicists (and maybe more than one named "Feynman"). But Kripke’s claim is 
plainly that in spite of this the speaker is referring to Richard Feynman, the Nobel 
laureate for inventing the renormalization method for QED (together with Tomonaga 
and Schwinger). In this case the speaker reference is on a par with the semantic 
reference, but in a negative way: according to Kripke’s argument the speaker could not 
avoid being referring to any other person than Richard Feynman because that is the 
way that name refers in the linguistic community to what the speaker belongs. 
Semantic reference is assumed to overrule the speaker reference. To restate Kripke´s 
explanation of this the causal communicative links have established this semantic 
practice. However it is left totally open how this could come about, i.e. what is 
supposed to prevent "cuts" or "mixings" taking place during the evolving courses of 
the causal links. (Kripke realizes this lacuna but nevertheless does not give any 
solution to it.) 
 
The Gödel example is designed to show that the senses are not even sufficient for 
successful reference. Here the focus is clearly on the semantic reference as in the 
previous argument, for Kripke claims that we do refer to Kurt Gödel by the name 
"Gödel" and not to Schmidt, even if it were the case that the latter solely discovered 
the incompleteness of arithmetics, and we associate the sense expressed by the 
description "the discoverer of the incompleteness of arithmetics" to the name "Gödel". 
So again, if one intends to refer to the discoverer of the incompleteness of arithmetics 
by using the name "Gödel", he fails because he refers instead to Kurt Gödel. The 
explanation is again the weaving of the net of the causal communicative links in which 
"Gödel" has been used since the baptism of Kurt Gödel back in Brno. So it certainly 
seems that Kripke has refuted the Fregean sense theory from the semantic reference 
perspective, if that theory is taken to concern speaker references only. 
 
As already pointed out Devitt ignores counterexamples that are given in terms of 
possible worlds. Instead he gives three types of empirical arguments. The first states 
that there are cases in which we do, or could, not associate an appropriate description 
  63 
to a proper name, but the name does still refer to the very bearer of that name. The 
second argument maintains that the description identifies a wrong object as the 
referent of the name in question. The third argument faults the Fregean description 
theory with cases in which a description identifies no object but the name does refer 
successfully. As I already pointed out the first argument is very similar to Kripke´s 
argument that the descriptions are not necessary to successful reference, and the 
second argument is similar to Kripke´s argument from the insufficiency of the 
descriptions to successful reference. Consequently I will pack them together when I 
will criticize them later. Devitt´s third argument deserves an independent handling, 
also later in this chapter. But this should be done with effect, so it is in order first to 
critically discuss the mechanisms of the causal reference. 
 
??????????? ??? ?????????? ?????????? ?????????? ??? ?????????? ??? ?????? ???? ????
?????????????????????????????
 
Is the direct-causal theory´s explanation of the reference of proper names sustainable? 
To be able to answer this question one must study more closely the communicative 
links on which the theory relies, for the crucial explanatory factor of the theory is the 
mechanism by which the referent is retained in the linguistic practices. In Kripke´s 
picture this mechanism is realized by the intention of the hearer to keep on referring to 
the same individual as does the speaker from whom he acquired the name. In Devitt´s 
theory the mechanism is the reference borrowing. It should be realized that the 
intentions to co-refer and the reference borrowings are not equivalent notions, for one 
may borrow reference unattended without specifically intending to co-refer, and one 
may be intending to co-refer as sincerely as one could but still not be borrowing the 
reference – as is the case with the first misreference in the Madagascar example. 
 
So the explanatory success of the direct-causal theory depends on the claim that the 
communicatively built links and chains are uniformly able to preserve the individual 
originally named. Certain uses of "Nana" refer to the Devitts´ cat Nana because the 
uses of that name derive from the naming "ceremony". In Devitt´s version this is so 
because the other people acquire abilities to refer to Nana upon hearing (or reading) 
about Nana. When they subsequently use "Nana" they intend to co-refer to whom or to 
what the person, from whom they picked the name, used the name to refer, thus 
borrowing reference. This allows that the descriptions used in the original naming, or 
the descriptions taken into use later, may be false of Nana without that severing the 
referential connection. 
 
I intend to argue now that the intentions to co-refer are not capable of explaining 
referent retention. Let us begin with what Alan Berger says 
 
"How, then, is a description used to transmit the reference of 'Aristotle'? 
The description is used to indicate something the speaker or the linguistic 
community, by and large, believes true of the referent of the term. By the 
use of a description, then, a speaker helps to indicate which historical 
chain (of intentions to corefer) he is on when he uses a given occurrence 
of the term 'Aristotle'. The historical chain determines the referent of the 
name 'Aristotle', but the use of a definite description helps indicate who 
the speaker or the linguistic community believes is the referent of the 
term." (Berger 2002: 15; an earlier statement by Berger is in (Berger 
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1989: 185-6), but this later version has deletes both of emphasis and an 
epistemic tone with respect to the causal determination of the referent.) 
 
Berger explicates here what he calls “F-type terms”, i.e. referential terms whose 
referents are fixed by perceptual contacts, but later the referential chain is retained by 
the uses of descriptions also. Even if we ignore the difficulties, over which Berger 
jumps, with the distinction of the semantic and the speaker reference, what Berger says 
fails at the crucial point. For how could a description, even a definite one, indicate 
merely by itself in any sufficient way the historical chain, or chains, which originated 
from the intended referent? A description can do that but only by the trivial way of 
being part of the chain. This, however, does not enable us to find out anything 
referentially relevant about the causal chain. (The description could do that only when 
it says something of the course of that very chain it is part of, but such descriptions are 
very rare.) On the contrary it seems that the only way a description can indicate 
referential relevance is that it gives us information about the (intended) referent; but 
then the historical chain just drops out of the picture. The utterance "Socrates was 
snub-nosed" contains information about the famous Greek philosopher that he was 
snub-nosed and presumably this information has been carried via the referential chains 
to us since antiquity. But about the chains themselves the utterance, hence the 
description, does not indicate anything. And what it indicates about its referent it does 
by telling us something about him. It should also be noted that talking about 
“indicating” the whole chain is perforce a strong idealization. Or at least it is advisable 
to take it so because the way of indicating is left unexplained by Berger. We do have 
access to the very latest, the most proximal parts, of the referential chains (in a relative 
sense, for written notes and other such sources can be old). We do not have at our 
disposal any stronger means to know the referent than the information the descriptions 
contain.8 I take it that this is so obvious that it does not need any further 
argumentation. But at the same time it reveals the indispensable epistemic and 
cognitive elements functioning in the reference by proper names, as well as by the 
definite descriptions. 
 
A clear manifestation of this is that people typically ask for more information about 
the referents when they do not have it or when what information they have is 
insufficient for determined reference. It seems to me that the direct-causal theorists 
have gone grossly too far in their denials of the referential relevance of knowledge and 
information in their attempts to avoid anything that would speak in favour of the 
Fregean sense theory (and the description theories) of reference. Moreover being able 
to use a proper name referringly on the mere basis of the intentions to co-refer 
confuses the basic function of proper names - the function possessed by all referring 
expressions - as referring devices with the uses of them in which reference is not taken 
nearly so easy an accomplishment as the direct-causal theorists would have it via the 
causal connections. It is very remarkable that the direct-causal theorists overlook that 
mass of evidence that clearly shows that we are most certain of successful reference 
only when we have individuating information about the referents. It is easy to claim 
that the causal connections do all the work, but that is tantamount to fail to see that 
they go together with the information that does the real work and which the causal 
links only transmit. Take away that information and people become very unsure about 
what they are talking about. (Take away, that is, all of the information they have or 
have had access to, so that no deferential moves are reasonable.) 
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Why then have the direct-causal theorists lapsed time and again into thinking that the 
intentions to co-refer retain the referent? As a partial answer I suggest that they have in 
a way confused things at the theoretical level. It certainly seems that a description 
indicates a historical chain if one is already looking through the lenses of the direct-
causal inclinations (and has accepted, or is sympathetic to, the anti-sense and anti-
description theoretic arguments and views). Consequently it is easy to lapse into 
thinking that, because the theory postulates that there are (idealized) causal chains, we 
qua speakers immersed as parts of them are somehow "in touch" with the original 
referents. The direct-causal theorists tend to take the causal chains as simply given, 
even though they recognize that they are communicatively built. But quite ironically 
this has led them to ignore the very factors that in those very referential exchanges by 
proper names preserve the referents: information about the referents given by the 
descriptions (expressive of the senses). Descriptions in use do what Berger says they 
do: they tell us that the referent is such and such, and in that way they do indicate the 
referent. But that is how the referential communication typically functions when it is 
successful and retains the referents of proper names. The picture the direct-causal 
theorists paint is just too abstract and idealized to be able to get the real explanatory 
factors into the view – in fact it hides them from view. 
 
The argument just given suffices to show that mere intentions to co-refer are too weak 
to guarantee actual co-reference between the speaker and the hearer. Conversely, due 
to the lack of individuating information  they could neither repair a damaged link or 
chain, i.e. they could not by themselves prevent an unintentional reference change. 
Recall again the well-known case of "Madagascar". This name refers now to the large 
island southeast of the African mainland but originally it referred to a part of that 
mainland near it. A natural explanation of the reference change is that new information 
was brought into the discussion, or that too sparse information was around so that the 
speakers were prone to confuse the original referent. Once the unintentionally 
incorrectly borrowed referent became widely accepted as the referent of 
"Madagascar", the change was robust. Still all the participants to the discussions may 
have had sincere intentions to co-refer to what "Madagascar" has always referred to. I 
think that this case admirably underlines a crucial point of comparison between the 
direct-causal and the Fregean sense theory. It follows as a prediction from the latter 
theory that the mere intentions to co-refer do not suffice, but information about the 
intended referent must be involved. The intentions to co-refer are only derivative at 
best, or subsequent upon receiving information about the referent. It is a typical feature 
of the language use that when the hearer does not know (in advance) about whom or 
what the speaker is talking about, or the hearer could not infer that from the 
discoursive context, he demands identifying information from the speaker. Only after 
receiving that information will the hearer intend to co-refer with the proper name (or 
whatever referential expression is relevant). Without this informational check the cases 
like Madagascar are very likely to result. And conversely the informational checks 
keep the referents preserved, not the however sincere intentions to co-refer. 
(Sometimes the way to referential hell is paved with good intentions.) 
 
Although the Madagascar case is indisputable it seems to me that the whole lesson 
from it has not yet been drawn. Note first that the emergence of the new causal links, 
i.e. those based on the island, is via Devittian groundings. In other words the direct-
causal theorists could insist that the island is the proper referent because it was named 
first time in some occasion even if only inadvertently or because of a misconception. 
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And this is equivalent to giving up the claim that the original object named is the sole 
referent. 
 
But even that modification is not explanatorily sufficient. For the real problem is how 
the change of reference became known to have taken place. No one could have been 
able to realize the change if the causal links by themselves were the only effective 
factor available. But that was not so: a definite change of reference was detected. The 
answer to the problem is that the reference change became known because it was 
realized that to what “Madagascar” now refers differs from what it referred to earlier. 
And to find that out the mere presence of the past causal links qua causal could not 
have sufficed. So the change must have become realized because people had access to 
the causal links by cognitive means. That is, we have to have such information about 
the referents that enables us to realize that there is some discrepancy with the current 
uses compared to the earlier uses. These cognitive means enable us to get access to the 
causal links but only informationally, only via what is said about the referents. (Except 
the demonstrative situations where the causal links are perceptually obvious in most 
cases.)  And the natural explanation for that is that the causal links and connections 
only carry information; by themselves they do not have any other role. We are so to 
say cognitively tuned to information in all cognitive tasks, some of which are 
referential language uses. 
 
Here we begin to see that the direct-causal theory involves an error of misplacement of 
its explanatory means. The causal links qua causal do not explain reference, for they 
could not do that because of the way we are built cognitively. Only the information 
that the links carry explains matters referential. (In section 4.2.5 I propose an 
explanation of the intuition why the causal links – even when communicatively 
installed, as they should as the more perceptive of the direct-causal theorists have 
observed – seem so robust mechanisms of reference.) 
 
A corollary of the argument just given is that the notion of reference borrowing needs 
to be informationally enriched. When a hearer catches upon a new name, a new fixing 
and grounding of the referent takes place. But in order to avoid an unintentional 
reference change there has to be sufficiently individuative information transfer 
between the source and the receiver. So we see that reference borrowings with 
information transmission can be recurrent reference fixings  The direct-causal theorists 
are obviously right when they point out that the information, in the form of 
descriptions, can occasionally be false of the referent of the proper name without this 
severing the fixing link. But they have overgeneralized this observation, and this has 
led to ignoring the crucial facts effective in the referential communication. For if the 
transmitted information is misinformation, is totally false of the referent, the danger 
becomes imminent that we will not be able to retain the original referent. And that 
happened in the Madagascar case. 
 
I suspect that the insistence by the direct-causal theorists on the mere causal chains in 
the reference borrowings is nothing but the result of the restricted picture the 
counterexamples to the Fregean description theory, understood as only a stringent 
theory of the meaning of proper names, has forced on the direct-causal theorists. The 
communicative facts manifested in the referential uses of language do not support this 
picture. In most cases when we use a proper name we talk about and gossip how NN 
looks, what he has done, his character and acquaintances, and so on. I would even 
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claim that proper names could not even function as proper names, i.e. naming devices, 
if they had not this informational task tied to them. That the fixing descriptions may be 
false or inapplicable in some cases is of course a platitude, but it should not be 
forgotten that very much more often they are not.9 It is this way that the referents are 
retained and the referential causal nets are weaved through information-transmitting 
communication. 
 
Devitt seems to grasp the crucial role of information in the reference retention when he 
speaks of the acquired abilities to refer upon catching a new proper name. I suppose 
that these abilities are supposed to explain our intentions to co-refer, for if we had not 
any such abilities we could not be able to refer at all. The reason I say that he seems to 
grasp the crucial role is because he does not say anything sufficiently detailed about 
the abilities acquired which enable one to borrow reference and use competently the 
name in question. But perhaps the following quotation helps, to begin with. 
 
"As materialists we expect the advance of science, particularly neurophysiology, to 
show us that it [the ability to refer, to designate] is a certain sort of state of the 
central nervous system. It is a state which is brought about in a language user by 
perception of a naming ceremony…and which is apt to produce (in part) certain 
sorts of utterances, viz. utterances using the name in question. It is such states, 
whatever they are, that largely constitute the links between names and objects." 
(Devitt 1974: 186) 
 
In that paper Devitt also observes that the various abilities to refer with the various 
proper names require other abilities. To gain a particular ability to refer with a 
particular proper name one must already possess the general ability to refer, to use 
referential expressions to refer (Devitt 1974: 185, n.5). I think that this is correct. One 
can support it for instance by the Donnellanian notion of referentially used 
descriptions, i.e. not just proper names. Devitt also suggests, again correctly to my 
mind, that the abilities to refer can be related also to the non-linguistic behavior, 
especially to pointing (Devitt 1974: 186, n.8). 
 
As we saw above by themselves the intentions to co-refer are too weak to enable us to 
retain the original referents. Neither do the mere causal links enable one to do that for 
the reason already argued: there is no guarantee that the causal links have not been 
broken earlier. My argument is then that the referential abilities Devitt postulates must 
be informational to fulfill the role of referent retention - for what other means could 
there be once the causal factors fail? The abilities must include a sufficiently detailed 
conception of the referent of the proper name in question. 
 
Devitt relates the abilities to the hearer, but their symmetrical nature is implicit in the 
case, for obviously the hearer is a future speaker using the acquired name. Therefore 
the abilities become speaker´s abilities to refer as well. And clearly the first speaker 
with the name must possess the ability to refer. So it follows that the abilities to refer 
are transitive: via the acquiring of a particular proper name, via the reference 
borrowing, the same ability so to say travels from one speaker to the next and further 
on. Devitt acknowledges that information is carried through the communicative 
exchanges, for he says that "As a result of many remarks using the name type 'John', 
we acquire many beliefs concerning various people of that name. The beliefs 
concerning different people are, in some sense, 'stored' separately with their respective 
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abilities." (Devitt 1981: 34-5) This amounts to the fact that successful reference 
requires "having referent in mind" (Devitt 1974: 188; Devitt 1981). However, despite 
that Devitt sees the close cognitive connection from the beliefs about the referent of a 
proper name to the ability to use that name to refer, he insists that having in mind is 
best construed as causal relation between the speaker´s state of mind and the object, 
this relation conferring to the speaker the ability to refer to that object.10 
 
But that just is not so. The reason is, as we observe again, the correct insight of the 
sense theory of reference (and Devitt himself admits it being such), that of having the 
referent in mind, loses its explanatory point when it is buried in the causal chains. 
Devitt accounts for the abilities to refer by their causal inheritance, i.e. borrowing, 
beginning from the referent which they were originally grounded (Devitt 1981: 34). 
But with this the relation of explanatory dependence becomes turned around. It is not 
denied that there are causal relations between objects and the expressions that refer to 
them. But they become referential only because of the information they carry; 
information from which we choose with respect to the earlier acquired information and 
in light of which we judge the reliability of the new information as to the existence of 
the referent. In this connection it is telling that Devitt does admit that the descriptions 
allow us to borrow an ability to refer also (Devitt 1981: 38). In short, Devitt as well as 
the other direct-causal theorists confound the "raw" mechanism of reference, the 
causal link, with the very individuative factor (the sense of a proper name) without 
which the mechanism could not work, by losing sight of the latter.11 (Again no doubt 
because of the fixed idea that the Fregean description theory has been shown to be 
false.) 
 
If one is allowed a harsh manner of argumentation, one could point out that Devitt’s 
causal conception of the notion of having in mind has in fact nothing to do with what 
having in mind really is, even minimally. For it is characteristic of that notion that one 
can have a thing in mind without any relevant causal connections to or from it. I may 
have in mind, say, the thickest spruce in the center of the forest outside my window 
without having ever been inside that forest earlier. Just as Devitt commits a category 
mistake when he proposes that the causal connections are taken as non-Fregean senses, 
he commits similar one here. The diagnosis can only be that these are desperate 
attempts to save the causal approach in the face of the grave difficulties that the focus 
on mere causal links brings with it. True, it belongs to the scientific enterprise, and 
even maybe more to its philosophical areas, to reinterpret and tear down old and 
common concepts and distinctions. But here we have a conception that is too deeply 
entrenched because of the way we are cognitively built. Even if the boundary between 
cognitive and non-cognitive is not strict (there may be a continuum), the causal 
interpretation of the senses and having in mind is so far at the other end that Devitt’s 
causal senses just will not do. They so to say try to tie the two ends together at the 
same time giving up the other end, the cognitive one. This is totally contrary to the 
view of the senses as semantic-cum-cognitive entities. Consequently I just refuse to 
take seriously Devitt´s merely causal interpretation of the notion of having in mind.12 
 
After all this argumentation what answer can we give to Kripke´s and Devitt´s 
arguments against the sense theory of reference? The Feynman case from the non-
necessity of the senses receives the following answer. To begin with it is to be noticed 
that the argument itself is not quite adequate. The reason is that the sense expressed by 
the description "famous physicist" is not an individuating Fregean sense of a proper 
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name. It is rather a concept expression in Frege´s terms. I think that this point becomes 
obvious in the following quotation: “This is in full accord with the criteria I gave – that 
the singular definite article always indicates an object, whereas the indefinite article 
accompanies a concept word.” (Frege 1997c: 184) Therefore the referent of “the 
famous physicist” is the concept famous physicist, not the individual Richard Feynman 
(or any other individual physicist separately, called “Feynman” or not). The 
description expresses the sense “famous physicist”, but that is the sense of the concept 
famous physicist the extension of which is the class of famous physicists. The sense 
does not even purport to be an individuating sense of an individual referent. 
Accordingly the “Fregean description theory” could not be faulted by Feynman case. 
 
But if we let this inaccuracy pass the argument boils down to Kripke´s causal picture 
of the links from the baptism of Feynman to the mouth of the man in the street. But I 
argued that neither the causal links themselves nor the intentions to co-refer suffice to 
guarantee the original referent. Moreover Kripke overrules the speaker reference in 
favour of the semantic reference. But that just is the issue: the Fregean theory of 
reference can be taken as theory that explains the speaker reference as the primary 
form of reference. The semantic reference is derivative; usually it arises from the 
individual speaker references through the "informational negotiations", i.e. through the 
normal information transmission utilized in the language use with proper names. I take 
the speaker reference to be primary; the semantic references are just speaker reference 
writ large. That is, it is commonly known who the referent is because speaker 
information about that referent is commonly shared, and known to be shared through 
particular communicative exchanges. Sometimes the semantic reference may be 
incorrect but the speaker reference is not when one speaker knows the real referent but 
all others believe incorrectly some other to be that referent. Of course it also happens 
that sometimes the semantic referent is the correct one and the speaker referent is 
misguided. But in most cases they indeed do seem to coincide; referential use of 
language could not work efficiently if they did not. 
 
Another way to put my view is that the speaker reference is thinker reference: the 
referent is that individual to whom one thinks he is referring via the thoughts he takes 
to be about that referent, i.e. what the sense he grasps individuates. Contrary to what 
often seems to be assumed the semantic reference is then not a property of the 
linguistic expression in question. The semantic reference is in this sense just a mass 
phenomenon: there is semantic reference, a community-wide reference, when 
information about the referent is shared and is known so to be. Therefore one’s 
speaker reference coheres, or does not as the case may be, with the semantic reference. 
 
In the Feynman case this means that the man in the street in the example does not refer 
uniquely to Richard Feynman, the famous physicist. This is the judgement the Fregean 
sense theory implies. So because the mere causal links are not to be trusted, as I 
argued, Kripke’s Feynman example can only stand if it invokes a tacit application of 
deference thereby giving substance to the semantic perspective from which Kripke 
amasses his argument. The intuition on which Kripke bases his claim that the man 
does nevertheless refer to Richard Feynman is not scrutinized sufficiently at all. And 
moreover in that role Kripke´s intuition seems to be the result of the community-wide 
information about Feynman, for so much is known about Feynman that it is in fact 
impossible for Kripke, or for any other academic to have escaped being 
"contaminated" by parts of that information about Feynman. To even to begin to show 
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his case a direct-causal theorist would need to present a “null case”, i.e. give an 
example of a proper name about the bearer of which nothing non-trivial is known. But 
then the claim that the proper name in question is used determinately to refer becomes 
a slender one; or that is what I predict will happen if queried of ordinary speakers. 
 
What about the Gödel case? It challenges the sufficiency of the role of the senses in 
reference with proper names. Here again the rivalry between the semantic and the 
speaker reference is decided in favour of the former notion without any cogent 
argument, but only by invoking a referential intuition that that is what we would say, 
or that is how we feel about the proper referent of the name "Gödel". Kripke says that 
"we simply are not" referring to Schmidt by "Gödel" (Kripke 1972: 294). But in 
similar terms the case is informationally contaminated to begin with. I want to 
maintain that if the sense the speaker has associated with "Gödel", expressed by the 
description "the discoverer of the incompleteness of arithmetics", when Schmidt is the 
discoverer of the incompleteness, "Gödel" refers in his idiolect to Schmidt. No doubt 
"Gödel" refers to Kurt Gödel in the idiolects of those who know more about Gödel 
(the more so if some of them happened to belong to the very small class of his 
acquaintances). That is the semantic reference of "Gödel". That the semantic and the 
speaker references are in genuine competition here would be revealed if some of 
Gödel´s acquaintances were to meet the innocent and they started to talk about 
mathematical logic. Presumably it would soon dawn upon that what the innocent has 
been talking about, when using "Gödel", has not been what the acquaintances have 
been talking about (namely Kurt Gödel). (Of course the innocent would most likely be 
corrected and thereby taken in to the network of the semantic reference of "Gödel".) In 
other words Kripke´s example is ruined from the very beginning, just as his Feynman 
case is. The intuition that tells that we all simply are referring to Gödel by "Gödel", 
and to Feynman by “Feynman”, could not be trusted because of this defect. Were we 
all as informationally poor as the speakers in the examples, it would become very 
uncertain indeed that by "Gödel" and “Feynman”, with the associated senses, we 
would be all referring to Kurt Gödel and Richard Feynman. (The same verdict goes 
with Devitt´s two first arguments because they are in effect the same as Kripke´s.) 
 
To remind the reader, remember that the counter "the causal links and the intentions to 
co-refer guarantee the right referent" will not do anymore, for that counter was argued 
down above. Neither succeeds the counter that I am not entitled to informational 
considerations because proper names do not refer by the senses. There are two reasons. 
First, as I argued above, information does have a central role to play in individuating 
referents. Second, the counter is really based on the conception that because the modal 
and epistemological arguments are sound the senses are not relevant to the issue. But 
those arguments fail, so this conception becomes irrelevant. As I already pointed out 
the corollary from all this is that the only way Kripke and Devitt would have 
succeeded in making a plausible argumentative case would have been by constructing 
an informational "null case" so that the proper name would not be informationally 
contaminated from the start. That way the examples, and the use of intuitions, would 
not be open to the charge of in effect begging the question. (It seems that the Homer 
case is a better example, and close to a null case, than the Gödel example. But then, as 
I argued, the direct-causal theory receives no support from Homer.) 
 
What is however adequate in Kripke´s and Devitt´s examples is that they show that 
proper names can be used deferentially. The very distinction of the semantic and the 
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speaker reference is motivated in part by that distinction. The essence of deferentiality 
(and not just with respect to proper names) is trust. That is, in using a proper name 
about the bearer of which one knows nothing nontrivial, or too little by way of the 
unique individuation of that bearer (as with the description "famous physicist"), one 
typically associates with it a belief that it genuinely refers because it is in current use 
in one´s linguistic community (or subcommunity). One trusts the other speakers being 
competent, speakers who know what they are talking about. I would like to propose 
that this metasupposition associated with proper names, and referring expressions in 
general, manifests in part the function of proper names, i.e. their being used as naming 
devices, singling out certain individuals ("tagging") with the help of the related 
information (=senses expressed by descriptions). This metasupposition is in full force 
practically in all deferential language use. But deferential practice could not be used as 
an argument against the “Fregean description theory” for the simple reason that that 
theory is entitled to include the deferential practice as well. So the postulation of 
deferential practice, and “name-producers” versus “name-consumers”, is no invention 
by the direct-causal theorists. 
 
However I should like to point out that the deferential practice with respect to proper 
names may not be that extensive as the direct-causal theorists invariably like to make it 
seem. That is, are we really as deferential as the direct-causal lore would have us to 
be? That issue is straightforwardly empirical and so a potential object of study. To my 
experience – by listening to conversations – we use (at least purportedly) identifying 
descriptions, and invoke such information, to a surprising extent with the uses of 
proper names. In a way we are somewhat loath to be deferential: we strongly tend to 
need to know what we are talking about. That is why we ask questions like “Who is 
she?”, “What are you talking about?”: in short we yearn for identifying information. 
(That is not to deny that there are cases of “pure” deferentiality, but as said my 
suggestion is that they are minority compared to the claim of their extensiveness by of 
the direct-causalists.) 
 
In his book on metarepresentations Recanati explicates deference and uses also the 
notion of trust explicitly (Recanati 2000: 273). I accept his account in outlines. 
However I do not agree with Recanati’s statement that every language has a 
"deferential operator" related to it as a semantical factor. That seems not to be an 
unavoidable explanatory assumption. The notion of language related deferential 
operator should not be taken too literally. Rather I would say that there is a pragmatic 
factor (in the sense of wide pragmatics, see note 22) concerning communicative 
comprehensibility such that when one encounters an expression one does not 
comprehend, or comprehends only partially, one trusts that it has a sufficiently 
determinate sense which at least some of the other speakers in one’s linguistic 
community possess (the experts most likely) and to whom one can rely on, hence 
defer. So this supposition is a (wide) pragmatic guide, not a semantic one. And it 
seems to me to be also arguable that the pragmatic supposition, hence deference, 
manifests a particular form of our more general epistemic tendency to rely on those 
whom we know, or believe, to know more than ourselves about the specific matters 
under consideration. 
 
Another theorist that should be mentioned in this connection is Frank Jackson. There is 
clearly an affinity between his and my views on the referential workings of proper 
names by the non-experts (Jackson 2004: 270-3).  How close the affinity is would 
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require a further study, but the following has to do here. Jackson talks about 
“representational properties” related to expressions, whereas I emphasize the 
underlying “formal” or pragmatic modes of their use here. Still it is quite evident in 
Jackson’s presentation that the representational properties are about the general 
features of the contents of those expressions pertaining to the deferential features of 
them that the competent speakers understand (and can most likely state explicitly if 
asked to). 
 
The other side of the deferential coin has already been described: if one is not content 
with merely deferring, upon encountering a new proper name, one asks the speaker 
about the referent. One wants to become cognitively and epistemically competent 
speaker with respect to that name as are the others on whom one trusts. I think that it is 
deferentiality, based on the cognitive and epistemic trust, that also explains the 
division of the linguistic labour, the resorting to the experts as to the referents of and 
knowledge about particular terms. The division of the linguistic labour has usually 
been related to the natural kind terms, but it is obvious that it is a feature of linguistic 
practice in general, a fortiori it holds good with the deferential uses of proper names. 
 
That one is deferring does not entail that one is always referring vicariously by 
deference, as it were automatically by the references the experts make. It is not the 
case that the deferring speaker´s use of a proper name is, to put it picturesquely, 
absorbed into the domain of those who are able to refer identifyingly with it, if the 
informational connections to the latter are too indirect (or that there are no such at all). 
I just could not bring myself to accept that if there is no informational connection to 
the ignorant speaker it still is the case that the epistemic state of the community as 
whole he belongs to enables his deferrings to be genuine referrings. (And even here 
the right kind of the informational connection has to be spelled out in general.) That 
the deferring speaker does not refer automatically can be seen when those on whom he 
trusts do not in fact refer to anything either, as is the case when unbeknownst to them 
the purported referent does not exist. Conversely the references of those who can refer 
identifyingly do not automatically "radiate" back to the deferring speaker. Putnam, 
who introduced the division of the linguistic labour, formulates the issue just in this 
mysterious way, as if the knowledge the experts possess somehow subsumes also the 
innocent speakers, enabling the latter to refer because of the epistemic state of the 
linguistic community “as a whole” due to the knowledge possessed by the experts. He 
writes that "the way of recognizing possessed by the 'expert' speakers is also, through 
them, possessed by the collective linguistic body, even though it is not possessed by 
each individual member of the body…" (Putnam 1987c: 228), and "…individual 
psychological state certainly does not fix the extension; it is only the sociolinguistic 
state of the collective linguistic body to which the speaker belongs that fixes the 
extension." (Putnam 1987c: 229). But to my mind this is simply too general and too 
idealized in that it blurs the sound distinction between knowing nothing individuating 
and knowing something individuating. In other words, in his attempts to avoid the 
sense theoretic view and to defend the causal view Putnam – like the other direct-
causal theorists - has gone too far in trying to retain a robust notion of reference - too 
robust in fact. It seems to me that if we go all the way with Putnam´s view, we are led 
to the position in which we could not help but maintain that we all do refer by all the 
referring terms we use in our linguistic community, as long as there is one expert with 
respect to the particular term used. I surmise that this view would turn out to be 
contrary to facts, were we to ask the other speakers in our respective linguistic 
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communities at large. It also seems to me that it is very unlikely that the speakers 
would take themselves to be such vicariously referential omnipotents. The case is 
instead that at most the innocent speakers, with respect to many terms - especially the 
esoteric scientific natural kind terms - would say that they “sort of” refer to the bearers 
of those terms, but not really and that is because they know so little about their 
extensions. Ditto for proper names. 
  
The deferential supposition does not differentiate between the sense and the direct-
causal theory of reference, however. This follows from it being pragmatic and not a 
semantic factor. It could be that others are competent, and one´s trust on them is 
reliable because they have identifying knowledge about the referent, so that it is 
practically certain that the referent exists. Or they may be competent with the name 
because there is an uncut, reliable, information transferring connection from the 
referent to the current uses of the name. (Normally when there is an epistemically 
reliable relation there is also a causal connection; indeed in most cases they coincide 
extensionally, or so I will argue a little later.) One can say that the deferencing speaker 
with respect to a particular proper name is temporarily cognitively and epistemically 
blind. That is precisely why he has to trust the other speakers. The blindness is total 
when he possesses no (nontrivial) information about the referent neither knows 
anything about the causal routes of the name (except the last proximal part via which 
he acquired the name). 
 
The Fregeans can accept deference if the reservations from the informational contacts 
are taken into account. But even then deference is sometimes only a form of vicarious 
reference in that it is not quite genuine reference. The reason is that its success 
depends on there being knowledgeable speaker with respect to the proper name in 
question. The speaker reference is not fully genuine in such cases, but it is not to be 
absorbed to the side of the semantic reference either. Only when the ignorant speaker 
becomes to know identifying information about the referent do the speaker and the 
semantic references coincide (provided tat that information is sufficiently widely 
known). So we see that the Fregean reading of the notions of deference and speaker 
reference are more constrained than the direct-causal theory reading. And that I take to 
be an explanatory virtue. 
 
We still have to deal with Devitt´s third argument, i.e. those cases when a description, 
or descriptions (expressing the sense) does or do not apply to or fit to anyone or it is 
false, but the proper name in question still refers. I deal with that argument in section 
4.2.5 for it can be put in a better argumentative service there on behalf of my account. 
Here I just explicate the run of the argument. The claim of the direct-causal theory is 
that there is a genuine reference made by a proper name even when the descriptions all 
fail to be true of that referent. (No one of them applies; all misdescribe.) To the extent 
that the claim leans on deferentiality it carries no argumentative weight against the 
“Fregean description theory”, as we just saw. But what about if there are no experts to 
whom to defer? (Here the Fregean and the description theorists’ verdict is that the 
proper name does not refer at all.) To the extent the claim, now without the role of the 
experts, leans on the intact causal links it carries no explanatory weight, either; that 
was also argued above. So what is left with that argument? Only that it seems to has an 
intuitive feeling about it. And what that feel  is based on will be explained in section 
4.2.5, thus to further disarm the direct-causal theory. But before that a word or two 
about the meanings of proper names is in order. 
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I have been talking quite extensively about information and information transmission 
through the referential uses of language. The neo-Fregeans have also put that notion in 
good use, see for example (Evans 1982) and (Luntley 1999). But how does 
information specifically relate to my Fregean view? At this point, as a prelude to 
chapters 6, 7 and 8, I need to provide a preliminary answer to this question. I will get 
to the relevance of information in a roundabout way by first discussing the meaning of 
proper names. Of course this might feel at least as a minor shock to some readers, for 
the consensus view has quite a long been that proper names do not have meanings. But 
let us see about that now. 
 
I argued that contrary to what the direct-causal theorists have presupposed the Fregean 
theory has nothing to do with strong semantic demands like providing proper names 
with descriptive synonymies. This is the basic conception the direct-causal theorists 
have of the “traditional theories” of meaning. Just because they argued that the 
Fregean - and the description - theory fail to give such meaning equivalences they 
were led to the view that proper names do not have meanings. 
 
There is also another way the direct-causal theorists have argued for their view, a way 
that adheres closely to the Millian tenet inherent in their theory. According to that 
argument proper names differ from the general nouns in that the latter have 
connotations (=meanings) whereas the former do not. For instance the term “chair” 
means, roughly, a portable object, natural but usually artifactual, primarily used for 
sitting. Proper names do not have meanings in any comparable sense; they just are 
“non-connotative appellations”, tags. Not even does the name “Dartmouth” mean “the 
mouth of Dart” but is just the name of a town. (Though that it is located at the mouth 
of the river Dart may have played a role in fixing the town as the referent of 
“Dartmouth”. That is, I am talking about Dartmouth 50 21 N, 3 35 W, not Dartmouth, 
Canada, 44 40 N, 63 30 W, let alone the Ivy League university.) 
 
The weakness of this line of arguing is that synonymies and analyticities (and such 
semantic notions) do not exhaust the domain of meaning. (If they did, even according 
to the direct-causal theorists own lights, they would not have proposed meaning 
theories for the natural kind terms like that of Putnam’s.) It should be noted that there 
is a general meaning theory for proper names that to me seems more of a degenerate 
descendant from the synonymy view than a substantial meaning theory. In the formal 
mode it says that the meaning of a proper name “NN” is “the individual called ‘NN’”. 
This is intersubjectively sufficiently uniform, as is easy to see. But as I will argue in 
the next section that view spells out but only the function of the proper name as 
naming devices. 
 
To mention it once again, Frege pointed out explicitly in his Aristotle note – and what 
he said he did not modify later on – that people have different senses related to the 
same proper name. To me at least this is tantamount to the denial of any 
intersubjectively uniform synonymies between the ordinary proper names and the 
definite descriptions. But by no means does it follow that on the Fregean view the 
ordinary proper names do not have meanings. Quite the contrary: I propose that the 
Fregean senses constitute those meanings. The crucial question that should be asked – 
and should have been asked back in the 1960s - is how to draw the line between those 
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senses, or sense elements, that contribute to the meaning of a proper name and those 
that do not. Or are all senses relevant possessed by an individual speaker? 
 
The answer to the latter question is no. We have already encountered the reason for 
that: when a proper name has, for an individual speaker, only a general concept related 
to it, that name does not refer individuatively. That was the lesson we learned from the 
Feynman example: the sense expressed by “famous physicist” has as its extension the 
class of famous physicists only. Hence only identificatory senses are relevant. 
(However those senses can be expressed by structurally more complex concept 
expressions, like “the pupil of Plato”, when they have an unsaturated functional 
element - “the pupil of _” – and the “saturating” element – “Plato” together in one 
overall structure.) But that is all that is required of them. So when the descriptive 
senses one relates to the name “Aristotle” are, for instance, “the most famous pupil of 
Plato”, “the author of Poetica and De Anima” and “the teacher of Alexander the 
Great”, these express the meaning of “Aristotle” for that speaker. Contrary to the 
direct-causal theorists view there is no relevant difference to how the general terms 
like common nouns and predicates pick up their extensions, except that in the latter 
cases there is an additional step involved in the Fregean view. That is the step from the 
sense of a concept word to the concept itself, and then to its extension consisting of the 
objects characterized by the concept. But the referential structure is the same, in both 
cases ending up with objects. The only difference is the ranges of the objects: the 
general terms refer to classes of individuals, i.e. they refer collectively (or 
distributively); proper names refer to individuals separately.  But that does not suffice 
for any arguments to the effect that proper names do not have meanings. 
 
The meanings of the general terms can then be taken to be individuative as well. They 
individuate the classes of objects (but also substances like water). The classes consist 
of individuals that are in their turn individuated by more focusing meanings (=senses). 
There is nothing qualitatively, let alone metaphysically, different in the manner the 
meanings of the general terms relate to things from the manner the meanings of proper 
names relate. The meaning of a general term differentiates its extension from the 
extensions of the other general terms; the meaning of a proper name differentiated its 
referent from the referents of the other proper names. 
 
Now we can turn to the role of information transmission in communicative exchanges. 
Speakers use descriptively expressed information related to proper names in question 
when they talk about the happenings and whereabouts of other individuals. The 
information these descriptions transmit becomes to form the senses, or elements of 
them, of proper names. Some senses are immediately individuating, “one-shot” senses, 
like the one expressed by the description “the fifth president of Finland”. Of course it 
must be realized that the individuating effect is relative to what the speaker knows at 
that moment: if one does not know what president is, or what Finland is, it is unlikely 
that the description speaker-refers uniquely to Risto Ryti – or for the audience.) The 
senses of some proper names become individuating only in piecemeal fashion. For 
instance none of the following descriptions make a unique reference to an individual 
but together they do: “was nearly killed at Mommila in November 1917”, “was the 
head of the board of the Bank of Finland”, “was the president of Finland”. 
 
Linguistically speaking proper names have meanings and cognitively speaking they 
have senses. That is, proper names have meanings because they have senses. And 
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those senses are what the speaker “grasps” when he acquires information about the 
individuals to whom the names refer. The grasping of most sense elements need not be 
conscious. All in all, then, I conclude that the claims to the effect that proper names do 
not have meanings, but only refer and tag, are based on a misconception of what 
meanings are in general and what the senses are in particular. It seems to me that the 
claim that proper names have no meanings is the result of a myopic view. By this I 
mean that those who have so claimed have been unable to take a step back and look at 
the issue afresh. For I surmise that if they had done that, it would not have been likely 
that it had escaped their notice that they have in fact mistook the multiplicity of the 
senses related to proper names for the lack of their meanings. This myopia is 
understandable to some extent because the meanings of the general terms – common 
nouns and predicates – are relatively easy to explicate, at least to the extent that their 
characterizing features can be agreed on by most speakers. (That does not mean that 
they possess necessary and sufficient conditions – as indeed they seem not to.) But just 
because a particular proper name usually has quite a many pieces of information 
related to it, hence multiplicity of the sense elements, it is all too easy to lose sight of 
that fact and be led to think that proper names do not have any meanings at all. 
 
That proper names do have meanings, not a single uniformly shared piece of 
information descriptively expressible, is still denied by the direct-causal theorists. As I 
already mentioned for example Scott Soames writes that there are no uniform 
meanings (or senses) that proper names have, hence they are not synonymous to any 
definite descriptions: “However, there is no substantial descriptive content associated 
with [simple proper names – like “Soames”] that remains constant across all 
contexts…” (Soames 2002: 26); see also (Soames 2005) in many places). I think that it 
is a high time that we turn this direct-causal tide and accept that proper names do have 
meanings, or contents, in a perfectly natural sense of that notion that does not lay any 
demand on the meaning being constant and shared by all competent speakers. 
Therefore we could do well to discard all synonymy demands of them also. 
 
It also seems to me that there is no qualitative semantical difference between proper 
names and the common nouns when looked at from the point of view according to 
which meaning is what relates to an expression in such a way that enables us to use it 
in communication. According to that view we have general characterizations of, say, 
chairs and humans, but like with the latter class of entities – and their names – we 
could (begin to) name chairs and relate their particular properties like colours and 
shapes to those individual names. That would obviously facilitate the individuative and 
identificatory aspects of our “chair talk”. (Think of a hypothetical sect that worships 
chairs as gods.) Us humans being what we are, then, it would be no wonder at all that 
the meanings of proper names contain much specific information; chairs are rather 
static entities and their uses are few. In other words those who have thought that 
semantically the common nouns differ from proper names have confused the level of 
extension-characterizing information with some principled semantic category. 
 
Note, by the way, that uncovering that confusion gives further support to my view that 
the referential use of language is a form of human action, and indicates that it involves 
a ground for a generalization (the substance of which I will not develop here): 
semantics of the linguistic expressions is subordinate to the uses of those expressions. 
And because these uses require information meaning requires information. Therefore 
the particular things in the extension of the common nouns are used the way they are; 
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it is indifferent to us in most cases what particular individual belonging to the 
extension in question relates to the utterances (a chair is a chair is a chair). The 
semantics of those expressions, i.e. their meanings, is left at the general level of 
characterization. 
 
The general change of perspective I suggest here is based on the following 
observation. Proper names and the general terms have been taken to be semantically 
different classes of expressions because they have been focused on from the linguistic 
perspective. (But then again, in a way, how else they could have been looked at in the 
philosophy of language?) But if we adopt the neuroscientific and in general 
neuronaturalistic perspective, and focus on the linguistic expressions across the board 
as “tools of the brain”, it is no longer adequate to compartmentalize proper names and 
the general terms. The reason is that the way the brain works – gathers and utilizes 
information in commerce with both external and internal reality – allows us to make 
no explanatory semantical difference between these two classes of expressions. As I 
argued the only relevant difference is about the range of the referents of the respective 
expressions. From the semantic, a fortiori referential point of view that is accidental. 
 
Of course it could be claimed, similarly to Kripke but forgetting the synonymy 
demand, that if the meanings of proper names are just the pieces of information about 
the bearers, the interest of the Fregean sense as well as the description theory 
diminishes too much. This claim needs to be answered, not because it could be correct 
but because it brings the background of the issue out in the open. The situation 
changes 180°: the reasonable sense and description theorists have not ever demanded 
anything stronger than that the senses and the descriptions function as the factors 
which single out the referents. In particular no uniform, “constant content”, related to 
any proper name has been claimed to exist. So the diagnosis is that the direct-causal 
theorists have mistakenly thought that they have been occupying the reasonable 
ground all along – the ground in which the sense and the description theorists have in 
fact been standing even before them. Only by believing (and propagating) the view 
that the sense and the description theorists have been committed to the theory of the 
meaning of proper names in some semantically strong sense like providing 
synonymies (“constant content”) have the direct-causalists’ arguments been able to 
gain credibility. But that credibility should vanish the very moment we realize that it 
has been based on an utter straw man as to the meaning theory of proper names 
allegedly held by the sense and the description theorists. The general argument is that 
to infer from the lack of synonymy to the non-existence of the meanings of proper 
names is non sequitur. The inference would go through only if synonymy (and such 
strong, maybe even too idealized, notions) was the sole semantic notion involved (or 
even relevant). But it is not; only the too narrow theoretical and methodological 
climate back in the 1960s has made it look so. 
 
It also seems to me that the multiplicity of the pieces of information is, in effect at 
least, the same thing as Recanati talks about in his theory and by which he explains the 
direct referentiality of proper names and the feature REF (Recanati 1993). This 
observation is supported also by the tendency to relate direct reference of proper 
names with the “no meaning” view. However Recanati argues for that view by stating 
that proper names have linguistic meanings: this is what I called above the “degenerate 
descendant view” from the synonymy demands: that the meaning of a proper name 
“NN” is “the individual called ‘NN’” (or some equivalent to that). This may be an 
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acceptable middle position between the stringent synonymy view and the Fregean 
view because it is about the linguistic meaning: the Fregean view is primarily about 
the cognitive meaning. (And Recanati is a neo-Fregean in that he postulates 
“psychological” modes of presentations also.) 
 
That proper names have meanings but that they are accessed mostly tacitly in use and 
so need not even be descriptively articulatable in all cases is strongly indicated by 
those proper names that have become to “live their own lives”. These names include 
the names of the famous figures like “Einstein”. It is rather common to hear it said that 
someone is “a little Einstein” or, maybe more often, “you are no Einstein”. What the 
former utterance is understood to be saying (or implicated or whatever – I do not care 
here for the Gricean distinctions) is that one is bright and imaginative, and the latter 
that one certainly is not. These uses of “Einstein” would not be comprehensible at all if 
people did not relate certain properties to that name, based on the character and 
achievements of Albert Einstein, the physicist and natural philosopher. These 
properties are what the senses, i.e. the meanings, of proper names express. 
 
There are also two corollaries we can draw from the above observation. The first is 
that the category of “partially descriptive names” that Scott Soames has argued for 
(Soames 2002) is not a distinct category of referring expressions on its own right. The 
descriptive names – like “Mt. McKinley” and “professor Saul Kripke” – just make 
explicit the most central piece(s) of information as elements of the meanings of those 
names. For example “Mt. McKinley” makes it explicit that “McKinley” is – of course 
– ambiguous but because of that very ambiguousness it has become common practice 
to disambiguate its uses to refer to the mountain (location at Alaska 63 4N, 151 0W; 
6194 meters high). If the “simple” proper names functioned in the common use as 
directly referential tags there would not be any semantic need to invoke explicitly an 
identifying descriptive element. 
 
The second corollary is that proper names are not only direct naming devices. The 
reason is the tacit (descriptively expressible) meaning elements. In fact this is rather 
obvious when something is said about someone by using a proper name. As an 
example: “He’s a regular Koba”: “To say of someone ‘he’s a regular Koba’ was to 
accuse him of impropriety, foulmouthedness and lack of moral refinement.” (Hingley 
1974: 39) Or consider the shout I heard recently during a heated debate “don’t Bush 
it!” I take it that the shouter warned the other to remain within the sphere of decent 
argumentation. Obviously these utterances and many like them make sense only 
because proper names used have such information related to them that is commonly 
known to characterize the intended bearers of the names. So proper names can be used 
also predicatively and not only referentially, contrary to the view in the direct-causalist 
camp.13 
 
It seems to me also that, as a corollary to the second corollary, Recanati’s account of 
direct referentiality as being a type of reference (see section 3.4) is not sound. Recanati 
argues that proper names are type-referential, i.e. that they are not just used 
referentially (as for example are the descriptions according to Donnellan’s referential-
attributive distinction) but are nothing but always directly referential as syntactic and 
semantic types of expressions. But if some proper names are used as predicative 
expressions, it immediately follows that proper names are not type-referential as such. 
They are only as token-referential as the descriptions used referentially. That proper 
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names function in almost every case of their use as referring devices should not be 
mistook for the lack of the possibility of predicative use. So the referentiality of proper 
names is only a statistical phenomenon, not the sole function of them. (In the next 
section I will also argue that the feature REF that Recanati relates to the directly 
referential terms is neither the sole feature of proper names.) 
 
???????????????????????????????????????????????
 
I have been arguing that information carried by the communicative causal chains, not 
the chains themselves, is what guarantees the retention of the referents of proper 
names. As I mentioned among the neo-Fregeans Gareth Evans already focused on the 
role of information. But he discussed mainly demonstratives and indexicals. In general 
the neo-Fregeans including later writers like Recanati (1993) and Michael Luntley 
(1999) have not scrutinized the nature of information at any deeper level. They have 
been content with coarse taxonomies like perceptual information. So my approach here 
– and in the following chapters – is an attempt to improve on the usual way of thinking 
about information relevant to reference. 
 
In light of the essential role of information being the decisive factor in reference the 
direct-causal theorists could change their argumentative gear and suggest the 
following. They may admit that the Fregean theory, in its modern informational 
version, does explain how we use proper names in communication, i.e. locally. But the 
causal story explains why there is the continuity in those uses, i.e. why the Fregean 
factors are able to accomplish their referential task. But this suggestion will not stand 
closer scrutiny. To show why that is so I want to radicalize ontologically the argument 
from “no causal links but only information”. I argue that there are no causal chains 
qua causal, but only qua information transfers. Therefore the causal chains the direct-
causal theory postulates are even powerless as explanatory factors. The argument is 
quite straightforward. What the direct-causal theorists have been talking about are in 
fact informational relations through and through. To understand this let us take a 
general look at what really takes place in so-called causal interactions. When an event 
is causally preceding another, i.e. when we talk about something causing something 
other to happen, we are in fact talking about information transfers (or information 
chains, if you like). The talk about causal relations is only a folk idea about contact 
relations that taxonomizes events in contrast to others. For instance a billiard ball 
contacting another due to which event the second ball moves is said to be a causal 
event. But what happens is that (part of) the momentum of the first ball is transferred 
to the second. Or in biochemical process calcium ions inside a neuron get into contact 
with the protein kinase molecules and that contact changes the conformation of the 
latter, which in turn changes their ranges of activity. Of this process we say that the 
second messengers caused a cascade of changes that eventually leads to gene 
expression. When a sentence follows from another, as when one applies modus 
ponens, that relation is logical; still the information the sentences express drives the 
inference. And when you say "Aljechin was the most creative chess player so far" you 
transmit the information your remark expresses (i.e. your thought). If I know who 
Aljechin was, if I am able to identify him, hence know to whom you referred, I may 
agree with you. If I do not know who Aljechin was, presumably I ask you. Still, 
information has been transmitted. So instead of plain causal relations we should be 
talking about the different kinds of relations of information transfer, at least in the 
appropriate philosophical and scientific contexts. 
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It is true that we do not yet know much about the structure and dynamics of 
information and how they constitute the informational interactions. Neither is this the 
place to engage in that study, the “metaphysics of information”. But as a modest 
hypothesis I want to propose that information is what emerges in the interactions of the 
different structures of matter and energy at all levels of reality. Change the 
surroundings of the type of interaction and you might have an interaction with 
different information involved (like when the same syntactical expression has a 
different meaning in different contexts). And it might be that these “levels” are 
themselves only relatively robust dynamical structures of matter-energy, i.e. maybe 
reality is information through and through. Everything that is, is in unceasing bath of 
information, inside out and vice versa. But information is not substance; rather it is 
intertwined processes. My argument is then that the causal connections as such do not 
explain anything. It is the information transmitted, and utilized in the cognitive 
contexts, that counts explanatorily. (In some cases it may even be that the medium is 
the message; the alluded biochemical processes seem to be this kind of information 
transmissions. Anyway, even if the medium-message distinction is ubiquitous it does 
not affect my argument either; at the level of reference only the message counts, not 
the medium by which it is carried.) 
 
It is rather trivial that the causal links have been selected in the folkish conception as 
the installations of the mechanism of reference. For in the great majority of cases there 
are intact causal links. But that is because the information is smoothly transmitted; 
because of that we know whom we are talking about in those cases. (Of course we add 
to the information by associating pieces of other information, and by inferring new 
pieces from the acquired ones.) The essential point is that the causal links, if such there 
are qua causal, at most only carry the information. Therefore it is very easy to 
understand why the misplacement of the real explanatory factor of reference has taken 
place: we have a deep entrenched image of causal connections – like lines connecting 
things - and we are not used to think that the simple connections, by whatever physical 
media, really consist of the varieties of information transmitted. (We do not perceive 
the information an sich. But it is there, and our brains pick it up and utilize it.) 
 
My general argument is then that the direct-causal theorists could not have recourse to 
the claim that we need not know anything about the causal links for there still to be 
genuine reference. They could not do that because there are no causal links qua causal; 
it is all information transmission. And that requires – I would even be willing to 
suggest that it nomologically requires – that for information to be functional it must be 
registered and be tuned to, i.e. the receiving end must be able to utilize it. (If there 
were no “utilization” of it, there would be no effects.) In the case of the referential use 
of language that tuning on is the ability – on the basis of already acquired information 
and inferences – to pick up individuative information about the referents of proper 
names. 
 
The direct-causal theorists are likely to object. They can ask "does not this radical 
picture on information transfer succumb to the argument that, with respect to the sense 
theory of reference, it could not as such differentiate between information and 
misinformation?". That is, my proposed view of the information transfer, instead of the 
causal relations as such, does not explain the fact that in the communicative exchanges 
there are occasionally transfers of misinformation in which no true (non trivial) 
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information is given (or implied). Is not one forced to maintain in regard of such cases 
that because no correct piece of information helps to retain the referent, it must be 
(even if only what we call folkishly) the causal connections that only count 
referentially in retaining the referent? According to this argument the causal 
connections, so to speak, are revealed as referential through the fog of the 
misinformation they carry. In other words, do not the causal connections nevertheless 
seem sufficiently robust by themselves? If that were so the direct-causal theorists 
could then conclude that there are referential uses of proper names, the associated 
information of which is false but which still do refer. Hence the sense and the 
description theories fail after all. Here is then the crucial version of Devitt´s third 
argument from the inapplicable descriptions but still referring name, the version that I 
mentioned quickly earlier. If my arguments up till now are correct, this is the last straw 
for the direct-causal theorist to clutch. But it also sinks as I will argue at length in the 
rest of this section. 
 
The explanation the direct-causal theory gives for this referential claim is that there is 
a causal chain of the uses of the proper name originating from the naming of the 
referent. But I argued above that the causal communicative exchanges, even fortified 
with the intentions to co-refer, do not suffice to retain the referents. So we seem to be 
back at the level of the intuitive support to the direct-causal theory. At that level the 
core question that never seems to have been asked is why does the causal connection 
seem so strong a factor that it is claimed to overrun the (mis)informational impacts 
associated with proper names? Why does this intuition seem to have so strong a grip 
on most of the direct-causal theorists in the way that it is let to discard the at least as 
strong empirical facts showing the informationally driven referential communication 
with proper names, facts which do not support the direct-causal theory?14 
 
One must realize that the clash here is a symptom of a deep underlying difference 
between the sense and the direct-causal theory. When the issue is viewed from the 
dialectical angle the direct-causal theorists adopt, the causal connection easily seems 
compelling over the senses as the explanation of the mechanism of reference. But 
when it is viewed from the angle of the actual communicative exchanges the sense 
theory overruns the direct-causal considerations: in most cases we do not have access 
to the causal history of the name; we could only use the information associated with 
the names. The reason is simple: the past causal connections are out of our current 
control. And as we saw they are out of our control even when guided by the intentions 
to co-refer: there is no purely causal guarantee that the referent would not have 
changed. In other words a successful reference borrowing needs support from the 
informational factors. (To object that the direct-causal theory does not require us to 
have an access to the causal links is correct but helps not a whit because, as I argued, it 
leaves the retention of the original referent as the referent unexplained.) 
 
In personal communication Panu Raatikainen has pointed out to me that the causal 
links being out of our control is also Kripke’s view. However I am not claiming that it 
is not. My argument is that because we rarely do know the past causal route, the claim 
that those links constitute reference is much too weak as an explanatory claim; indeed 
it is much too unconstrained even with the intentions to co-refer. The intentions bring 
needed cognitive respectability to the direct-causal theory but that is still explanatorily 
much too weak. With this meager cognitive resource we are unable to assure ourselves 
that the communicative causal links are preserved intact from the naming to the 
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current uses of the name. Taken purely causally a proper name might refer or it might 
not for all we know, and there is nothing we can do about it. (Except if we can control 
the causal route at the very communicative situation with the presence of the referent.) 
A quick argument that shows the danger of the uncontrollability of the past causal 
links is that there may be cases in which we use proper names exactly the same way as 
usual but without knowing that they do not refer to anything. In such cases the causal 
links have become cut or the individuals we purportedly refer to do not even exist. 
That such cases are rare, for all we know, speaks not for the causal but for the 
informational retention of the referents. (As an example consider the postulated planet 
Vulcan to explain the anomalous Newtonian orbit of Mercury.) 
 
Put in another way the charge is that the notion of reference given to us by the direct-
causal theory is too idealized, and too simplistic, for it to be able to explain the 
referential practices. The fact is that in the actual practice of the referential language 
use we eventually do require cognitive control over the referents of proper names. That 
is, even if we tend to defer we trust, and demand if need be, that some users of proper 
names do know what and whom they are talking about, i.e. are able to individuate the 
referents sufficiently well. The names have also an epistemic role in that the 
representations of their (purported) referents qua referents are situated within our 
beliefs. (These are sometimes called “notional worlds”.) Epistemically speaking it is 
the overall coherence and cohesion that counts with the uses of proper names. The 
direct-causal theory just fails to account for that. 
 
But let us suppose both that information is discarded and that the causal-cum-
communicative factors do not suffice by themselves for the retention of the referents - 
what then will we find underlying the referential intuition invoked by the direct-causal 
theorists? It seems to me that in addition to the causal picture there is something 
having to do with proper names themselves from which the intuitive referential force 
of the names supposedly derives. This feature shows itself in those cases when there is 
no referent but a proper name is used as if there is such, i.e. when we do not (yet) 
know that there is no referent of the name in question. For the sake of the argument we 
can ignore the fact that even these uses of proper names take place with respect to an 
informational background, with respect to the beliefs purportedly about the referent 
and other things related to it. So all there is left in this type of case is the proper name 
itself and that it has been used as a genuinely referential expression. 
 
Some theorists have considered the view that the meaning of a proper name, "NN", is 
best explicated as "there is an individual called, or named, 'NN'" (Bach 1987; Recanati 
1993).15 This view seems to hit on some important property of proper names; it might 
even partly explain what is meant when it is said that proper names serve as mere tags 
("Proper names can perhaps be regarded as associated with the referential feature 
being named or commonly called 'NN'." (Evans 1982: 312, n.10)). But I propose that 
instead of explicating (only) the general linguistic meaning of proper names, it is far 
more fruitful to take the explication as an indication of the basic factor underlying all 
referential expressions. In developing this theme we can take as our starting point 
Recanati´s argumentation for the general meaning view with respect to proper names. 
Recanati postulates a property of directly referential singular terms he dubs REF: 
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"…referential terms have the following property: their meaning includes a special 
feature, which I dubbed "REF", by virtue of which they indicate that there is an 
object the referent of the term…" (Recanati 1989: 241) 
 
He also relates REF to thoughts and what he calls de re concepts of individuals (as the 
referents of proper names): 
 
"But, in another sense, it is possible to think about objects directly, thanks to the 
special nature of de re concepts. They are such that the thought in which they occur 
is intended to characterize the reference itself independently of its satisfying the 
very concept which is used to think of it. This property…is the mental counterpart of 
the feature REF in language. It is achieved by means of a simple architectural trick: 
putting our conceptions of an object in an informational file supposed to derive 
from that object makes it the case that a thought containing a pointer to that file is 
about the object itself." (Recanati 1993: 130) 
 
I would like to adopt the feature REF but transform it from the philosophical surface 
phenomenology of the referential expressions into a scientifically argued postulation 
belonging to the domains of developmental cognitive psychology and neurolinguistics. 
From this perspective it becomes clear that REF is indeed an indication of the basic 
function of the referring expressions, an indication of a developmentally fundamental 
mechanism functional in language learning. 
 
The studies of Jean Piaget, as well as many later ones, have shown that the sensomotor 
patterns of action begin to develop in the newborn infants from the very first 
encounters with their surroundings.16 It is arguable that this whole patterning is based 
in part on an innate neural specialization in service of the social behavior and the 
establishment of being in rapport with the entities in one´s surroundings (Brothers 
1990). Here I am interested in the relations of these patterns to language learning. I 
condense a long developmental story to a very short space, ostensive and 
demonstrative pointings shown to an infant by a caretaker, and then made by the infant 
itself, are not unproblematic. In other words learning takes time: the infant has to 
integrate the different factors that become to constitute the abilities to refer 
demonstratively. He has to learn from rudimentary gestures, gazes, touches and the 
caretaker´s vocalizations which of them go together in the intermodal perceptual and 
motor patterns with respect to which external objects. Later proper names form a 
special class of vocalizations (or so we may assume) in that most of the objects, of 
which they are vocalizations, are other humans like the caretakers, and that everyone 
has one’s own name (in contrast to general concept names like "chair"). It is likely that 
only after some time the infant will be able to comprehend the function of the names 
as naming devices from utterances like "this is Gottlob" and "Bertrand is sleeping". 
Then the infant begins to comprehend proper names as symbols that are used to refer 
to those certain individuals that they are the names of. This is one form of the birth of 
the symbol function. By that time the child has also learned to distinguish proper 
names from the common nouns, so he is able to comprehend the difference between 
proper names and the descriptions attributing properties to the bearers of the names. 
 
There is evidence that pointing has acquired referential function after about 7 months 
(Butterworth & Glover 1988; Messier & Collis 1996: 450). Recall that Devitt 
hypothesized that pointings are related to the referential abilities. Now we see that he 
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is basically correct when the relevance of the pointings is explained from the 
perspective of the developmental cognitive psychology. After pointing has become a 
robust function in the child’s cognitive tool kit (in the beginning of his "linguistic 
turn") there comes first the single-word utterances, then two-word utterances and so on 
to the fully structured sentences of one´s home language (or languages, as it might be). 
The learning of demonstratives and personal pronouns as well as indexicals as pointers 
to the surroundings takes time also. When the names of the pointed-out and reached-
for objects get linked to the information received from them (constituting the 
sensomotor and cognitive-perceptual information) the basic abilities (Devitt´s general 
abilities) of the referential use of language are in place. The specific individual 
abilities to refer that Devitt postulates can be explained as formed from the cognitive-
perceptual information one acquires upon encounters with the referents. (Later the 
connections become also indirect, as in reading about the referents). The connections 
of the specific abilities to the general ability to refer are cognitive: in hearing and in 
reading the name in question can engage the information related to it (its neural 
representation), and in thinking and in speaking that information (or parts of it) 
engages the name and its relation to the neural structure realizing the general ability to 
refer, thus producing the referential use of the name in question. (More about that in 
chapters 7 and 8.) 
 
I dare to propose that once the general and specific abilities have been acquired, with 
respect to proper names, the descriptions, demonstratives and indexicals, by then the 
child has acquired basic schema of reference. It is a functional neurocognitive and 
linguistic structure that enables us to deal with our surroundings, first literally by 
guiding hands and gazes and then linguistic expressions. Later when the child acquires 
more and more information about the world, the linguistic devices assume more and 
more the role of referring devices within the child's inner epistemic world; he 
hypothesizes, uses counterfactuals, engages in fiction and pretend-play with them. 
 
The basic schema of reference is not primarily a structural neural entity, a type-
identifiable structure. But as a structure it is functional one. It is the functionality 
which counts out the type identity, for, trivially, the blind, the deaf and the mute are 
able to use language referentially (natural or signed), but the relevant respective areas 
in their brains that would support the type-identification of the basic schema are 
lesioned as compared to normal speakers. Although I can not go into the details of the 
neural underpinnings here, the following must be said. Presumably the basic schema of 
reference consists of many networks (and networks of networks) from the primary 
receiving sensory areas to the secondary and the tertiary multimodal and associative 
regions, together with the subcortical nuclei, most likely thalamus, hippocampus and 
basal ganglia. Also Broca´s area seems to be involved for there is currently evidence 
that it partakes in ordering relations. As it happens additional support for the idea of 
the basic schema of reference can be found in the results that implicate a role for 
Broca´s area in the recognition of movements and action patterns and in their 
executions (Rizzolatti & Arbib 1998). A very interesting is also the suggestion made 
by Rizzolatti and Arbib that Broca´s area is a counterpart, a homolog in evolutionary 
terms, of the area F5 in the premotor cortex in monkeys. It is an area phylogenetically 
preceding the speech area in humans that also participates in other communicational 
functions. In other words the basic schema of reference could be a species-wide 
phylogenetic functional structure - humans only have succeeded in exploiting it 
massively with language. Broca´s area seems to be the place where it "all comes 
  85 
together", i.e. where the build up of the perceptual and cognitive information 
associated to the representations of individuals relate to the linguistic expressions and 
their utterings, these being the end products of the neurocognitive processes active in 
the particular occasions of the referential use of language. 
 
The philosophical point of the postulation about the basic schema of reference is that it 
explains the intuitive referential pull that we saw above proper names to possess. I 
further propose that this intuitive pull is also what Recanati´s feature REF indicates, 
and what Salmon is after with his notion of reference simpliciter (though he 
misconstrues it). All these rather fleetingly explicated notions owe their existence to 
the sensomotor and the cognitive-perceptual patterns which develop during the 
frequent ostensive and demonstrative encounters with one´s surroundings as an 
infant.17 Now the important argumentative point of all this is that the referential 
intuitions (and REF, reference simpliciter) are not primarily specific to proper names 
at all. They are the results of the more basic neurofunctional structure that makes 
possible our capacity to use all kinds of linguistic expressions to acquire specific 
referential function. Consequently the counterexamples to the Fregean theory given by 
the direct-causal theorists, in which the referential intuitions are called for help, have 
been misunderstood. Contrary to what is widely believed they do not point to primary 
semantical-cum-referential features of proper names, in contradistinction to the 
definite descriptions, but to the preconditions of any referential use of language. The 
basic schema does not favour proper names over the descriptions, or the 
demonstratives over the descriptions as (directly) referential devices. Without the 
development of the basic schema of reference no linguistic expressions could refer at 
all.18 
 
One can maintain, following Recanati´s account, that there is still a certain difference 
between proper names and the descriptions in that the former are clearly more directly 
referential than the latter. But it seems to me that what the persisting difference 
indicates is the rather obvious difference between proper names and the descriptions: 
the former name individuals whereas the latter do not (except when, as is sometimes 
said, "they have grown capital letters" like "the Holy Roman Empire"). The 
descriptions do not name but, well, descriptively characterize their referents. But 
notice that at the level of the modes of presentation proper names and the descriptions 
are on a par. As Recanati himself argues the mode of presentation of a proper name 
“NN” is the name “NN” itself with the meaning "the x called 'NN'". The mode of 
presentation of a description is, of course, the description itself (expressing part of the 
sense of the associated name). In other words, because in most cases the descriptions 
express parts of the senses of proper names, it is not to be wondered at that there is a 
difference between them with respect to their referential directness, i.e. between 
naming objects and specifying their properties. So if we were able to explain the 
difference between naming and specifying the referent, even when the referents of 
proper names can only be identified by their senses (parts of) which are expressed by 
the descriptions, we would have been able to account for our proposed extension of the 
feature REF. However I have to postpone that explanation for a while. 
 
So with the basic schema of reference the first intuition about the "intrinsic" referential 
force of proper names is answered. But what about the second intuition, the very 
causal picture which is supposed to display the referential power of the causal 
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connections from the referents to the later uses of their names? How can it be 
explained away? 
 
Let us begin with the causal picture itself. The Thales example can again be taken as 
the representative example of that picture. What is wrong with it is that it has been 
magnified to such a proportion that it has become to support a much too an idealized 
picture. One just could not help getting that impression from the example itself. There 
is the original referent of the name "Thales" and he is given that role because of the 
causal connections to the later uses of "Thales". There just is no room for error in this 
picture; the causal connections are supposed to be drawn and preserved intact. (If there 
were an error, for example a “cut”, the whole example would lose its relevance.) Now 
what are such situations of the referential language use where there are no errors, or at 
least the possibilities for errors are minimal? It needs only a quick reflection to see 
those are the demonstrative and the ostensive situations. These are the primary 
situations in which a speaker singles out his intended referent to his audience, and the 
audience comprehends (mostly by perceiving) what or who the intended referent is. 
 
To put this in another way I claim that the picture of reference which the direct-causal 
theorists have drawn is simply a generalization of demonstrative reference, and very 
idealized at that. The demonstrative references are those situations in which the 
speaker perceives the referent in his immediate vicinity - just as it is in those situations 
when the basic schema of reference develops. In reality the causal routes are 
spatiotemporally extended, hence at the mercy of the vagaries of all historical 
processes. But what is crucial in the direct-causal picture is that all the factors that are 
postulated to guarantee the determination of the referent are compressed into it, just as 
they are in the demonstrative situations. And just like in those situations, in the layout 
of the Thales example one takes himself, as the speaker, to be within it, even if within 
a short reflective distance. This tacit move is easily understood to have taken place 
because the fundamental mode of our referential Dasein is to be always "situated" in 
some particular surroundings of objects, persons and events. In the direct-causal 
picture one, so to speak, looks omnisciently at reference from the demonstrative 
perspective , i.e. as if one partakes in it as just in another demonstrative referential 
situation. 
 
I think that it adds force to this diagnosis when we take into account that it is 
sometimes claimed, on behalf of the primacy of the causal connections, that the 
referential case is parallel (i.e. stronger than analogous) to the perceptual case. In the 
latter case the causal connections are taken for granted as providing the most adequate 
explanation of perceiving something. For example Evans writes 
 
"The absurdity in supposing that the denotation of our contemporary use of the 
name 'Aristotle' could be some unknown (n.b) item whose doings are causally 
isolated from our body of information is strictly parallel to the absurdity in 
supposing that one might be seeing something one has no causal contact with solely 
upon the ground that there is a splendid match between object and visual 
impression." (Evans 1985a: 13) 
 
But it seems to me that it is precisely this "absurdity" that remains a real possibility 
because the parallel fails: presumably it would be absurd to maintain that someone was 
or did something if there were no causal contact whatsoever, but that just does not 
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extend to the language use in its entirety. The reason is that language is also stimulus 
independent vehicle of storing and transmitting information. That is, language use, 
especially referential use, enables us to talk about things to which we may not have 
any such causal connections that would amount to closeness to the object on which the 
causal theory of perception relies, and which Evans presupposes in the above 
quotation. Mere causal connections will not do for reference for the simple reason that 
there are too many of them, most of which presumably are fleeting and irrelevant even 
by the causal theorists´ own lights. The parallel Evans draws manifests again the tacit 
assimilation of the demonstrative situations and the presupposition of the general 
adequacy of the referential causal relations. 
 
But, as we have been seeing in this chapter, the vagaries in the causal routes of proper 
names destroy the idealization inherent in the causal picture; there are no causal 
guarantees against cut routes, mixed routes, meshed routes, diverging routes, and other 
such contingencies. The intentions to keep on co-referring will not do for the referent 
retention; for that informational impacts are required. The mistake of the direct-causal 
theorists is the age-old and familiar one discussed in the philosophy of science of 
causation. For instance, a match is lit and causes a fire. But it would not have caused 
the fire if no oxygen had been present, no appropriate materials had been present, the 
weather had been too windy, and other such conditions. In the referential case the sole 
operative cause has been taken to be the use of a proper name and the surrounding 
cognitive and informational conditions have been largely overlooked. But just as with 
the match causing the fire the surrounding conditions are at least as much needed for 
the referential effect. I would go as far as to state that, in both cases (and in such cases 
in general, of course) the surrounding conditions are the enabling causes. A robust 
referential route for a proper name is possible only because it transmits information 
about the referent.19 
 
It is understandable that the demonstrative situations have tacitly become the model 
for the direct-causal theorists: as I said our everyday Dasein is immediately contextual 
and we do not just speak about the things in our surroundings, we use and manipulate 
them as well. The causal connections because they are short and perceptually sharp, 
manifest themselves in these activities; touching and using objects is a form of 
demonstration. The causal events are "short" in that we usually manage fairly quickly 
to achieve the effects we intended; they are "sharp" in that at the perceptual level 
unexpected and loose effects like misperceptions are not common. The cause-effect 
events are typically quite isolated at the perceptual and practical level. So I propose 
that the natural explanation of that is the contribution of the basic schema of reference. 
For us that is just as well because it strongly indicates that behind the intuitions and the 
picture of the direct-causal reference there is in fact a single explanatory factor. The 
basic schema of reference, so to say, keeps the direct-causal theorists tacitly on its 
grip.20 
 
What comes to the Thales case, which has prompted the whole argument that the 
causal routes guarantee the reference of a proper name even when not a single piece of 
true information is known about the referent, the Fregean sense theoretic prediction 
prevails: when no true information is available we just do not refer by that name to 
anyone, or to anything, neither from the speaker´s reference perspective nor from the 
semantic reference perspective. If it is later discovered that there is a referent for that 
name, then only from that point on we would be referring to the bearer of that name, 
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but not before. In this case it even suffices that we only know that there is a referent; 
we need not know any specific descriptions of it, for we may have become to know 
that there is the referent by a source, or several sources, which only tell that the name 
"NN" was (or is) the name of NN, that NN was, indeed, called "NN". Or we may be 
able to infer from some other pieces of information that there was that NN.  (Or even 
that there was NN, who we call "NN" but who was back then not so called.) These 
sources may even deny explicitly that anything else is known about NN. Both of these 
types of knowledge are still sufficiently individuating in that we know that "NN" is a 
name of a certain individual. The reason is that the information the source conveys (or 
which we infer) relates NN, at least implicitly, to other pieces of our knowledge about 
the times and places which help to confer the epistemic reliability on the source. But if 
that "surrounding story" is lacking we do not accept the claim that there was NN but 
that we just know nothing about it (else than that it was called "NN"). That we do not 
accept that claim seems to be a common fact of our referential practices, but I also 
intend it to be adopted as a constraint on that practice: because the Fregean sense 
theory seems to be correct in informational terms, we should adjust our judgements 
with respect to such cases which have seemed problematic up till now and deny any 
purported references with a proper name when nothing is known about the purported 
referent. This shows clearly how the reference of proper names is deeply cognitive and 
epistemic matter. The causal connections are there but they are the information 
transmitting links from the sources to us and they are constituted by the cognitive 
activities of the speakers at the occasion they put the sources into use, i.e. understand 
what the sources say or imply about NN. 
 
So I urge that no matter how compelling the direct-causal intuitions may feel to so 
many, they should be shrugged off, because they are misinterpreted and much too 
idealized even then. They indicate nothing with respect to the referent retention of 
proper names. The demonstrative picture underlying the direct-causal theory and the 
referential intuitions are just those general but deep-entrenched, mostly tacit, 
conceptions through which we become used to perceive and manipulate things. Instead 
I propose that we take a fresher look at what really takes place in communicative 
exchanges. That should help to leave aside the direct-causal picture of reference and 
the related intuitions. 
 
To set the record straight we should note that the confusion is not restricted only to the 
direct-causal theorists. As we saw above even some neo-Fregeans are victims. About a 
possible case in which all information about a purported referent is misinformation, 
maybe incorrect rumors about the referent of "NN", Evans writes that 
 
"Nevertheless [the speakers] have got hold of rumours and claims about a 
particular man. As it was used in conveying the misinformation to them, and as it is 
used by them in further transmitting that misinformation, the name has, and is 
understood by the consumers [of the name] to have, a quite definite reference, 
provided for it by the practice of those who know some individual as NN (namely 
the producers [of the name])." (Evans 1982: 385) 
 
As I argued above it may be the case that "NN" could be used as if it were a proper 
name of a particular referent even if there never was any individual named "NN". And 
if the whole information is misinformation, on what grounds one is supposed to hold 
firmly that there ever was anyone to whom, or what, "NN" purports to refer. (One 
  89 
could not even state, as Evans does, that there is a particular man; for all that is known, 
i.e. nothing, there might have been, say, a particular dog named "NN".) If the 
producers of the name who know something about the referent of "NN" are still alive 
and around Evans´ point is correct, but only because it invokes deference of the later 
name-consumers to the former name-producers. But as I argued earlier that feature can 
not be used against the sense theoretic account. It seems to me that Evans confuses 
here the pragmatic metasupposition I proposed in the previous section. That goes with 
all referring expressions in the deferential uses, with the functioning of proper names 
at the object level as devices referring to a particular individual named "NN". 
 
We may eventually discover that the rumours are all false of a certain NN. But that by 
itself does not prove that "NN" was used to successfully refer to NN in the middle 
period, when all of the original and correct information came to be replaced by the 
rumours and till the discovery of the rumours. Just like the direct-causal theorists 
Evans has here succumbed in front of the force of the referential function of proper 
names and taken it to be the essential referential substance of them as such. But that is 
not so; it is only a misplaced intuition. Moreover, just like the direct-causal theorists 
Evans presuppose that once a proper name acquires a definite referent (by the 
producers) it thereby stays with the proper name everafter till it "dies", i.e. drops out of 
circulation. That is, it is presupposed that the reference of a proper name could not 
cease and be re-established. I myself do not see anything in this presupposition such 
that would compel us to accept it. On the contrary it seems quite possible that 
particular referential relations can cease to exist and be re-established. This is so 
because reference is epistemic and cognitive matter. To repeat, reference is not causal 
but informational affair; hence when information related to a proper name is complete 
misinformation, reference ceases. 
 
Now I have reached the end point of my counterargument to the semantical argument. 
The main result is that the sense theoretic approach has become vindicated. In short, 
the informational factors, which find their way into the senses of proper names and 
which are expressed by the definite descriptions (though not all of them could be so 
expressed) are the only factors that can explain the reference of proper names. 
Ontologically the (what we have used to call) causal factors are informational. The 
demonstrative and the ostensive references are no exception, for the informational 
perceptual and cognitive factors determine the referents in those situations. The direct-
causal theory is correct in these situations; it only fails to notice that the factors it relies 
on are very Fregean ones even there. 
 
????????????????????????
 
??????????????????????????????
 
As we recall the thrust of Salmon’s Twin Earth argument is that the conceptual 
contents of proper names are not the same as their information values. The argument 
proceeds from the assumption of the conceptual sameness (and the sameness of the 
respective mental states individuated by content) of the Doppelgängers to the 
difference of the referents of their (syntactically) same utterances ("Hubert weighs 165 
pounds"), because earth Hubert weighs 165 pounds but Twin Hubert 165.000000001 
pounds. According to Salmon this shows that the information values of "Hubert" differ 
in the two utterances without the conceptual content of the utterances differing. 
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The first impression one is likely to get from this argument is that it is much too an 
easy one. For who would deny that in the envisaged situation, in the two different 
environments, it is obvious that the Doppelgängers refer to two different things? And 
more to the point, there is no evidence gathered from Frege´s writings that would 
imply that he would have denied this had he thought about this kind of possibility (i.e., 
put in somewhat anachronistic terms, were he to have thought about possible worlds). 
But we should still ask does it follow from his theory of the sense and reference that he 
should have denied it. That is, is the Twin Earth argument a good one against the 
Fregean sense theory of reference after all? (I let it also pass that strictly speaking this 
type of scenario begs the question against the counterpart metaphysics of individuals. 
That is, Earth Hubert and Twin Hubert are counterparts of each other, strong 
counterparts one could say, because they are identical except the minutest difference 
in weight.) 
 
The answer is negative, though it takes a few steps to show this. Let me begin with 
Salmon´s notion of information value that he equates with the referents of the 
linguistic expressions that encode the information (objects, properties and relations). 
Information value is, then, closely related to truth, as can be seen in his version of the 
Twin Earth argument: the statement "Hubert weighs 165 pounds" is true in Earth but 
false in Twin Earth. What in Frege´s theory corresponds to this? Frege makes a 
distinction between grasping a thought and making a judgement. To judge something 
is to assert that a thought a sentence expresses is true or false. To grasp a thought is to 
entertain a thought without any claims in regard of its truth-value. The grasping of a 
thought corresponds to entertaining the conceptual content of the mental states of the 
Doppelgängers in the Twin Earth argument. Both Doppelgängers hold that Hubert 
weighs 165 pounds, so there is no relevant difference in that respect in spite of the fact 
that the sentence “Hubert weighs 165 pounds” is true in Earth and false in Twin Earth. 
By hypothesis they also grasp the same thought that the sentence expresses. 
Consequently the thought as the sense of the sentence "Hubert weighs 165 pounds" 
should determine the same referent, but it does not. How could we exempt Frege´s 
theory from this failure (so to say merely 10-9 failure)? 
 
It should be realized that Salmon´s talk of the conceptual content seems intended to be 
understood in psychological sense, for he says that conceptual content is subjective. 
Strictly speaking this alone is sufficient to charge Salmon´s argument as defective, or 
even being beside the point, because it is put in terms that are clearly un-Fregean: 
Frege denied categorically that psychological states have anything to do with semantic 
and cognitive matters, except that grasping a sense is a psychological act. The senses 
and the thoughts are third realm denizens and therefore intersubjectively objective in 
Frege´s framework, but mental states are only subjective occurrents. However I apply 
the Principle of Charity and take Salmon’s notion of the conceptual content in the 
objective or the "third realm” sense. (I am not committing myself to any third realm 
entities, as should be clear from the fact that I am out to naturalize Frege’s theory.) 
 
I said that the first impression one is likely to get from the Twin Earth argument is that 
it is too easy. This may lead one to suspect that there is something implicitly wrong 
with it. My diagnosis is that the argument makes an incorrect assumption about what 
the sense theory is committed to; an assumption that has become accepted as 
unproblematical, or that it has not even been realized that it has been accepted. It 
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seems to me that the assumption can be detected with only a little reflection. The 
manner of the determination of the referent by the sense seems to be the source of the 
trouble. It seems to be misconceived by Salmon and the direct-causal theorists alike. 
As I pointed out it is very unlikely that Frege would have denied the conclusion of the 
Twin Earth argument. Consequently this puts the central explanatory principle of the 
sense theory of reference only seemingly in jeopardy. But we need to elaborate this a 
bit more. 
 
Consider what would happen were some of us, except the two Huberts, transported (or 
teleported?) to Twin Earth, and the Twin Earthians to Earth, without either of us 
noticing this. This procedure does not affect the senses, the conceptual contents, of our 
linguistic expressions. This will show up in the respective subsequent behaviors: they 
will not differ from what they would have been were we not switched. (It is part of the 
Twin Earth scenarios that the respective Earths are exact replicas of each other at least 
when it comes to the relevant features of the issue.) The linguistic behaviors will not 
differ either, so when we will refer to Hubert – i.e. whom we take to be our Earth 
Hubert - in Twin Earth we will not detect any difference and will not know that it is 
the Twin Hubert to whom we have referred. In the same vein the Twin Earthians will 
not detect any differences in Earth. Thus our respective senses do determine the 
referents just as before. It is only that the truth-conditions and the informational values 
of the sentences in which  "Hubert" surfaces are different. But that is not known to 
anyone. We judge the sentence "Hubert weighs 165 pounds" as true in Earth, which it 
is, and we judge it true also in Twin Earth, only it is not. But this difference in the 
truth-values is irrelevant to the thesis that sense determines referent. In other words, 
the direct-causal theorists assume too strong version of the thesis. The reason is that 
they have assumed from the outset a non-cognitive and non-epistemic interpretation of 
the determination relation. To put this point bluntly, it is not and it never was part of 
the Fregean sense theory of reference that senses would determine referents beyond 
any reasonable failures, in all possible contexts (or possible worlds). When we will 
discover and become to know, or only to believe, that there are two Huberts, we will 
divide the previous uniform referential practices with "Hubert" accordingly. And that 
follows because upon the discovery we become to differentiate between the two senses 
of “Hubert”. That is, the senses become to include an element that tells that the 
Huberts are different individuals. Of course we may still believe that Twin Hubert 
weighs 165 pounds when he in fact does not, but - to repeat - that does not matter for 
reference determination because we have become to grasp the new senses related to 
"Hubert" and only these senses are relevant for the judgements and truth-evaluability 
of any sentences in which "Hubert" occurs from there on. 
 
There has always been a persistent tendency to take the Twin Earth examples from the 
god´s eye point of view, i.e. from the epistemologically omniscient perspective. But 
strictly speaking this assumption is not warranted when the issue concerns the 
explanatory adequacy of the Fregean sense theory of reference. That is because the 
assumption clashes with the central tenet of the sense theory, viz. that senses function 
primarily as semantic-cum-cognitive factors. This involves that they are intertwined 
with our (and the Twin Earthians´) epistemic practices. When we do not yet know that 
the two Huberts are two different persons, the situation is just as it should be from both 
our and the Twin Earthians’ mundane cognitive and epistemic perspectives. The 
accusation that sense does not determine the referent uniquely is imposed from the 
perspective of epistemic omniscience. It is given from within the presumed current 
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knowledge used in the argument that distinguishes the two Huberts. (One could say 
that Salmon commits himself to a general use-mention confusion, as do all those who 
use the Twin Earth scenario to argue against the Fregean senses as reference 
determiners.) 
 
The sense theory of reference predicts that when the senses are or remain the same, the 
referents of our referential practices remain the same also. This prediction is born out 
in the "switch test": both the Earthians and the Twin Earthians will keep on referring 
exactly to what they take to be the same things in both planets just as they did before 
the switch. No referential differences are detected. (The switch test is also used by 
Jerry Fodor but to a different purpose (Fodor 1987).) If any referential deviance from 
this uniform pattern should take place, the only reasonable source of explanation of it, 
given the premises behind the Twin Earth argument (and the assumption, which I 
share, that the senses remain unaffected during the transportation), would be traceable 
to some difference in the senses, which are the only explanatory cognitive and 
semantic factors in the theory under consideration. But this would destroy the Twin 
Earth argument because the sameness of the senses of the Doppelgängers is essential 
to it. 
 
So we can conclude that senses do determine the referents to all semantic and 
cognitive purposes. It is true that there is not one and unique referent in the case of 
"Hubert". But that does not matter because the same referents are determined (or 
should we say cross-determined) uniformly by the same senses, as long as the 
difference is not known. Twin Earth scenario involves a misidentification of the truth-
conditions with the “meaning-conditions” of thoughts (and sentences). Moreover the 
Huberts are taken by both the Earthians and the Twin Earthians to be the same 
referents with respect to the knowledge they have. The knowledge they possess is in 
its turn explained by its being embodied in the senses and thoughts the people in both 
communities grasp (which are all same by hypothesis, for otherwise the whole Twin 
scenario becomes suspect argumentatively). It is the grasping of the thoughts that 
matters for reference determining for the constituent senses of thoughts, not that we 
always grasp only true thoughts (let alone that we would know that). This latter option 
does not follow from the Fregean sense theory, neither is the theory committed to it. 
As long as we keep on letting the perspective from epistemic omniscience influence 
our philosophical conceptions of what is going on in Earth and Twin Earth, we will be 
unable to comprehend the situation from the perspective of the sense theory proper. 
Only when we discover that there are two Huberts in the two planets, the senses that 
we grasp when we use the name "Hubert" have become changed and divergent. I 
propose that a proper Fregean, albeit somewhat metaphorical, way to drive the point 
home is to suggest that in the latter situation our range of grasp of the senses and the 
thoughts have changed. Strictly speaking in the situations up till and after the 
discovery that there are two different referents we grasp new senses in addition to the 
old ones. In this manner our knowledge changes also and that has its effects on our 
referential practices, just as the sense theory predicts. 
 
?????????????????????????????
 
Because the point I am making here is rather radical when compared to the received 
view it may help if we imagine that our current epistemic state of affairs is that of what 
it was before the discovery that there are two Huberts. In that scenario we (currently, 
  93 
as it were) use expressions to refer to what we take to be the same things and take the 
things to be the same (in extension) without being bothered at all by the possibility that 
they might be distinct (even when in fact they are so but unbeknownst to us). In other 
words the senses which we currently grasp determine the referents of the expressions 
they are the senses of. Later scientific research, or just happy everyday coincidences, 
might reveal the distinctness of the referents. Then we will change our referential 
practices accordingly with respect to those expressions. The reason is that, to keep on 
putting it in the Fregean terms, we have become to grasp new senses and thoughts. 
What we now grasp as being the case and what we now judge as being true or false 
will also change in the relevant respects. The point is that whatever is the "real" 
encoded information and the "real" information values of the expressions that make up 
the sentences we use we may not currently know, so they could not affect our current 
referential practices either. Except in the way that we may be more guarded in our 
judgements and referrings; that is, we may become more conscious of the 
metaprinciple which says something like "the referent may turn out to be a wrong one, 
or even non-existent, and the thought to be false, so proceed cautiously". Consequently 
it is misconceived to argue against the Fregean account by the Twin Earth examples to 
the effect that the senses do not determine the referents. 
 
This temporal comparison of the collective epistemic states reveals what I like to call, 
for want of a better term, an "epistemic symmetry principle" (ESP). It is modeled after 
the basic symmetry principles of physics, for example the equivalence of temporal 
points, spatial locations and directions. The importance of the physical symmetry 
principles lies in the fact that they all imply some conserved quantity or some 
invariance (conservation of energy, momentum and angular momentum in the case of 
the three above mentioned symmetries). But the symmetries are not restricted to the 
domain of physics. Different symmetry considerations are relevant in chemistry and 
molecular biology as well. And from there it is only a short step to neuroscience and 
cognitive science – or so I propose here. (On the different kinds of symmetries 
prevalent in nature and in many scientific disciplines, not just physics, see 
(Mainzer1996).) Applied to the sense theory of reference the analogical invariant is the 
state of knowledge: when the knowledge of a community does not change, the senses 
do not change and neither do the thoughts. From this it follows that the referents the 
senses determine do not change either. Only when the symmetry between the 
respective epistemic states is broken there results a change in the senses, thus possibly 
in the references. This is analogous to the case when a when a physical symmetry is 
broken. Then one value of a relevant parameter or quantity is singled out in contrast to 
all the other previously possible. The physical symmetry principles and invariance 
laws have a powerful role in the construction of physical theories and explanations. 
They dictate that something could not happen in our universe. For instance you could 
not construct a perpetuum mobile because if that were possible energy would not be 
conserved (in closed systems like universe). Similarly the epistemic symmetry 
principle I propose says in effect that one is not referring to a thing as distinct from 
another if one does not know or believe anything distinctive about it, i.e. one does not 
know or believe about the distinctness directly, or does not know or believe indirectly 
something that would allow him to infer the distinctness. I further propose that the 
epistemic symmetry principle (and there may be others like it) should be accepted as 
one basic principle of cognitively oriented semantics. (Purely formal semantics are 
different things altogether, but they have no explanatory relevance to the studies of 
reference.) 
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It follows from the epistemic symmetry principle that no semantic and referential 
comparisons are allowed with respect to the referring expressions in the different 
contexts if the totality, or relevantly restricted part, of the knowledge of the speakers in 
those contexts differs respectively. Neither are comparisons allowed across the 
contexts at a single instant if such knowledge is imputed on the contexts from outside, 
knowledge to which the subjects of those contexts could not have access, or which did 
not or could not have had its effects upon them at that moment. From these restrictions 
it follows that any semantical and referential cross comparisons between Earth and 
Twin Earth, before and after the discovery that what is called "Hubert" weighs 165 
pounds in Earth and in Twin Earth a tiny minuscule bit more, are prohibited if the 
respective communities could have no access to these facts in a way that would change 
their range of grasp of the relevant senses. It also follows that we are not allowed to 
impute, and are not justified in smuggling in tacitly, our epistemic perspective to either 
of the two communities when they are compared at any temporal moment. The Twin 
Earth scenario violates both of these prohibitions, so it violates the epistemic 
symmetry principle, hence the Twin Earth scenario could not be used against the 
Fregean sense theory of reference as a form of cognitive semantics.21 
 
It is sometimes argued that the respective behaviors of the Doppelgängers are not the 
same because the objects toward which, or with which, they behave are different 
(Recanati 1993: 200-1). For example, an Earthling drinks H2O and a Twin Earthling 
drinks XYZ. One could not invoke then the so-called narrow contents alone in the 
explanations of the respective behaviors. But this argument fails to show its case. This 
follows from the considerations we just found with the epistemic symmetry principle. 
The reason is that, as in the situation of the comparison of the referential uses of the 
(syntactically) same name in the switched contexts, both Doppelgängers would behave 
in the same way as before were they switched to each others´ contexts. Once again, it 
does not matter in these cases that we now know the differences. What matters is what 
the speakers and thinkers in those contexts know and what differences they do detect. 
 
It can be accepted that the Twin Earth arguments point to some important feature 
related to the notion of reference. But the Twin Earth scenarios exaggerate the 
substance of that feature. For it need not be anything stronger than the (tacit) 
recognition by all competent speakers that if the uses of two (syntactically the same) 
proper names, and referring expressions in general, in fact do have two distinct 
referents, contrary to what has been thought, then their senses should also differ from 
one another. But that metaprinciple does not by itself result in any differences in the 
senses of the names in their actual uses as long as there is no indication that they may 
in fact have different referents. So the Twin Earth scenarios do not support arguments 
against the sense theory of reference; they only give a vivid explication to one tacit 
metafeature underlying the notion of the reference. 
 
One is likely to ask why should ESP be elevated to such a dominant role? That is, why 
should semantic matters mesh with epistemic ones, or with any other kind of matters at 
all? This is a sound question and deserves an answer, if for no other reason than to let 
us avoid the charge of begging the question.22 The answer evades also the charge that 
the principle is ad hoc, i.e. proposed only for the purpose of disarming the Twin Earth 
argument against the sense theory of reference. However the basic justification I can 
give has to be a short one here. The epistemic principle acquires its motivation from a 
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larger perspective within which I look at the semantical issues and, of course, propose 
should be adopted at large. I take it that all parties involved agree that semantics is 
concerned primarily with the content of the linguistic expressions and their referential 
properties. But there would not be any linguistic representations if they did not 
express the results of our thoughts and perceptions. I take this Gricean view as being 
fundamentally correct of the way we humans are cognitively built. Languages are so 
tightly meshed with our cognitive (and practical) functioning that a semantics which 
aims to study the contents of the linguistic representations, but which ignores the 
cognitive and the epistemic matters which manifest themselves in our linguistic 
communications, does so only to its own peril. This is the reason why the sense theory 
of reference can gain explanationwise because it relies on the cognitive and the 
epistemic factors in its explanation of the reference of proper names. The direct-causal 
theory, on the contrary, loses explanationwise because one of its core claims is that the 
semantics of the reference of proper names is non-cognitive and non-epistemic matter. 
 
In addition to these general considerations one possible counterargument to ESP needs 
to be dealt with, however. It may occur to a direct-causal theorist to argue that just 
because ESP is epistemic and it is applied to the Twin Earth scenario, it could not 
harm the direct-causal theory. For the Twin Earth scenario represents in effect 
Kripke’s notion of qualitatively same epistemic situation.  For instance one could be in 
such a situation with respect to “Phosphorus” and “Hesperus” but the names having 
different referents. In that situation there are two distinct planets and the two proper 
names have two distinct referents – whereas the qualitatively same epistemic situation 
we find ourselves in there is only one planet, Venus and the two names has Venus as 
their sole referent. That is so because “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” are rigid 
designators. 
 
That is true but it has not the assumed relevance with respect to ESP. For either the 
application of Kripke’s notion is beside the point, or it is an open issue whether the 
application of that notion or the application of ESP is primary. It is beside the point 
when it is realized that the proper domain of the Fregean sense theory of reference is 
our cognitive and epistemic states at a particular situation. In other words, because 
reference is cognitive and epistemically constrained phenomenon, metaphysical or 
such strong considerations are not argumentatively applicable. And if Kripke’s notion 
is taken as applicable, it could be faulted immediately. The reason is that it smuggles 
in philosophically illegitimately our current epistemic state into the epistemic state 
built into the example (as it does in the Twin Earth scenario). Only because of that 
could it be claimed that “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” are not distinct objects when 
compared to the epistemically qualitatively same counterfactual situation. 
 
ESP provides also an antidote to the notion of “omniscient observer” that the direct-
causal theorists have invoked since Donnellan’s explicit postulation (Donnellan 1974) 
to Joseph Almog’s recent flirtation with it (Almog 2005). ESP counters the use of the 
omniscient perspective (of an Almighty Theoretician) because that notion violates the 
boundary within which reference research should be confined, i.e. reference as it is 
manifested in our ordinary referential use of language. These uses are informationally-
cum-cognitively based – apart from the preconditions like the metaprinciple uncovered 
above, which the direct-causal theorists’ arguments really only indicate – and the 
omniscient perspective ignores that empirical situation. And that it does, I surmise, 
because it also mistakenly sees the causal links as sufficiently powerful by themselves 
  96 
to be able to retain the referents. That is, the application of the notion of omniscient 
observer again confuses the demonstrative reference for reference as a whole. 
 
As such the omniscient perspective is rather innocent; all explanatory approaches 
involve focusing on their domains at varying levels and magnifications. But the 
application of the omniscient perspective/observer that claims that the finding out, 
retracing, of the causal links from the current uses of the name back to the original 
naming event would be available is far from being an adequate claim. For such 
omniscient retracing is not possible for us as theoreticians – as it were observing the 
whole causal history (hence Donnellan’s label “causal-historical explanation view”) of 
a proper name at once (the demonstrative illusion again!). We can retrace the links, 
however, but in limited contexts and with the help of information only. First, in the 
very naming events the causal links are at sight through perceptual contact; second, by 
finding out what was, and has been said, by whom and in that way as far back as is 
possible. But that usually is not far back: we do remember but only few of those events 
where we have communicated with the proper name in question. (This observation is, 
then, correct by the direct-causal theorists, but it does not offer a stronger support to 
their account, not even when the links are preserved via recorded sources like books 
and conversation notes. For when information runs out, omnisciency whimpers away.) 
 
ESP is violated also in the usual arguments the direct(-causal) theorists amassed to 
show that despite the appearances in the Frege puzzles the speaker does believe that 
Hesperus is a planet and that Phosphorus is a planet, even when he does not believe 
that Hesperus is Phosphorus. The reason is that they adopt the theoretician's 
omniscient epistemic perspective who knows that Hesperus is Phosphorus is Venus. 
But this step just makes the singular propositions expressed, according to the direct(-
causal) theory, irrelevant to the speaker’s concerns. (Of course the speaker may 
surmise that it is possible that there is only one self-same planet; but even if he does, 
but does not believe it, he presumably does not take himself to be expressing the same 
beliefs with respect to “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus”.) In other words, because of ESP 
we are able to distinguish referential concerns from the issues pertaining to the truth of 
those beliefs in relation to the world external to them. Singular propositions are, so to 
speak, what we may aim at, but because all our semantic practices are also epistemic, 
singular propositions are relative to the total knowledge possessed by us at a time. The 
referential and the truth-pertaining issues should be kept distinct because what is the 
case but not accessed cognitively – believed or known – does not have an effect to the 
semantic contents of thoughts. That is why the singular propositions as usually 
conceived of are not taken as cognitive constructs, except when accessed via some 
mode of presentation of them. But that is what makes the trouble, for the theoretician 
has access to what is the case through many distinct modes of presentation of the 
singular proposition. (And singular propositions could not be accessed by any other 
means: reality could not be semantically accessed by any other means than 
cognitively.) For example Salmon’s postulation of “guises” reflect this aspect of the 
singular propositions, i.e. in effect it admits that for the singular propositions to play 
any explanatory role in semantics they need to be tied to some kind of cognitive access 
to the referents. That is why the Fregean “intuitions” prevail but the direct(-causal) 
ones fail when the focus is on the actual practice of referential use of language and 
thought expression. Singular propositions might be all right for formalist semantics 
that does not, or need not, honor ESP. But for explanatory semantics they do not 
suffice. 
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The direct-causal theorist could still object and state that it is because “Hesperus” and 
“Phosphorus” are rigid designators that Kripke’s conclusion does follow. But it 
follows only if the notion of rigid designation stands on its own. However I will argue 
in sections 4.4.and 4.5 that it does not so stand. Instead it presupposes the Fregean 
factors in that the referents have to be antecedently individuated. Therefore I take the 
liberty to conclude already before that argumentation that ESP overrules Kripke’s 
notion of qualitatively the same epistemic situation in matters referential. 
 
??????????????????????????
 
Internalism is an approach in the philosophy of mind and language is commonly taken 
to give no explanatory role to the environment of an organism in the constitution of the 
semantical properties, the contents, of the mental states of the organism. Sometimes 
this is expressed by saying that internalism eschews "wide content" and endorses only 
"narrow content". Wide content is (a type of) content that involves at least some 
objects, events, relations and properties external to the organism. In contrast narrow 
content does not find any sufficient contribution for them in the cognitive and 
psychological explanations of behavior, a fortiori the linguistic behavior including the 
referential use of language (when these are given in terms of content, that is). Another 
way that is used to characterize internalism is to say that it is committed to 
methodological solipsism as a research strategy, i.e. that it does not explain behavior 
with the help of such mental states that would imply or entail entities other than those 
states whose content depends only on the internal states of the organism under 
explanation. 
 
The notion of narrow content and its relation to the notion of wide content can best be 
explicated by an example. Fortunately the very Twin Earth scenario provides us with 
such an example. What goes on inside the psychological or “cognitive lifes" of the two 
Doppelgängers is, by hypothesis, exactly the same. Whatever the Earthling thinks and 
whatever concepts she possesses, the Twin Earthling thinks and possesses also, and 
conversely. In the Twin Earth scenario these thoughts and concepts are taken to 
correspond to the Fregean thoughts and senses. Consequently the respective identical 
senses of the two Doppelgängers are taken to be the narrow contents that internalism 
endorses. When Eartha thinks that Hubert weighs 165 pounds, and Twin Eartha thinks 
that Hubert weighs 165 pounds, the narrow contents of the thoughts are the same. But 
in contrast the wide contents of the two thoughts differ. The wide content of Eartha´s 
thought is that the Earth Hubert weighs 165 pounds, and the wide content of the Twin 
Eartha´s thought is that the Twin Hubert weighs 165 pounds. The wide contents, then, 
include the external objects of the thoughts. The wide contents are usually interpreted 
as functions from the narrow contents and the contexts of the use of the expressions to 
the truth-values. So because the contexts of the two Doppelgängers are different in the 
Twin Earth scenario, with respect to the referents of "Hubert", the wide contents are 
different. 
 
Internalism is also taken to endorse the Fregean thesis that sense determines reference 
(or equivalently that intension determines extension). In the Twin Earth scenario this 
obviously implies that narrow content, as the sense of a proper name, determines the 
referent of that name. In other words, nothing that lies outside of a cognitive agent is 
needed to account for the individuation of the thoughts of that agent, or for the 
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sufficient explanation of the agent´s use of the language he speaks. All that would be 
needed for the semantic purposes, as well as for the explanation of behavior, is to be 
found inside the cognitive economy of the speaker. 
 
It is usually the second clause, that of the sufficiency of the internal factors of an agent 
for the explanation of the use of the language he speaks, that the externalists have 
attacked. (So in general the externalists are those who deny the explanatory sufficiency 
of internalism - but usually also its adequacy on other counts.) If all that it takes to 
explain one´s referential use of language is to be found within oneself, within one´s 
cognitive economy, it follows that the referential behavior of the two Doppelgängers 
should be fully accounted for by only internalist principles. But it is claimed that their 
respective referential behaviors differ, despite the fact that they are internally exact 
replicas of each other.  So according to the externalists it follows that 1) internalism is 
false, and 2) the Fregean sense theory of reference is also false, because the senses of 
the expressions are the same but the referents differ. The moral the externalists draw 
from the Twin Earth scenario is that the context, the referents or extensions of the 
terms used by the cognitive agent and also by the other speakers in the agent´s 
linguistic community, are indispensable for the specification of the semantic properties 
of the expressions of the language. 
 
As we remember from section 3.2 Salmon equated the substance of the Fregean sense 
theory of reference with the thorough descriptionality of the senses, in the manner that 
the senses give the "purely qualitative and/or general properties" of the referent they 
determine. This characterization means in effect that the senses are purely conceptual 
representations that do not involve anything non-conceptual. In particular the senses 
are supposed to involve neither anything that is in its turn about other objects nor any 
contextual factors in determining their referents. This is taken to be equivalent to the 
internalist view. If the senses are purely conceptual representations, then they could 
not explain the referential divergencies the Twin Earth scenario is alleged to reveal. 
Related to the three subsenses that we discussed earlier, the Twin Earth argument is 
taken to show that sense1 and sense2 are different. The reason is that the sense1 (the 
narrow content, the conceptual content) is the same for both Doppelgängers, but 
sense2, the manner the referent is secured, differs because the referents of the name 
"Hubert" are different. By implication, then, the conclusion from the Twin Earth 
argument is that there are no uniform Fregean senses. 
 
This combination of the externalist argumentation and taking the Fregean sense theory 
as an internalist theory has become very widely accepted. But the combination is 
misconceived and the pattern of the counterargument should be familiar by now. The 
first thing to notice is that there is nothing in Frege´s writings that can be forced, 
somewhat anachronistically at that, to the mold of internalism. Neither is there 
anything in his writings that would support the imputation of the doctrine of the senses 
being purely conceptual representations or representations with purely qualitative 
and/or general properties of their referents. The situation is quite the contrary. To 
realize this it is sufficient to give a couple of extracts from Frege´s corpus. 
 
In concluding this section it should be mentioned that sometimes internalism is taken 
to have its roots in Cartesian considerations. It is claimed that according to internalism 
mental states and representations could be exactly the same as they are if the external 
world did not exist. (Shadows of Descartes’ evil demon.) This is the way Putnam 
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introduced internalism together with methodological solipsism (Putnam 1987c). But 
that conception is erroneous. Descartes pondered of the possible non-existence of the 
external world because he was interested in methodological and epistemic issues; he 
only used ontological or metaphysical examples in his argumentation against 
wholesale skepticism. Modern internalism and methodological solipsism are only 
psychological and, derivatively, semantical views; the existence or not of the external 
world is a red herring. Internalism does not deny (nor is committed to deny) the 
existence of the external surroundings of the subject, quite the contrary. (Besides there 
is a discrepancy manifest in Putnam’s Twin Earth scenario in relation to his 
characterization of methodological solipsism in that the relevance of the existence, or 
not, of the external world with respect to the Doppelgängers is not even remotely 
hinted at. The point of the Twin Earth scenario is the psychological sameness but 
semantical difference between the Doppelgängers.) 
 
Internalism does not claim any kind of psychological and semantical, let alone 
ontological, independence of mind on its surroundings. It is a doctrine about the 
representational capacities of mind in relation to its surroundings. It states that our 
mental-cum-representational constitution is epistemically relevant (but not in regard of 
the problem of skepticism); being surroundings-constrained in the strong externalist 
sense, and how that shows up in externalist semantics, is too strong epistemically. We 
just could not let us have such semantics and theory of reference that involves that 
what we currently have become to know (at separate temporal spans, epistemically 
speaking) influences the contents of the thoughts and the meanings of the linguistic 
expressions of other subjects in epistemically different (temporal) situations. That is 
the point of my postulation of ESP. 
 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????
 
It is true that Frege did say about the senses much less than we would have liked him 
to say. But it seems to me undeniable that Frege acknowledged the role of 
environment, both causal and contextual factors, in the constitution of the senses and 
in their reference determining roles, even if he did not say that in so many words (and 
in so many places). Let us begin with the notion of pure conceptuality as it is 
explicated negatively by what Tyler Burge has to say about non-conceptuality of the 
senses. He writes that 
 
"…term 'non-conceptual' does not imply that no concepts or other mental 
notions enter into a full statement of the [contextual] relation…The crucial 
point is that the relation not be merely that of the concepts´ being of the object-
concepts that denote or apply to it…perceptual content…illustrates the sort of 
element independent of semantical or conceptual application that is essential to 
the notion [of contextuality]." (Burge 1977: 346) 
 
Burge goes here against the assimilation of the Fregean senses, as the modes of 
presentation of the referents, to the senses as the determiners of the referents. He does 
that mainly on the grounds that the latter notion requires non-conceptual and 
contextual relations, and that "they go beyond what a thinker grasps in thought" 
(Burge 1977: 358). 
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Another characterization of the conceptuality involving purely qualitative properties is 
given by Robert Adams. According to him a property is purely qualitative if, and 
when, "it could be expressed, in a language sufficiently rich, without the aid of such 
referential devices as proper names, proper adjectives, and verbs (such as 'Leibnizian' 
and 'pegasizes'), indexical expressions, and referential uses of definite descriptions." 
(Adams 1979: 9) When this view is combined with Burge´s emphasis on the non-
conceptual angle on the senses, we get essentially Salmon´s account. Note that Adams´ 
view also gives voice to the linguistic version that demands "thorough 
descriptionality" of the senses. 
 
All seems to be well as far as one does not ask whether the notion of pure 
conceptuality has any sufficient plausibility after all. The argument is that if it does 
not, the whole substance behind Salmon´s (and many others´) argumentation collapses. 
In other words we could then apply modus tollens instead of accepting the 
straightforward argument to the effect that so much worse for the Fregean senses. Take 
Socrates for example. He can be described by invoking qualitative properties as being 
the most famous philosopher who was sentenced to death and who drank hemlock. 
Even in this case there seems to be an implicit indication to human kind. But not just 
that. For if one takes a closer look at the very description, one realizes that it does not 
enable one to use "Socrates" in one´s linguistic community (and in one´s thoughts) to 
the extent that proper names, with their individuating descriptions, are typically used 
in referential exchanges. I may know that the most famous philosopher drank hemlock, 
but that by itself does not yet guide me at all in my cognitive and linguistic activities if 
I do not know in addition other, mostly implicit or tacit facts related to the bearer of 
the name "Socrates", facts about ancient Greece and Athens, about democracy, history 
of philosophy, and such things. These facts, hence the senses of the expressions related 
to them, are not purely conceptual, or at least they involve elements that are not such. 
 
In the famous Aristotle note Frege spells out two different senses of "Aristotle" out of 
many. In the first is mentioned "the pupil of Plato" and in the second "born in Stagira". 
This shows that the Fregean senses can contain the senses of other individuals and in 
this way they can be object dependent. This in no way militates against the Russellian 
demand that all ordinary proper names involved in the descriptions must be further 
analyzed to their general properties. No Fregean denies that for example "Plato" and 
"Stagira" have their own senses even when they form part(s) of other senses. But the 
point is that the Fregean senses need not be “analyzed through". Maybe they can but 
there is no obligation for that in Frege´s account. (And Frege never demanded that.) 
We see here, again, how the careless assimilation of Frege´s views on Russell´s has 
caused irrelevant points of argument. 
 
The argument I gave assumes that what Frege explicitly said should be taken at its face 
value. And why not? Indeed, the naturalness of the way Frege handles descriptions 
that express the senses of proper names is telling. Proper names involved in the 
descriptions are perfectly acceptable expressive elements of those senses they are 
part(s) of. I think that it is obvious that there is no slip on Frege´s part. The explicit 
involvement of proper names in the descriptions of the senses of other proper names is 
much too striking for anyone to have failed to recognize it - let alone Frege with his 
logical acuity. It is much more likely that if Frege did not mean his explications of the 
senses of proper names to be taken as he gave them, he would have said so. (But, then, 
why should he have explicated them in a misleading way?) 
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The argumentative point of these examples is that the descriptions expressing the 
senses of proper names are not conceptually pure. It also puts in severe doubt the 
semantic usefulness of the general and/or qualitative representations of the referents. It 
seems to me that the doubt is so serious indeed that the motivating substance behind 
the Salmonian charge evaporates. Consequently no Fregean needs to honor the 
Salmonian demands on the senses. 
 
Also Strawson, on the description theorists side, emphasized that the individuation and 
identification of the referent may involve non-descriptive and non-articulatable 
elements: 
 
“[A speaker] may know the name of a thing and be able to recognize it when he 
encounters it, even if he can normally give no identifying description of it other 
than one which incorporates its own name.” (Strawson 1971a: 77) 
 
“…an identifying description…may, of course, include demonstrative elements, 
i.e. it need not be framed in purely general terms. In general, indeed, it could 
not be so framed; it is impossible, in general, to free all identification of 
particulars from dependence upon demonstratively indicatable features of the 
situation of reference.” (Strawson 1959: 182, n. 1) (In fact the whole beginning 
of (Strawson 1959) could not be misunderstood: its emphasis is on referential 
communication and the role of demonstrative contacts with objects.) 
 
The emphasis on the recognitional factor is what the neo-Fregeans have made quite 
much out of later. But independent of that I think we can conclude that it is beyond 
any reasonable doubt that the description theorists need not commit themselves to any 
“purely” descriptional and/or conceptual factors in identifying reference. Strawson 
calls such purely general descriptions “pure individuating descriptions” (Strawson 
1959), like “the first dog born in sea”, but he denies that they would be very acceptable 
means, let alone adequate by themselves, for identifying references. In other words 
such descriptions are much too detached from what he calls “our general scheme of 
knowledge of particular things”. (That is, I think, precisely why such descriptions are 
so rarely used). And this scheme of knowledge is essentially spatiotemporal as comes 
to the identifying references made within its confines. Therefore the demonstrative 
factors are part of the descriptive means of reference. So contrary to what the direct-
causal theorists claim there is a natural descendant line from Frege via Strawson to the 
neo-Fregeans, a line that emphasizes the partial i) non-conceptuality and ii) non-
descriptionality of the senses of proper names. Consequently the demands for such 
purity by the direct-causal theorists are mistakes – indicating either poor homework or 
deliberate “straw-manning”. 
 
????????????????????????????????
 
The Burge-inspired Salmonian argument against the contextual involvement of the 
senses fails also. There is a compelling Gedankenexperiment by Frege that shows that 
the argument from contextuality does no harm to the Fregean theory. Frege gives the 
example in his letter to Philip Jordan (Frege 1997f) and it goes as follows. A 
geographer happens to see a mountain in one of his explorations. Upon that encounter 
he calculates its height and performs other such tasks the geographers are educated to 
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do. He then learns that the mountain is called "Afla". As it also happens another 
geographer is adventuring in the nearby area quite the same time and he performs 
similar geographical things but learns that the mountain is called "Ateb".23 Frege then 
states the natural conclusion that the identity statement "Afla is Ateb" – formed when 
the two geographers happen to meet and exchange the results of their investigations - 
is non-trivial and informative because the two names differ in their respective senses. 
To support this it is in order to quote what Frege says on determining an object for it 
reveals clearly that the sense theoretic account involves the causal and the contextual 
factors. 
 
"An object can be determined in different ways, and every one of these ways of 
determining it can give rise to a different name, and these different names then have 
different senses; for it is not self-evident that it is the same object which is being 
determined in different ways." (Frege 1997f: 321; emphasis mine) 
 
It seems to me clear that both Frege´s example and the quotation speak for themselves. 
Consequently the direct-causal theorists are very hard put to evade the conclusion that 
the explanatory machinery of Frege´s theory, and by an obvious implication the 
Fregean approach in general, has always involved the causal and the contextual 
factors. As is easily seen especially the core elements of the baptisms and the naming 
situations are subsumed by the mountain example: there is no relevant difference 
between Frege’s conception of determining the object and Kripke’s notion of fixing 
the referent. It is true that Frege left open the way the relevant elements from the 
perceptual and the contextual encounters end up in the senses and the thoughts, and in 
what way they are effective in determining the referents when they are grasped. But 
that they are there can not be plausibly denied in light of the Ateb-Afla example. 
 
Now we see that Frege´s account of the senses is much more liberal than has been 
thought. The contextual factors are involved. The alleged gap between thought and 
world (through language) is in fact closed in Frege´s theory. That some can grasp a 
sense, say, "born in Stagira", even if he has no causal or any other contextual means at 
his disposal to link him "directly" to Stagira, is not to be argumentatively jumped at. 
He has presumably learned from some source or another that Aristotle was born in 
Stagira, and as we can assume that the speaker is a competent language user, he knows 
or can infer that Stagira is a name for a place, a town most likely, and other such more 
general things in relation to the particular things about ancient Greece (and even about 
Aristotle). That is, he grasps the senses that constitute his grasp of the thought that 
Aristotle was born in Stagira. He may be unable to identify Stagira or find his way to 
Stagira without help, but that only shows that his sense of "Stagira" is quite limited. 
Those who live in Stagira or had been there have much richer senses of "Stagira". 
Most likely "Stagira" was introduced to the language of the Greeks (whichever its 
spelling was then) by someone who named it so; and some later users of the name had 
some other contextual means for getting to grasp its sense. But no matter what the 
details were, the Fregean theory is able to explain them. 
 
It should be pointed out that the neo-Fregeans have taken it as an almost self-evident 
fact that the senses are informational and contain a fair amount of perceptual elements. 
But from my dialectical perspective this could not be just assumed, especially because 
I am arguing against the direct-causal theory. The reason is that it is part of the 
argumentative practice of the proponents of that theory to assume that the Fregean 
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senses do not contain contextual and perceptual elements. That is why they are thought 
to be "purely" conceptual and contain, or express, only qualitative/general properties. 
But the Ateb-Afla example shows that assumption to be an error. 
 
Also on the description theoretic side the contextuality, hence non-pure-conceptuality 
of the descriptions (expressing the senses) was the official view before Kripke’s 
arguments. Strawson maintained that in cases where the individual referred to could 
not be demonstratively identified in the context “…it may be identified by a 
description which relates it uniquely to another particular which can be 
demonstratively identified.” (Strawson 1959: 21) (Context for Strawson includes “…at 
least, the time, the place, the situation, the identity of the speaker, the subjects which 
form the immediate focus of interest, and the personal histories of both the speaker and 
those he is addressing.” (Strawson 1971b: 19)) It is easy to see that this demonstrative 
identification subsumes the naming situations (baptisms, dubbings, groundings). 
Consequently there is in this respect nothing new in the direct-causal theory’s causal-
communicative component, either. 
 
With the contextuality of the Fregean senses that the Ateb-Afla example brings with it 
we can also reject another widespread misconception of what the Fregean sense theory 
is like (or, even, as it is sometimes implied, what it should be like). That conception 
concerns the “guiding direction” of the relation between the senses and their referents. 
The operative mechanism of the senses has been taken to be one-way street from the 
senses to the referents. That is, one as it were searches with a sense through 
individuals in a particular domain (in principle a whole possible world) and picks up 
the one who, or what, fits the sense uniquely. It need not be denied that there are 
obvious cases when one literally searches for the "fittest" individual with respect to the 
sense. (If that did not work, D.C.I.s would be largely unemployed.) But the point of 
the received conception about the Fregean view is that the process could not go 
conversely; it is not allowed that one acquires the sense from first encountering the 
individual that is, or becomes, the unique referent of the sense. But as we saw, this 
conception is misguided. The Ateb-Afla example makes it evident that there are no 
prohibitions for the speaker to have the individual at his disposal first and then for him 
to acquire the uniquely referring sense from that encounter. Afterwards the sense is 
used in identifying references to that very individual. 
 
The neo-Fregeans have used the notion of the information about the referents of proper 
names. Being about, or of, the referent the information is supposed to derive from the 
referent causally. The only point I want to register is that the apologizing tone 
sometimes associated with this view by the neo-Fregeans in relation to the direct-
causal theory can be forgotten. That is, the neo-Fregeans need not look at their view as 
involving a concession to the direct-causal approach with respect to the causal 
element. As we just saw that element originated already with Frege and therefore even 
preceded the direct-causal approach. 
 
There is a double irony facing the direct-causal theorists. We saw that the causal and 
the contextual factors in learning a name, and of course in giving a name to something, 
belong to the theoretical machinery of the Fregean theory. But what I have argued 
reveals also that the communicative factors, like the reference borrowings emphasized 
by the direct-causal theorists, are nothing new to the sense theory. And generally 
speaking, it does not even seem plausible that the sense theorists would have thought 
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that the contextual, causal and communicative factors did not have any role in 
explaining reference, and referent retention - quite the contrary. The description 
theorists, or at least Strawson, and the neo-Fregeans have always taken those factors to 
be so obvious they have not emphasized them in particular. (But as I mentioned above 
Strawson was very explicit on those factors.) Rather the factors have become along 
with their arguments and examples tacitly understood to be there. (And tacitly thought 
that that is understood.) This is evident in, for instance, what Strawson says on the 
relations between the speaker and the hearer in those situations where the former is 
making an individuating reference (Strawson 1971: 78-81). I will not repeat his 
discussion here, I only point out that it does not need a trained eye to see that it is 
obvious that the communicative reference transmission is assumed there. For one thing 
how otherwise would it make sense to speak, like Strawson does, about the possible 
referential failures that take place in such communicative situations. 
 
The direct-causal theorists deserve credit for their emphasis on the role of 
communication and the causal, albeit informational, factors in the referential use of 
proper names. But the use they have put them and the "picture" they have painted of 
both of them is much too an arid one. This we have been seeing during this chapter 
time and again: the varieties of information related to proper names are overlooked by 
the direct-causal theorists. So I think that we can firmly conclude that the arguments 
from the demands of the senses being "thoroughly descriptional" and "purely 
conceptual" and expressing only purely qualitative and/or general properties are based 
on a widespread misunderstanding of the Fregean theory. The Fregean theory is an 
internalist one in that it requires cognitive senses as the determiners of the referents. In 
this role the grasped senses form the epistemic boundaries of the knowledge of the 
communities of the speakers at any moment, as well as the knowledge possessed by 
every speaker individually. This determination of the referents is weak in that it does 
not automatically differentiate between the actual distinctness of the two (or more) 
referents in the Twin Earth scenarios. The reason is that in those cases there is not 
(yet) sufficient knowledge indicating the referential distinctness of the two terms in 
question in the two communities. But that does not amount to any kind of failure on 
the sense theory´s part. The internalism of that theory takes the environments and the 
contexts of the thoughts and the referential expressions into account. The Fregean 
theory presents a midway solution between the extremities of externalism and 
internalism, respectively, i.e. that external objects are elements in the meanings or that 
external object has nothing to do with the meanings. The Fregean content is not 
externalist in the former sense. Before the discovery that there are two Huberts the 
contents of the thoughts of both the Earthians and the Twin Earthians were the same 
(by hypothesis). That is, what is wide and what is narrow depends on what is known at 
the moment the thought involving the referential representation is entertained. But 
neither is the Fregean content completely narrow for it takes the contextual factors into 
account in its very constitution. The Twin Earth arguments are based on too strong 
presuppositions of what the sense theory is committed to. Moreover the 
presuppositions of the arguments themselves are much too strong epistemically.  
 
It seems to me that we can also conclude that there is a uniform, full-blown Fregean 
sense, fulfilling the functions of the subsenses simultaneously. Sense1 as the 
conceptual content is also the way the referent is determined, the sense2. The 
contextual and the causal elements belong to a sense of a proper name, either those 
acquired in the naming situations and groundings or those acquired later from other 
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sources, because these types of senses involve the cognitive relations to the contextual 
and object-dependent elements. (It follows also that the "purely" qualitative senses are 
not such: for instance "the tallest man alive" is contextual in relation to the 
humankind.) I have not dealt with the propositional attitude contexts here where sense3 
is taken to be prominent. But I do not see any difficulties such that Burge argues for. 
That two different thinkers do not believe the same thing when they believe that p 
because their respective senses of p differ from each other is not really a problem at 
all. Burge is misled (and many others, for this mistake is surprisingly common) in 
taking too seriously the notion of believing the same thing. To invoke again one of the 
main points of Frege´s Aristotle note: as long as the intersubjective variance between 
the senses related to the object of a propositional attitude is not so wide as to prevent 
mutual comprehension it causes no troubles. In other words we should take the notion 
of believing the same thing (in general, "propositional attituding" the same thing) with 
a large grain of semantic salt. In fact so large grain that in typical cases it demands 
only, as Frege maintains, that the referents, or extensions, be the same.24 So sense3, the 
information value or the content of one´s thought, does not differ from sense1+2. From 
which it follows that the unified full-blown Fregean sense is a sound notion. Hence the 
whole line of the Burge-Salmon argument fails. 
 
The imputation of the extreme version of internalism to Frege´s view is understandable 
though. Frege was interested in the thoughts and the senses and held them to be "third 
realm" entities, distinct from the material objects and the subjective mental states. But 
in light of this it may be more adequate to say that the tendency is non-externalist 
rather than internalist. It is true that for Frege Bedeutungen are indispensable for the 
truth-values and truth-evaluability of the thoughts, but the actual procedures for 
finding out the truth-values has nothing, or not much of relevance, to do with Frege´s 
logical and semantical framework. Senses determine referents, but it is the business of 
every particular scientific discipline to find out whether the thoughts about its domain 
of study are true or false. As already pointed out, the true thoughts are not the only 
thoughts, for it was Frege´s contention that if they were, scientific research and 
questioning would be impossible. 
 
The arguments that demand pure conceptuality of the senses are then based on 
misconceptions. In concluding this section I think it is in order to correct one more 
instance of this mistake. It is from an influential handbook on philosophy of language. 
Devitt and Kim Sterelny give a prompt formulation of the argument that the Fregean 
descriptive sense theory is inherently incapable of explaining reference, thus linking 
language to the world. They argue that the sense-cum-description theory only invokes 
other expressions, descriptions, but it does not give any account of how these are in 
their turn related to the world (Devitt & Sterelny 1987: 51-2). But the sense theory is 
fully capable of doing that as the discussion of the Afla-Ateb example above shows. 
Moreover this happens in the way that the direct-causal theorists cannot even deny 
because it involves the very causal and the contextual factors they emphasize. Devitt 
and Sterelny give a diagnosis from their argument. According to it the essential 
incompleteness of the Fregean-cum-description theory, in the form of the lack of the 
ultimate explanatory connection between language and world, was not noticed until 
recently – thanks to the direct-causal theorists. However, taken at its face value and in 
light of the argumentation above this diagnosis is quite incredible. It seems to me that 
instead Devitt and Sterelny, as well as the other direct-causal theorists, should rather 
have paused to reflect how unlikely it must be that such an easy point, the relation of 
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the descriptions to the world, would have been missed all along by the sense theorists. 
But as we saw above it has not been missed because it has been taken to be evident. 
 
Internalism is best comprehended when it is realized that the representational 
capacities of the brain copy the external world. By this I do not mean the old and 
erroneous theory that mental representations are exact copies of the corresponding 
external entities. There are no copies in the brain in that photographic sense. But the 
brain does copy the external surroundings, from small to large, because of its 
informational connections from and to it; action is at least as important to 
representation as perception. The representations, the senses, the brain constructs are 
better understood to be structurally and dynamically isomorphous to the external 
entities. (That is the correspondence.) Of course this is a very general hypothesis, but 
which I am trying to begin to answer in chapters 7 and 8. As to its general, i.e. 
philosophical, substance I do not even pretend to claim any originality. But now its 
function is to help us in comprehending the naturalness of the internalist perspective. 
So if we could at least tentatively accept that the brain houses a copy of the external 
world – or rather many representational copies of the external entities like objects and 
their properties and relations, events and their interrelations; in short, the whole of the 
senses individually possessed – the externalist statements can be seen in the correct 
light. Take for instance the claim that the internalist narrow content is independent on 
the external surroundings and therefore inherently incapable of truth-conditional 
representation. But if it is understood that the informational constraints on the 
representations that the senses confer result in epistemic constraints also (=ESP), the 
position emerges in the midway between extreme version of both internalism and 
externalism. The mental representations are semantically related to the external world 
because they are informational. But that informational impact, with respect to 
individual representations, is not forceful by itself to support the externalist claims like 
“meanings ain’t in the head”. I argued above why that is not so: the content of an 
individual representation, the Fregean sense, depends on the other representations – 
which also contain information about their connections to the external entities they are 
about – and are therefore cognitive and therefore epistemic in turn. Ergo: reference is 
cognitive-cum-epistemic phenomenon. (Thus the content of the word, say, “water” is 
not, repeat is not, only H2O and does not refer, repeat does not refer, rigidly to H2O 
before it is known that water is H2O.) 
 
??????????????????????????????
 
According to Salmon´s argument from content variance the conceptual content is not 
part of the information value of a linguistic expression. The reason is that the content 
varies from person to person because people have different conceptions of the bearer 
of a particular proper name. These conceptions are also acquired in many different 
ways, from being acquainted with the referent to just fleetingly hearing something said 
about it. If the conceptual content is part of the informational value it follows that the 
informational value differs from person to person. But this clashes with the "original, 
natural idea" of a sentence encoding the same single piece of information for everyone 
(Salmon 1986: 68). Hence the relation of encoding information is objective and 
semantic, claims Salmon. 
 
Now this argument could be attacked head-on by focusing on the semantic framework 
and the assumptions that Salmon uses. For one thing it is not at all clear that the notion 
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of information that best applies to semantics is the cognitively purified, not to say 
cleansed one, that Salmon uses; hence it is not clear at all that there is any “original” 
and “natural idea” of information encoding. Or that the only acceptable and 
semantically respectable entities are singulars (objects), properties and relations. But I 
will not adopt this strategy. (Though from my point of view Salmon begs some 
essential questions that have to be asked and answered before we pursue any 
semantics.) Instead I will argue that the first of the two caveats that Salmon makes not 
only robs the force of his argument from content variance, but also leads to an 
argument that reveals that one crucial question has indeed been begged by the direct-
causal theory time and again. 
 
As the reader remembers Salmon’s first caveat is that the encoding relation has to be 
relativized to a particular use of a sentence, of which the proper name in question is a 
part. (Kripke makes in effect the same remark (Kripke 1980: 8-9).) This relativization 
means in effect that the bearer of the proper name must be individuated beforehand. 
Take the sentence "Aristotle was fattish". It must be relativized, i.e. it must be decided 
whom the proper name is about. Until that is done no precise piece of information is 
encoded and expressed by the sentence. Thus if one is talking about the Greek 
shipping magnate, the sentence encodes the information that Aristotle Onassis was 
fattish, and the information value of "Aristotle" is Aristotle Onassis. Whereas if the 
sentence is used to talk about the ancient Greek philosopher it encodes the information 
that Aristotle the philosopher was fattish, and the information value of "Aristotle" is 
Aristotle, the commonly known Greek philosopher (though this last characterization is 
not part of the information value). That is what the content variance argument is all 
about; the conceptual associations expressed by the descriptions (like "the commonly 
known Greek philosopher") are irrelevant to the semantic attribution, to the encoding 
of information and having informational values – only the object and its properties 
matter. 
 
Kripke says that the “classical description theorist” talk “for simplicity as if names had 
unique references” (Kripke 1980: 8-9). This is meant to imply that Kripke takes 
himself to be entitled to that simplifying assumption, too. But Kripke fails to mention 
that the “classical description theorist” (as any kind of description theorist) is entitled 
to that assumption precisely because it follows from his theory. The definite 
descriptions individuate and identify the unique referents (or at least they purport to do 
that in the actual practice of their use). It seems to me that this slip on Kripke’s part is 
indicative of the rather shallow general interest the direct-causal theorists have paid to 
the description theory (and to the Fregean theory). In fact I am even quite appalled 
here, for to me it seems obvious that when the “simplifying assumption” (the 
relativization of use) is made, it should have immediately been asked why is that 
assumption/relativization possible in the first place. Why have the direct-causal 
theorists turned the blind eye to the individuative issue involved? And especially after 
Kripke explicitly pointed out that only after the simplifying assumption can the rigidity 
claims be made at all. 
 
Scott Soames discusses widely about the information expressed – singular propositions 
– and information conveyed, information depending on what the hearer knows about 
the referred things, by the declarative sentences/utterances (Soames 2002). But he 
premises his account on the “…simplifying assumption that ordinary proper names are 
unambiguous…” (Soames 2002: 55). However this again clearly amounts to bypassing 
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the more basic level of explanation that tries to account for the fact how one is able to 
single out a certain particular individual to be talked about in the first place. In other 
words, Soames’ approach does not answer the problem of the relativization of the use 
of a proper name but presupposes that the name has been disambiguated already (in a 
context of use). Soames does explicate the competence conditions for the proper use of 
proper names by requiring that one either has acquired a referential intention that 
determines o as the referent (of “NN”) - and this takes place by reference borrowing 
from the speakers (who intent to use “NN” to refer to o), or by acquaintance with o 
(Soames 2002: 65). But as I already argued the first subcondition is much too weak, 
for intentions to co-refer do not guarantee the retaining of the referent. And the 
acquaintance with the referent is allowed by both the Fregean and the description 
theories, as we also saw above. 
 
I endorse the caveat myself, but I argue now that the caveat in fact disarms the content 
variance argument. The point of my objection is that if the use of a particular proper 
name has to be relativized to a particular individual out of the many others with the 
same (syntactically individuated) name, that very individual must be identified in the 
relativization process. Put in another way individuating the bearer of the name is in 
effect already making an identifying reference to that individual. Still in other words, 
the argument from content variance presupposes, and even in explicit terms, that we 
must first be able to identify the individual for the Salmonian semantic framework to 
be applicable at all. But that is a cognitive task, hence readily amenable to the Fregean 
approach. 
 
The direct-causal theorists are likely to argue that the relativization of the use, i.e. the 
individuation of the referent, is taken care by the groundings and the causal networks. 
But that argument fails by now. I have spent the larger part of this chapter in arguing 
that the causal factors by themselves are insufficient for any referential purposes. It is 
the information they transmit that is the primus motor in reference. Neither are the 
intentions to co-refer explanatorily sufficient, for they depend on the information the 
speakers have access to, even if eventually via deference to the information the experts 
possess. Furthermore Salmon himself rejects the causal connections as individuative 
factors as they are postulated in Devitt’s theory. He takes that proposal to be a 
category mistake (Salmon 1986: 70-1). So I conclude that the referent could be 
individuated only by invoking information about it; that is, by invoking the Fregean 
senses related to the proper name in question. 
 
Because this is the main point of my argument against the sufficiency of the 
communicative links qua causal it is in order to bolster it with an example. The direct-
causal theory claims that no (non-trivial) pieces of knowledge, or beliefs, are necessary 
elements in successful reference; instead the communicative causal links suffice for 
reference and irrespective of whether we know their previous courses or not. (That is 
because we very seldom do.) The communicative aspect is emphasized because the 
direct-causal theorists claim that their theory explains the ways we commonly express 
thoughts and use proper names to refer. So they will be under severe theoretical 
pressure if the communicative facts do not confirm the theory on that count. Now 
witness the following rendition of an exchange that took place a while ago. 
-“People should not want too much. But everyone should have so much that he feels 
good.” 
-“That is pretty much what Aristotle said.” 
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-“Who is Aristotle?” 
Then I told the wise 4 years old who Aristotle was: that he was an ancient Greek 
philosopher; that he lived 384-322 before year 0 (she likes to say “year zero”); that he 
thought that moderation in everything one does is the best way to live; that he is taken 
to be the most brilliant of the Greek philosophers; that he was a pupil of Plato (but 
about Plato we maybe talk some other time). I am not sure that all of this registered, 
especially as her conception of the ancient Greece might be somewhat hazy. (Mine is, 
anyway.) 
 
Now the direct-causal theorists may claim that the child’s use of “Aristotle” was 
relativized nevertheless because she automatically deferred through me. I do not wish 
to contest that that is what she can be said to have achieved. But as I already argued 
deference does not complete reference make. In particular she did not make genuine 
speaker reference to Aristotle at the moment she asked who Aristotle was. (That only 
seems so if one could not shrug off the highly idealized and omniscient perspective the 
direct-causal theory works with.) Her question did manifest the particular tacit 
application of the metasupposition, i.e. that “Aristotle” is a name of someone. But this 
metasupposition does not by itself tell anything substantial about the referent. What is 
left then? What is left is to understand why she asked who Aristotle was. The answer 
is obvious: she did not know at all who Aristotle was; nay, she did not have even 
rudimentary information about Aristotle. So there was nothing with which she could 
have individuated the referent of “Aristotle”. In other words her use of “Aristotle” was 
not yet “relativized” to anything. And if the direct-causal theorists keep on claiming 
that “of course the use was relativized” because of the deference through me, the 
answer is that I have had to individuate Aristotle the philosopher as the referent of 
“Aristotle”. Either way the need for the individuative information about Aristotle the 
philosopher will not go away. 
 
We see here again how the direct-causal theory meshes the epistemic perspective of 
those “in the know” about the referent with the highly idealized picture of the causal 
routes. In fact that is doubly erroneous: in addition to the unrealistically cleansed 
causal picture (and its tacit mesh with the elements of the demonstrative references 
due to the basic schema of reference in action) the direct-causal view invokes 
knowledge, but which according to the official doctrine should play no role in the 
reference of proper names. It may be in many cases, or even in most, that in addition to 
the activation of the basic schema of reference, the tacit involvement of the 
metasupposition and also the mere knowledge of the existence of the practice of 
deference all contribute to the so far unscrutinized “intuition” that is claimed to give 
evidential support to the causal explanation of reference. The latter two explain in turn, 
but only in part, the prevalence the perspective of the semantic reference is usually 
given over the speaker reference. The other part consists of information: the shared 
knowledge about the referent - together with the shared knowledge of that knowledge 
being shared. But as we saw in the discussion of the Feynman case it does not follow 
that when there is semantic reference with a particular proper name the speaker 
reference conforms to it automatically. To claim this as Kripke (with his direct-causal 
followers) does, is to confuse the above factors with the role the individuative 
information about the referent has in the speaker reference. Therefore a proper name 
does not speaker refer if the speaker does not know sufficiently individuative 
information about the referent. 
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I think that my argument gets even more support when the perspective of the ignorant 
speaker is adopted. Many of us have been in a similar situation: first completely at a 
loss to what the speaker is referring by a certain name. Usually the topic of the 
conversation affords some clues where to “locate” the referent spatiotemporally. But 
we may imagine that the hearer just arrives at the scene and only overhears the proper 
name used. When we put aside the application of the metasupposition, as I argued 
above that we should, we see that the hearer is in a hopeless position referentially 
speaking as long as he does not acquire information that would help him to individuate 
the referent. (Recall the Liebknecht example in note 11.) In short, I do not see how we 
could escape drawing the conclusion that in the ordinary referential uses of proper 
names it is the information related that only makes it possible to refer genuinely. 
 
We saw above in section 4.3.1 that senses do determine referents, but this does not 
involve any stronger mode of determination than what the knowledge and beliefs 
possessed by the language users allow. If the epistemic state of the community 
changes, i.e. if the knowledge states of some, or even one, of its members change upon 
the discovery that what they thought about, say, Hubert is not in fact so, that will have 
its effects on their referential practices – though not as immediately as is thought by 
Putnam. I would not argue the next point in detail for it would digress too much in this 
stage, but it seems to me that Salmon incorrectly distinguishes the information 
encoded by an assertive sentence as if it were independent from what the speakers 
know who assert the sentence, or who use the sentence to refer to some definite 
individual. "Aristotle was fattish" certainly encodes information that can be expressed 
by saying something like that the Greek philosopher commonly known and called (in 
contemporary English) "Aristotle" was fattish. Put in Salmon´s (Russell-Kaplanian) 
jargon the singular proposition expressed by the sentence consists only of Aristotle 
himself and the property of being fattish. The mode of presentation of the referent is 
not part of that proposition. This type of proposition is all right in semantic purposes at 
least in that it seems not to be an incoherent notion. The notion even seems to have a 
role to play in explaining out truth-seeking activities. But it has to be noted that the 
singular propositions are not what primarily count in this context. What does count is 
the way we get to the propositions, the way their constituents are, as it is said, loaded 
into them, and that they indeed are the intended constituents. But this requires the 
identification of the individuals (and individuation with respect to properties and 
relations). Singular propositions and their relations to truth-conditions of the sentences, 
which express them, owe what explanatory fruitfulness they may have to the epistemic 
and the cognitive factors that are invoked in constructing the very propositions to 
begin with. Thus it may be that the singular proposition that the descriptive sentence 
like "the second king of France was fattish" expresses consists of a certain individual 
and the property of his being fattish, not the Fregean mode of presentation "the second 
king of France" and the property of being fattish. But who that very individual is 
(Charlemagne) must be predetermined by some epistemic and cognitive means for the 
singular proposition to be of any use in communication (and in truth-seeking 
practices). And these means are the Fregean senses (which the descriptive modes 
express). 
 
It certainly seems strange to hold that a flesh-and-blood individual is part of a 
proposition. Frege never accepted that. In many occasions (for example in his letters to 
Russell) he complained that some (like Russell) think that, say, the Mont Blanc itself is 
a part of the thoughts about Mont Blanc. The above elaboration of my argument about 
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Salmon´s caveat should be taken as providing the justification for Frege´s view. We 
see again how the Fregean and the direct-causal theories differ from each other. 
Singular propositions are the pet entities of most of the direct-causal theorists. The 
reason is that the modes of presentation of the referents are the conceptual counterparts 
of the descriptions, and since the direct-causal theorists have disregarded the semantic 
relevance of the descriptions for the reference of proper names, the singular 
propositions are the natural choice for them because the modes of presentation are not 
parts of such propositions. But this ontological move only betrays the cognitive 
poverty of the direct-causal theory once again. If there has to be - as there has - the 
relativization of the use of sentences to be about specific individuals at a time, that re-
enters the Fregean factors with full force. Also on this score the horror cognoscere 
haunts the direct-causal theory of reference to its peril: it could not provide us with 
genuine explanation of the workings even of its own basic postulations. 
 
Another way the direct-causal theorists could still try to counter my arguments is by 
stating that their examples and arguments are used to help to explicate the conceptual 
aspects of our notion of the reference of proper names. Therefore it is sound 
methodology to impose our epistemic state and perspective on the examples. The 
examples also clearly indicate that reference is causal. Unfortunately I could not 
accept this view either. For the conceptual aspect not merely to coincide with causal 
“intuitions” something must differentiate it from the latter to give it even a minimal 
credibility. But if my arguments here and in section 4.2.5 are to the point there just is 
no explanatory substance left with the “conceptual” aspect of the notion of reference 
relating to the causal links. When these arguments are coupled to the other arguments 
showing the overall explanatory poverty of the causal links (in section 4.2.3), the 
direct-causal theory is seen to be explanatory failure. 
 
The direct-causal theorists can of course retreat and claim instead that the conceptual 
aspects reveal the (what I called) formal, or pragmatical, aspects of the reference of 
proper names. But because the Fregean as well as the description theory can 
incorporate those aspects – because of their very “formality” and pragmatic status – 
the conclusion is that the direct-causal theory is only a subtheory of the Fregean theory 
of reference. We will also see a little later that there is another line of argument that 
shows how this result is the best the direct-causal theory could hope for. So all in all 
we can conclude that the Kripke-Salmon-Soames caveat line pulls out the 
argumentative rug under them: if the individual the proper name in question refers to 
must be singled out “in the context” before any semantic results could be achieved, in 
particular such as are used in arguments for the rigidity of proper names, their game is 
lost to the Fregeans. That is, the bearer of the name, in the context, has to be 
individuated and identified before any direct-causal considerations could even to be 
applied to that name. Since it could not be the causal links that enable us to do that, 
what is there left but the Fregean senses-cum-information? 
 
?????????????????????????????
 
From the relativization argument follows a corollary that is of utmost importance to 
our subject. It is that Kripke´s idea of proper names being rigid designators also 
presupposes the individuation of their referents. A proper name is a rigid designator if 
it refers to the same individual in all the possible worlds, or counterfactual scenarios, 
in which that individual exists and that individual is the actual-world referent of the 
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proper name in question. According to Kripke this explicates the modal difference 
between proper names and the definite descriptions, for the latter refer to whatever has 
the properties the description specifies in a particular world under consideration. This 
is a stipulative move on Kripke´s part (as he acknowledges himself). We start with the 
actual referents of proper names in our language, not with the possible worlds. In other 
words we do not, as it were, go to a possible world and try to find out who or what the 
referent is satisfying the properties the description gives. We have the referent firmly 
fixed to begin with. This stipulation is an attempt to pre-empt any counters that use the 
notion of transworld identity. The application of this notion requires that we can make 
sense of the transworld identity of individuals antecedently in our counterfactual talk. 
But to Kripke this is to put the cart before the horse: "it is because we can refer 
(rigidly) to Nixon, and stipulate that we are speaking of what might have happened to 
him (under certain circumstances), that 'transworld identifications' are unproblematical 
in such cases."25 (Kripke 1972: 270) But one could not fail to notice that this is just to 
trade the problem of the transworld identity for the problem of actual identity. Salmon 
makes the same trade for he says that "in the case of nondescriptive singular terms, 
there is no such possible world relative process for determining denotation."26 (Salmon 
1982: 33, n.35) But that is patently false: actual world is also a possible world; so it is 
the actual individual we are referring to that must have been antecedently individuated 
(or at least during the process of talking about it). It seems that in effect Salmon also 
says that the mechanism by which the free variables are assigned values is a paradigm 
case of the non-Fregean semantic mechanism. But this only hides from the view the 
fact that the assignment presupposes an evaluation function by which the values are 
assigned; and that function is all that a Fregean needs for his purposes. In fact such 
evaluation function may be taken to consist of whatever the Fregeans need for their 
explanatory purposes (see the second quotation from Almog below). 
 
As we saw in the preceding section virtually in all cases when the direct-causal 
theorists discuss the reference of proper names their characterizations are like this: "x" 
refers to x, and it is then made clear, or let be understood from the context, that x is 
some well known individual, i.e. already individuated. It is easy to see that this is in 
effect Salmon´s relativization caveat again. Joseph Almog has observed a related point 
about the antecedent individuation, for he says that 
 
"On the possible-worlds picture, a rigid designator, weak or strong, de 
jure or de facto, is defined as a designator picking out the same individual 
in all possible worlds (with this or that qualification). But for this to get 
off the ground, the idea that the transworld identity of individuals is given 
must be taken for granted. Question it, make the very idea of overlapping 
domains meaningless…and rigidity is tottering." (Almog 1986: 227) 
 
It is in order to note, however, that Almog´s own view, his "structural objectivism", 
presupposes the "generation" of propositions (in fact singular propositions with the 
"flesh-and-blood individuals" in them (Almog 1986: 220, 225)), and therefore could 
not tell anything about the individuation of the referents of proper names. As I argued 
the antecedent individuation is required for us to be able to generate the right singular 
propositions expressed by the sentences. In other words one has to know who, say, 
Quine is in question when one generates the proposition the sentence "Quine is 
human" expresses. Of descriptions Almog realizes that they are not naming devices 
but devices that induce conceptual contents at the generation stage, "blueprints" for the 
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referents (Almog 1986: 225). The distinction between the generation and the 
evaluation of the propositions as to their truth-values in possible worlds seems to me 
obvious in this type of semantics. Almog presents this (what seems to me to be) under-
the-carpet-individuation with respect to proper names in a somewhat different way. He 
speaks about Kripkean "one-stage theories of evaluation" and says that 
 
"a point of evaluation…may include a world, a time, an agent, a spatial 
location, or what have you. No matter what information is needed for 
evaluation, it can be packed into a single 'index' (with many 'coordinates'). 
Then, setting a sentence relative to that index, we obtain the sentence´s 
truth value." (Almog 1986: 218; emphasis mine) 
 
So although Almog perceives that without the individuation of the referent we could 
not achieve an adequate semantics, he fails to see that the point of the evaluation lies 
just where the Fregean factors are to be found. In other words, not even Almog does 
realize that the direct-causal theory presupposes the Fregean theory.27 
 
Almog does say that the general Kripkean one-stage evaluation framework can 
provide for the semantic notions like contents, so presumably also the senses. As he 
points out the content of a sentence is its evaluation function that assigns to it truth-
values in accordance with how things are in those possible worlds with respect to 
which it is evaluated (Almog 1986: 214). But as the formulation itself shows this is in 
effect just what the Fregean senses of the referring expressions do: they lead us to the 
referents, to the things in the world(s), and so enable us to judge the truth-values of the 
statements of which the expressions are parts. 
 
As we saw earlier Soames admits that there are partially descriptive names (Soames 
2002). For instance "Mountain McKinley" and "President Halonen" are such names. 
(As these two examples show the Soamesian partially descriptive names should be 
kept separate from the Evansian descriptive names like "Julius" which is the name for 
the one who invented the zip, because the latter names have their descriptive content 
related to them implicitly at the linguistic level.) But it should be obvious that the 
partially descriptive names indicate, in being halfway between proper names and the 
descriptions, that proper names do have senses expressible by the descriptions 
associated to them. The partially descriptive names, so to speak, have pulled up some 
descriptions from among the rest of the class they belong to, with respect to the proper 
name in question, and characterizing the whole sense of a name. That there are those 
other descriptions, i.e. that the particular sense is informationally richer, is shown by 
the fact that for one to understand whom I am talking about when I say, for example, 
"president Halonen gave a speech today", the hearer needs to know also which country 
Halonen is the president of and other such related things. That proper names are not 
semantically different from the partially descriptive names should be evident because 
one may say that "Halonen gave a speech today" and some other one would 
understand what was said because that someone comprehended that most likely one 
was not talking about his eccentric neighbour, but the president. The descriptive part 
of the proper name is then seen to be optional and its use context dependent. 
 
The category of the partially descriptive names, as Soames conceives it, is rather weak 
one in that such expressions are rather seldom used (except when the referent has to be 
disambiguated, or it is the practice to mention the descriptive element, as with the 
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presidents). Those names are quite poor in their descriptive content because the 
predicates do not by themselves contribute the unique identification of the referents by 
themselves in every case. Take for example the descriptive name "Professor Saul 
Kripke" (one of Soames´ examples). It does not pick up any professor SK in case there 
happens to be more than one such.  (Or it picks them up distributively.) I think that this 
does not merely indicate but in fact shows that the sense of a proper name, as uniquely 
referent determining, is richer. The reason is that Soames´ very examples would not 
work if they did not indicate other, tacitly presupposed, parts of the senses; for 
example that it is professor SK, the famous philosopher of language and modal 
logician, the author of Naming and Necessity, and such other pieces of descriptive 
information. 
 
Now that we have swept the causal factors aside together with the “intuitions” there 
are left only the sense theoretic factors for the individuation of the referents of proper 
names. We can accept that proper names are rigid designators, but this just shows that 
the notion of rigid designation could not be used in the arguments against the sense 
theory of reference. It follows that the idea of rigid designation must presuppose the 
sense theoretic individuation of the referent for its meaningfulness. Put in other words 
the direct-causal theory only seems to be a viable theory of the reference of proper 
names because it works implicitly with what only the Fregean sense theory can 
provide. The result is that rigid designation belongs at the "phenomenological" level of 
reference of proper names. But this does not abandon the sustainable idea that we can 
"actualize" the descriptions, i.e. fix their referents by an “actuality operator” so that 
they pick up the same actual referents proper names do in all the relevant possible 
worlds. This way the descriptions become as rigid as proper names. But rigid 
designation does not reach into the core, to the explanatory level any theory of the 
reference of proper names has to provide. It is precisely at that level where the 
identification and the individuation of the referents are operative. By the same token it 
follows that we can accept that proper names are directly referential expressions, but 
they are such only because the Fregean mechanisms of the individuation and 
identification of the referents have had their say in the “relativization of use”. But 
proper names are not directly referential if by that is meant that the referents are not 
determined by the Fregean senses. Proper names are directly referential only in that 
they behave differently from the non-actualized descriptions expressing parts of the 
senses of proper names. 
 
We saw in section 3.4 that Recanati draws a distinction between rigid designation and 
pure referentiality (or type referentiality). Before him A. Smith had discussed the 
distinction (Smith 1984). Because his discussion helps to develop my view further 
with respect to the direct-causal understanding of proper names and their primary 
mode of functioning I will now shortly discuss Smith’s paper. Smith argues for the 
semantic difference of proper names (without modal considerations) from actualized 
descriptions (to which we return in the next chapter). His argument is that it is the 
notion of pure referentiality, not of rigid designation, that brings out the difference. In 
essence the rigidified descriptions denote their referents by satisfaction, i.e. by the 
referents being the objects the world contributes to the denotation relation. But proper 
names denote without any satisfaction relation; a proper name designates, names, a 
particular individual. According to Smith with names 
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"the relation of term to item in the world is internal to semantics…because 
names…do not first express a descriptive condition…Since the fact that a certain 
name names a certain individual is internal to the meaning of that name…" (Smith 
1984: 190-1). 
 
This is the crux of Smith´s notion of pure referentiality (of proper names). But this 
view does not succeed. We can take it for granted that the semantic descriptive 
condition the description expresses has to be met for that description to refer to an 
individual. But, as Smith says, proper names have semantic meaning condition 
attached to them also, and that condition characterizes their referentiality: it says in 
effect that they are names of individuals. Hence there is no functional difference 
between the descriptions and proper names from the referential point of view. The 
descriptions refer by their descriptive condition, proper names refer by the condition 
that they are names. As I have kept pointing out the crux of the matter is that we still 
has to know to whom a particular proper name "NN" refers, for there may be many 
other NNs around (the problem of the disambiguation of proper names). And the 
proper name by itself does not tell us that. So in addition to its naming condition there 
has to be related some other condition which enables us to refer to a certain NN and 
not to any other NN. It does not seem to me to be of semantic and referential relevance 
that proper names are, so to speak, one remove from the descriptions. In other words, 
behind any successfully used proper name there stands a description (or descriptions) 
expressing the sense of the proper name. 
 
No one denies that proper names name, and no one denies that the definite descriptions 
describe. That proper names behave differently from the mere descriptions, i.e. the 
non-actualized descriptions, in modal contexts (and in counterfactual talk in general) is 
true. That proper names are rigid designators, compared to the mere descriptions, is the 
explanation of that differential behavior. So, despite the air of triviality of the 
difference, I am not saying that Kripke does not deserve the credit for pointing out the 
modal differences. But I have no doubts whatsoever that if Frege and Russell had been 
interested in the modal issues in relation to thoughts and language, they would have 
spotted the difference readily. (It seems to me that Russell’s distinction between the 
primary and the secondary occurrence of the description is the starting place for that.) 
Still we must be careful not to lose sight of the fact that the function of proper names is 
to name, both in form and in substance. That is, they name in form because their 
function is to pick up individuals. That is what their (pure) referentiality amounts to, or 
equivalently their possessing of Recanati’s postulation "REF". But they are, or rather 
we as speakers are able to do that, to name in substance, to refer, because of the role of 
the "blueprints", the related senses (which the descriptions are used to express). Proper 
names are rigid because the named individuals must have already been individuated 
and identified for the names to be meaningfully and not just formally used (i.e. only as 
names). And this includes the counterfactual talk as well. Pure referentiality pinpoints 
the formal aspect of proper names, rigid designation the substantial aspect (ditto for 
the actualized descriptions). 
 
In short naming should not be confused with genuine referring. A proper name names 
a certain individual, but it is able to do that (or strictly speaking the speaker is able to 
do that), to name that particular individual, i.e. to refer to him, her or it, only because 
of the sense of that particular name. The basic mistake of the direct-causal theorists as 
Millians is to equate naming with reference. A revealing case is Kripke himself: 
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"According to Mill, a proper name is, so to speak simply a name, it simply refers to 
its bearer, and has no other linguistic function. In particular, unlike a definite 
description, a name does not describe its bearer as possessing any special 
identifying properties." (Kripke 1979: 239-40) 
 
Everything in this quotation can be accepted, but only if the confusion of name´s 
simple function to name and its reference, i.e. how it is able to name a particular 
individual, is avoided. A name does not describe but names; if it described, it would be 
a description and not a name. But the name refers because it has descriptions 
associated to it expressing its sense. Everything is fine when we keep separate the two 
semantic elements related to proper names. 
 
 
????????????
 
It is time to review the results reached in this chapter. The modal and the 
epistemological arguments against the Fregean sense theory of reference (or the 
“Fregean description theory”) are misguided because the former presuppose 1) strong 
semantic relations between proper names and the descriptions expressing the senses to 
which neither Frege nor the Fregeans are committed; and the latter presuppose 2) such 
a priori knowledge of the referents of proper names which Frege did not and the 
Fregeans need not have anything to do with either. Large part of the negative attitude 
to the sense theory of reference is explained by these misunderstandings of what that 
theory is or should be like. The Fregean theory is an empirical theory of reference, not 
a philosophical "meaning" theory or theory providing analyses or definitions of proper 
names. What has happened is that these cherished methodological-cum-semantic 
assumptions from the 1950s and the 1960s have been forgotten to have been operative 
but not dropped, and what has been left is the too easily accepted impact of the first 
(Kripkean) arguments because of the forgetfulness. This is rather curious because it 
was shown fairly soon after the publication of Kripke’s arguments that 1) the 
“actualized descriptions” view survives the modal argument, and 2) the causal 
component of Kripke’s theory has problems of its own (“cut” and changed causal 
links). The other part of the explanation of the dominance of the direct-causal theory is 
the conception that neither the Fregean sense theory nor the description theory has 
anything to do with the contextual and the causal factors essential in reference of 
proper names. But as we saw the Fregean theory does. And so does the description 
theory: Strawson has discussed the preconditions of the individuation of individuals 
and these contain the contextual and causal elements (Strawson 1959). 
 
The semantical argument fails also. There are both internal and general reasons for the 
failure. The internal reasons have to do with the explanatory poverty of the causal 
links, even when they are coupled to the communicative intentions to co-refer and to 
the (perceptual) groundings of the referents.28 What explains referent retention is the 
information that the referential communicative exchanges transmit – i.e. to all intents 
and purposes the Fregean sense theoretic factors in modern terms. The general reasons 
have to do with the misunderstanding of the referential intuitions, on which the direct-
causal theorists have relied rather heavily.29 The intuitions telling that proper names 
have referential power of their own are in fact 1) only indications of the basic schema 
of reference at work, the cognitive and neurolinguistic functional structure on which 
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all referential use of language is based; and 2) the mistaken belief that proper names as 
rigid designators have no semantic connection with the definite descriptions. The 
direct-causal theorists have also a highly idealized picture of the very causal 
connections from the referents to all subsequent uses of their names. The only 
situations where the causal links are in force in the way that their robustness can be 
relied on are the demonstrative references. But the Fregean senses take these situations 
into account. The Ateb-Afla example demonstrates that the senses contain the 
contextual and causal elements and are therefore not "purely" conceptual. That this has 
not been realized explains, in addition, why the Fregean sense theory of reference 
(“Fregean description theory”) has been deemed refuted. But here I would go even so 
far as charging the direct-causal theorists as having not been up to the standards of 
their trade: Frege´s Ateb-Afla example has been available for quite a long time in 
Frege´s published correspondence. 
 
The causal picture is a very high-level picture and very idealized at that, too. In 
contrast the Fregean approach focuses on the “microlevel” of referential language use 
and the factors operative at that level: varieties of information gathered and stored in 
memories, books and other records. So we see that there is a serious rift. Because the 
theoretician’s perspective of the direct-causal theorists is such high-level and idealized 
one, they are prone to claim that reference is independent on what the speaker knows 
or does not know about the referent; only the causal links matter. But the actual 
practice of referential language use is not nearly that clean; it is epistemically and 
informationally dirty, and it is local. The localness underwrites the informationality of 
reference. Reference is informational business; the talk about causal links 
misconstrues this from the very start. Consequently it is easy to succumb to believing 
that the causal links exist as such. As I argued they do not, and from this it follows that 
the transmission of information is what counts for referential purposes. Therefore we 
use expressions to refer because of what we know and believe – because of the 
information we possess (purportedly) – about the referents. In the case of mixed links 
information rules; Madagascar case shows that. In the case of unbeknownst cut links 
we can accept that reference is not always made, but even that depends on the amount 
and epistemic quality of the information about the referent “beyond the cut”. The 
contrary “intuitions” are just borne by our demonstrative Dasein erroneously writ 
large. 
 
To continue the diagnosis of the results of the failure of the semantical argument, apart 
from the demonstrative situations all other temporally extended causal connections are 
shown to be incapable of explaining the referential uses of proper names. The causal 
picture has been unclear because the first causal proposals (Kripke) mentioned 
communicative events as the nodes in referent retention but left the matter at that. In 
other words, the causal perspective was so general that it perforce ignored the specific 
factors in those communicative events that really contribute to the retention of the 
referents. Also the talk of the intentions to co-refer and reference borrowings was left 
at too general level. In effect it masked the actual factors operative in referential 
communication. Therefore the direct-causal lore was able to survive and be taken as 
superior to the Fregean theory. (However some direct-causal theorists have realized 
that the informational factors must be given an explanatory role. But to my mind this 
amounts to inadvertently admitting that there is not much left with the original content 
and aims of that theory.) 
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I argued that the common but mostly tacit knowledge of the practice of deference 
explains many of the claims made in the counterarguments to the Fregean theory. I 
also proposed that this factor – together with the basic schema of reference as the 
precondition for any use of language – constitutes a general mechanism prevailing in 
the linguistic communities. If that is correct we can conclude that the direct-causal 
theory has, so to say despite of its proponents’ aims and explicit claims, been 
concerned about these preconditions instead of the substantial matters at the level of 
the actual practice of reference. It does not help to claim that that is what the reference 
of proper names is, then. For as I argued the Fregean theory involves the preconditions 
also. And the claim would not be wholly true, either: the Fregeans can explain the 
substantial issues that are also commonly taken to be part of the phenomenon of 
reference (like Frege’s puzzle, the propositional attitude contexts). 
 
So all in all, the “Fregean description theory” has been an easy target only because the 
direct-causal theorists have forced it into a straitjacket of synonymies, a priori 
knowledge of the identies, purely qualititative/general properties and predicates, non-
deferentiality and isolated from typical referential communicative practices (because 
its being allegedly unreasonably internalist). Not all of these presuppositions have 
been deliberate: as I explained, the theoretical climate in the analytical philosophy of 
language back in the 1960s contributed a lot. But the overall result has been that the 
direct-causal view has been able to grow on seeming importance at the expense of 
misconceived Fregean (and description) theory. 
 
With the anti-Fregean and anti-descriptivist arguments it has become common to adopt 
the stance that we have to make a distinction between purely referential semantics and 
cognitive semantics; distinction between how we refer and how we think the referents 
(Wettstein 2004, Almog 2005). The issues here are more complex than that 
formulation reveals (for example there are singular propositions involved, empty 
names, and all usual problem cases one can find). But the general rationale for this 
distinction is that in the ordinary referential uses of language the directly referential 
expressions – proper names being the primary class – function differently from the 
way the Fregeans and the description theorists have thought. It is the received view 
that there are not Fregean senses to mediate and secure the reference, neither uniform 
descriptions related to the referents. Consequently it is believed that the only robust 
things are the causal-cum-communicative links from the naming events onward. 
 
The cognitive semantics deals with the thoughts of the speakers and focus on such 
phenomena as Frege’s data. The purely referential semantics is, however, premised on 
the soundness of the anti-Fregean arguments. My general argument in the first part of 
this essay has been that this decoupling of the purely referential from the cognitive 
thought contents does not and could not succeed. As we saw the anti-Fregean 
arguments and the arguments allegedly giving support to the direct-causal theory fail 
one way or another. Hence the purely referential semantics is not an option. (Of course 
in the “logical space” there is a place for such referential semantics that is not an 
antagonist to the content semantics; i.e. purely referential semantics could be 
independent from the anti-Fregean reasons. But the corollary from my argumentation 
is that this option is empirically ruled out also.) The basic reason, or factor, that 
underlies this failure is information. This amounts also to the “could not” part, for I am 
arguing that referring as a form of human action is intentional, and because of that it is 
informational and cognitive. Information finds its way into proper names and it needs 
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to be individuating for genuine reference to occur. Towards the end of this essay I will 
develop the cognitive, and neural, approach to modernize the Fregean senses. But for 
now it suffices to bring out the general diagnosis of the basic error in the direct-causal-
inspired referential semantics. It is that it takes reference and thought to be 
independent on each other. But they are not. There is a constitutive dependency from 
cognitive to referential.30 
 
It should be mentioned that the very general theoretical switch from the dependence of 
language on thought to the directly opposite way (or alternatively their mutual 
independence) is a possibility, at least as far as I can see. But what I deny is that the 
particular switch proposed for example by Wettstein and Almog could not be achieved 
for the reason that I have been arguing: the general theory of reference on which they 
rely is an explanatory failure (Wettstein 1991, 2004; Almog 2005). Of course it would 
be very satisfying if I could construct a general argument showing that no dependence 
of thought from language is nomologically possible. I do think that I have the makings 
of such an argument in what I argue in the appendix to chapter 6. It is an argument for 
the wholesale Fregean view according to which language expresses thoughts and these 
involve the “cognitive fix” on the referents - and that could not be otherwise because 
of our biological nature. 
 
But let us go back to the main course of argument. In a way the direct-causal theory is 
a retreat from the sense theory. The direct-causal theory looks at the communicative 
links and nodes from a far too general perspective for it to be of help in the specific 
explanations of the referent retention. That is reflected especially in the reliance on the 
co-referential intentions without realizing that it is the information about the referents 
on which the intentions must depend for them to be able to fulfill their role in the 
reference retention. And because the Fregean sense theory has all along contained the 
communicative, hence causal, links as information transmitting, the direct-causal 
theory is no advance. The issue has been over what referential factors one focuses. The 
direct-causal theorists have focused on the communicative links and nodes, albeit – as 
we have seen – poorly scrutinized. The sense theorists have focused on the information 
about the referents, for that is what the talk of the senses is in modern terms. But all in 
all since the arguments for the direct-causal theory fail in the crucial places, as well as 
do the counterarguments to the sense theory, it can be concluded with sufficient 
firmness that the direct-causal theory of reference is explanatorily hopeless with 
respect to those factors that are not already parts of the Fregean sense theory. 
 
The general result is, then, that the direct-causal theory of the reference of proper 
names, in regard of its few viable features like demonstrative references, is at most a 
subtheory of the Fregean theory of reference. This conclusion is based on our findings 
that i) the Fregean senses take into account the very causal and contextual elements the 
direct-causal theorists have thought are what set apart their theory explanatorily from 
the Fregean theory; and ii) the semantical viability of the idea of rigid designation 
presupposes the Fregean individuative machinery. Neither are the Fregean senses 
purely conceptual (and general, or qualitative) modes of presentation of the referents, 
nor need they be; they can be and usually are object-dependent and involve contextual 
information. That the much used Twin Earth arguments make epistemic assumptions 
which the Fregean sense theory need not respect strengthens the case for that theory 
more still. That is not to be wondered at, really, for the contents of our cognitive and 
epistemic states are so to say “local” at most and the “grasping” of the Fregean senses 
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happens only locally. That is why the reference of proper names is, pace the direct-
causal theorists, essentially cognitive and epistemic phenomenon. And that is how it 
should be because referring is a form of human action, and all human action is 
intentional, i.e. cognitive. So we see that the direct-causal theorists have all along been 
Fregeans by another name. (Their mistake is that they believe that name is everything.) 
 
The rather irritating implication from the direct-causal theory is just its causal 
robustness. This does not fit well with the facts. After the naming event – though 
already to some extent in them: ostension is not unproblematic pointing device, neither 
is the use of demonstratives - the fate of the causal links is at the mercy of the 
misunderstandings, forgetfulness and such vagaries on the speakers’ part - just like 
anything we do. There just seems not to be available any stronger, or more basic 
means than the cognitive and epistemic ones to guarantee that the original referent is 
preserved as the correct and intended “source”. But the direct-causal theorists seem not 
to care because they confuse 1) the information transmitted with the causal links as 
such, 2) the tacitly applied deferential metasupposition, together with the 
misgeneralization from the demonstrative situations of reference and perception of 
objects, overrules the speaker reference by the semantical reference. But that begs the 
issue in many cases. 
 
According to the Fregean theory there may be much less reference around. That 
prediction follows from the nature of genuine reference being based on the 
individuative information about the referents, the senses of proper names. When the 
speaker does not have sufficiently individuative information at his disposal, the feeling 
that a genuine reference is made with the proper name is explained by the tacit 
working of the deferential metasupposition together with the activation of the basic 
schema of reference. (And that explains also why proper names name and why the 
definite descriptions can be used to refer.) But I have been arguing that this is not 
genuine reference, substantial reference, but only reflects the preconditions of the 
referential use of language. Genuine reference depends on the cognitive and epistemic 
factors and these depend on the sufficiently individuative informational factors. 
 
?????????? ????????????????????????????
 
I have been arguing that all of the counterarguments to the Fregean sense theory of 
reference fail for some crucial reason or another. Now I want to change the gear 
diametrically and charge the direct-causal theory of reference with respect to its 
constant failure to explain the famous four puzzles of reference and cognitive 
significance. In other words the charge is about the empirical poverty of that theory. 
The four puzzles are the informationality of the identity statements, the positive and 
the negative existential statements and the propositional attitude contexts. (Acute 
observations about the issues can be found in (Wettstein 1986), (Bach 1987: 162-7), 
(Devitt 1989), (Salmon 1989) and (Nelson 1992: 154).) 
 
Remember that the puzzles are motivated by the problems with the Millian and the 
neo-Russellian views according to which the semantic value (or the sole meaning) of a 
proper name is its referent. The informationality (the non-triviality) of the identity 
statements like "a is b" is a semantical problem for this view because, though "a" and 
"b" have the same referent by hypothesis, the statement tells us more than the 
tautologuous "a is a" (or "b is b"): the cognitive significances of the two statements 
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differ from each other. Russell argued that the positive existential statements like "a 
exists" become trivial or redundant because "a" already names an entity, so there is 
really no need to affirm its existence (affirming becoming semantically idle 
reaffirming). The same line of reasoning makes the negative existential statements ("a 
does not exist") contradictory, for on the Russellian view "a" could not but name an 
already existing individual the existence of which is then denied by the very statement. 
The propositional attitude contexts are problematic because one may believe that a is F 
but not that b is F, even if a is in fact b. It is commonly said that the substitutivity of 
identicals fails in these cases. For instance one may believe that Russell was a 
philosopher without believing that the junior author of Principia Mathematica was a 
philosopher, even though Russell was the junior author of Principia Mathematica. Or, 
to restrict the examples to proper names only, you may not have a faintest idea of who 
Saloth Sar was, but know that Pol Pot was a nihilistic dictator; still the two names refer 
to the same individual. Another problem with the propositional attitude contexts is that 
one may believe that, say, Santa Claus is fat, but from this belief it does not follow that 
Santa Claus exists. The rule of the existential generalization fails in these types of 
cases. 
 
The best straightforward direct-causal attempts at explaining the four puzzles that do 
not commit some kind of ad hoc moves like postulating strict semantic-pragmatic 
divide are those offered by Michael Devitt. Devitt offers solutions to both types of the 
existential statements such that make them meaningful, not tautologuous and 
contradictory. According to him the positive existential statements are meaningful 
because there exists an object on which the causal links underlying the referential 
expressions are grounded, and the negative existential statement are meaningful 
because there exists a causal network which is grounded on an "imaginative act" 
giving rise to a type of referential expression; for instance a story or a hallucination 
that are, or were, taken to be about a really existing object. I can in fact accept these 
solutions, provided they can be given a formulation on the informational terms (such 
will be given in sections 8.1.4 and 8.1.5). However the explanation of the negative 
existentials is too narrow: the source of the causal chain can be for all intents and 
purposes a normal act of postulating an individual. This shows, moreover, that the 
causal links are not the primary factor in these explanations of the existentials even on 
Devitt´s account. Instead it is the kind of information, for the "imaginative" 
groundings need not differ epistemically at all from the normal groundings of proper 
names. The consequence is that the names are used as if they refer genuinely, i.e. they 
are used purportedly to refer, as are all proper names in the contexts that are about 
fiction or such topics when that is known to the participants. That is why the negative 
existential statements are not contradictory: they purport to give us new information 
about the ontological status of the purported referents of the names in question. 
 
If Devitt´s account of the existential statements is provisionally acceptable, the same 
could not be said about his solution to the identity statements. As pointed out, Devitt 
recognizes that the direct-causal theory needs some kind of notion of sense as the 
mode of the presentation of the referent, albeit a non-Fregean one as he emphasizes. 
His proposal is that that kind of sense consists of the types of designational chains 
originating from the referent (Devitt 1981: 153, 236), (Devitt 1989: 227-31), (Devitt & 
Sterelny 1987: 58). The cognitive difference between the identity statements "a is a" 
and "a is b" is explained by the different designational chains grounded in the same 
object. In spite of the fact that I said earlier that I categorically refuse to take seriously 
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any kind of non-cognitive notion of sense let us take a look at Devitt´s proposal. His 
account is in danger of being vacuous. For consider the question how different the 
causal networks or the designational chains must be for there to be a difference in the 
sense? In other words, how one singles out the sense-relevant parts of the networks on 
the purely causal basis? Take for instance the statement "Manoel Francisco dos Santos 
is Garrincha". This is an informative statement if one did not know the identity before. 
According to Devitt, now that one knows the identity, the networks underlying 
"Garrincha" and "Manoel Francisco dos Santos" have "merged" in one´s brain that 
resulting in the informationality of the identity statement. The problem with this 
solution is that the relevant causal parts of the respective networks qua causal could 
not be individuated to explain this. One needs recourse to the factors that make for the 
differences in the causal links, and these factors are again informational: as I argued 
only information keeps the referential links alive so that the names can be used 
meaningfully to refer. Here I could not help but quote Evans´ brusque expression of 
the problem: 
 
"And it is quite obscure how, if one mental state represents a particular 
object in virtue of one sort of causal relation to it, and another mental state 
(of the same subject) represents that object in virtue of another sort of 
causal relation to it, the sheer differences between the causal relations 
could generate a difference in content between the two mental states, 
given that it need not in any way impinge on the subject´s awareness." 
(Evans 1982: 83) 
 
In a later paper Devitt admits this point, in fact endorses it (Devitt 1989: 227-8). But 
now the vacuousness of the solution becomes obvious because Devitt has admitted that 
the designational chains merge in the brain of the speaker. What precisely happens is 
that the proximal parts of the chains get registered by being neurally processed in the 
brain. It is true that the neural processes can be said to be causal but it is essential that 
they also constitute the information processings that in their turn constitute our 
cognitive activities, the neurocognitive information we individually possess. Put in 
modern terms the parts of the causal links qua informational in the brain are thus at 
least very similar to the Fregean senses (pace Devitt). So Devitt´s solution is not an 
improvement at all but in effect just the old sense theoretic one. 
 
What about the propositional attitude contexts? Devitt has discussed the matter in 
earnest (Devitt 1981: ch. 9, 10; Devitt 1989: 229-31). In short he is after a solution to 
the problem of exportation, i.e. under what conditions singular terms appearing in the 
propositional attitude contexts can be said to refer to a definitely existing individual. 
When for example the expression "the junior author of Principia Mathematica" can be 
said to refer to an individual (Bertrand Russell) as it is used by a certain speaker when 
that speaker believes that the junior author of Principia Mathematica was a 
philosopher. (Devitt assumes the descriptions to be singular terms.) Devitt´s account 
says that exportation goes through when the singular term in question is non-empty 
and designational, i.e. when it has a referent and it is grounded on that referent. 
 
But this is not yet sufficient even by Devitt´s own lights – which he does notice. What 
more is needed is that the speaker "has the referent in mind". As we saw Devitt spells 
out this notion along the by now familiar lines that there must exist a designational 
causal chain from the referent to the occasion of the use of the singular term. Moreover 
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Devitt tries to save Frege´s "functionality principle" which he takes to state that the 
meaning of a statement or a thought depends on the meanings of its components. In 
regard to the propositional attitudes it follows that the sense of a belief is made up of 
the "customary senses" of its components. For Devitt these are the causal mechanisms, 
or parts thereof, by which we refer. If you believe that Cicero was an orator, the senses 
are the (subsets of the) designational chains underlying the use of "Cicero" and 
"orator". As Devitt says, "Cicero" and "orator" specify the modes of their reference 
(Devitt 1989: 238). 
 
The immediate problem with this solution is how the (subsets of the) designational 
chains are told apart. Obviously not all of the chains grounded in the referent will do, 
for this does not allow any finer distinctions within them. So we must presuppose that 
their variance from person to person is what is relevant here (though Devitt´s 
discussion of this seems not quite clear to me (Devitt 1989: 227-8)). But that will not 
do either because it does not explain the differences in the associated senses of the 
singular terms. The links in the causal chains are distal, so in the overwhelming 
majority of cases the speaker has absolutely no clue at all what their courses have 
been: the major part of the causal network eludes the speaker epistemically. We do 
have access to the proximal parts and effects of the networks, but our mode of access 
to them is cognitive and informational (I know that someone is such and such, but I do 
not know my brain processes, the proximal causal patterns, when I am thinking of that 
individual). The earlier proximal links do not get into our brains qua causal; the only 
way they could do that is for them to make a cognitive difference for example by 
carrying a "mark". That is, when they show by themselves that there is a difference in 
the causal mechanisms that are supposed to constitute the differences in the respective 
senses. But that could not be done without informational clues about how the links 
were created and retained, and that requires, to state it once again, information about 
the referent as well as the courses of the causal links. And that is what the puzzle about 
the propositional attitude contexts is all about. (As it is also with the identity 
statements. So it is no wonder why the two puzzles are usually discussed together. And 
it is no wonder why Devitt´s solutions to both of them fail together.) 
 
It also seems that there is a revealing feature (or an error from my point of view) in 
Devitt´s proposed solution to the exportation. He writes that exportation "is in order if 
and only if 'b' is designational and non-empty" (Devitt 1981: 226). This requires that 
from i) a person x believes that b is F (where "b" is opaque) and from ii) b exists, one 
can infer that x believes of b, that it is F ("b" is transparent). But this seems to make 
the whole exportation trivial, for it guarantees that if "b" is a non-empty term (it has a 
referent, namely b) and is designational (is grounded in b), exportation goes through 
without the subject needing to have anything to do with this; the subject is not even 
required to know that b exists. Here we can clearly see again the main problem with 
the direct-causal theory. By claiming that knowledge and beliefs are not necessary (or 
sufficient) for reference, the way to the solution of the puzzles is simply cut off. 
Especially the propositional attitude contexts measure the needed amount of 
information for a reference (exportation) to succeed. If one does not know who the 
referent of "b" is, one could not export "b". What Devitt says, in effect, is that one does 
not have to know who or what b is for exportation to go through. If this is so, why, 
then, the problem with the propositional attitudes have become and keeps on being so 
pressing in the first place? It is a problem and will not go away by trying to answer it 
with a theory which so cleanses reference that it becomes divorced from what it 
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actually is: one form of human action, inevitably bringing the epistemic and cognitive 
paraphernalia with it. 
 
It should also be realized that bringing in the semantic reference instead of the speaker 
reference, as is the case with Devitt’s example, his solution would seem to succeed in 
most cases. That is because the linguistic, or epistemic, community includes those who 
know who or what b is (the “experts”). But I have already argued that that solution is 
not wholly cogent. Moreover the propositional attitudes are the attitudes of a particular 
individual, so the “epistemic state” of the community must be kept out of the 
considerations. 
 
It should be noted that Devitt takes up some cases that he admits do not yield to his 
account (Devitt 1981: 271-4).  There are three types of them: i) one has an access to a 
designational chain but we do not think that he has the object in mind nor that 
exportation is in order; ii) one has no access to a designational chain but seems to have 
an object in mind and exportation is in order; iii) one has no access and no object in 
mind, but seems to have a belief about the object. Devitt´s discussion of all these cases 
is quite short, and we do not have to present the particular examples he gives because 
his answer to all three types of cases is in effect the same. Devitt resorts to intuitions. 
Although all of the three cases seem to show that his account is in trouble, he says that 
intuitions about exportation do tend to vary among people, so his theory may emerge 
unscathed when developed further. Devitt says also that the theory may be able to 
change the intuitions. Be that as it may the notion of having in mind is the crux of the 
issue. (And leaving aside the point that if intuitions are allowed to change with one´s 
theory then they can not be used against the sense theory by the direct-causal theorists, 
especially when the intuitions involved clash with one another, as seems to be the case 
especially with the propositional attitude contexts.) I think that we can correctly say 
that the intuitions as to when one can be said to have someone or something in mind 
are not firm because - once that notion is severed from Devittian causal chains - it is 
the amount of cognitive information about the referent that determines the reliability of 
the reference. In general the less information about the referent, or less the central 
information, the less sure we are about successful reference having been made, hence 
of having the referent in mind – contrary to appearances. This is not a yes-no problem, 
but rather exhibits a continuous gradation of cases depending on the amount and 
quality of the information a subject possesses. Consequently it is no wonder that 
intuitions fluctuate. 
 
Notes 
 
1. The following quotation, besides that it is quite hilariously ironical in putting Kripke good 
company with Frege and Russell, is also relevant to the present issue: "Kripke´s thesis 
here is greatly supported, I should think, by the fact that we would not ordinarily even 
know what was meant by 'fixing the meaning', 'giving a definition', or 'giving a synonym' 
for a name. It is hard to believe that either Frege or Russell, when they were not being 
careless, ever actually claimed that descriptions did any of the things." (Linsky 1977: 49) - 
Searle seems to be after some strong semantic relation between proper names and the 
descriptions (Searle 1958: 172). If that is so, his cluster theory fails if it is taken also to be 
a version of the sense theory of reference. 
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2. This argument occurred to me while I was reading Bar-Elli’s paper on Frege (Bar-Elli 
1981). That it did is easily understood for in one place Bar-Elli seems to say as much in 
effect himself: "…but then on Frege´s own assumption, that a is b would itself be known a 
priori. This, however, is exactly what Frege tries to avoid." (Bar-Elli 1981: 142) I would 
add that Frege does not try to avoid it; rather there is no need to such move on Frege´s 
view. 
 
3. This statement is anachronistic, for the notion of rigid designation is Kripke´s own label. 
Also the opinion that both Frege and Russell held the view "one description per proper 
name" is empirically false, at least in Frege´s case (remember Frege´s Aristotle note). 
Robert May argues (May 2006) that Frege did held that in any language a name in it has 
no more than one (complete) sense, i.e. that there is no variability of the senses with 
respect to a particular name, prima facie contrary to the standard interpretation of Frege’s 
Aristotle note. (Thanks to Panu Raatikainen for drawing my attention to this paper.) 
However May’s argument so to say equivocates practically. Here it suffices to state the 
outline of my would-be detailed argument. The complete sense is a thesis about the ideal 
scientific language only (as May himself acknowledges), so the vagaries of the natural 
languages still remain haunting. In other words, as long as we do not possess the ideal 
language our grasps of the senses of names are bound to remain partial. In a way it is then 
true that every speaker speaks his own language. Therefore it becomes very 
understandable that the referents and the extensions of the expressions different speakers 
use (especially those with the same syntactic or ortographic form) have to be the same for 
communicative purposes. But that suffices for the communicative purposes as well (even 
if it is not known that the referent is the same). So May is correct but his argument is 
rather irrelevant – especially because May accepts that a sense may be only partially 
grasped by different speakers. (To be noted, I endorse May’s argument that to the extent 
we have conscious access to the senses – or just to the parts of them (see chapter 6) – they 
can be characterized only by descriptive means, but from this it does not follow that the 
senses are wholly descriptive.) 
 
4. So there is also this subclass of the definite descriptions that are rigid, in addition to those 
considered by Recanati above. It seems that these latter descriptions are rigid because of 
the nature of their referents, like "the only even prime" shows. This seems to be closely 
related to the issue of essentialism, unlike the descriptions fixed with the “actuality 
operator”. (Another class of rigid descriptions is made up by the Quinean predicates like 
"x Socratizes", which express the property of being Socrates, thus having Socrates as its 
sole extension in every possible world. But these kind of rigid descriptions are trivial in 
relation to the Kripkean argumentative context, as Linsky points out (Linsky 1977: 54).) 
Note also that actualizing the descriptions and fixing the referent by the descriptions are 
not equivalent. The description that fixes the referent can be taken as rigid, but any 
description applied to the referent can be actualized, thus rigidified. 
 
5. In a way Kripke admits this, for he states that in Searle´s cluster version "in a rare class of 
cases, usually initial baptisms" we find all the features (2)-(5) that characterize Searlean 
version (Kripke 1972: 290). But considering the central role of the baptisms in Kripke´s 
picture, and the allowable range of the namings, is that class so rare at all? 
 
6. It has been countered to me that the referential intuition for the direct-causal view is 
certainly much more widely held than my contrary intuition. I have two points to make in 
response. When has the argument from authority/majority become sound? And what has 
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truth to do with the opinions, or intuitions, held by the majority? I guess that the intuition 
that the Earth stands still and the Sun revolves around it was as strong and as widely held 
an intuition as anything is (and still seems to be); but Aristarchus and Copernicus did not 
accept it, and were correct in not so doing. My answer to the second complaint that rare 
individual intuitions should not be respected is that it manifests a complete 
misunderstanding of the role of counterevidence in science (and I assume that in 
philosophy we ought to respect that, too). The relevant point is that a contrary intuition, if 
intuitions are regarded as evidence, is then an instance of counterevidence, a datum that 
needs to be explained (away). It is not to be dismissed as a rare and maybe isolated 
instance, but it is a fact to be accounted for. My second guess is that many foundational 
scientific developments would not have seen the light of the day (but the darkness of the 
night of the authority and tradition) if the contrary facts, seemingly unaccountable 
phenomena, were just ignored (though many of those were ignored for some period). 
. 
7. One could also use a shortcut argument and point out that Salmon´s notion of reference 
simpliciter is non sequitur. For he assumes that there is only one intuitively uniform 
notion of reference. But there may well be more than one. Indeed, the contrary intuitions 
indicate that this is so, i.e. that the descriptions associated with a proper name are the 
theoretical clothing of another notion of reference simpliciter. This further indicates that 
the notions of reference simpliciter depend on larger theoretical considerations. In short, 
in some situations the operative notion of reference could be the Salmonian (causal) one, 
but in others it is the notion that the sense theory accounts for. In fact my argumentation 
will have as one of its main results that the situations in which the former notion is "at 
home" are the demonstrative contexts, but even then only together with the sense theoretic 
factors; in all other situations the sense theoretic notion of reference is solely operative. 
(One could try to distinguish the larger considerations as "merely" pragmatic ones. But I 
think that in that case there seems to be no viable explanatory distinction to be drawn 
between semantics and pragmatics in relation to the reference research. I praised 
Recanati´s account because it invests quite extensively on the pragmatic factors. I take it 
that his account can be taken as an argument for the explanatory mesh of semantics and 
pragmatics.) 
 
8. Michael McKinsey argues that the problem with causal intentions to co-refer (intentions 
not individuated by anything descriptional), i.e. intentions which are constituted by factors 
belonging to the causal connections, is that this requires, for the speaker to know that he 
has that very token intention, that the speaker "must also know something about the chain 
of events by which this intention was brought about." (McKinsey 1978: 185) The reason 
is that the knowledge of the very token intention is a necessary feature of the co-
referential intention qua intentional; the general intention to be co-referring is forceless in 
relation to the particular (token) intention with a name "NN". But that is generally false: 
one need not engage in any empirical investigation going beyond his current mental states 
to know what he intends to. Hence the causal theory´s reliance on the intentions fails. 
 
9. So I am in fact denying Devitt´s claim that people have false beliefs in many cases about 
the referents of proper names. But this is surely an empirical issue that could, and should, 
be decided by research that records people´s beliefs about the bearers of the familiar 
proper names. 
 
10. The relevance of information with respect to the borrowings of reference by the abilities 
to refer, both by proper names and by the descriptions, is revealed also by what Devitt 
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says about the loss of a particular such ability: "This loss of ability is a failure of memory. 
For a sense theory, what is forgotten is the required associated descriptions. For the causal 
theory the inability to produce descriptions usually associated with a name is evidence for 
loss of ability with a name, but does not constitute it." (Devitt 1974: 188, n.11) The 
problem with this view is that the distinction between evidence and constitution is left 
totally unclear in relation to the role of the descriptions. And what specifically constitutes 
the loss of an ability to refer in the causal theory? Are there any other relevant memories 
than the memories about the referent of the name? In other words, if abilities to refer are 
not constituted by the senses (expressed by the descriptions, and cognitively speaking: 
beliefs and memories), why even bother to invoke the memories in explaining the loss of 
particular referential abilities? According to the direct-causal theory the causal links 
explain having in mind, period; the cognitive stuff is totally irrelevant as evidence. 
 
11. Here I only note the point because it becomes obvious in Devitt´s explanation of his 
example of the Liebknecht case (Devitt 1981: 140-3). As the reader recalls ignorant Joe 
catches the name "Liebknecht" upon the conversation by his friends. But being ignorant 
he spreads a referential tangle as to whether it is Wilhelm or Karl Liebknecht to whom his 
uses of "Liebknecht" refer, for there seems to be no fact of the matter to tell them apart 
(by the causal account). Devitt invokes Field´s notion of partial reference: "Liebknecht" 
refers partially to Wilhelm and partially to Karl. But that explanation does not differ from 
what the sense theory of reference delivers, for there are no individuating descriptional 
means on Joe´s disposal by the help of which it could be found out whether Joe refers to 
Wilhelm or to Karl. The causal account here rides a piggyback on the sense account. This 
point generalizes to other cases where the routes of the causal links are not known and 
information related to the bearers of the names are of no help either. 
 
12. In this I find myself in company with Salmon who states that equating Fregean senses 
with "…the linguistic network or a chain that secures the referent is…on the order of 
category mistake." (Salmon 1986: 70-1) 
 
13. Another use of proper names is to “verb” them, like in “I’ll Sarah Young you, you 
#¤%&!”, as one once teased me. I take it that the relevant elements of the meaning of 
“SY” on which the tease was based are obvious (if one knows about SY, that is). 
 
14. Though there are also strong contrary intuitions to the causal ones: we do seem to talk 
about future individuals with descriptional specifications ("the first born baby in Finland 
in the year 2010"). We can also talk about individual black holes in the centers of 
particular galaxies, about the heaviest whale in the oceans, and so on. 
 
15. NN = notetur nomen or nomen nescio; meaning "note the name" or "name not known". 
There are well known arguments against this view by Kripke (Kripke 1972: 283-4) but I 
concur with those who favour the explication and take Kripke´s arguments to be weak. 
 
16. I mention Piaget here to anchor the background of my proposal (and for historical 
accuracy). That does not mean that I accept his overall theory; at least I prefer to stay 
uncommitted with respect to his strong antinativism. 
 
17. It seems that the basic schema helps to explain also Donnellan´s notion of referential use 
of descriptions, at least in those cases where the intended referent is in sight (so that it can 
be pointed to, if needed). In these situations the basic schema takes over the referential 
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role; the specific information the description conveys cannot, so to say, resist in these 
essentially perceptual situations (even if it is correct). 
 
18. The basic schema may also help to explain what Evans calls "generality constraint". The 
generality constraint assumes that thinking involves conceptual abilities (in contrast to 
mere manipulation of distinct symbols) and that thoughts are essentially structured (Evans 
1982: 101-5). The substance of the generality constraint is that if a cognitive agent is able 
to think that a is F, he is also able to think that a is G, a is H and so on. But he is also able 
to think that b is F, c is F and so on. In other words there are no isolated conceptual skills 
with respect to the objects of thoughts and their properties in the mental life of any 
cognitive agent. In this way the generality constraint partly characterizes what is to be a 
cognitive agent. Now the formal presentation (a is F) displays it admirably how the 
generality constraint works at the fundamental level of enabling cognitive agents to think 
about anything. So I propose that the basic schema of reference explains this ubiquitous 
feature of the cognitive agents being able to think subjects being F, G and so on, that is 
involved in any thought which is about someone or something. - Evans denies that the 
generality constraint applies to the information processing in the brain (in contrast to 
person’s thinking), i.e. he thinks that the brain´s processing modules are distinct (like the 
modules processing the speed of sound and the speed of moving objects) (Evans 1982: 
104, n.22). But as an argument it fails. For all we currently know there could be such 
information processing systems in the brain that execute just the general ability the 
generality constraint focuses on. The basic schema of reference could indeed be such a 
general system. 
 
19. It seems that the idealizing tendency, which goes with the tendency to take the causal 
connections to be without any real problems, is clear in Devitt´s presentation of his theory 
(Devitt 1981). Although he reminds us on a few occasions that there are difficulties with 
the details of his theory, and discusses them also, the tone throughout his book is that the 
Fregean and the description theoretic factors are referentially almost epiphenomenal; only 
the causal connections, the d-chains, count in explaining the abilities to refer, the 
reference borrowings, non-Fregean senses of proper names, the different conceptual roles 
of them, the justifications of exporting singular terms in the propositional attitude 
contexts, and so on. In reading the book one rather soon gets the impression that the 
causal links work magic and one is left wondering how anyone ever thought that the 
Fregean sense and the description theories could provide viable explanations of reference 
of proper names at all. But Devitt´s theory is the most thoroughly developed causal 
account of the reference of proper names, so the impression immediately suggests a 
general tollens argument: the direct-causal theory of reference just will not do. 
 
20. And not so tacitly sometimes. For instance David Kaplan, one of the proponents of the 
direct-causal theory, asks in one occasion that, if pointing can be a form of description, 
why could not description be a form of demonstration (Kaplan 1990: 24). (Look also at 
what Kaplan says about the relationship of the demonstratives to proper names in sections 
6 and to the language learning in section 10 at the same paper.) 
 
21. Since I first read about the Twin Earth scenario and the related arguments against the 
Fregean theory, and for externalism and wide content/meaning, it has always seemed 
obvious to me that they could not be correct because they ignore what is known and not 
known in the scenarios by the subjects. It is, at last, reassuring that there is at least one 
other who seems to think precisely that way too: Frank Jackson points out that the neo-
  129 
Russellians (though he does not name them) are in troubles because they must help 
themselves to the distinction between information conveyed and knowingly conveyed. 
But then “…we have the problem of giving an account of what is knowingly conveyed.” 
(Jackson 2004: 262). In other words, and generalizing, the neo-Russellians and direct 
referentialists, and those who use the Twin Earth scenarios against the Fregean views, do 
– and have to – presuppose an epistemic element to the peril of their core claim (that the 
object of thought with cognitively differing expressions both referring to it is the same in 
every case and at all times, i.e. the referent itself). 
 
22. To pre-empt the issue of begging semantic and pragmatic questions before the section 4.4 
where they could arise anew I want to bring up three subjects here. 1) Salmon´s own 
information-semantic framework begs several questions, for example he takes information 
to be very strong metaphysical notion (it is eternal and same for every thinker and speaker 
with respect to every distinct declarative sentence). But the most serious failure of his 
framework is internal. In his eagerness to prevent any Fregean factors from creeping in he 
postulates guises under which objects are thought. But that is clearly equivalent to the 
postulation of the Fregean senses for all explanatory purposes. (Graeme Forbes has 
observed that also (Forbes 1989: 135, n. 19).) But what is more his formal framework, 
with its "contours", "schedules", "characters" and such factors contains also intensions 
which give the extensions in any possible world (Salmon 1986: 32-4). How is Salmon to 
avoid that those intensions contain the Fregean factors that determine the referents? It 
strongly seems that Salmon´s neo-Russellian semantic framework works only because it 
has the central elements of the Fregean theory tacitly built into it. (This charge becomes 
even more pressing when it is noted (see note 12) that Salmon rejects any causal links 
between objects and expressions as having anything to do with information (Salmon 1986: 
70-1).) – 2) Salmon also charges the Fregeans of begging the question in that they do not 
differentiate between semantically encoded information and pragmatically "imparted" 
information by a sentence. But Salmon is led in effect to a stipulative mode; he is forced 
to keep the semantic information so narrow that it only contains the referents including 
properties and relations (in general, the information values) of the expressions involved 
(this is what his neo-Russellian "doubly modified naive theory" of information content 
claims, in fact). The stipulativeness in Salmon´s approach becomes even more evident 
when he says, in countering the suggestion that his guises are in fact Fregean notions, that 
whatever the guises are they are "entirely separable from the semantic nature of the 
relevant sentence…" (Salmon 1986: 120). Salmon differentiates between semantics proper 
and pragmatics; the latter deals with the way "a thinker is familiar with the thought 
content [a singular proposition]…" (Salmon 1986: 174, n. 2). This maneuver, when it is 
coupled to the drawbacks of that theory (for example that the guises are operatively 
Fregean), justifies the application of modus tollens. But in a way I am quite willing to let 
Salmon to have his austere conception of semantics, for I suspect that ultimately it will 
coil unto itself without any explanatory power with respect to the referential 
communication: the singular propositions are rather uninteresting because they can be had 
only after our epistemic work is done, i.e. when we eventually become to know the 
ontological inventory of our world - until then all the claims to the individuals being the 
constituents of the singular propositions are hostages to the temporary states of 
knowledge. -3) One particular result of this that I favour is to break the distinction 
between the encoded and imparted information. Whether information is semantic or 
(merely) pragmatic does not count. What counts is what explains what, and the modified 
naive theory loses in that game, with the guises and all. I think that this morale 
generalizes: any attempts to draw a wedge between semantics proper and pragmatics are 
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bound to be stipulatory and without explanatory force when the subjects are reference and 
thinking as forms of human action. (As already mentioned an enlightening antidote 
against the overly "semanticizing" attitude is (Recanati 1993).) By pragmatics I here 
understand factors that have to do with the speaker´s and the hearer´s contexts, their 
perceptual surroundings as well as their beliefs (this conforms closely to Recanati´s view 
of pragmatics). In contrast "wide pragmatics" may be barren with respect to questions in 
semantics and "narrow pragmatics". The "wide pragmatics" deals with Gricean maxims 
and such factors. (Therefore it could not be held against me that with my postulation of 
the metaprinciple in section 4.3.2 - which says that it is tacitly acknowledged by all 
competent speakers that if there are in fact two distinct individuals for the same proper 
name, that could make differences in the referential practices and in the senses, but that 
that is irrelevant as long as there is no indication that such is the case in fact, i.e. that they 
are two different referents –Am I here ignoring my own view of the non-existence of any 
strict explanatory boundaries between semantics and pragmatics? I am not because the 
metaprinciple belongs to wide pragmatics.) -3) There is the puzzling account when 
Salmon states that according to the Fregean view, when someone believes that there are 
two distinct individuals bearing the (syntactically) same name when in fact there is only 
one self-same individual, the name must be as univocal as it is to those who know that 
there is only one individual concerned. But why are we supposed to be forced to adopt our 
epistemic perspective as exclusively applicable to the subject? We are trying to 
characterize the innocent speaker´s perspective on things, and we can do that by keeping 
his senses separate (i.e. we acknowledge that he thinks there are two distinct individuals). 
We do not "use the name to refer to our sense" only (Salmon 1986: 171). Of course we 
must use our senses when talking about the speaker´s senses, but we can characterize them 
being separate from each other and as giving at least a sufficient approximation to the 
speaker´s senses. If we could not, ascribing specific propositional attitudes to anyone who 
has not our epistemic perspective on things would be futile, but it is not. Salmon has made 
a singular mistake here, not the Fregeans. (It seems that he is here the victim of the urge to 
adopt the epistemic god´s eye point of view of which I warn about because it is bound to 
lead to distorting results in semantics.) 
 
23. Maybe a more realistic example could be given with names "Gaurisanker" and 
"Qomolangma" which, I believe, both refer to Mount Everest. 
 
24. Russell held also this view, albeit – of course – expressed in terms of descriptions: “The 
description required to express the thought will vary for different people, or for the same 
person at different times. The only thing constant (so long as the name is rightly used) is 
the object to which the name applies.” (Russell 1912: 29-30) Scott Soames uses the notion 
of information asserted by a sentence and argues that no substantial descriptive 
proposition (in contrast to singular proposition) is expressed by any such assertive 
utterance because different speakers know different things about the referent of the proper 
name used in the sentence (Soames 2002: 64-5). But as I already argued Soames´ fallacy 
lies in the fact that the sense theorist (even if it is assumed that the senses could be 
expressed descriptively without a remainder) is not committed to such common-
information-to-all-speakers demand: remember that it is part of the sense theory that 
speakers have different information, i.e. different senses, about the referents of proper 
names. I would like to ask bluntly how could two people ever believe exactly the same 
thing? Our experiences and information we individually possess, hence the senses, differ 
from one another. So it is extremely improbable that there is any intersubjectively same 
thing believed by any two thinkers (and by any single thinker throughout his whole 
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cognitive life). Sometimes it is strongly maintained that if the contents of particular beliefs 
were not the same, we could not comprehend one another. (I have even met explicit 
exclamations in the literature that it would be absurd if that were not so - but I will not 
disclose any names here.) Be that as it may, for now, I can not help believing that those 
who impose this a priori demand from the sameness of the content of the objects of the 
propositional attitudes, in the manner just alluded, are simply confusing the minimal 
(Fregean) requirement of the sameness of the referent, or extension, with the sameness of 
the whole content of a particular propositional attitude, i.e. the total sameness of the 
senses related to a proper name. (When one meets a priori demands, generally one should 
be ready to fire the charge of question begging. Here it is that the proponents of the 
sameness of the content beg the question against the similarity of the content of the 
objects of the propositional attitudes.) 
 
25. It should be pointed out that transworld identity of individuals is a heavy metaphysical 
issue. For instance one could argue that since Kripke stipulates possible worlds, via the 
actual individuals, he simply begs the question against any different view. A particular 
different view is the Lewisian possibilist approach that postulates that there exist (many) 
other possible worlds that are just like our world in their basic physical properties (but that 
there are also many others which are not, i.e. in them even different laws of nature reign). 
This approach comes with the counterpart metaphysics of individuals. According to that 
metaphysics no inhabitant of any world is strictly identical with any actual individual, or 
with any individual in any other possible world; they are at most counterparts of one 
another (one counterpart per world, though this may not be necessary) depending on the 
(different) similarity considerations of their properties. However the issue is not so clear 
cut. For the Kripkeans may argue that it is precisely the similarity relations that beg the 
question against their view. Another way to put this is to note that the Lewisian 
metaphysics does not countenance rigid designators at all (because there are no strict 
transworld identities). In this work I have been accepting for the sake of the argument the 
notion of rigidity, but as comes to the metaphysics of individuals as such, distinct from the 
issues in the philosophy of language and semantics, I side with Lewis. In particular I 
cannot help but wonder why there are, in Lewis´ words, "incredulous stares" the view has 
been facing. These stares should be dimming. My reason is that the possibilist view is 
currently a scientifically justifiable option. That is because the multiversum hypothesis is 
gaining ground among the cosmologists and astrophysicists. That our universum, our 
possible world, is only one among many others (most likely different from our world in 
different degrees with respect to the basic physical properties and the laws of nature) 
seems to be the best explanation of, for example, the fact that in our world life as we know 
it has been able to evolve (although the margin of error for that happening is very thin 
indeed in terms of the values of many basic physical constants and parameters). In other 
words the issue is also as much an empirical one as it is metaphysical. – I would like to 
add that when the counterpart theory is wedded to the Lewisian possibilism, the 
categorical denial that any two individuals are strictly identical across any two possible 
worlds might not be true. For if our universum is totally deterministic, then another 
possible world that has the very same origin (with the same basic physical laws of nature 
and the same distribution of matter/energy) evolves as an exact copy of our world. Thus in 
it every individual is a totally identical counterpart to a corresponding individual in our 
universum, and the counterpart mapping is strictly 1-1, i.e. the worlds are perfectly 
identical. Consequently it is not wholly true to state that the counterpart theory eschews 
rigid designators, for with respect to the possible world just envisaged all the names of the 
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actual individuals are rigid; hence at least the letter of rigid designation is respected in the 
cosmologically supported Lewisian counterpart theory. 
 
26. With Salmon we have a case of theoretical blindsight on this issue. For he says on another 
related occasion that "Strictly speaking, each of the argument applies to a proper name or 
indexical singular term as it is in a possible context. This is important…also for proper 
names such as 'Salmon', which may be the name for two or more individuals at once." 
(Salmon 1982: 24, n.26) So he sees the need for the actual identification of the referent of 
a proper name, i.e. the problem of the disambiguation of proper names. Salmon’s lapse is 
even more curious because the contextual relativity he mentions is just what his caveat 
from the relativization of a use of a sentence states. In this connection I should mention 
also what Devitt and Sterelny say: "We do not overlook the importance the linguistic and 
non-linguistic context of an utterance but see all aspects of it, aside from the relevant parts 
of the causal theory, as having only evidential significance. The context guides the 
audience in removing the ambiguity; it supplies evidence of what the speaker has in mind 
and hence evidence of the semantic reality, but it is not that reality." (Devitt & Sterelny 
1987: 59) But the very distinction, in relation to the individuation of the referent, between 
reference proper and evidence for a specific reference, is problematical. Once the causal 
theory is shown to be explanatorily vicarious with respect to the Fregean theory what is 
left are the "evidential" factors, and these are informational and so, to emphasize it again, 
the sense theoretic factors. 
 
27. Soames discusses disambiguous proper names (Soames 2002: 96-103). He answers the 
problem of the individuation of the referent, or the determination of the semantic content 
of the ambiguous proper name in a context, by arguing that the sufficient condition for 
that is that a particular name used has the same referent in all contexts of its use (Soames 
2002: 101). This is spelled out, in part, by the requirement that the speaker has acquired a 
"referential intention" that determines a certain individual as the referent of the name (for 
example by picking up the name from others and intending to use it to refer to whom they 
use it to refer). But this method of individuation, i.e. disambiguation, fails as I already 
argued: the intentions are not sufficiently powerful to determine the referent without 
related individuating information. And Soames disregards the associated information in 
that role, but his argument fails also there, for it assumes that the information must be 
uniformly shared by the speakers; the sense theory does not require that. Soames’ take on 
the issue here manifests the status of the current common opinion, the received view: it 
has become uncritically accepted as involving only but the barest of outlines (like the 
intentions to co-refer allegedly being sufficient for referent retention). Moreover there 
seems to be a plain counterexample to the soundness of the intention strategy. For what 
are we to say about the possible case when the causal contacts of the names the current 
speakers use are to two (or even more) distinct individuals with the same name, but we do 
not know that and the causal links have become mixed? It could even happen that this is a 
case with deliberate confusing: the two characters – identical twins, perhaps – have just 
been amusing themselves in appearing to others in different occasions. What singular 
proposition is expressed in that case? Is it one that involves both characters? But that 
seems not to conform to the normal practice of thought expression, and the expression of 
the semantic content of the propositional attitudes in general. We would be taking 
ourselves to be expressing unproblematic singular propositions (NN is so-and-so), but it 
seems that the thoughts expressed would involve both NN-characters. Or if not, then what 
would they express? 
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28. Metaphysically-minded direct-causal theorists could still argue that the individuation of 
the referent is ultimately not to be decided on such rather slender empirical grounds as the 
causal connections, or the Fregean senses, but on much firmer grounds. This leaves them 
two options (as far as I can see): 1) haecceitas, or primitive thisnesses, or 2) essentialism 
with respect to origin. The first view is argued for by Robert Adams (though not in 
relation to the issue of reference) (Adams 1979), and the second view is Kripke´s (Kripke 
1972). I will not argue against these views here in any detail. I really cannot make 
metaphysical sense of (primitive) thisnesses so I will leave Adams’ account aside. 
Kripke´s version of essentialism with respect to individuals I reject because the origin of a 
biological entity, its “parent” DNAs, could have been different without that affecting 
differentially in any way his, hers or its later development so that the result would be the 
same individual as actually. The reason is that there are degeneracies of amino acids, i.e. 
the relationships between some nucleotides and amino acids are many-one. Likewise the 
relationships between some amino acids and the resulting proteins are such functionally. 
Some proteins are still able to function even if some parts of them are lacking or 
weakened (as in mutations). So the question is what is the relevant range of variability and 
differences in DNA to preserve the identity of a biological individual? If it is stipulated 
that only when the DNA is exactly the same is it metaphysically legitimate to talk about 
the essence of origin as the essence of the individuals, the Kripkean view may still not 
stand a closer scrutiny. For what are we to say when DNA-identical individuals become 
so different that all other individuative criteria than DNA give the verdict that they are 
different individuals? It seems to me that in that case we should at least reconsider the 
soundness of the stipulation. (By the way should not exact DNA-identical twins be the 
very same individual on that account, only numerically distinct?) 
 
 
29. Kripke says about the evidential role of intuitions: "Of course, some philosophers think 
that something´s having intuitive content is very inconclusive evidence in favor of it. I 
think it is very heavy evidence in favor of anything, myself. I really don´t know in a away 
what more conclusive evidence one can have about anything, ultimately speaking." 
(Kripke 1972: 265-6) Even if one ignores the rhetoric impact this presents a very tall order 
- so tall in fact that I am stupefied. There is no attempt to explicate intuitions; do intuitions 
serve as evidence for any issue whatsoever?; why are intuitions the ultimate evidential 
base in philosophical matters?; what about conflicts of intuitions, especially equally 
“strong”?; or is the number of those holding the same intuitions (and, perhaps, with equal 
strength) to be counted only as evidential, the minority intuitions not? In short, this is not 
critical philosophy but a sample of not a very reflective philosophical methodology. I 
would say that the more a discipline resorts to intuitions, the more immature it is if it has 
scientific aspirations. (As I already pointed out, if uniform intuitions were to be respected 
as evidence, and respected the more so because they were held by the majority of people, 
Aristarchus and Copernicus would not have proposed that Earth revolves around the Sun; 
but it does, so even very firm perceptually-based intuitions as evidence can be discarded. 
And mind you, the firmness in the direct-causal theory seems quite shallow in 
comparison.) When this skeptical view is coupled to some other recent writings – 
(Rosenberg 1994), (Hintikka 1999), (Cappelen & Winblad 1999) - that also cast a serious 
doubt on the cogency of the evidential status of intuitions. The case against them deserves 
serious consideration. And I could not resist quoting Hintikka here, for his rather harsh 
verdict on the unargued status of any justification for the use of intuitions is to the point: 
“The blind faith [of appealing to intuitions] is below the intellectual dignity of 
philosophers for whom unexamined intuitions should not be worth intuiting.” (Hintikka 
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1999: 130) The only naturalistically respectable attempt at justifying the use of intuitions I 
know of is Devitt’s paper (Devitt 1994). But he seems to give intuitions a role only in the 
starting stages of semantic research, i.e. in the preliminary carving and characterization of 
the domain. Clearly, then, the results of such applications of intuitions could be discarded 
at the later stages. For a scrutinized account of the role and the nature of intuitions in 
science, with obvious implications to philosophical methodology, see (Fishbein 1987). 
 
30. It should be noted that Almog’s view is for unification of referential semantics and 
cognitive semantics, but only terminologically. He wants to achieve this unholy alliance 
by subordinating cognitive to referential: “It is because our cognition is object-bound and 
content-free that our semantics is, in turn, purely referential.” (Almog 2005: 531) This is 
but verbal unification for the “content-free” means anti-Fregean. But, as I argue, because 
reference depends on cognitive, on contentful thoughts, and because the anti-Fregean 
arguments fail, no unification could be achieved – only subordination the other way 
around. 
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5. ACTUALIZED DESCRIPTIONS 
 
???????????
 
My focus has been on the Fregean theory of sense and reference, although I have 
pointed out in the appropriate places when my arguments work also in favour of the 
description theory. But maybe I have been more assuming than explicit in that what is 
said in defence of the Fregean theory, and against the direct-causal theory, is to be 
readily understood to apply to the description theory. To this class belong 1) the 
misconception that the description theory of reference is committed to the stringent 
semantic equivalences like synonymies and/or analyticities between proper names and 
the descriptions related to them; 2) the arguments from ignorance and error in that i) 
the Feynman and Gödel examples are basically beside the point because they invoke 
descriptions that are not sufficiently individuating to begin with, and ii) they use 
deference as the mechanism of reference in the way that the description theorists are 
not forbidden to use also; 3) the arguments for the epistemic symmetry principle and 
against the relevance of the Twin Earth arguments work for the description theory as 
well. However, and as Panu Raatikainen has more than once emphasized to me, even 
if the Fregean theory emerges unscathed from the direct-causal attack, some of the 
arguments given by the latter theorists may still be effective against the description 
theory. It is this dialectical situation that forms the background of the argumentation in 
this chapter. Still, I want to point out that I am not a proponent of the description 
theory; I endorse the Fregean view modernized. The main reason for this is that the 
senses are not totally articulatable by any linguistic means. (I say more about this in 
the following three chapters.) If, as it seems, the description theory gets also defended 
along with my arguments for the Fregean view (and against the direct-causal view), 
that is fine by me. The following argumentation is motivated by the inherent interest I 
find in it and because it seems to me that the points I will be making are new to some 
extent. And obviously, what suspicions there might be left about the Fregean theory 
because of the modal argument, the argument in this chapter should put them to rest 
because actualized descriptions express “actualized senses” also. 
 
?????????????????????????????????
 
The original version of the modal argument is based on the presupposition of 
synonymies between proper names and the definite descriptions related to them (as 
their meanings). We saw that this presupposition has no justification with respect to 
the Fregean, and neither the description, theory. But the argument can easily be 
stripped off of that presupposition. Indeed it seems to me that there is an ambiguity 
with respect to the argument: it has also been advocated without any (at least explicit) 
recognition of the synonymy demands. I propose to accept that line. It seems to me 
that the modal argument can be maintained also with respect to the semantic relations 
of the definite descriptions and proper names outside any stringent theory of semantic 
equivalences 
 
 Let us begin with the statements 
 
1) Aristotle might not have been Aristotle 
2) The most famous pupil of Plato might not have been the most famous pupil of 
Plato.1 
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The first is true, and necessarily so according to the rigid designator account: Aristotle 
was Aristotle, the self-identical man, so he could not have been anyone else. Apart 
from some scruples from the metaphysics of essentialism, we may accept this account. 
The statement 2) is ambiguous – or it has two readings, the so-called narrow and wide 
scope readings. The narrow scope reading focuses on the content of the description as 
singling out the referent. Therefore the most famous pupil of Plato could not but be the 
most famous pupil of Plato, whoever that individual is in different possible worlds. 
That is why the statement 2) is contradictory in the narrow reading. But the wide scope 
reading focuses on the individual and takes the content of the description to have a 
secondary role after it has picked out the individual. Therefore the most famous pupil 
of Plato, the very actual Aristotle, might not have been the most famous pupil of Plato; 
he might have gone to pankration instead. 
 
Kripke used this kind of statement pairs in arguing that proper names and the definite 
descriptions differ in their respective modal profiles (Kripke 1972). Aristotle could not 
but have been Aristotle, but the most famous pupil of Plato could have been something 
else than the most famous pupil of Plato. Consequently, and generalizing, proper 
names differ from the definite descriptions with respect to their modal profiles. 
Therefore proper names are not synonymous to the definite descriptions: the 
descriptions do not give the meanings of the names - for if they did, no such 
differences could arise. But we agreed to drop the synonymy demand. Still it is correct 
observation that Kripke focused only on the predicative, or narrow scope reading of 
the definite descriptions. But the predicative use may or may not be the more frequent 
one in the everyday practice of referential language use. We often say things like “NN 
did so-and-so” and “NN is such-and-such”, but we also use the descriptions only and 
say things like “the so-and-so …”. The former statements, the referential reading, 
brings the description to the place of the subject in the sentence (or makes it the 
“logical subject”) just like in the statement 2) above. But Kripke has taken the 
referential reading and interpreted it to be the predicative reading, i.e. the narrow 
reading instead of the wide reading, the one that amounts to the actualized description 
view. This is especially clear when presenting Russell’s theory Kripke plainly ignores 
the real referentially relevant impact of the context and treats the description related to 
the proper name via its predicative content only: he takes the correct reading of 
“Aristotle was fond of dogs” to be the predicative reading of “Exactly one person was 
last among the great philosophers of antiquity, and any such person was fond of dogs” 
(Kripke 1980: 7). This begs the issue by ignoring the possibility that Russell’s theory 
could be made to cohere, or even is already coherent with the actualized descriptions 
view.2 And “in a context” what presumably would exclude other individuative factors 
– amounting to Kripke’s notion of “conventional use” of the proper name in question – 
such that it is made amply clear that only the actual referent of the description is 
intended? That is, these other factors need not be given descriptively at that context. In 
fact I would suggest that they could be of whatever kind as long as the actual referent 
gets singled out. (And they are, as we saw in section 4.3.5.) But anyway because there 
is this alternative reading Kripke’s argument could not be accepted as it stands. Or at 
least that is the claim of the actualized descriptions view. According to it we can take 
the definite description to refer (or to denote; I do not think that the particular term for 
being about is relevant here) to the actual individual the description describes and then 
keep that individual as the referent in all contexts, the modal ones included. The 
upshot of this maneuver is that the description has become rigidified and so to possess 
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as strong a referential force as the proper name it is related to. This actualized 
descriptions view has been proposed by Plantinga (1978) and defended by Yu (1980) 
and Stanley (1997), to mention a few. (See also (Davies & Humberstone (1980: 29, n. 
42) who state that Kripke’s argument will not succeed against the actualized 
descriptions view.)3,4 
 
As we saw in section 2.6 Searle’s theory could have been more precisely formulated. 
However he states correctly that we do not define proper names. I take it that this 
statement would preclude such arguments against his view that depend on the demands 
of semantic equivalences like synonymies and/or analyticities between proper names 
and the descriptions if there were not another place where Searle is explicit that 
analyticities are involved (see the quotation in section 4.1). So it seems that we could 
not have a sufficient defence of Searle’s view such that could rescue it from the modal 
argument. The case against him is more conclusive because he also states that if not a 
single one of the descriptions commonly attributed to a referent, say “Aristotle”, were 
true of the purported bearer of that name, then Aristotle would not have existed (or did 
not exist). Now Kripke’s modal argument – when read even as independent on the 
demand for strong semantic equivalences – shows that Searle’s view is not correct. For 
it is meaningful to say, i.e. it is possible, that Aristotle existed even if we know nothing 
about him.5 This is also the crux of the “argument from intuition” that we saw above is 
the last straw in the semantical argument. But these two arguments should not be 
equated even here. The reason is that the modal argument does not say, or presuppose, 
anything about the causal links, whereas the semantical argument ultimately invokes 
them. The modal argument focuses on the modal profiles operative in the way we use 
proper names versus the definite descriptions. As Salmon explains it the semantical 
argument contains a modal element in that we are to envision a situation in which the 
use of a proper name derives from some other individual than the one to whom the 
description applies (Salmon 1982). In other words in this case the referent is not what 
it actually is; but in the modal argument the referent is the actual referent of the proper 
name in question. Therefore only the modal argument is relevant here; only the modal 
argument purports to support the thesis that proper names are rigid designators. 
 
This issue has sometimes been approached by invoking referential intuitions: it has 
been taken as understood that it is intuitively obvious that proper names differ from the 
definite descriptions in just the way Kripke’s modal argument shows. But I have to 
deny the correctness of this approach – for two related reasons, an intuitive and a 
factual. My intuitions support the actualized reading of the definite descriptions: the 
general schema “it might have been that the F is not the F” has never had an odd ring 
to it for me. Of course I have known that if the definite description “the F” is taken 
narrowly, or predicatively as restricted to its descriptive content, the statement is 
semantically incoherent. But that reading has always seemed to me to be beside the 
point. I think that this clearly indicates that I have been reading “the F” as an 
actualized description in relation to its referential force. Assuming that I am not an 
atypical speaker (in this respect at least) I surmise that this is the case with many, or 
most, other speakers, so that the actualized reading is the natural one. (If one has 
schooled oneself with the Kripkean modal argument, his intuitions might have 
changed so that he only, or first, reads the statement predicatively.) And this is the 
factual reason: we do use the definite descriptions in many cases as referring to the 
actual individuals they describe individuatingly. This is more important still when the 
parity is observed: Kripke has always emphasized that the focus should be on the 
  138 
ordinary ways we use proper names and the descriptions. Now that ordinary way is, I 
claim, the actualized reading of the definite descriptions, not the narrow-predicative 
reading that Kripke’s modal argument exclusively relies on. Therefore the modal 
argument in fact does not have the ground it has been assumed to possess by the 
direct-causal theorists (and the anti-Fregeans and the anti-descriptivists in general). In 
other words the modal argument is non sequitur for it ignores the wide-referential 
reading, i.e. the actualized descriptions view. 
 
But my intuitions and factual proposals related to them aside, are there firm evidence 
for the actualized descriptions view as being the primary mode in the ordinary uses of 
the definite descriptions? Indeed there is, and quite amply in fact. So let me give just 
few cases which I hope show the primacy of the actualized reading over the 
predicative reading. When one takes a look at any quiz where the riddle is about an 
individual the questions help to single out, the role of the definite descriptions as being 
about actual individuals could not be more obvious. My recent encounter was “Who 
author?”, and the 5 points clue was “Her maiden name was Miller. She wrote in 
English and used also a pseudonym “Mary Westmacott”.6 As to non-quiz examples I 
once heard it asked “did he became the most famous pupil of Plato at those times, or 
only much later like in the Middle Ages?” during a discussion of the very issues we 
are focusing on here. No one, obviously, took it that “the most famous pupil of Plato” 
referred to any other individual than the Aristotle we all know (by descriptively 
expressed information). Sometimes we also use the definite descriptions “out of the 
blue” in that the proper name of the individual has not surfaced explicitly in the 
context, like when someone says “the president of France seems to suffer from 
Aspergerian inferiority feeling”, and the audience is currently likely to know that the 
referent is Nicolas Sarkozy. I do not think that any more examples are needed, for I am 
sure that if one begins to recall similar happenings the actualized force behind the 
descriptions becomes evident; ponderanda sunt testimonia, non numeranda. (It should 
be noticed that to try to counter the argument by stating that “of course we use the 
definite descriptions also referentially the way the above examples manifest, but that is 
almost trivial, hence carries no argumentative weight” fails. The reason is that this 
“triviality” just is my point, and it strengthens my case even further: because of it the 
focus of the modal argument on the predicative reading, and use of the definite 
descriptions, is even more misdirected.) 
 
So we see that the actualized descriptions view remains unscathed from the modal 
argument because the referential force of the actualized definite descriptions in actual 
use is the same as that of proper names. However the referential uses of the definite 
descriptions, with the tacit actualization-rigidification of them through that use, puts 
the original version of the actualized descriptions view in a sharper focus. It has 
always seemed to me to be quite an artificial view for it has been taken to involve the 
explicit fixing of the “actuality operator” to the descriptions. It is thought that the 
adequate way to understand the actualized descriptions is to present them by 
statements schemas like “the actual such-and-such is so-and-so”. But the evidence 
concerning the normal referential use of the definite descriptions we reviewed above 
shows that the “actualization operator” is implicit in most cases of the use of those 
descriptions.7 That is, it is tacitly understood that the purported referent of the definite 
description used is the actual individual; its actuality needs not be distinctly 
emphasized in any way. Consequently I propose that we should get rid of the 
artificiality of the original actualized descriptions view by taking the “actuality 
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operator” to be implicit in the use of the descriptions. In other words, the actualized 
descriptions view is not just a syntactico-semantical theory designed to rescue the 
description theory from the modal argument. We should instead see it as what it is: an 
expression of the central feature of the normal referential use of the definite 
descriptions. The original actualized descriptions view is then also seen to have been 
on the right track but for a wrong reason. It was based on the shared belief with the 
direct-causal theorists that the only proper way to understand the definite descriptions 
is the predicative reading. (Apart from the Donnellanian cases, which are mostly 
demonstrative (see section 8.2).) Because of that the explicit imposition of the 
“actuality operator” is bound to be an obvious move. But that move is the result of an 
inadequate understanding of the normal referential use of the definite descriptions. The 
description theorists have so to say succumbed to Kripke’s maneuver.8 
 
When it is recalled what I argued in section 4.5, anyone who accepts that proper names 
are rigid designators should not recoil from accepting the referentially used actualized 
definite descriptions as rigid also. The rigidifying of proper names involves the same 
tacit application of the “actuality operator” (or perhaps: index) as do the referential 
actualized uses of the definite descriptions. If one mistakenly stares only at the explicit 
descriptive content of the descriptions one is bound to fail to observe this rather 
obvious fact. It seems to me that the deeper explanation of this mistake is that the 
functional differences between proper names and the definite descriptions have not 
been made too clear. A proper name refers to an object – when used to refer, i.e. not 
used predicatively – and names it. But spelling out what object the name specifically 
refers to requires descriptions (expressive of the senses) because of the lurking 
problem with the disambiguation (relativization of use). In that function the 
descriptions function predicatively. But when a definite description is used to refer to 
that object, the object it also describes, it assumes the same referential force as the 
proper name it is associated with. If there are several other descriptions associated with 
the proper name they function predicatively, i.e. they support the referentially used 
“primary description”, just as they support the proper name in whole when only the 
latter is used. (The mechanism of this will be further elaborated in the next chapter.) 
 
??????????????????????
 
Scott Soames has recently argued that the actualized descriptions view could not be 
sustained (Soames 2002: 39-50).9 His argument invokes the interplay of modal 
considerations with propositional attitudes. He amasses six arguments to show this. I 
will deal with all of them in turn. The first argument is that the rigidified-actualized 
descriptions, unlike proper names, do not refer to the individuals they specify in the 
possible worlds (counterfactual situations) where those individuals do not exist. 
However Soames himself counters this argument by admitting that it depends on the 
assumption that the rigidified descriptions make existence claims (Soames 2002: 326, 
n. 33), but that need not be assumed. The second argument is the same as the 
epistemological argument. Soames formulates it thus: the proposition expressed by if n 
exists, then n is D is not knowable a priori, but if D exists, then D is D is so knowable 
(Soames 2002: 41). Soames claims that this difference holds also when the 
descriptions are actualized-rigidified. But we need not dwell on this argument any 
more because it was countered in section 4.1 by showing that neither the Fregean 
theory nor the description theory is committed to, and need not be committed to, a 
priori epistemological claims about the senses and the descriptions. Moreover 
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Soames’ formulation seems to flout the distinction between the speaker and the 
semantic reference (or comprehension). If a speaker relates to n the description D it is 
a priori knowable (indeed known by her) that if n exists, then n is D. Someone else 
may relate some other description to n so it is not known a priori by him that n is D. 
But if the semantic reference is assumed, and in the idealized form that the 
descriptions express all that is known, say, about Aristotle, then the statement that 
“Aristotle is D” (“D” including all the descriptions) is known a priori. But the 
semantic reference perspective need not be assumed in the first place. 
 
Soames’ third argument invokes the semantical argument. But that argument was also 
shown to fail on all of its crucial aspects in chapter 4, so no more about it here. Let us 
then turn to the fourth argument which invokes Donnellan’s observation that proper 
names as compared with the rigidified definite descriptions are exportable from the 
scope of the propositional attitude verbs without problems – or at least without such 
problems that the descriptions face (Soames 2002: 42-3). (Soames mentions here 
(Donnellan 1979: 54-5).)  But this presupposes, as Soames notices, that knowledge 
that n is F is always de re of the referent of “n”, but that is not always so with the 
descriptions (D is F). Consequently synonymy between proper names and the 
descriptions fails.10 In addition to the by now out-moded assumption that the definite 
descriptions should be synonymous with proper names one can ask why is knowledge 
that n is F always supposed to be de re? On the face of it there is no compelling reason 
for that assumption. For example I do not know de re to what “Butcho” refers in the 
sentence “Butcho is fat”. (I assume that for de re contact, hence knowledge, it does not 
suffice that there is some causal relation from the referent to me. That would make de 
re demand here all too easy to fulfill – even if there were not the insurmountable 
problems with it that there are, as we saw in chapter 4. I will also argue in section 8.1.6 
that de re is not always tied to proper names only.) And I do not know that because I 
do not know who is Butcho (or if he does exist); I only overheard this utterance. 
Moreover from the way Soames himself explicates de re beliefs about the actual world 
– “…that is, believing of the actual world that it is so and so…” (Soames 2002: 327, n. 
43) – it becomes obvious that that characterization of the content objects of the de re 
propositional attitudes, i.e. them being about the actual world objects and their 
properties, does not differentiate the objects of proper names from the objects of the 
actualized definite descriptions because both are about actual individuals. So, pace 
Soames, from the sentence, “A believes that the actual shortest spy is a spy” (assuming 
spies actually exist) it follows that there is a spy that A believes to be the shortest, just 
as it follows from the sentence “A believes that NN is the shortest spy”. To know who 
the shortest spy is, equivalently who NN is, is not required; and being de re is not 
precluded from the definite descriptions either: the causal contact must be relevantly 
informational, i.e. not just whatever fleeting physical relation with the referent of the 
name and the description. 
 
The fifth argument is finally Soames’ own and we need to set out its premises at length 
(Soames 2002: 43-4): 
 
P1. It is possible to believe that Aristotle was a philosopher without 
believing anything about the actual world Aw – that is, about the way the 
universe really is (the property it really instantiates). In particular, there 
are worlds w* in which agents believe that Aristotle was a philosopher, 
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without believing of Aw that anything was F in it, and hence without 
believing of Aw that the unique thing that was F in it was a philosopher. 
 
P2. Necessarily, one believes that the actual F was a philosopher iff one 
believes of the actual world, Aw, that the unique thing that was F in it was 
a philosopher. 
 
C1. It is not the case that, necessarily, one believes that Aristotle was a 
philosopher iff one believes that the actual F was a philosopher. 
 
P3. If the content of Aristotle, as used in a context C, were identical with 
the content of the actual F, as used in C, then (i) the contents of 
(propositions expressed by) Aristotle was G and The actual F was G in C 
would be the same; (ii) the propositions expressed by α  believes that 
Aristotle was G and α  believes that the actual F was G, in C, would be 
necessarily equivalent; and (iii) C1 would be false. 
 
C2. The content of Aristotle, as used in a context C, is not the same as the 
content of the actual F as used in that context. 
 
Soames claims that each premise is true. But it seems to me that that is not so: P1 
seems to be false – or alternatively irrelevant to the issue of rigidity. Of P1 Soames 
says that “Surely it is a datum that agents could have believed that Aristotle was a 
philosopher even if things had been quite different from the way they in fact are. Must 
these agents also have had beliefs about the actual world…Presumably, in some 
merely possible world (world-state) the agents there have no direct acquaintance, or 
epistemic contact, with this world (world-state) that I am now calling ‘actual’; nor, in 
many cases, will they possess any uniquely identifying descriptions of it. As a result, 
often there will be no way for them to form beliefs about the actual world.” (Soames 
2002: 44)  But what is Soames’ argument then supposed to be? What is it supposed to 
be showing? If there is no contact whatsoever with the actual world (this world of ours 
here now), what do those otherwordly agents believe when they believe that Aristotle 
was a philosopher? For the crux behind the rigidity is that “Aristotle” refers rigidly to 
the actual Aristotle (in our world here now as well as in every other possible world 
where that Aristotle exists ). Even if the syntactical formulation of their belief is the 
same as ours, there just is no way to make sense what those otherwordly agents believe 
if they are not related to the actual Aristotle in any way (short of accepting interworld 
magical theories of reference). And as Soames himself states they do not believe 
anything about the actual (our here) world. If they did, the expression “Aristotle” 
describing their belief would also be about the actual world (given the rigidity of 
proper names). Hence Soames’ premise P1 is not sustainable. Or it is irrelevant to the 
issue of rigidity: if proper names are not rigid, then the actualized descriptions view is 
not even needed. But as I argued above it also manifests the referential force, the 
counterfactual scope, implicit in the ordinary referential uses of the definite 
descriptions. So those descriptions would be rigid in that use. Either way, Soames’ 
argument fails. If proper names are rigid then the actualized descriptions are 
equivalently rigid too. So either the otherwordly agents believe that the actual Aristotle 
was a philosopher or we do not know what they believe when we express their belief 
by the statement “Aristotle was a philosopher”. Consequently Soames’ premise 
involves an incoherence with respect to rigidity. 
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It also seems that Soames have misunderstood the role of the “actuality operator”. For 
he seems to assume that the only acceptable reading of “the actual F” always restricts 
it to the world (the context) in which it is used. From this it follows rather trivially that 
whatever was the actual F in that world, and who was a G (as “our” actual Aristotle 
was a G, by hypothesis), that “actual F” and “Aristotle” need not be co-referential. But 
here Soames has assumed that “Aristotle” is rigid and the otherwordly description “the 
actual F” is not rigid in the same way. But the whole point of the rigidity issue is that 
all referential uses are anchored in our world here, those of proper names as well as 
those of the actualized definite descriptions. Hence it is invalid to read “the actual F” 
as anchored on the other world to begin with. The actualized descriptions view is only 
about the descriptions of the objects in our actual world. It is beside the point that they 
are evaluated in (or at) other possible worlds, or counterfactual situations. Kripke has 
been explicit in emphasizing that it does not matter what the expressions of the 
language spoken by the agents in the counterfactual situation refer to or mean there; it 
only matters to what our expressions refer as evaluated in that counterfactual situation. 
(See also (Stanley 1997: 555-6).) In other words, why should we care what Soames’ 
otherworlders believe and say from their perspective? All in all, Soames’ conclusion 
C2 does not follow.11,12 
 
The sixth argument by Soames is the following. Soames acknowledges that actualizing 
a definite description is equivalent to the application of David Kaplan’s “Dthat” 
operator (Soames 2002: 49-50). However he argues that this move does not help 
because Dthat obliterates the descriptive content of the description it is attached to. 
From this it is supposed to follow that the descriptions could not be called for help any 
more after the fixing of Dthat to them because then, when someone believes that NN1 
is F but does not believe that NN2 is F (and “NN1” is co-referential to “NN2”) that 
could not be explained for the reason that the descriptive content is supposed to be 
there no more because of the application of “Dthat”. But this seems again a 
misunderstanding, or rather, perhaps, a misapplication, of the “Dthat” operator. 
“Dthat” just rigidifies the description in the way that its uses refer to the actual 
individual the description applies to. (It need not even apply to that individual truly; it 
suffices that it is believed to apply.) Just as a proper name is the vehicle that ties its 
uses to its referent rigidly, so is a “Dthated” description the vehicle that ties it rigidly 
to its actual referent. The description is not re-assigned a referent in any counterfactual 
situation after it has been actualized in our world (or with respect to our world). It is 
not denied by the actualized description theorists that there could be in some other 
possible world, say, the most famous pupil of Plato who is a philosopher, but who is 
not the actual Aristotle. Still the actualized description “the most famous pupil of 
Plato” picks up the actual Aristotle in every possible world (where he exists). The 
application of “Dthat” to the definite description just does not, as Soames seems to 
think, take away the descriptive content related to the proper name and make it, in 
effect, a mere actualized demonstrative. The descriptive content and the demonstrative 
factors work together with equal force in “Dthated” statements. And Kaplan himself 
has pointed out that “Dthat” can be eliminated in favour of the definite descriptions 
with the “actuality” and “now” operators (Kaplan 1989: 579, n. 29). So I conclude that 
Soames’ sixth argument fails also. 
???????????
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So all in all, if my arguments are correct, the actualized descriptions view remains 
unharmed by the Kripkean modal argument as well as by Soames’ argument from the 
mesh of the modal and propositional attitude contexts. Kripke’s argument fails because 
it focuses only on the predicative reading of the definite descriptions. Soames’ 
argument fails because it invokes assumptions that violate the very point of the 
(Kripkean) notion of rigid designation: other worlds are strictly speaking irrelevant to 
the references of the rigidly referring expressions. In particular it is beside the point to 
put any emphasis on every possible world being actual with respect to itself and then 
explicate “the actual such-and-such” statements with respect to that world. In rigidity 
issues only our actual world counts with respect to both the modal and the 
propositional attitude contexts. That could not be otherwise because they both are 
intensional contexts, so adding the propositional attitudes to the modal ones adds 
nothing of substance.13 
 
As to the relevance of my argumentation to the Fregean sense theory the connection is 
straightforward. If the definite descriptions express the senses of proper names related 
to them, when the descriptions used as actualized have attached to them - through their 
referential-actualized use - the referential force equivalent to rigidity, the senses they 
express have that force too. So the modal argument does not reach the Fregean theory 
either. This verdict is not changed when the inarticulatable elements of the senses are 
taken into account, for they do not effect a sudden “jump” in the intended referential 
scope from our actual world to some other possible world (considered as another 
actual world). The remaining difference between proper names and the definite 
descriptions manifested in the pairs of statements like 1) and 2) above was explained 
earlier, and will be accounted for a little more exhaustively in the next chapter. But let 
me take it up here in outlines. The differential modal impression is the result of not 
keeping separate the referential-actualized and the predicative readings of the 
descriptions. The sentence “the most famous ancient philosopher might not have been 
the most famous ancient philosopher” is contradictory when read predicatively 
throughout, i.e. when the focus is exclusively on the descriptive content of the 
description. But when the description is read in the mode of referential-actualized, and 
predicative respectively, it is a true statement (barring considerations from strict 
determinism) for Aristotle might have gone in for pankration instead of philosophy. 
The differential effect comes from two sources. First is the statistical fact that the 
definite descriptions are also frequently used predicatively (“NN is the such-and-
such”); and second one is that because the descriptions express the information the 
speakers possess about the referents of proper names (and so express their senses and 
meanings), this predicative role of the descriptions tends to influence the statements in 
which they are used. Consequently because proper names tend to activate (many of) 
the pieces of information (=the elements or parts of the senses of those names) the 
descriptions express, the predicative reading “forces its way” into the reading of the 
statements. But when a definite description is used referentially and actualized that 
description is so to say chosen from amongst the other related descriptions (the whole 
of the information related to the proper name in question). It is this interrelatedness of 
the descriptions as the sense-expressers that makes it hard to suspend the predicative 
reading from being taken as primary. 
 
 
 
 
  144 
Notes 
 
1. Is it impossible to hear (to “intuit”) the predicative reading of “Aristotle could not but 
have been Aristotle”? I think not, for I can comprehend what that reading says – with 
effort, though. So I claim that it is possible and the effort one needs only reflects the 
degree of seldomness of the predicative use of proper names, but no in-principle 
feature of them. 
 
2. There are places in Russell’s writings that can be interpreted according to the 
actualized descriptions view. See for example (Russell 1956: 52-3). As Russell 
explains the “primary occurrence” of a definite description is intended by the speaker 
when one and only one X is intended and to that X something is attributed. Thus 
George IV wished to know who wrote Waverley. The “secondary occurrence” reads, 
instead, that George IV wished to know whether one and only one man wrote 
Waverley (and if so whether that was Scott). Let me quote Russell in full: “To return 
to George IV and Waverley, when we say, ‘George IV wished to know whether Scott 
was the author of Waverley’, we normally mean ‘George IV wished to know whether 
one and only one man wrote Waverley and Scott was that man’; but we may also 
mean: ‘one and only one man wrote Waverley, and George IV wished to know 
whether Scott was that man’. In the latter ‘The author of Waverley’ has a primary 
occurrence; in the former, a secondary. The latter might be expressed by ‘George IV 
wished to know, concerning the man who in fact wrote Waverley, whether he was 
Scott’.” I claim that as far as the ordinary referential uses of the definite descriptions 
(Russell’s “denoting phrases”) are concerned the primary occurrence is equivalent to 
the actualized descriptions. There seems to be no doubt about that equivalence in their 
referential forces: Russell’s use of the locution “who in fact wrote” indicates this when 
“in fact” is semantically equivalent to “actually”. There seems to be no reasonable 
alternative interpretation whatsoever with which to try to counter the natural reading 
that “in fact wrote” is intended as saying (or paraphrasing, if one likes the formal 
mode better) that the referent is the one who actually wrote Waverley. The secondary 
occurrence, in contrast, focuses on the descriptive-cum-predicative content of “the 
author of Waverley”. As Russell says the secondary reading amounts to finding out 
who wrote the piece, if one man wrote it. (Though it may be that even here the 
referential intention has the force of “in fact”, which only strengthens my case.) – Be 
that as it may with Russell, Strawson’s theory can be easily interpreted as a version of 
the actualized descriptions theory. For Strawson maintains that there is a 
presupposition of existence of the object referred to (Strawson 1971b). When the 
purported object does not exist, the statement the part of which the referential term is 
does not have truth-value. Because of that I take it to be natural that in the latter type 
of cases the referential expressions – descriptions in our case – are not to be evaluated 
with respect to any other counterfactual situation, either. The existence presupposition 
can be taken to amount to the descriptions having the semantical force of the 
actualized descriptions; Strawson just eschews them any counterfactual application. – 
as an afterthought taking into account that Russell did not care about the modal 
contexts (let alone possible worlds) his theory’s clause “there is at least and at most 
one individual such-and-such” is evidently restricted to our actual world only. This 
supports indirectly the actualized descriptions view. But even if not, as far as I can see 
there is no semantical reason that would prevent a construction of a version of 
Russell’s theory such that would possess the force of the actualized descriptions (and 
on account of that be modally extended). 
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3. Davies & Humberstone assume that proper names, in contrast to the definite 
descriptions, need no world relativization (Davies & Humberstone 1980: 12). But as 
we saw that is only a manifestation of the widespread misconception. Plantinga’s 
argument invokes essences of individuals. These constructions I could not accept (if 
they are meant to be anything stronger notions than akin to the individual concepts). 
But his argument remains valid. Notice that I am not saying that the wide scope 
reading is the same as the actualized descriptions view. They are not because a 
description can have a wide reading in a possible world without that world being the 
actual world, i.e. our world. (Though I am not sure whether or not that type of 
situation allows us to be more specific at all about the other world. The reason is that 
we could only talk about it by using our language, i.e. the references its expressions 
have, and these need not be the same at all in that other world.) –We saw in section 
4.2.4 that proper names have also predicative use (“He is a regular Koba”), albeit 
infrequent. So the argumentatively harmful way Kripke presents the modal argument 
becomes even more aggravated: he concentrates only on the referential function of 
proper names and only on the predicative reading (of the referential function) of the 
definite descriptions. Consequently it is no wonder that he is able to make the modal 
argument seem as plausible as it has seemed to so many. Instead he should have kept 
the referential reading stable through the whole argument; but in that case he would 
have realized that that is equivalent to the actualized-rigidified descriptions, hence the 
modal argument becoming void. (Note that Kripke’s, and the other direct-causalists’ 
point could not be that proper names are rigid as such. There could not be predicative 
uses of them if they were only rigidly referential as syntactico-semantical devices. 
This is the same reason why Recanati’s argument for the type-referentiality of the 
directly referential expressions was found wanting in section 4.2.4.) Shortly, 1) 
“Aristotle might not have been Aristotle” can be taken as false; the statement 2) “The 
most famous ancient philosopher might not have been the most famous ancient 
philosopher” has combinations of readings: i) predicative-predicative, ii) predicative-
referential/actualized, iii) referential/actualized-predicative and iv) 
referential/actualized-referential/actualized. According to i) 2) is false in the same way 
as 1); reading ii) says that some individual, whoever that is, who is the most famous 
ancient philosopher might not have been Aristotle, and that is true (because there 
could be such a world); iii) reading is equivalent to saying that Aristotle might not 
have been the most famous ancient philosopher which is true also; and finally iv) says 
that Aristotle might not have been Aristotle, which is as false as 1), for it says what 1) 
says. Now it is easy to see that the modal argument fails because the only relevant 
reading, with respect to that argument is iii) actualized-predicative, but that reading is 
not forced upon the description theorist: he can choose the reading iv) that is 
equivalent to the rigidity claim the statement 1) involves. So only by (inadvertently, I 
hope) insisting on the predicative reading of the definite descriptions can Kripke claim 
that – even after the “fixed understanding” that the proper name in question refers to 
an already individuated and identified object – “rigidity requirement is violated” in 
Russell’s theory with respect to the definite descriptions (Kripke 1980: 9). But with 
respect to the actualized-referential reading this claim has no bite. 
 
4. The core tenet of the thesis of proper names as rigid designators is that they refer to 
the same actual world individual in every possible world (counterfactual situation) 
where that individual exists. Why, then, are not the definite descriptions allowed that? 
For surely there are different individuals named “NN” in those different possible 
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worlds, just as there are different individuals who are “such-and-such” in them. Only 
if the definite descriptions are read as predicative to begin with, and proper names as 
(only) referential-rigid (and the relativization of use is taken as unproblematic), could 
the former be put in use in the modal argument. But that reveals the modal argument 
to be non sequitur: the definite descriptions can be used referentially and with the 
force of rigidity due to their tacit actualization-through-use. Kripke’s formulation of 
the modal argument is defective also in that it uses only one description, when 
Kripke’s attack was directed against the cluster version. So the proper formulation 
should include all that is known and related to the named individual (for example, 
Aristotle) at the same instant (and not all those descriptions separately). But then it 
begins to look that the content of the descriptive part approaches the rigid referential 
force the proper name has. (Which is, of course, evident: according to the description 
theory the proper name contains implicitly those descriptions.) Hence the reading that 
“Aristotle might not have been D1, D2, D3,…” (Dis being the relevant descriptions) 
becomes as false as “Aristotle might not have been Aristotle”. (At least that is what 
my “intuition” strongly tells me.) (As we saw Salmon’s formulation takes the 
multiplicity of the descriptions into account – but that does not change the verdict. 
And notice that I am not saying that the definite descriptions as such, i.e. as 
descriptive devices with the focus only on their explicitly expressed content, are 
always “locked” to a particular actual individual in their actualized uses, in contrast to 
other actual individuals. But, then, neither are proper names always so: they have to be 
disambiguated (relativized in use, in context). And that may require non-conceptual 
and contextual factors that are not linguistically articulatable.) 
 
5. Synonymies and analyticities between proper names and “their” descriptions is an 
independent issue from the referential-predicative readings: synonymical description 
can be used both referentially and predicatively. (So for example Soames is both 
irrelevant and in error when he states that actualized-rigidified descriptions are 
synonymous with proper names (they relate to) (Soames 2002: 40).) 
 
6. In case you need 4 points clue: In 1926 she disappeared inexplicably for 11 days. 
Many thought that was a publicity stunt. (3 points: Her play “Mousetrap” has been on 
stage in London since 1952 – more than 21000 shows. 2 points: The famous auction 
established in 1766 has the same name. And 1 point: Among the characters she created 
are Hercule Poirot and Jane Marple.) 
 
7. So for example Stephen Schiffer is partly correct and partly wrong when he states that 
the actuality operator is “pretty sophisticated” and that “one might reasonably doubt 
that it belongs to the conceptual repertoire of young children and other non-
philosophers.” (Schiffer 2005: 1175) He is correct in that the operator is not explicit 
(except in pointed semantico-logical studies, but young children rarely engage in 
those). He is wrong, however, because being part of the repertoire need not mean 
being explicable or even consciously used. (That is why the rigidity force is tacit with 
the actualized definite descriptions.) Again, by the way, how young a child must be to 
not manage the actuality-rigidifying force? It seems irrelevant to the issue when any 
speaker tacitly assumes the actuality operation. Schiffer also mentions Soames-type 
counterarguments to the actualized description view, but we will see shortly that they 
fail. 
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8. Donnellan’s distinction is partly based on this misconception. For how otherwise to 
explain that he contrasts the attributive uses of the definite descriptions with such 
referential uses that work only in demonstrative situations. That is, if he had realized 
that the definite descriptions are used referentially with actualized force, the 
attributive use would not have seemed so important to him. Or so I presume. Of 
course Donnellan’s focus on Russell’s theory of definite descriptions played the other 
part in his argumentation, but as I mentioned earlier, even Russell’s theory could be 
interpreted as supporting the actualized descriptions view. 
 
9. Soames has recently argued against the so-called “two-dimensional semantics” 
(Soames 2005). That issue is not relevant to my argument here for, as Soames himself 
acknowledges, the actualized descriptions view is distinct from the two-dimensional 
semantics. They are related because that semantics also uses actualized descriptions as 
rigidified referential devices. But Soames only repeats – (Soames 2005: 303-4) - his 
earlier arguments against the actualized descriptions view, arguments that I counter in 
this section, so we need not pay a further attention to his recent book. (Moreover, two-
dimensionalism is motivated mainly by the epistemological-modal scruples – 
contingent a priori and necessary a posteriori – which are altogether different issues 
than the reference of proper names. The latter is primary, the epistemic-modal are 
mere corollaries the chips of which I can let fall where they may. But to the extent that 
I admit that there are rigid designators I can have it the Kripkean way, i.e. that there 
are necessary a posteriori truths. But if there are not, the notion of rigid designator 
(proper names and actualized descriptions – and “Dthated” terms, see the end of 
section 5.3) remains a sound notion as explained in the next chapter (and at section 
4.5). – Soames’ arguments are defective in that he still clutches to the mistaken view 
that the descriptions must not contain any uneliminable object-dependent elements 
(like other proper names), and that the actualized descriptions must be synonymous 
with proper names (Soames 2005: 268). 
 
10. As noted Soames claims that the actualized descriptions view is after preserving 
synonymies between proper names and the actualized-rigidified descriptions (Soames 
2002: 39, 40). But this is a misconception, and I think that merely pointing this out 
one more time by now suffices. Of course it is most unfortunate that the synonymy 
demand for the descriptions (and for the Fregean senses) is still so entrenched in the 
direct-causal camp. However I will deal with Soames’ arguments as if they were 
independent on the synonymy demand. 
 
11. Soames claims that the propositions the actual F was G and the F was G are different, 
say something different (Soames 2002: 45). That is true but here he equivocates the 
referential actualized use with the predicative use of the descriptions. And another 
point, related to the fifth argument: Soames claims that English belief ascriptions are 
understood as being true at arbitrary worlds only if the agents’ beliefs in those worlds 
are about the individual in (our here) actual world, “…even though the beliefs 
themselves are not about [the actual world] (Soames 2002: 49). How could they not be 
about the actual (our here) world if they are at least partly about the actual individual 
in our actual world? Is not the case symmetric, i.e. do not we have beliefs about 
individuals in other worlds but not beliefs about those worlds? But how could that be, 
unless talking about beliefs about particular individuals can only be made sense by its 
being talk about actual world individuals? But then actualized descriptions are as 
much in the business as proper names. So what distinction Soames is making use of 
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when he differentiates beliefs about individuals from beliefs about worlds? (It is hard 
for me to comprehend Soames’ argumentation in this place for it seems so elliptical 
that I am not sure whether it is he who is confused or I.) This is even more confusing 
on Soames’ part because he also says that his argument “…is based on the elementary 
observation that not only individuals in the actual world, Aw, but also inhabitants of 
other worlds, share many of my beliefs.” (Soames 2002: 43) For if they share those 
beliefs and those beliefs are about the actual world (as Soames’ beliefs in this world 
about this world are, say, his descriptive beliefs about the actual Aristotle), the 
otherwordly agents have beliefs about the (our here) actual world. 
 
12. By the same token of argument I could not accept Recanati’s argument that 
descriptions are non-rigid when they fall outside the scope of modal operators 
(Recanati 1988: 106; 1993: 8-10). According to his argument, if every world is actual 
to itself, it is possible that there is no unique individual in all other (relevant, 
accessible) possible worlds that the description specifies. But this interpretation of 
actuality affects the bearers of proper names as well. If “F. Recanati” in some actually 
taken world, not our actual world, is a rigid designator, the referent of it in all other 
(relevant, accessible) possible worlds is that FR, and there is no guarantee that that FR 
is the FR in our world. (Notice by the way that “the” does not just restrict definite 
descriptions to unique individuals, but also proper names: this indicates the tacit 
application of disambiguating proper names. And related to that observation proper 
names can be actualized also: that we have been doing all along in this chapter when 
we have been talking about “the actual Aristotle”.) So “FR” is not a rigid designator in 
Recanati’s argument because it severs the notion of rigidity from being anchored only 
in our actual world. Another way to put this is that Recanati’s argument ignores the 
relativization of the use of proper names, i.e. the individuation of their referents before 
any rigidity claims could be made - which we saw is the common mistake by the 
direct-causal theorists also. Recanati is assuming that it is adequate to assume that the 
actuality operator can be restricted to apply to one world other than our actual world at 
a time, and this seems to be the same mistake as Soames makes. 
 
13. Their effective equivalence with respect to semantic matters have been repeatedly 
argued for by Jaakko Hintikka; see for example (Hintikka 1969; 1975). 
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6. FROM NEO-FREGEANISM TO NEURONATURALISTIC FREGEANISM 
 
????????? ???????????????????
 
I have been arguing that the notion of the Fregean sense of proper names is a sound 
notion with respect to all the tasks it was postulated to explain. That this is so is what 
the neo-Fregeans have assumed as the starting point of their studies, so compared to 
them I am on a firmer ground. Moreover it seems to me that the conceptions of the 
senses the neo-Fregeans have invoked are many and varied, without any evidently 
undisputably common property. In particular we still lack adequate answers to two 
questions: 1) what specifically the senses of proper names are?, and 2) what is to grasp 
such senses? We have inherited these problems from Frege because he did not say 
anything much non-metaphorical about them. Basically the grasping of a sense is a 
psychological act that allows a thinker to confer something of cognitive relevance to 
one´s linguistic expressions, a fortiori to proper names. 
 
In the neo-Fregean camp Michael Luntley has recently voiced the need for some 
model which would explain the recognition of a person as a cognitive achievement, 
and which would as well be explicative of the senses of proper names (Luntley 1999: 
253). This is in accord with the views of Gareth Evans and Michael Dummett that 
recognition of individuals manifests an important function of the senses. More 
particularly Luntley states, in relation to the partial inarticulatability of the senses - i.e. 
the unattainability of fully linguistically articulated individuation of the senses, which 
is currently acknowledged to be part of the neo-Fregean approaches - that 
 
"We can distinguish between the theory of sense and a theory of senses. 
The latter is a theory capable of specifying, for any given linguistic unit, 
the sense of that unit…In contrast, the theory of sense has no such 
aspirations. The theory of sense specifies the kind of thing sense is: its 
fundamental role within our self-conception as creatures with 
intentionality, what kind of information sense is, and how this will differ 
systematically for different categories of expressions…The theory of 
sense must give some account of how we could understand the claim that 
each singular term has an objective package of information associated 
with it that constituted its sense. It does not follow from this that it should 
be always possible to state what that package is…" (Luntley 1999: 231-2; 
my emphasis) 
 
 
I endorse this approach and try to give such an account of the general nature of the 
senses of proper names in the next two chapters. As we will see, indeed, the senses of 
proper names can not be always articulated without any remainder in linguistic terms, 
in particular by descriptions. 
 
But as said, in general the neo-Fregean studies, valuable though they are, have been 
pursued in a rather "phenomenological" way. Usually the neo-Fregeans have been 
content with quite general pronouncements like the ones that a sense of an expression 
is what the thinker knows (or has to know) in order to be able to determine the referent 
of that expression. The more penetrating studies have invoked folk psychological 
concepts and secretarial analogies like information about the referents of proper names 
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contained in "files", "dossiers" (Evans 1982; Forbes 1989, 1990; Recanati 1993), and 
"clusters" (Kvart 1989) (though Kvart’s clusters consist of linguistic expressions only, 
so his account is rather a mixture of the description theory and Fregean view, but the 
former carrying the most weight). These analogies are catchy, but the more specific, 
and dynamical, relations between proper names and the information related to them 
still remain quite unexplored. However, the positive point of the neo-Fregean 
secretarial analogies is that they do invoke information, thus indicating that the (future 
neurocognitive) accounts in which they are (to be) embedded are not exhaustively 
description-theoretical ones, thus disarming the persistent but mistaken view most of 
the direct-causal theorists still seem to hold. 
 
So it can be claimed that to some extent the secretarial analogies do manifest progress 
within the neo-Fregean camp - though for instance Evans´ original conception of 
"Ideas" of referents remains quite unarticulated despite the fact that he discusses 
extensively recognition and memory-based thoughts. For instance he does not 
penetrate into the specific cognitive dynamics of those mechanisms, but uses examples 
at the "phenomenological", molar-behavioral level together with folkish guides as to 
what seems to be the case. (“we would say that” and “we would not say that”). The 
largest gap this approach leads to is Evans’ total rejection as being relevant what goes 
on in the brain in the recognition- and memory-based processes. These processes he 
takes to be very different from what the subject does. This gap only grows because 
Evans argues in part against the description-theoretic approach and, though correctly, 
emphasizes the role of information in the referential individuation of the referents in 
thoughts. This distinction explains in large part Evans’ use of the phenomenological 
level concepts. For if it is the case that what only matters is what persons do, and are 
capable of doing, one is almost conceptually hindered from taking the next step toward 
the specific cognitive models – let alone the neuroscientific ones. But because of that 
hindrance the importance of the informational focus is bound to remain limited. To a 
comparable extent folkish studies will remain insufficient explanations of the specific 
mechanisms of the reference of proper names, as well as reference in general. 
 
Another argument for the neural-cum-cognitive step presents the neo-Fregeans in a 
dilemma. Information is information; i.e. information at the phenomenological level is 
what the information processing paradigm in the cognitive sciences focuses on, so the 
at first progressive informational step by the neo-Fregeans is in danger of turning to a 
regressive one. Or if information is not information, i.e. if the phenomenological level 
of information is different from the neural-cum-cognitive information, the neo-
Fregeans owe us still an argument that would show the primacy of the first type of 
information. But from my modern Fregean perspective it could only be the study of 
the informational structures and dynamics within the subject that enables us to make 
further progress. The main reason for the gap between the person and his brain seems 
to me to be that Evans indeed made a categorical distinction between the acts the 
subject performs and the informational processes in his brain.1 But such a distinction is 
an outdated one in the current theoretical climate; in the philosophy of language and 
mind there are no obstacles to the explanatory top-down approach in which we start 
with the person and by descending from that level down, step by step, we reach the 
specific neural systems executing the perceptual and cognitive functions that make up 
what persons are. To ignore the person-brain divide is one of the main motivations of 
my approach in this work: as I see it only the neurocognitive approach can help us 
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forward. That this approach is to some extent top-down but more bottom-up is all to 
the good explanationwise. 
 
The observation that in addition to the cognitive roles the senses have epistemic roles 
as well was reinforced by Michael Dummett (1973, 1981). He takes the sense of a 
proper name to be what a person knows when he understands that expression, or its 
contribution to the truth-value of the sentence, or an utterance, of which it is a part. 
Dummett also stated that 
 
"The sense of an expression is the mode of presentation of the referent: in 
saying what the referent is, we have to choose a particular way of saying 
this…we might here borrow a famous pair of terms from the Tractatus, 
and say that, for Frege, we say what the referent of a word is, and thereby 
show what its sense is." (Dummett 1973: 227) 
 
And Evans says, by way of an explication, that 
 
"The closest we shall get to a systematic theory of sense is a systematic theory of 
semantic value which, however, identifies the semantic values of expressions, 
including whole sentences, in the way in which the competent speakers of the 
language identify them." (Evans 1982: 26)2 
 
For example with respect to the clauses 1) "the semantic value of 'Afla' = Afla", and 2) 
"the semantic value of 'Afla' = Ateb", only the first shows the sense of "Afla". It 
should be pointed out that Dummett´s view requires only that it is sufficient for any 
term t and a person p to have a sense s by which he understands t (Dummett 1973), 
and not, as Evans did have it, that for any term t there is a sense s such that for any 
person p to understand t is to attach s to it (Evans 1982: 16, n. 14). That is, it is not 
required by Dummett, as it is required by Evans, that there is one particular sense 
shared by every speaker competent with the expression t. In particular Evans states 
that sense is the particular way one thinks of the referent, and to understand what 
someone says is to think of that referent in the same way. I side with Dummett on this 
issue because his view is Frege´s view, according to which different persons may have 
different senses related to a particular term t. (See note 3 in chapter 4.) The evidence 
for this is Frege’s Aristotle note, again. But on the whole I think that the way both 
Evans and Dummett understand that saying what the referent is, is by showing the 
sense of the expression, is not adequate from the properly Fregean perspective. For 
what difference is there supposed to be between "Afla = Afla" and "Afla = Ateb" such 
that only the first statement shows the sense but not the second one? Suppose that the 
two geographers have the same referent determining experiences in Frege´s original 
example but only the names they relate to the mountain differ from each other. In that 
case the identity statements also show the same senses (excepting metalinguistic 
ingredients). It seems to me that the correct way to understand the identity statements 
is rather the following. "Afla" and "Ateb" in the right side of "=" bring always with 
them the associated senses of an individual speaker. But that takes place below the 
linguistic surface level, and therefore what is shown is not really shown at all. In most 
cases when different proper names are explicitly given they can be taken to indicate 
that different senses are involved but not that the senses are shown, as it seems that 
Evans’ and Dummett’s views require. 
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So to talk about showing the sense of a proper name is too coarse, for that does not 
really enable us in finding out at the linguistic level what the senses of proper names 
are the speakers grasp. The plain talk of showing leaves it totally open how the sense 
is shown when this is meant to be contrasted to the possibility of stating the sense 
directly, albeit with linguistic means. This relates to the problem of grasping a sense of 
a proper name. Consequently I propose that showing the sense reduces empirically, not 
conceptually, to a manner of grasping a sense.3,4 And what that is, in modern cognitive 
terms, will be explained piecemeal further on. 
 
The general line of my argumentation is then the following. The information-based 
thoughts that Evans focused on is an important step forward in the neo-Fregean 
studies.5 I would even claim that this notion manifests a very similar overall account to 
mine in that it also plays down the role of causal links qua causal (even if 
inadvertently to some extent). Only information counts; the causal links are at most its 
carriers. (That is, when the links are conceptualized folkishly to be distinct from the 
information – which may not be, perhaps not even metaphysically, possible at all, as I 
argued in section 4.2.5.) But there is still a discrepancy between the senses of proper 
names and the demonstratives and indexicals in Evans’ account. He discussed proper 
names in his 1982 book, but the discussion remained on the intuitive level of what we 
would say with respect to, for instance, when a proper name has definitely changed its 
referent. Evans’ analogy of the producers and the consumers of a proper name does 
not really add any explanatory value; it is only a cogent description of the social 
dynamics of reference change. Fortunately there is a later development within the neo-
Fregean camp that focuses also on the senses of proper names. 
 
???????????????????
 
The notion of a sense of a proper name fluctuates quite much in the earlier neo-
Fregean pronouncements and tends to remain rather general. But fortunately there is a 
more recent and more developed account of the neo-Fregean senses of proper names. 
We saw earlier that Recanati talked about the "architectural trick" of putting 
information about the bearer of a proper name into a dossier. We can drop the 
secretarial analogies from now on. That is because we can get much more literal: we 
do not "put" information to the “dossiers”. Information goes into the neural memory 
stores in the cortex along the neural links that has been formed, or that are formed at 
the moment when one acquires a new proper name and information about its referent. 
Talking about putting information in a dossier makes the whole process turn out to 
look as something that we do in full awareness down to the last piece. But that is not 
how it goes neurally, and not even cognitively in most cases. To venture a bit to the 
neural territory of the next chapter, the brain gets the information from which it selects 
pieces in accordance of what it has already acquired, and consolidates the information 
by transferring it from hippocampus to the cortical networks. This is essentially the 
"architectural trick". Recanati´s account is also one-sided, for it needs to be explained 
how the informational traffic goes from the other direction, from the cognitive 
memory information (the “dossiers”) to the linguistic expression of a proper name. But 
that will be explained also in due course. 
 
Still the general features of Recanati´s account of the senses of proper names are 
valuable, for they clearly make a step forward. Recanati makes it clear that "a dossier" 
can be initiated by a referent-fixing description (when in effect the proper name is a 
  153 
"descriptive name"). But when afterwards new information is acquired by a thinker, 
the original description "gets subordinated to the dossier and loses its privileged status: 
the name becomes associated with the dossier rather than with the description which 
initiated it." (Recanati 1993: 110) This leads to the situation in which the referent of 
the proper name is thought of "non-descriptively" (possibly without the thinker ever 
having been perceptually acquainted with the referent). In short, the non-descriptive 
mode of thinking of the referent is the result of "sheer descriptive multiplicity". This 
mode of thinking ("de re representation") about the referent is such that the thought 
characterize the referent itself independently of it satisfying the concepts that are 
entertained by the speaker in thinking of that referent. That mode is the "mental 
counterpart" of the linguistic feature REF that characterizes the directly referential 
singular terms. 
 
The non-descriptive mode of thinking about the referent through the descriptive 
multiplicity is, however, left much too unarticulated by Recanati. It even seems to 
have something mysterious about it in cognitive terms. For plainly, if there are nothing 
but descriptions in the dossier, how their sheer amount could give rise to a 
qualitatively distinct mode of apprehending the referent? When the descriptions 
accumulate, at what point does the mode of presentation change into non-
descriptional? And more pressingly, how could a descriptional mode turn into non-
descriptional mode? I have not found any answers in Recanati’s discussion. But in a 
way I do not expect to find them, for it seems to me that Recanati has confused 
cognitive matters (his psychological modes of presentation) to epistemic ones. 
Accordingly I propose that instead of the descriptional mode changing into the non-
descriptional, what happens when one acquires a de re mode of thought about an 
individual is that the accumulation of the descriptions increases their mutual 
cohesiveness. That is, the descriptions become to express such pieces of information 
that enforce one another as being about the same individual. That is natural: it happens 
(almost every time) one acquires new descriptions – new information - about an 
individual, and even in those cases when one knows that those descriptions are about 
the very same individual. In other words one’s sense of the referent (of the proper 
name in question) becomes epistemically reliable in its overall informational 
coherence to such an extent that it is taken to characterize a unique individual. We see 
again that semantic, a fortiori referential, and epistemic considerations mesh; but then 
that tenet lies at the core of our Fregean approach also. 
 
There is another level of the senses of proper names that contributes to the epistemic 
cohesion, hence to the Recanatian de re mode of thinking about the referents. It 
consists of the informational relations between i) the particular senses and ii) the 
senses about other things, like events in the world, i.e. the world knowledge the 
speakers possess both individually and collectively through communication. In the 
modern Fregeanism the senses of proper names are not separate entities but only 
relatively separable because informationally interrelated. This second level of the 
senses supports evidently the cognitive and epistemic nature of reference. 
Consequently we also see that this epistemic base supports internalism over 
externalism. (See sections from 4.3.1 to 4.3.3.)  The senses are related both to the 
external world and to one another, but the former connections are not so strong as the 
externalists believe. That is because the latter connections constrain the former, i.e. the 
connections within the internal representations as well as to the external world are also 
informational. And because this information, the senses, are our only means by which 
  154 
we know anything about the external world, nothing from outside the individual 
representational system made up of the senses could mediate cognitive, hence 
semantic, relations between them and the external world. In short, Fregean internalism 
is the only viable view in semantics and reference research. 
 
Still it needs to be remarked that strictly speaking the dossiers do not contain linguistic 
descriptions, pace Recanati and Kvart. The descriptions are the linguistic items one 
produces from the cognitive information the dossier contain. Recanati does appreciate 
however this point for he says that the descriptions express concepts and that we could 
not think about objects without a conceptual mediation (Recanati 1993: 130, 186). But 
it seems that the “dossiers” contain also perceptual information about the referents. To 
see this, think about exemplars and typical instances of categories and concepts.6 
Recanati also realizes that one acquires information about the referent via perceptual 
encounters with it. Nevertheless in his account that seems only to result in the 
linguistically articulatable, and representable, pieces of conceptualized information 
entering the dossiers. In light of this Recanati´s notion of "encyclopedia entry" needs 
modification. Consequently it is better to take the notion of the dossier as a cross-
informational and a functional construct. The same goes with the encyclopedia entries 
informationally explicative of the dossiers about individual referents (Recanati 1993: 
184). In other words the encyclopedia entry contains one´s knowledge and beliefs 
about the referent of the expression, including the “pointer" by which one gets access 
to the entry at a time. It is also to be understood that there may be more than one 
proper name linked to one and the same entry; in that case the two names have the 
same sense (excepting of course those portions of the sense which have to do with the 
fact that the names differ). 
 
The relevance of proper names as pointers, with respect to the encyclopedia entries, is 
that with their help the speaker both initiates and accesses the entries. (For similar 
accounts see (Forbes 1989) and (Kvart 1989).) But the entries can also be initiated and 
accessed by descriptions (as well as with indexicals, demonstratives and pronouns). 
The basic elements of the initiation was described above with the acquiring of the 
original description: it causes a "peg" for "clustering" further information about the 
object that the very information is about (Recanati 1993: 183). The access in its turn 
goes via any information the entry contains, as when one hears something about the 
referent that is already known to him. And obviously one can acquire new information 
in that occasion. 
 
Let me try to make the notion of encyclopedia entry, as the secretarial analogy of the 
Fregean sense, more clear by an example. For this role I offer portions of my sense of 
"Stalin". 
 
"Stalin" (the main proper name pointer); "Josif Vissarionovich Dzugashvili" (birth 
name), "Soso", "Koba" (other proper name pointers) 
-born officially 21st December 1879, really 8th December 1878, at Gori, 
Georgia 
-met Lenin first at Tampere, Finland, December 1905 
-Commissar of Nationalities in 1917 
-second wife Nadezda Alliluev 
-Secretary of the Communist Party of SU 
-vozhd of the Communist Party and Soviet Union since 1929 
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-started the first pjatiletka in 1929 (5 years plan) 
-worked closely with Molotov 
-started the massive campaigns to industrialize and dekulakize SU in the 
beginning of 1930s 
-let few million Ukrainians die of hunger 
-originated the purges of the higher party, economic and Red Army 
echelons in 1936-1938 in the show (and secret) trials 
-negotiated with the Finnish envoys in October and November 1939; as 
the result started the Soviet-Finnish War ("The Winter War") 30.11.1939 
-deliberately on purpose let Germany attack SU in 1941 
-supreme commander (at Stavka) in the "Great Patriotic War"; later 
assumed the title Generalissimus 
-died at 5th March 1953 
 
This encyclopedia entry lists some main properties of Stalin and events in his life. All 
of them are not separately sufficient for unique individuation of him, however. But 
that is a common feature of the senses: in many cases they contain pieces of 
information that alone would not suffice for identification of the referent of the proper 
name they are the sense elements of; but together they are sufficient. That can be 
achieved in two ways. Either the pieces of information together form uniquely 
individuating sense or there are some elements that suffice for that alone. With respect 
to my sense of Stalin such are, for instance, that Nadezda Alliluev was his second 
wife, and he being the supreme commander of the Soviet Armed Forces during the 
Second World War. 
 
The multiplicity of the pieces of information amounts to what Recanati calls 
descriptive multiplicity. As we just saw in most cases it accounts for the uniqueness of 
the sense of a proper name, the result being that the name refers to a unique individual. 
The other, not so frequent, cases are those which the sense is a "one-shot" sense 
typically characterizing the referent as the first or the only to have done something, or 
somehow being a distinctive individual (like "the first man in space" referring to Juri 
Gagarin).7 Usually we tend to know quite much about the referents of the familiar 
proper names. Now I want to use this multiplicity of the senses of proper names to 
give a Fregean explanation of the differential behavior of the definite descriptions and 
proper names in the modal contexts. As we recall the direct-causal theorists rely on 
this phenomenon in their arguments that the definite descriptions (expressing senses) 
could not be semantically equivalent to proper names. The name "Aristotle" is taken to 
refer to Aristotle, the famous Greek philosopher (as individuated in the occasion of 
use), when one talks counterfactually and says that "Aristotle could have been a 
miserable destitute". But when one says that "the most famous pupil of Plato could 
have been a miserable destitute" the referent might not be the actual Aristotle, the 
Greek philosopher, but whoever is the most famous pupil of Plato in the 
circumstances, in the possible world, the counterfactual talk concerns. 
 
With a proper name is associated an encyclopedia entry which encodes the conceptual 
(and possibly perceptual) information about the referent of that name and the (neural) 
representation of that proper name is the pointer enabling the speaker to accesses that 
information, it follows naturally that the name tends to activate much of that 
information in every occasion of the use of the name. That is, a particular use of the 
name brings with it pretty much the whole informational package associated to it. In 
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contrast a single description focuses only on a single property of the referent. As 
individuals have common properties, or may acquire common properties, without 
being the same individuals, it follows naturally that sometimes the description picks up 
different individuals in different circumstances. That accounts for the differential 
modal profiles of proper names and the descriptions. (As the reader realizes this 
explanation is independent on the actualized descriptions reading defended in the 
previous chapter; at this point, for a while, the focus is only on the predicative reading 
of the descriptions.) 
 
Recanati postulates the (in my view narrowly) pragmatic process of synecdoche by 
which a definite description expressing a "descriptive concept" can stand for a de re 
concept of an individual of which it is a part (Recanati 1993: sec. 15.6). Synecdoche 
process is a part-whole process in which the informational part engages the whole it is 
part of. Now it seems to me that this process also helps to explain the differential 
behavior of proper names and the descriptions in the modal contexts. For it seems, 
when looked at the direction from proper names to the descriptions, that the part-whole 
feature involved in Recanati´s synecdoche process corresponds to my account that 
proper names tend to activate larger portions of their senses than the descriptions. It 
may also be that an activation of a piece of neurocognitive information, expressed by a 
description, activates automatically the main pointer to that encyclopedia entry, i.e. the 
proper name of that entry, and the name then activates automatically in a reciprocal 
manner other portions of the neurocognitive information, other portions of the sense of 
that name. But because the focus is on the explicitly used description, those other 
portions are presumably activated to a lesser degree, so that they do not need to 
become conscious (at least for the time being). So the feature REF, which has the 
effect that the referent of a directly referential singular term becomes the sole content 
of the thought, or the singular proposition entertained, does not explain the difference 
between the modal profiles of proper names and the descriptions; it is the synecdoche 
process that explains it. From the perspective of my account this is how it should be. It 
is the different range of the focusing on the neurocognitive information initiated by 
proper names, and the descriptions respectively, that explains the modal difference. 
With respect to my encyclopedia entry of Stalin this may happen as follows. If I say 
“Stalin was the Secretary of the Communist Party of SU” the pointer “Stalin” activates 
many informationally related pieces, expressible descriptively (though not necessarily 
all of them). For instance that he was the effective vozhd of SU since 1929, the same 
year when the first 5 years plan was started, and that he worked closely with Molotov. 
Also other related pieces of information get typically activated but to different extents 
(depending on the topic). But if I say that “the commissar of Nationalities in 1917 was 
very busy” the activated pieces of information are presumably fewer and more closely 
related to the information the description expresses. The name pointer might not even 
get activated at all, so the certain feel of inevitability that relates to rigidity is not there. 
The description is more likely to “float free” and therefore assume the feel of non-
rigidity even if the description is used referentially actualized, hence becoming 
rigidified. Moreover because the description expresses information that may not be 
commonly known, it may not be readily inferred that it refers to Stalin. Thus it is 
easier to see why it tends to float free and tends to have the aura of referential non-
rigidity. (But this effect of course depends on what a particular speaker and hearer 
know.) I hope that this example of the spread of information explicates sufficiently the 
general mechanism of how sense elements make up the token cognitive significances 
of proper names as well as the descriptions used. 
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The situation changes when a description that expresses part of the conceptual 
information associated with the name is actualized, hence rigidified. In that case the 
description is equivalent semantically and modally to the proper name; they both pick 
up the same individual in all counterfactual circumstances. However there still seems 
to be an "intuitive" discrepancy remaining in this case: it still feels that the rigidified 
description is not equivalent to the proper name. I suggest that it is the very 
architecture of proper names as pointers to the conceptual information that explains 
this residual feeling, along the lines of the Stalin example above. For if the description 
does not activate all that information at once (though that is possible the sparser the 
information in the encyclopedia entry is) the other associated information that is not 
invoked in the rigidification tends to affect the content of the name; it so to speak leaks 
in. The mechanism is explained in general terms in the next section. In short it is due 
to the dynamic architecture of the encyclopedia entries encoding the senses of proper 
names that makes it difficult for us to comprehend naturally the result of the 
rigidification of the descriptions as referential devices when the descriptions are 
considered at the theoretical level, i.e. not as they are ordinarily used. But of course 
that does not argue against that very result: proper names and the rigidified 
descriptions are semantically equivalent. 
 
When a description is actualized it becomes to stand for the whole sense of the proper 
name the part of which it expresses.8 This is equivalent to the role proper names have 
as the main pointers (as well as conforming to the synecdoche). They so to say collect 
together temporarily the pieces of the information constituting the sense. In practice 
this collection is only partial in most cases because usually the senses are quite rich in 
information. But because of that equivalence it naturally follows that the actualized 
description behaves just as the proper name does, i.e. it is rigid. The only difference is 
that any other description as well, expressing a part of the sense, can assume that same 
role when actualized, but the proper name has that role in all normal referential uses. 
This of course follows from the architecture of the sense, or the Recanatian 
encyclopedia entries: proper names frequently provide a wider access to the senses. In 
every referential use the name functions by being the main pointer and by being 
activated with the basic schema of reference and this accounts for proper names being 
naming devices. Because proper names (or strictly speaking their neural 
representations) organize and collect together the neurocognitive information about 
their referents, they as the main pointers are the usual naming devices. (Though 
descriptions can become to assume that role also: “The Holy Roman Empire”.) The 
descriptions usually express only parts of the information so their referentiality - the 
force of REF - is weaker though it is functional all the same. I propose that it is the 
amount of the information that is being focused on that explains the relative strength 
of REF with respect to proper names and the descriptions. So when Recanati takes 
REF to be categorical feature I take it to be a graded one and variable in its force in 
relation to the different kinds of the referential expressions. 
 
?????????????????????????????
 
As the reader have realized by now we have entered the road to the neuroscientific 
Fregean account of the senses of proper names. We started with the denial of Evans´ 
categorical distinction of the unbridgeable explanatory levels between persons and 
information processings in their brains. We then parted company with the neo-Fregean 
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secretarial analogies which are postulated to account for the cognitive aspects of the 
senses of proper names. The third step is to look at the dynamic aspects of the senses. 
That I will do next. The fourth step, and the other main aim of this study, is taken in 
the next two chapters, in which the Fregean theory is neuronaturalized by the 
construction of a general neuroscientific theory of the senses and reference of proper 
names. 
 
So what the senses of proper names are and what it is to grasp such senses, conceived 
of in the neural-cum-cognitive terms? To answer the first question first, let us 
concentrate on the cognitive aspects of them (which Frege also thought to be their 
primary aspects). The senses confer different cognitive significances to the referential 
expression a speaker uses. Thus one can, presumably, tell who is the referent of the 
name "Manoel Francisco dos Santos" and also know some facts about a person called 
"Garrincha", but may still not know, or believe, that they refer to the same individual. 
Different names can have the same cognitive significances, hence the same senses 
(apart from the fact that their respective names differ), and one and the same name 
may have different cognitive significances in different contexts, hence different senses 
(without being ambiguous, though the speaker may believe so). As I have been 
arguing information is what the senses are made of, hence different information 
associated to different expressions, even if they refer to the same individual, explain 
the different cognitive significances the expressions have for the speaker. Of course 
the difference have to be such that the speaker does not realize, or infer, on the 
grounds of that information, that the distinct names refer to one and the same 
individual; that is why we have cases like “Hesperus”-“Phosphorus”. Still, as is 
obvious, some parts of the senses of two proper names may be the same without that 
creating such cognitive/epistemic relations between the senses that would lead to the 
realization that the distinct names have in fact one and the same referent. For example 
the information expressed by the description "was a superb player in team Brazil back 
in the 1960s, but later became a drunk" may characterize the senses of "Garrincha" and 
"Manoel Francisco dos Santos" for a speaker without him realizing that they refer to 
the same individual. (This account generalizes obviously to other speakers. The senses 
of distinct proper names, as the information possessed by two (or more) persons, can 
be so different that the persons do not realize that they are talking about the same 
individual. But normally persons possess sufficiently similar and cohesive information 
for them to be able to carry on a conversation with respect to a particular referent. 
(And of course the cohesiveness increases – or decreases – through such 
conversational exchanges, i.e. they “measure” the informational similarities of our 
senses.) 
 
Much of what takes place when a proper name is used to refer goes on automatically 
and without us being aware of it. Only when a name could not be accessed to be 
tokened are the descriptions generated from the information storage. This information 
is the "world knowledge" possessed by the speaker, and it varies from a speaker to 
another. This informational view of the senses of proper names, and the senses in 
general, explains naturally the epistemic nature of the senses as cognitive-
informational entities. 
 
Let us turn to the second question: what it is to grasp a sense? We are now in the 
happy position to be able to give an easy answer to that question because the 
explanation of the nature of the senses above already implies it. This is also good on 
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the epistemic grounds, for we have achieved a unificatory step. As we remember Frege 
held the grasping of the senses to be a psychological act. And so it is in my view, 
albeit a neurocognitive one. One can maintain this by specifying how the senses are 
neurophysiological entities. But to stay here in the upper steps of our current top-down 
approach to the matter, the grasping of the senses is in outlines the following type of 
process. In the first instance grasping a sense is to have those pieces of the 
neurocognitive information activated which relate to the (purported) referent. This 
goes on all the time when we engage in a referential use of language. Notice how this 
account is similar in modern terms to Frege´s account. He was primarily interested in 
explaining thoughts, and they are made up of the component senses of the thoughts. 
The senses as pieces of the neurocognitive information is what thoughts - or what is 
also called mental representations - are made of in my account. The only difference is 
that unlike Frege I do not take the senses to be third realm abstract entities, but 
physicalistic ones in that they are neurophysiological-cum-informational. 
 
So the grasping a sense of a proper name is to have those pieces of the neurocognitive 
information activated which relate to that name. (Recall the Stalin example above.) As 
I explained in the previous section this activation is not the total engagement of the 
sense; it has parts the activation of which is caused by the information residing in the 
current context, both the external and the internal cognitive context (like related 
memories). Of course there are degrees in this type of grasping because the pieces of 
information one possesses may not be specific enough to enable the speaker to know 
who or what the referent is. A case in point would be the description "the king of 
France" which by itself does not activate such pieces of information that would enable 
one to know immediately which one of the kings of France is the proper referent. But 
usually the grasp is sufficiently extensive because the context guides the grasp in 
contributing to the activation of the sufficiently individuating information. 
 
Now we also see in another way why the synonymy demands between proper names 
and descriptions is empirically unreasonable demand. To establish a synonymy 
relation would require the linguistic expression of all of the sense elements related to a 
proper name (as a pointer) in question. But that is an insurmountable task in most 
cases. Only by assuming that there is one or only a few descriptions per proper name is 
one likely to succumb to the synonymy demand. (Of course the possibility of “massive 
reduplication” would remain even when all the sense elements have been put in 
descriptive form; but these I take as irrelevant in the present dialectical situation, for 
such far out scenarios can always be devised – as any philosopher is well aware.) 
Moreover if my reconstruction of the notion of individual concept in section 7.5 is 
correct in outlines, descriptive synonymies are precluded in principle also because the 
concepts – as senses – involve non-articulatable pieces of information. 
 
It should be mentioned that there is another way to grasp a sense that is a derivative or 
an extended one. That is to have the sense in one´s focus, to explicate it further and to 
articulate as much as one can those pieces of the neurocognitive information that make 
up the particular sense one possesses. Notice that this proceeds in most cases at the 
cognitive and linguistic levels, like when one draws inferences from the pieces of 
information one already possesses. I am not claiming that there is always such a clear-
cut distinction between the two modes of grasping a sense. For there are cases in 
which the description used turns out to be inadequate because someone else knows 
more about the referent and points that out to us. In these cases we immediately 
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become aware of the inadequacy of the sense we possess (or of that part of it which the 
description invoked expresses). Consequently we modify the sense accordingly during 
the exchange, and not only, as it were, by contemplating upon the sense in an extended 
private study. (One might even reject the sense outright in the case it is thoroughly 
incorrect). 
 
?????????????????????
 
Howard Wettstein has argued that on the sense theory of reference the proposition 
about the referent a speaker has in mind remains unrevealed in many cases. The 
proposition is here taken to be the Fregean thought the speaker grasps. Wettstein 
writes that 
 
"Consider an assertive utterance of 'John was born on March 23, 1976." If 
the speaker knows enough about John, he will possess several (non-
equivalent) unique characterizations of him. He may think of John as, for 
example, my best friend, my wife´s brother, the best mathematician in 
Yale, and in countless other ways. For each replacement of the name 
'John' in the uttered sentence by such a characterization (or by a 
conjunction of such characterizations) we obtain a sentence which 
formulates a different proposition…the speaker…will be often unable to 
select some one sentence as the correct one…If this response is one that 
we are likely to get, then we cannot suppose that the speaker had a 
Fregean proposition 'before his consciousness.'" (Wettstein 1981: 150) 
 
 
I propose that instead of taking Wettstein´s point as an argument that purports to show 
an alleged weakness in the sense theory of reference, it is better to accept it as an 
adequate description of the sense theory, without any of the presumed unwanted 
consequences. With the preceding characterization of the senses of proper names, as 
pieces of the neurocognitive information, no explicit mention of the descriptions is 
required in the normal cases of the referential uses of proper names. Only when the 
connections between the neural representations of proper names and the information 
are severed the descriptions become to assume the role of being the devices of the 
primary referential function (with respect to the particular "lost" proper name). So 
there need not be any uniquely correct description of the referent in the speaker´s 
mind. Usually there is not except in those cases when the description expresses all that 
the speaker knows about the referent. Moreover, as I argued, the senses are context-
sensitive items. This involves that the components of the senses that get activated 
depend on the particular emphasis or focus on the referent, for instance what properties 
and features of the referent are being talked about. It seems to me that this corresponds 
well to Frege´s senses as modes of presentation. This becomes even more obvious 
when we remember that normally we do possess quite an amount of different kinds of 
information about individual things, such that we are able to talk about them 
knowingly (and because of that we also know that others know that the common focus 
is on the same referent). 
 
There is the difference between proper names and the descriptions in the modal, or 
intensional, contexts. But as I argued that difference lies in the differential scope of the 
focus on the range of the information. Proper names tend to activate their senses as 
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wholes because they are the primary pointers to that information. But it does not 
follow that the whole sense has to be activated, or that it would be so activated, in 
order that one would be able to single out the referent of that name. In most cases we 
do not grasp the whole sense. (Not even in the second sense of grasping a sense, i.e. 
when it is the object of our cognitive and semantical investigations.)  That is the reason 
why there need not be a full Fregean proposition before the mind of the speaker in 
Wettstein’s sense. But Wettstein´s argument fails also in a stronger sense. Such a “full 
Fregean proposition” (contra singular proposition) seems to be prevented from being 
there by the very neurophysiological-cum-cognitive nature of the information residing 
in the brains of the speakers. This can be explained by the facilitation of those synaptic 
connections that are involved in the token processes that activate the parts of the 
information making up the sense in question.  In contrast to a proper name a 
description in its turn activates usually a more restricted number of the elements of the 
sense. The number of the elements of the whole sense can presumably be explained by 
the stronger facilitations of the particular synaptic connections (for details see the next 
chapter). The descriptions so to say focus on a narrower sector of the senses than 
proper names. So talking about having a full Fregean proposition before one´s 
consciousness is more plausible with proper names, but for the same reasons as with 
them the content of a description is not restricted to only that component of the sense it 
linguistically expresses; in many cases the other connections between the elements of 
the sense, the closely related ones, influence the content of the thought in the particular 
occasion. Now we also see that the Fregean mode of presentation of the referent is 
usually not the sense as a whole but it is something in between. From our perspective, 
that of the modernized Frege, this is how it should be (as I remember telling a couple 
of times before): the senses are the informational elements of the thoughts and the 
linguistic expressions are the resulting condensations of them. 
 
Because of the differential focusings on the senses, either via the name or via a 
description (expressing directly “its” part of the sense of the name) we can now further 
constrain Recanati´s notion of encyclopedia entry. For we see that it is only natural to 
modify the "democratic" architecture of that notion. (To remind the reader, it is neither 
democratic in the sense that all speakers would possess the same entries.) That is, in 
Recanati´s original account the entries of an individual encyclopedia are all on a par, 
and it is not clear what could restrict all of them from being activated in every 
occasion of access of the entry in question. But if we suppose that via the name as a 
pointer one gains access to 1) some pieces of information, expressible by descriptions 
that are about the properties of the referent that characterize it in many cases and/or to 
the most degree for the speaker; and 2) those pieces have their own subpieces of 
information, expressible by the descriptions relating only to the former descriptions; 
and, which is likely, iii) these divide into further subpieces, then we can have a more 
adequate architecture of the encyclopedia entries as the senses of proper names than 
we can have with only the "phenomenological" means the neo-Fregean approach 
allows. 
 
This architecture can be represented by a tree structure some branches of which are 
connected to one another between the trees. In other words some pieces of information 
characterize many referents. This property of the senses, as Recanatian encyclopedia 
entries, accounts also for the occasional fluent engagement of the information about 
other referents, be they persons, events or objects that are related to the primary 
referent in the occasion. That explains the notion of the "surrounding story" I am using 
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in some places in this work. That spells out the phenomenon that the referents of 
proper names are readily located within larger informational contexts, the token 
representations of parts of these contexts becoming parts of the senses of proper 
names. Hence it accounts also for the contextuality of the Fregean senses that we 
detected in section 4.3.5. To this property of the senses adds what I noted above, and 
what also the Ateb-Afla example implies, that the entries can contain perceptual 
information as well and not just conceptual information. 
 
We can also explain the mechanism underlying the use of the actualized descriptions. 
When a speaker says “the ninth chess World Champion was a cunning positional 
player” he refers to Tigran Petrosian and intends tacitly that this use subsumes also the 
ordinary counterfactual contexts (“the ninth chess World Champion could have beaten 
Spasski if he had put more effort to his play in 1969”). That is because the description 
activates other pieces of information related to it – it activates those neural sites 
wherein information about and related to Petrosian resides. Primarily this includes 
knowledge about the history of the top class chess, Petrosian and games he played. 
And these in their turn tend to activate the more indirect pieces of information – 
presumably more weakly activated neural information (senses elements that become to 
assume a “stand-by” state) – related to the former informational sense elements about 
Petrosian in the speaker’s overall sense system. 
 
It seems that the surrounding sense elements explain also at least part of the 
“intuitiveness” of the direct-causal theorists’ arguments like that of Feynman case. 
Because we typically have plenty of the elements related to proper names we use, and 
we know how to use the names to refer to a particular individual, it becomes automatic 
to judge that despite the lack of individuating information in some cases the names in 
question still refer as usual. Hence it seems that “Feynman” refers to Richard Feynman 
the physicist in the ignorants’ mouths. That is, we possess amply individuating 
information, direct and indirect, about the referents in the majority of cases and that 
could not but influence the interpretation of the Feynman cases where there is no 
individuative information possessed by a particular speaker. Because we know that i) 
we usually know who we are talking about and that ii) if one does not know, there are 
others who know and to whom one could depend on by deference, it automatically 
seems that the proper name does refer irrespective of any individuative information. 
But, to repeat it, the semantic reference as deference is here confused with genuine 
reference: the cognitive information-based reference by a particular speaker (or 
speakers when all they know who the referent is). That the “intuition”, or feeling, of 
secure reference in the Feynman case is not to be trusted as such is evident from such 
cases where one believes that there are experts who know the referent, but when in fact 
there are not for the simple reason that the purported referent does not even exist 
(unbeknownst to all the speakers). So the “intuitions” reflect only the general 
conditions of the referential use of language, they do not reveal anything substantial 
about genuine reference. It is easy to see that this same explanation applies to the 
Gödel cases as well: despite the sufficiently individuating information involved, the 
intuition that “Gödel” refers to Kurt Gödel, not to Schmidt, taunts us because we know 
“too much” about Kurt Gödel. And when it taunts someone who does not know, that 
speaker’s verdict in favour of Gödel is explained by the trust on deference. 
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In concluding this chapter it should also be pointed out that the above explanation of 
the senses and the grasping of them help us to explain why the notion of grasping has 
remained rather unclear so far. Because the senses are processual neurocognitive 
entities there is nothing surprising that the earlier accounts of grasping have remained 
so timid. Also the tendency – characteristic of philosophers - to search for distinct and 
linguistically wholly articulatable notions has led us to demand of the senses more 
than they can deliver because of their very ontological nature. I think that the 
characterization of the senses of proper names as neurocognitive informational entities 
shows also that it is a high time to retreat from the overly linguistic conceptions of 
how language functions referentially. 
 
It could not be denied with any plausibility that the cognitive level studies, at which 
the earlier neo-Fregean studies have ventured, are important by themselves and as the 
forerunners, albeit inadvertent in most cases, of the correcting themes to merely folk 
psychological and folk semantic conceptions - though this aspect of the neo-Fregean 
studies is rarely explicit because they still tend to assume the basic explanatory 
soundness of those frameworks. However many cognitive scientists have also stopped 
at the cognitive level and have deemed the further attempts at searching for the neural 
level accounts as irrelevant. The common opinion seems to be that the neural facts 
only "implement" the cognitive ones, or only "realize" them (or that the latter 
"supervene" on the former). It also seems to be assumed that the search would not end 
up with any adequate theory because of the sheer complexity of the brain´s structures 
and processes. These opinions I take to be true as to the complexity but false as to their 
suggested negative implications: we might or we might not end up with explanatorily 
adequate neurocognitive theories of reference, but we do not know that beforehand. 
Here as elsewhere when we are taking the first steps toward explanations in a new 
domain opening up the burdens do certainly look considerable, but that is no reason to 
refrain from attempting. I will not engage in arguing about the ontological issues of 
conceding mere implementation or some such role to the neural level. As the next 
chapter makes it plain I take it as a fact that the neural does not merely implement the 
cognitive but it is the cognitive, even contentwise. This is why I take the senses to be 
neural entities informationally, i.e. the information is literally there in the neural 
processes, and the cognitive level phenomena and entities emerge from those 
processes informationally.9 
 
?????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????
 
In this appendix I will concentrate on a rather curious twist the direct-causal consensus 
has fertilized. The background is that the approach has repeatedly failed to explain the 
famous "Frege´s puzzles" of the cognitive significance of proper names and other 
cases. These puzzles center on what has also become to be called "Frege´s data" 
(Wettstein 1986: 186). Now I take it that Frege´s data is the basic data any theory of 
semantics and reference must explain. Therefore it is remarkable that the constant 
failures of the direct-causal theory of reference in accounting for that data have as 
constantly not been let to bother the proponents of that theory. The curious twist I 
alluded to is that, in addition to this indifferent attitude itself, one writer agitates for a 
further dismissive perspective on the data; indeed for a revolution in philosophical 
semantics. That writer is Howard Wettstein and the propaganda for the revolution has 
  164 
its beginnings in one of his paper from the mid-1980s (Wettstein 1986) and is 
collected together in his book Has Semantics Rested on a Mistake? (Wettstein 1991). 
 
Wettstein argues that we should give up being bothered by Frege´s data in referential 
semantics. In effect Wettstein states that we could ignore it and be no worse off; 
cognitive significance is a real phenomenon, but it has no relevance to referential 
semantics. This is the revolutionary impact of his perspective. In the following I take a 
critical look at some of the most important of Wettstein´s arguments and ideas. In 
particular I will argue that Wettstein´s view is not sustainable in that it is empirically 
inadequate even on its own terms. 
 
First of all it should be noted that unexpectedly Wettstein´s understanding of the 
Fregean theory is that it is a descriptive theory. According to Wettstein the senses of 
proper names, in general the referential expressions, are fully expressible by 
descriptive means. Wettstein´s arguments against the Fregean theory are premised on 
that conception, and that results in them possessing rather limited value, for the 
Fregeans need not, and do not, claim that the senses are wholly descriptive. Moreover 
Wettstein works also under another widespread misconception that the Fregean senses 
must be purely qualitative. According to him “Frege advanced a view…that a name 
user need attach to the name a purely qualitative concept that he takes to single out a 
referent…" (Wettstein 1991:  156) As I argued this is also an incorrect assumption, but 
for the sake of the argument I ignore it and deal with Wettstein´s arguments as they 
are. 
 
Wettstein contrasts two conceptions of semantics, Fregean and anti-Fregean. As 
mentioned this involves the wholesale denial of "Frege´s data" as relevant for 
semantics (Wettstein 1991: 27-8). But right here in laying out the central issue lies a 
serious problem. The denial of Frege´s data means that semantics proper should not 
have anything to do with the phenomenon of cognitive significance, or cognitive 
content, of the referential expressions. It should be only the notion of reference as such 
that semantics is concerned with, and the actual practices of the speakers creating and 
using referential expressions. All the cognitive stuff, the modes of presentations of the 
objects, the ways of thinking about the referents, beliefs about them, and such are mere 
paraphernalia well ignored in the semantics proper. This is revolutionary indeed. The 
real things on which Wettsteinian semantics advises us to concentrate are the 
conventional and institutional forms of communication with the referential 
expressions. In this he likens his view with Wittgenstein´s studies of language games 
and their roles in the linguistic communities. 
 
But we must not be taken in by the charm of the revolutionary aspects Wettstein´s 
propaganda advertises. That is because – as we have been seeing - the fact remains that 
cognitive significance and the modes of presentation, i.e. pieces of information about 
the referents, are so intimately tied to the referential expressions that it seems 
singularly implausible to even to try to sever them from reference without committing 
gross ad hoc moves. For instance the identity puzzle is about the modes of 
presentation of the referents. The importance of that puzzle is that it shows, because it 
is generalizable, that every referential expression has a mode (or modes) of 
presentation of its referent. Wettstein is very hard put to deny the relevance of the 
identity puzzle because it manifests itself in the everyday referential practices, i.e. the 
very data of Wettsteinian "semantic anthropologist". In other words, we do not use 
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proper names alone but express information and beliefs related to them; we always 
talk about individuals by saying that they are such and such and did so and so. 
 
It goes also the other way around. When we are reduced from exchanging information 
about a referent, for instance due to the information being all incorrect or due to the 
sheer lack of information about a historical figure whose name we only know, the 
name will before long drop out of our institutional practices if we will not acquire 
adequate information about the bearer. (That was argued in chapter 4, so I propose to 
take it for a fact now.) Consequently that figure will disappear from the scene of the 
history with the name. The only historical figures we are currently talking about are 
those about whom informational records have survived, mostly in the form of literary 
sources, tales and the beliefs of both ordinary and expert speakers like the historians. 
All other persons have faded into oblivion for some reason or another. For example 
one will quickly realize this when backtracking one´s family lineage -though if one is a 
descendant of a prominent figure that will take longer depending on how far back in 
the generation count that figure is to be found. This general phenomenon should be of 
interest to the anthropological semanticist. But that very phenomenon reveals that it is 
explained only by focusing on information about the referents, of the modes of 
presentation, and these bring with them the phenomenon of cognitive significance 
back again. 
 
Of course one can adopt synchronic view instead of diachronic. One can argue that the 
anthropological semanticist is more interested in the contemporary referential 
practices, suitably restricted. But how would that help to evade the argument from 
information? Maybe Wettstein is likely to argue that it does not take much effort for 
anyone to get locked to a proper referential practice with a proper name; for instance 
that could happen if one merely overhears something being said about someone with 
the explicit use of the name of that target. (Sometimes the direct-causal theorists 
indeed have claimed this.) But we must look at this case more closely. First, in 
conformity to what I pointed out above, with these overheard uses information is still 
transmitted in the overwhelming majority of cases. Second, when one´s epistemic 
resources, one’s beliefs, about the referent of that name are very scarce and not 
capable of enabling the speaker identifyingly to refer to the bearer of that name, to 
discuss about him, what to do? Here Wettstein can call the direct-causal theory for 
help and state that one is still locked in the appropriate referential practice with respect 
to that name because one has become part of the overall referential network which 
includes experts, i.e. those who can identifyingly refer to the bearer. But I am sure it 
will not escape anyone´s notice that here the ignorant speakers are again made to refer 
by deference, and the success of that mechanism depends on the information the 
experts possess about the bearer of the name in question. If the ignorants were to be 
left alone, their referential helplessness with respect to the bearer of the proper name in 
question would soon manifest itself (excepting trivial hypotheses like he is a human, 
and such). 
 
It seems that Wettstein has overlooked the direction of explanatory dependency. The 
referential conventions and institutions on which the anthropological semanticists 
dwell are sustained only because people talk about things and other persons by 
exchanging information. They do that always synchronically (how otherwise could 
they do it?); but from the synchronic events diachronic dimension grows. That is, the 
referential conventions and institutions supervene on the synchronic practices. To keep 
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one´s semantic eye only on these general uniformities – theoretically cleansed from the 
information that really is what makes them effective - is going to the diametrically 
wrong direction explanationwise. At best Wettsteinian semanticist only describes 
(parts of) the typical patterns of the use of proper names. 
 
The facts of the referential practices being what they are, i.e. based on information 
transmission, it is incorrect to claim that the Fregean theory is incompatible with the 
actual linguistic practice (Wettstein 1986: 201). This observation can be reinforced 
when we take a look at one of Wettstein´s own main examples (Wettstein 1991: 150). 
Suppose that someone has beliefs that apply to Socrates (Plato´s teacher, philosopher 
who drank hemlock) but uses the name "Aristotle" all the time. In relation to the 
conventional and institutional means of using referring expressions it is somewhat 
ironical that Wettstein stops short in his presentation of this example and only claims 
that there is no reason to prefer the Fregean view according to which the speaker is 
talking about Socrates, instead of the “New Theory of Reference”-inspired view that 
he is talking about Aristotle. The irony here is that, if the anthropological semantics 
really studies the social patterns of referential communication, Wettstein should have 
looked at what will happen in the possible subsequent situations when the speaker 
keeps on using "Aristotle" while having beliefs applying only to Socrates. If the 
speaker has managed to get along with his uses of "Aristotle", i.e. he has not said 
anything that would have revealed the discrepancy between his uses of "Aristotle" and 
his beliefs related to that name, he has not become under any suspicion of referential 
malpractice. But presumably that is only because his audiences have no discrepancies 
between their beliefs about Socrates and their uses of "Aristotle" (and "Socrates"), due 
to their accurate knowledge of the history of philosophy. But when the speaker will 
say things like "he was the teacher of Plato", he is obviously taken to be referring to 
Socrates by the expert audience. But then when he uses "Aristotle" and say things that 
are true of Socrates only, like "Aristotle drank hemlock", he will be corrected and his 
use of "Aristotle" made to conform to the prevailing referential practice. We see that 
what is said weighs much more than about whom it is purportedly said. But this is just 
what the approach relying on the primacy of the information transmission predicts.10 
 
The next problem, related to what was just argued, is that Wettstein generalizes even 
further his non-informational anti-Fregean account (though, of course, he lets us know 
this is a very positive thing; and how else it could be revolutionary). Wettstein claims 
that it is the loose linguistic practice which in most cases does not have, or even allow 
for, any "cognitive fix" such that would keep the users of the referential expressions 
tied to the referents of those expressions. He notes that 
 
"the crucial question is whether reference is to be tied to the community´s 
beliefs or rather to its practices. Couldn´t it be, for example, that our 
current beliefs about a historical individual have become all fouled up but 
that the continuity of usage secures reference nevertheless? Our beliefs 
about him are, in such case, mistaken, but there remains an individual 
about whom we are talking and about whom we are mistaken." (Wettstein 
1991: 224-5, n.19) 
 
In addition to the negative answer, already given to Wettstein´s innocently looking 
question about him, this quotation gives immediately rise to some other crucial 
questions.11 Why Wettstein thinks that beliefs and practices can be distinguished for 
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referential purposes, and for explanatory purposes, in the strict way that he assumes? 
Or that they are in fact so distinguished? It does rather seem that the practices, the 
conventions of using proper names and other referential expressions, have become to 
be the way they are because our beliefs of both the referents and the world in large 
have been what they were and still are? Before these questions are given such answers 
that would support the beliefs-practices distinction, it is advisable that we do not jump 
to Wettstein´s revolutionary bandwagon even on this count. 
 
Although the preceding discussion and the argument are condensed, I tend to take 
them conclusively showing that in propagating the anthropological semantics which 
studies the conventions and rules, and whatever, of the referential practices of 
language use, Wettstein´s account subtracts the very things that keep the conventions 
operative. Wettstein claims that "there is no reason to suppose that, in general, if we 
successfully uncover the institutionalized conventions governing the references of our 
terms, we will have captured the ways in which speakers think about their referents." 
(Wettstein 1986: 201) But this claims too much for it is not demanded by the Fregean 
approach that the indefinitely many particular ways of thinking the referents should be 
captured. It suffices to explain, in general, how the ways of thinking about the 
referents give rise to the institutionalized conventions and practices governing the 
references of our terms. And that is what the senses as cognitive fixes do.12 
 
Another weakness in Wettstein´s argument is his treatment of "that" (Wettstein 1986: 
202-3). He claims that any of the plausible explications of the rules by which the 
expression "that" refers (Kripkean causal relation, the object the speaker is having in 
mind, the contextual cues - which is Wettstein´s own account) do not have anything to 
do with how the speaker thinks about the referent, with what is his cognitive fix on the 
referent. But Wettstein could only make it seem that his argument supports the 
anthropological semantics because in this connection he ignores proper names. It is 
easier to try to make the case stick with demonstrative expressions like "that", for even 
to the Fregeans the cognitive content of such expressions is rather meager. But the 
demonstrative "that" does have cognitive content, for how else could it be different 
from the demonstrative "this"? That is, it is mainly the spatial distance from the 
speaker to the referent what decides whether the speaker uses "that" or "this". And the 
spatial cognitive fix is a plausible Fregean sense element. (And one is hard put to deny 
that it is such after Evans’ studies (Evans 1982).) (Though there is also the meaning 
relating to the order of comparison: “this is larger than that”.) 
 
The foregoing argumentation concerns the cognitive significance of simple, 
unembedded sentences. Wettstein shortly discusses embedded sentences and the 
propositional attitude contexts in the end of his paper (Wettstein 1986). The main 
problem of the anti-Fregeans is well known as was already noted in the beginning of 
this appendix. For instance if one believes that Cicero was an orator, and assents to the 
sentence expressing that belief, one still might not assent (and could even dissent) to 
the sentence "Tully was an orator". But because Cicero was Tully this should not 
happen according to the (Millian and neo-Russellian) anti-Fregean view: the semantic 
values of the two sentences are the same singular propositions. The Fregeans have no 
problems here: the senses of "Cicero" and "Tully" differ from each other, so the truth-
values can differ in the propositional attitude contexts. 
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Wettstein emphasizes that in this case the data is not to be ignored or denied. That is, it 
is not any (mis)solution to maintain that the truth-values of the Cicero-Tully sentences 
in the propositional attitude contexts do not really differ. However he claims that the 
consequences of that data may "not be what they have seemed" (Wettstein 1986: 205). 
But it is difficult to see what relevance Wettstein´s proposed way of looking at the 
attitude/embedding contexts could have with respect to the unitary explanatory force 
of the Fregean approach. The reason is that the direct-causal theory of reference, and 
the singular propositions wedded to it as well as Wettstein´s own attempt to replace the 
propositions with states of affairs, are all unable to handle the attitude phenomena to 
begin with because these postulations are extensional. Cognitive significance just is a 
fact of the referential language use, and a fact that by its very nature is incompatible 
with any coarse-grained proposals that work only with the extensions and the referents 
of the expressions involved. Therefore I maintain that it will not do any good to 
deliberately try to ignore it the way Wettstein attempts. 
 
That there are some problems with the Fregean way is of course not to be denied. But 
they seem to be not sufficiently serious to threaten the basic explanatory structure of 
that view. Wettstein argues that we often do not even try to retain the Fregean thought 
the believer grasps when we report what he believes. Wettstein gives everyday 
examples in which proper names are replaced by other proper names and descriptions. 
This is fine as far as it goes. But Wettstein so to say over demands from the Fregean 
view what it is not committed to. There is no need for the report of the belief to re-
express exactly the Fregean thought. I would even propose that the assumption from 
exactness is why the attitude reports have been so difficult to handle so far (see section 
7.1.3). So even if I concur with Wettstein on this point, I need not concede that this 
brings any threatening consequences to the Fregean approach. 
 
Wettstein also argues that the attitude reports involve social and contextual factors to 
such an extent that the semantic analysis of the attitude reports is even messier than 
has been thought before. I think that this is basically correct but, once again, nothing 
negative with respect to the Fregean approach follows.  The consequences are quite the 
contrary, in fact. For the social and contextual factors that has to be taken into account 
when reporting beliefs (and other propositional attitudes) only add to the variance 
resulting from the different cognitive fixes people have of the referents of the 
expressions they use. And as I argued Frege´s own account allows for such factors. 
Neither did Frege commit himself to the reporting of the strictly same thought. This 
follows from his view that different persons may well possess different senses, hence 
thoughts, related to the same referential expression. This is what Frege said in the (also 
in this work) often mentioned "Aristotle note". It naturally follows that the beliefs, the 
Fregean thoughts, do differ to some extent between the believer and the reporter. 
 
So all in all, the Wett(gen)steinian revolution is not likely to take place any day soon - 
as it has not since Wettstein’s book was published. Note that I am not implying that 
the study of the social practices, institutions and conventions of the referential uses of 
language are not useful explanatorily, let alone descriptively. But these studies focus 
on the "superstructure" of reference, on the wider and more general patterns primarily 
emerging from the "microlevel" facts of language use that only the sense theory has 
the full potential to explain. Reference with proper names succeeds not because the 
names are external to the speaker´s cognitive apparatus and are social instruments, but 
because as such they are the results of the internal informational factors we possess 
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individually. The social patterns and practices result from the co-operation and 
informational “negotiations” in cases of referential conflicts, which help to link our 
respective pieces of information. 
 
Of course Wettstein´s vision might not be a dream impossible to make true. But the 
only possibility I see for its success would require very drastic changes such that 
Wettstein has not even hinted at; the mere "radical" dismissal of Frege´s data and the 
related cognitive facts will not do. Let me explain. Wettstein writes, in a fairly partisan 
tone, that "Freed from Frege´s perspective, we will, I contend, no longer find it natural 
to think about semantics in this way. And so it will no longer seem a decisive 
objection to the anti-Fregean semantical work that no immediate solution to the 
cognitive significance puzzles falls out of that work." (Wettstein 1991: 8) Wettstein 
likens this to Wittgenstein´s idea of dissolving philosophical problems and deep-
entrenched views. (Though that is not especially Wittgensteinian activity: much of 
philosophy, but also science, is such.) What is important is that it should be realized 
that this strategy of dissolving commits one to the changes of subject, to the rejection 
of the previous conceptions of semantics. Now this is what revolutions are mostly 
about, but Wettstein is then committed to non-argumentative revolutionary change 
because his arguments fail (along with those the direct-causal theorists have offered). 
The very cognitive nature of our thinking and language use is so essential to semantics 
as we have it and live it in everyday use of language that no argument could change 
that. We should really have to be freed from the Fregean perspective, and that would 
require very different methods than the cozy arguments. But what are those methods, 
then? In effect I am claiming that the cognitive fix, via the ubiquitous informational 
links and our biological constitution, prevents us from having any other semantics than 
the Fregean. (The developments in the next chapter should be taken as providing a 
general argument for that claim.) This makes sense as a sort of scientific 
transcendental argument, because the biological facts are more basic than the 
anthropological ones. For one thing, obviously, our anthropological practices and 
uniformities are constrained by our biological nature. Consequently to be freed from 
the Fregean semantics would not just involve being freed from a perspective, but being 
"freed" from our very biological nature. In short, only by being changed into a very 
different species would we achieve any non-Fregean semantic revolution Wettstein 
dreams of. But I doubt that that will ever be possible in our kind of world because 
without the informational traffic between an organism and its surroundings the former 
is unlikely to survive. So it seems that Wettstein´s envisioned program is not a form of 
semantic revolution but ultimately a form of elimination of all semantics.13 
 
In Wettstein’s recent book from the year 2004, The Magic Prism, very little has 
changed argumentatively. Wettstein still mentions – as has become the usual practice 
of the anti-Fregeans of all kinds – approvingly the Kripkean arguments against the 
Fregean approach. But as we have seen these arguments fail, so there is no need to go 
all over that again. Wettstein’s only new argument for his variety of anti-Fregeanism 
has gone even more on the tangent: he claims that the Fregean modes of presentation 
of referents do not explain the informativeness of the identity sentences. Consequently 
Wettstein is ready to abandon the modes of presentation in semantic studies altogether 
(“…modes of presentation are a bad idea…” (Wettstein 2004: 135)). In short 
Wettstein’s argument is the following (Wettstein 2004: 134-8). He invokes Putnam’s 
example of the concepts of elm and beech which Putnam says he cannot tell apart: for 
him they are both expressed by “the large deciduous trees that grow in the east”. 
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(“Elm” and “beech” are supposed to be natural kind terms of course, but let us that 
pass here, especially since Wettstein remarks that Kripke’s Feynman example is 
similar to this case.) So there is only one mode of presentation associated with both 
concepts. But if someone tells Putnam (as is obviously the case) that elms and beeches 
are different trees, Putnam would acquire new information. Wettstein concludes that 
informativeness/cognitive significance does not require different modes of 
presentation, hence they do not determine reference. That is, Putnam knows that elms 
and beeches are different but still the modes of presentation have remained the same 
for him. 
 
The Fregean objection to the effect that the talk of the modes of presentation is talk 
about the information a speaker has at his disposal, and could supply if asked, 
Wettstein brushes aside by claiming that “it is neither here nor there that, in some 
cases, she [the speaker] had the information available to her in making the original 
reference.” But I fail to see what could be the point of this reply. If the speaker could 
supply the individuating information by whatever means that will suffice for her 
referential purposes. In other words Wettstein makes the same mistake as Kripke in 
that he thinks that any mode of presentation will do. No, only individuative modes will 
do, but “large deciduous tree that grows in the east” is not such. Wettstein tries to 
counter that often the speakers do not have sufficiently individuative information at 
their disposals. This is, again, one of the typical claims the anti-Fregeans keep on 
repeating time and again. But to my knowledge it has never yet been supported by any 
empirical studies, only isolated anecdotal examples like Einstein being the inventor of 
the atomic bomb. And as I have mentioned the contrary seems to be the case: we often 
do have individuating information about the referents (and extensions). If we did not 
what could be the point of using proper names? How could that practice have survived 
without any individuative information related to the names? Of course there are also 
cases when the users do not have individuative information, barely any information, 
about the referents of proper names they use. But the anti-Fregeans somehow take it 
that this automatically shows that proper names still genuinely refer. This I take to be 
plain non sequitur. To repeat my argument: the anti-Fregeans confuse the semantic 
reference by deference with the speaker reference, i.e. they take the metasupposition 
(that when a proper name is used there is a known referent) for genuine reference, and 
so confuse a precondition for substantial referential use of a proper name. 
 
Related to what was just argued and to round off the critique of Wettstein it seems to 
me that it is the referential preconditions, deferential metasuppositions most 
prominently, that Wettstein in effect means when he speaks of “linguistic 
anthropology”. But how curious that is, since 1991 Wettstein has not produced any 
case study of this anthropology; only propaganda in very general terms and an almost 
naively sincerely looking belief that the anti-Fregean arguments are correct. In light of 
this I think that I can conclude that Wettstein’s revolution is but a misapprehension. 
 
Notes 
 
1. As Evans emphasizes the verificationism inherent in Dummett’s notion of sense is of an 
ideal type. Senses do involve a verificationist element because they are the modes of 
presentation of the referents by which we “aim” and “reach for” their targets. But to find 
out whether the target is such and such is another matter and requires stronger means of 
verification. Dummett also takes part of the explication of the senses to be their roles in 
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finding out the truth-values of sentences. But this seems to be much too liberal, for it does 
not preclude whatever specific means one could use, even accidental ones. Evans noticed 
this also (Evans 1982: 96-100). 
 
2. This adoption of the categorical distinction between the subject and the brain processes is 
apparently a case of the "Oxford syndrome", the roots of which derive from the 
misconception (used in argumentation back in the 1950s) that the talk about mental states 
differs ontologically from the talk about the brain states (because the former are not 
spatial in their "logical syntax" whereas the latter are). John McDowell exhibits this 
syndrome when he states that postulations of implicit knowledge/information structures of 
mind, in order to help to explain language use and understanding, really do not shed any 
scientific light on those phenomena; rather that brings “philosophical darkness” 
(McDowell 1977). I am astounded. How do scientific attempts at explaining bring 
philosophical darkness – unless the very philosophical conception of explaining is 
incommensurable with scientific one? If so, that I simply take to constitute sufficient 
ground for a tollens argument, and such that amounts to a reductio of the Oxonian 
philosophical conception of explanation. I regard it hardly worth of anything to elaborate 
more on the issue. This kind of Oxonian apriorism just will not do, if only for the fact that 
– as McDowell himself admits, language understanding is what one has to explain with 
the Fregean senses – the Fregean senses are cognitive postulations (they have cognitive 
significance, Erkenntniswert) and cognitive postulations (including “informational 
structures”) can be studied scientifically. Mere philosophical explanation is not sufficient; 
it is too bound to remain too high-level enterprise by itself. To the extent that this involves 
“psychologism” that Frege detested (as does McDowell), the issue is much too coarsely 
characterized by McDowell. The point is the interplay of subjective cognitive information 
structures and mechanisms and how the exercise of them brings about the objective 
(intrasubjective) patterns of referential language use and understanding. I take it that this 
bringing about (akin to psychosocial emergence of the patterns of language use) of the 
intersubjective factors is an obvious fact. “Psychologism” is a red herring here: the 
validity and soundness, so to say, of the patterns can be explained by the subjective-cum-
biological factors like the need to cohere with others. Here philosophy without neuro and 
cognitive sciences is a sort of theoretical Parable of the Blind. 
 
3. As to Evans´ understanding of Frege´s view I think that Evans puts unnecessary weight on 
what he calls Russell´s Principle, according to which no thought has been entertained if 
the referent of a singular term, in the sentence or an utterance which purportedly expresses 
the thought (or should it be "thought", or schthought if Russell´s Principle is heeded?), 
does not exist (Evans 1982: 43-4). In some places Evans´ arguments reduce to mere 
claims to the effect that there has to be an existing object for there to be genuine 
communication at all (see for example (Evans 1982: 336-7)). I can not help thinking that 
the whole strategy of extending Russell´s Principle to the class of singular terms, 
expressive of particular thoughts (Evans 1982: 109, n.32), is just an instance of the 
mistake of the idealization of the causal connections from the demonstrative references, 
which the direct-causal theorists have made. Indeed, demonstrative identification of the 
referent (of the thought) plays a prominent role in Evans´ argumentation. (And it was no 
coincidence that Russell countenanced demonstrative and indexical expressions as 
referential, as the only logically proper names.) 
 
4. Evans claims that there follows an apparent inconsistency with respect to Frege´s theory 
of sense and reference when it is conceived along the lines that a sense is given when the 
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referent is given. For if there is no referent, the singular term is empty, and there is no 
sense. But Evans corrects the apparency. For Frege such cases belong to the realm of 
fiction (as he did say). In that realm the senses and thoughts are expressed, but what is 
thereby said is fictional just because proper names in question do not have real referents. 
Frege also called such thoughts mock thoughts (Scheingedanke). Evans interprets this in 
the way that the thoughts expressed are only pretended to be thoughts. But that seems 
incorrect: mock thoughts or not, they are thoughts. It seems to me rather that "fiction" was 
an umbrella term for Frege. It includes all thoughts and senses that have no real 
Bedeutungen. Evans takes fiction too literally, so to say. This mistake haunts also his 
whole explanation of the negative existentials by pretense attitude (Evans 1982: 353-68). 
The explanation is not just ad hoc but goes contrary to the facts: we do use empty names 
when we do not know them to be such, and we do this without any pretense (tacit or not). 
This is fundamentally damaging to Evans´ Russellianism because he states that the 
pretense explanation of the negative existentials, and other such types of (seemingly) non-
Russellian linguistic phenomena, is the only one compatible with Russellianism (Evans 
1982: 340). (This same point, though with a different emphasis, is made by David Bell 
when he criticizes Evans´ interpretation of Frege´s mock thoughts (Bell 1990).) 
 
5. I do not accept Luntley’s theory of sense “as the way our behavior is rationally structured” 
(Luntley 1999: 281). Here I do not have the space to develop the arguments in detail, so I 
only note the main points of disagreement. Not even our everyday behavior is uniformly 
rational, and to account for its irrationalities and quirks the senses are also needed. Focus 
on the behavior ignores the mass of the internal processings by which a thinker-cum-
speaker makes sense of his surroundings, forms new hypotheses and infers in ways that 
changes some of the other senses he possesses. Consequently Luntley’s account is too 
narrow. But it is also too broad because it does not seem to be properly Fregean at all in 
its rather general emphasis on the external information, in comparison to how the thinker-
cum-speaker utilizes it, i.e. in relation to the cognitive and epistemic functions the senses 
make possible. 
 
6. In the case of the descriptions and proper names the exemplar/typical representative is 
trivial: the sole and unique referent of the expression. But this of course does not militate 
against the point of perceptual information being part of the dossiers (because not all of 
that information can be descriptionally expressed). There are also other open questions, 
though ones that do not threaten the basic architecture of Recanati´s account, for example 
are there distinct representations, one for each individual encyclopedia entry, of the shared 
properties of the referents the thinker knows? 
 
7. There is a connection to what I will call ontological, or Leibnizean, individual concepts in 
the next chapter. If one could be able to guarantee that an individual sense determines 
uniquely its referent, one could add on and on the facts about the referent to the "dossier", 
the secretarial analogy of individual concepts, thereby approaching the Leibnizean 
complete individual concept. This does not help against the metaphysical possibility of 
massive reduplication (or such extreme Twin Earth scenarios). But one does not have to 
worry about these anyway, for as I argued they are out of the bounds with respect to what 
our cognitive and epistemic capacities allow to be reasonable considerations in semantics 
and theory of reference, taken synchronically. Moreover invoking reduplications can be 
used against the direct-causal theory as well. One can devise a scenario with mixed causal 
links such that on the direct-causal premises there is no fact of the matter what the 
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referential term picks up. (To call Field-Devitt partial reference for help is to miss the 
mark, for that notion is as allowable for the Fregean and the description theorists.) 
 
8. This is synecdoche process. Recanati states that it is a property of de re concepts of 
individuals (proper names refer to) that a description can assume the role of synecdoche. 
But this seems to me too restrictive. The same process can be effective in the purported 
uses of proper names (via the descriptions) in the case of empty names as well. That is, 
from the perspective of synecdoche there is no difference to the normal uses of proper 
names that do not refer to any existing individuals unbeknownst to the users – which is 
why they are used normally. 
 
9. In the appendix to chapter 4 I criticized Devitt´s account of non-Fregean senses as causal 
chains residing partly, or mostly, inside the brain of the speaker. But am I not committing 
that same mistake when I claim that the senses are neural entities ontologically? No 
because my account is different. I identify the senses with the neural network processes 
containing information. It is from these processes within which the neurocognitive 
information specific to the referents emerges as neural. The basic ontological and 
explanatory difference resides in the property that those processes can access one another 
because of their informationality (i.e. because of their content, their content features) 
whereas the causal networks Devitt takes to be senses are mostly out of the range of the 
speaker´s access in that way. And those parts, the chains and the networks in his brain, to 
which he has access are just the informational processes from which the senses emerge – 
or which the senses are – in the interplay of the received information and the already 
possessed information. So in effect Devitt´s account does not differ from the Fregean one. 
I am not sure that it characterizes the difference totally, but I surmise that it is the degree 
of informational complexity through the processing architecture which makes for the 
difference between the non-cognitive and the cognitive relevance, i.e. the cognitive 
emerges from the causal-cum-informational through the brain´s dynamic architecture. No 
such comparable feature is related to the causal links and networks outside the speaker´s 
brain, so the information they contain remain insufficient to attain cognitive status. (It is 
not utilized in those outside networks.) It should be kept in mind that Devitt´s notion of 
access is the culprit here. For him it is sufficient to have access to a part of the network to 
belong, qua speaker, to the causal network. For me access requires that one is able to 
utilize part(s) of the network. In other words access requires acquiring information and 
being able to process it in one´s cognitive apparatus. To put it picturesquely, only when 
the causal folds unto itself do the cognitive features and properties emerge. (See also note 
1 in chapter 7.) 
 
10. There is not a fixed fact as to whom the speaker refers when he uses "Aristotle"; it 
depends on in what "informational surrounding" he uses it, and in what way he uses it 
even in that surrounding. Wettstein acknowledges this, or something similar to it 
(Wettstein 1991: 150-1). But he fails to realize that the referentially deciding role in those 
situations falls upon the individuative information, not upon proper names. To claim that 
the speaker is always referring to some definite individual, then, is only a demand that is 
cherished by Wettstein along with the direct-causal theorists of reference, but one that the 
facts of the very communicative practices do not respect in most cases. (Wettstein also 
realizes that there may be no one thing thought about and referred to (Wettstein 1991: 
218, n. 41). But even here the urge to have a referent sweeps aside the reasonable 
alternative that the speaker possibly does not refer to anything.) 
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11. The whole answer being that once we discover that the beliefs are fouled up we are very 
likely to give up on using the name, or we use it only very tentatively to refer to him 
because we are not at all sure that it does refer to someone. (By the way, how can 
Wettstein say that it is him we are referring to if we do not know anything about the 
target?) 
 
12. It is partly correct that the conventions will not help with the questions of the speakers´ 
cognitive perspectives (Wettstein 1986: 201), but that is because Wettstein looks at the 
issue from the wrong end, and also does not realize the general way to explain the 
conventions as emerging from and supported by the particular referential uses of 
language. 
 
13. This observation can be generalized further. If our biological nature deems us to the 
Fregean semantics in the way I argued, it becomes also arguable that the Fregean 
semantics is operative with all biological species. By this I mean that all biological 
organisms have to survive and adapt in their respective (but mutual) environments, their 
overlapping ecological niches. For all we know the overwhelming majority of these 
species lack language-like communication (if physical and chemical signals are excluded 
from what can constitute language). But they still survive and adapt, which I like to 
construe as supporting the thesis that they, or at least those species with some kinds of 
nervous systems or ganglia, have very rudimentary senses, maybe even rudimentary 
concepts, of the objects and events in their surroundings, therefore Fregean graspings of 
them. (Remember that Frege himself allowed that for grasping senses language is not 
necessary.) 
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7. AN ATTEMPT AT NEUROCOGNITIVE THEORY OF REFERENCE 
 
??? ???????????
 
I would like to begin this second part of my attempt at the neuroscientific framework 
for the reference of proper names, and reference in general by obvious intention, by 
restating the point about the methodology I made in the introduction. The 
neuroscientific, or rather neurotheoretical, perspective might seem to some diehards to 
be out of place in a work that is supposed to belong to philosophy. That I could not 
accept. My motivation for the neuroscientific approach is very philosophical indeed. 
As I see it no adequate explanatory account of reference could be achieved without 
taking the relevant sciences into account. It is a metaphilosophical motivation in that 
reference research has been too much in the grip of old-fashioned “philosophical” 
methodology (like counterexamples to necessary-and-sufficient-conditions analyses, 
demands of strong semantical equivalences). This manifests a form of naturalism on 
my part: no strict wedges of any kind between philosophy and the special sciences. 
Moreover it seems that much of the nostalgia for the purely philosophical approaches 
– for conceptual analyses – is not based on any principled argument at all but is only a 
feeling or an attitude engendered by the still recent tradition within the analytic 
philosophy. I do respect that tradition, at least as much as I am suspicious of its 
potential (which seems to have been not so impressive). So I propose that the diehards 
would try to understand the naturalist approach (even though, as it seems, it is 
becoming a new tradition). 
 
Something must also be said about the specific methodology I use in constructing my 
scientific neurocognitive framework for the senses and reference of proper names. The 
considerations are obviously not meant to be extensive. I am not going to give any 
detailed arguments against any particular models found in philosophy of language and 
cognitive science; general points will do. 
 
I am not using connectionist models. Fruitful and promising as the approach 
("connectionism" or "parallel distributed processing") has proved to be in some areas 
of cognitive functions, my reasons for excluding it are mainly the following. We are 
not yet in the position to see clearly which of the connectionist models, and 
explanatory principles, are the most powerful in the sense that they would correspond 
to how the actual neural networks in the brain and in the central nervous system 
represent and process information. The most obvious problem here is that the 
connectionist networks (even the ones with recurrent architecture) only imitate the 
gross features of the actual neurons and networks. For instance they lack the essential 
neuromodulatory effects due to the second messengers, neither are the hormonal 
effects on the activity states of the networks taken into account. In general the whole 
synaptic dynamics is ignored: the interactions of transmitters and receptors, the 
functioning of different types of receptor channels, the role of calcium, and other such 
factors. Moreover it contributes little to our understanding to say that the information 
encoded in the networks resides in the weights between the individual units. One can 
well ask "what is in the number?", i.e. what the numerical value of the connections 
strength represents? If all we had at our disposal were the connectionist networks, we 
would be at a loss with respect to what and how the mere connection weights represent 
and enable the network to use the information residing in it. Neurobiology has, 
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fortunately, made some theoretical advances about the mechanisms and even of the 
molecular steps of the impulse transmission and the information preservation. Though 
that understanding is also quite rudimentary still, it is my I-hope-at-least-somewhat-
educated guess that as long as the connectionist models and simulations keep on 
lumping together all those intricate factors relating to the synaptic processes into 
numerical values, their utility as explanatory models will come to an end sooner than 
later. 
 
And not only are the current networks poor with respect to the synaptic dynamics, they 
are also quite out in the dark with respect to the overall network dynamics; the lack of 
many relevant functional analogues to the real network dynamics is only too obvious. 
To mention only a few: the recurrent nature of the networks should be multiplied so 
that there would be recurrency within recurrency. This means that the amount of the 
processing units (hidden units) must be "grown". Something like the cortical columnar 
structures must be added, if they are not emerging from the dynamics of the networks. 
In short, connectionism is still too coarse-grained approach (even if it seems to be on 
the right track in light of some of the tasks the networks have been given to solve so 
far). 
 
My general problem is how the mechanism of reference of proper names works 
neurally. I try to make way toward the solution of these problems by building a 
framework that focuses on the neural processing of the cognitive information. So I 
must use the language and concepts from both neural and cognitive domains. The 
former language uses such notions as synapses, recurrent connections, neural networks 
and hemispheric lobes, notions that are explained in due course. I presume that the 
reader is more familiar with the cognitive language, that he has an adequate grasp of 
such notions as representations, mental models and intentions. (Not that these notions 
would be more uncontroversial than the former notions.) But the reason for the use of 
the two languages is simple: we have to be clear on what the neurons and the networks 
are processing, for that ultimately constitutes what cognitive activities are going on in 
our brains.1 
 
The execution of my project is deliberately somewhat loose. This means that in some 
places I will be clutching any straw that have proved to be at least relatively robust and 
quite uniform even if only tentatively accepted. But I will occasionally also go to the 
other extreme and pick up an idea which seems to me very interesting and worthy of 
development. To the latter class belong the hypotheses of the re-entrant (recurrent) 
processing throughout the levels in the neural systems, and the application of that idea 
with the temporal synchronization of impulses to explain various traditional problems 
of reference (like Frege´s data). It may seem that the occasional clutching is an 
indication of a theoretical opportunism. But so be it, for I do not sympathize at all with 
that kind of an approach, usually called normative naturalism, which tries to find and 
justify some general and necessary aspects of “the” scientific method conducive to 
truth (or warranted assertibility). Self-correctiveness and some other features are most 
probably the constitutive features of "the" scientific method. But science is also a 
historic enterprise and viewed from the neuronaturalistic perspective its methods and 
tools are our own creations, hence they can also be made better still as the result of our 
cognitive and practical advancement. Especially in the reference research we are still 
in the early days, so it would be premature to insist on some normative methodological 
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rules when we do not even have decently developed cross-disciplinary theories on 
which to apply the rules. 
 
Still one might ask why it is supposed to be important to construct a neural model. We 
may even assume that everything that the referential use of language requires takes 
place solely in our brains, in that the contexts of use are taken into account because 
they are informationally projected inside the brains and informationally constructed 
there as representations. And taking for granted by now that my arguments against the 
explanatory adequacy of the direct-causal theory of reference are correct, why still not 
just concentrate on the familiar way to do philosophy of language and mind? That is, 
to theorize only more specifically about the cognitive representations and their 
dynamics without bringing in the brain? In addition to the pure fun of doing it, there is 
a simple but compelling answer to my mind: taking the neural facts and hypotheses 
into account we constrain the philosophical and the purely cognitive accounts. For 
example there are lots of good studies of discourse semantics, referential accessibility 
and such subjects, which have provided much empirical data. But the problem with 
them is that because they are not linked to the actual underlying neurocognitive 
dynamics giving rise to the data, the explanations they provide are bound to remain 
insufficient. And eventually we will be finding ourselves in the situation in which the 
only way to proceed is to “go neural”, so why not start now - for we also learn through 
errors. If my neurocognitive framework turns out not to be on the right track, at least 
that track will have been trodden and another more fruitful can be tried next. 
 
???????????????????????????
 
??????????????????????????????
 
Let us begin with an explication of the notions of cognitive and information. First of 
all, "cognitive" may seem to carry more weight than it actually does. It has become an 
umbrella term under which myriads of more specific hypothetical postulations find 
their home. To mention a few: scripts, frames, schemas, concepts and percepts. 
Basically when something is cognitive it is antibehavioristic; "cognitive" is both a 
descriptive and an explanatory label referring to the internal processing structures and 
mechanisms which interact with one another and with perceptual information to 
produce both behavior and new informational and representational states in the 
nervous system. So in this sense cognitive is thoroughly functional. (Or functionalistic 
but without any ontological commitments to philosophical functionalism on my part 
here; nervous system just has the general three-tiered functional architecture of input, 
internal processing and output.) 
 
What about information? It has been carrying the main explanatory burden in my 
arguments. "Information" has become another very general term used even as a 
metaphysical category (as is the case with Salmon´s semantic framework where it is 
something “eternal” (Salmon 1986)). In this study the material base of information is 
neural processing in all its forms from the biomolecular level to the level of the neural 
networks of networks. So I shall not deal with the physical information outside an 
organism or a cognitive agent in any detail; I assume that the Gibsonian view about it 
is largely correct in regard of the events and objects (Gibson 1966) (see also (Evans 
1982: 122-9)).2 Obviously the physical informational patterns in the brain contain also 
the non-perceptual information about distant events and objects. It is understood that 
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information is transduced into the forms of the neural impulses at the detector sheets 
that are the boundary between the organism and its environments. I use the expression 
"neurocognitive information" because it directs our attention to the neural systems 
involved in the processing of the cognitive information. Cognitive information is 
usually taken to be conceptual, but not exclusively. That is, cognitive information tells 
what events and objects are. The referential use of language, a fortiori the uses of 
proper names, utilizes that information because the referential use of language is a 
form of human action and as such it is intentional because cognitive and 
representational.3 
 
We are not aware of the amount of the neurocognitive informational goings-on in our 
brains that lead to the referential uses of linguistic expressions. How then can we find 
out about the varieties and amounts of that information? We have to be able to do that 
lest we end up permanently with the folkish analogical and phenomenological 
approach the neo-Fregeans have dwelled in. It seems to me that to begin with the most 
revealing source is cognitive neuropsychology. It studies the impairments of the 
cognitive capacities due to lesions like injuries and strokes ("experiments of nature"). 
Sometimes the impairments turn out to be quite selective. These cases, painful and 
confusing as they may be for the victims and their close acquaintances, provide us 
with ample and sometimes quite bizarre material. The relevance of the cognitive 
neuropsychology, in comparison to mere cognitive psychology, is that the cognitive 
functions involved can be related to relatively specific brain areas and to specific 
subsystems, sometimes even molecular ones (as is the case with the research on 
hippocampus). 
 
To mention some relevant types of cases, a defect in a certain area of brain may cause, 
say, an inability to find correct words (naming anomia) but spare the comprehension of 
the words when one hears them. Clinical record contains patients who are unable to 
name familiar persons, species of animals, colours, fruits and vegetables, words of 
abstract things, words of concrete things, and indeed proper names (Semenza & Zettin 
1988, 1989). The prosopagnosics, in turn, reveal the importance of faces in 
communication and in identification of persons. And conversely, the information about 
the bearer of a face may not be affected, which enables successful referential act 
taking place. The implication of this is that proper names are not necessary for 
successful reference. Like face(images) proper names facilitate reference, but if you 
are a name anomic, usually you still know perfectly well who the person in question is, 
and you can use that information to achieve a referential act by exploiting it through 
other means, descriptions most likely. A particular case may be in order to illustrate 
this. I quote at length for I think that the quotation is self-explanatory. 
 
"A further observation was that RFR, although unable to name people, could 
discriminate a famous face from an unknown face. He was also able to give the 
surname of a famous person when cued with the first name plus the initial letter of 
the surname. This suggested that RFR might know more about people than revealed 
by his basic naming ability. Subsequent observations indicated that RFR often 
possessed considerable information about people, but this never extended to any 
events that these people have featured in…The conversations describing his account 
of two friends illustrate the point: 
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'He´s a colleague I´ve known for many years. I think we are 
both in the…unit.' 
'Can you describe him?' 
'He is a rather chunky individual. Everything is large except 
for his height which is about 5´10´´. I´m not sure if he has 
ginger hair…He is an outgoing character of Scottish descent. 
I vaguely remember joking references towards his Scottish 
ancestry and his love of whisky. He does have a very 
attractive wife with the very apt first name of Eve.' (Parkin 
1996: 210-1; I have omitted the second conversation.) 
 
We could not fail to see that the descriptions the patient gives contain uniquely 
individuative information - excepting the extreme counterfactual cases of “massive 
duplication” as irrelevant because as philosophical Gedankenexperiments they could 
not be prevented by any means. (Valuable discussion of the points just made can be 
found in (Ellis & Young 1988: 5-25) where the authors take up also the 
methodological and the ontological presuppositions of cognitive neuropsychology.) 
 
????? ???????? ??? ?????????? ???????????? ???????? ????? ???????????
?????????????
 
Let us turn to some of the relevant results produced by the functional neuroanatomy 
and the neuropsychological investigations. The most relevant impairments to my 
approach are those that have to do with the neurocognitive processing of objects and 
persons. But a word of warning is in order: when I speak about shapes, colours and 
such properties as informational, do not take it the way that I would be saying that the 
brain executes its processings with such items, and builds up representations from 
them in a strictly compositional way. Rather all the involved networks process 
information in a temporally extended interactive manner, in a type of "global" 
processing within and between the many networks in which the neural representations 
are constructed. 
 
Object recognition defects show that the different types of information processed 
involve visually and tactually the shapes, textures, sizes, motions, sounds and colours 
(not to forget tastes and smells). The information about persons, in addition to those 
just mentioned, involves such pieces that constitute the ability to recognize faces 
visually (and tactually by the blind). All these types are sensory information and they 
are distributed in the different areas in the brain, but they are all processed 
simultaneously in parallel and in reciprocal fashion. They so to speak come together to 
form perceptions. If that were not so, you could not see and feel an object at the same 
instant, or you could not detect movement by auditory means on the base of the 
Doppler effect. Motor information about movements and action patterns is included 
also in the informational pool we are interested in here. For example it is known that 
neurons in specific motor areas fire when one is imagining motor actions while not 
executing them (Georgopoulos et al. 1989), so it is quite possible that elements of 
motor information get activated when one hears someone mentioning, say, a name of a 
tool. Information about the functions, and uses, of objects seems to be somewhat 
distinctive with respect to the information about the shape, texture and colour. Ellis 
and Young propose that the information about the use is linked to the structural 
properties of the object rather than to the "semantic properties" (Ellis & Young 1988: 
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56). This may be so, but I want to suggest that there is another explanation of the fact 
that some patients can, for example, mime the uses of the objects they could not name 
(i.e. when the information about the "semantic properties" is severed). The 
phenomenon may be related to the motor systems: the typical use of an object is coded 
as motor acts or movement patterns which can be engaged as long as some effective 
connections are preserved from the "semantic properties" to the motor areas. This 
could be related also to the now well known fact that severely amnesic patients, who 
can not remember their post-lesional experiences, can learn with repeated practice 
some manipulational tasks (like the Tower of Hanoi problem) even when they do not 
recall ever being confronted with such tasks before when queried at any instant after 
the practice. But be that as it may, my point is that it is rather artificial to separate 
"semantic" neurocognitive information from the motor information and information 
about the functions of objects (and typical actions to be executed in normal social 
events, like visiting relatives - especially boring ones). 
 
In addition to the point about the motor information I want to propose that the 
relevance of emotional and affective information should not be forgotten either. If one 
is after semantics that will be able to provide scientifically grounded explanations of 
behavior, the referential uses of language included, then perceptual, cognitive, motor 
and emotive (plus even endocrinological) information should all be eventually 
incorporated into that framework. The reason is that they are all functionally 
intertwined in the brain. From the perspective of the functional neuroanatomy this 
interrelatedness is almost a truism, because the regions involved in the processing of 
these kinds of information are connected to one another, both directly and indirectly, 
via interposed networks. For an explicit suggestion, on the ground of the growth of the 
neural connections from the sensory areas to the frontal lobe areas, that proposes that 
object identification and significance is tied to emotive processing, see (Pandya & 
Yeterian 1990). (On the psychology and neurobiology of the general issues, see (Buck 
1987) and (LeDoux 1987).) 
 
As a token of empirical justification of the general perspective let us take a look at 
Capgras syndrome. It is a remarkable phenomenon in which a patient thinks that for 
example his spouse is an impostor, not the "original" loved one. The most favoured 
current hypothesis is, roughly, that the connections between the limbic system and the 
visual areas are severed to the extent that the patient has lost his feeling of familiarity 
with respect to his spouse (Young 1998). This causes a delusional misidentification. 
This may show up in the referential practice of the patient. One is, one thinks, not 
referring to one’s original loved one but to a sort of Doppelgänger, an impostor. It is 
known that on some occasions this kind of delusion has led a patient to commit the 
murder of the "impostor". It seems quite clear, indeed, that the syndrome involves a 
disruption of the emotional evaluation of the perceptual and cognitive information 
related to a person. Note also that Capgras syndrome is not restricted to persons: "One 
may extend this argument to other reduplicative paramnesias. Places, objects and so on 
are not affectively neutral and so the absence of an emotionally charged input would 
produce the feeling of recognition, but it not being quite right." (Ellis & Young 1998: 
236) With respect to the reference of proper names this is all for the good, if I am 
allowed to say so in this connection, because places and even some objects are given 
proper names. 
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Another type of clinical case in which the descriptions do not "reach" the emotional 
elements of the senses related to persons is the following (Tranel & Damasio 1993). A 
patient who is severely amnesic and unable to form memories of his encounters 
exhibits differential covert responses towards the individuals who behave in different 
manners towards him. He tends to become uneasy and to avoid the company of a 
person who has been unfriendly. The contrary behavioral pattern is evident towards a 
person who has been friendly and helpful. And a neutral attitude is adopted when a 
person has been neutral to him. This case is grateful because the cognitive information 
is minimized: because the patient is amnesic he does not form consciously accessible 
memories, and so could not give identifying descriptions of the persons (for example 
by saying "that darn ginger-hair-pieced bloke who always makes me angry"). But it 
seems evident that emotional information has obviously become registered and has 
had its effects on the differential patterns of behavior towards persons and on the 
valuation of persons by non-verbal means. 
 
The motor and visceral information processing do not show up explicitly in the surface 
descriptions (except, maybe, in rare cases). But that could not be used as an argument 
against the enlarged view on semantics that incorporates a version of the Fregean 
sense theory of reference. The descriptions are the temporal publicly expressed 
products of the sea of processing in the brain and the whole nervous system (both 
central and autonomous). What counts in this framework are the varieties of the 
internal information processings leading to referential uses of language. With proper 
names this presents one more step away from the underlying informational dynamics 
because the descriptions are so to speak passed by. But if asked about the referent of a 
proper name, the focus turns on it, i.e. it becomes again the expressed end product of 
the processing. (The main “pointer” in the Recanatian encyclopedia entries.) 
 
However one may object that this mesh of the kinds of information is ultimately un-
Fregean. For did not Frege deny categorically that Vorstellungen, i.e. sense 
perceptions, images, feelings and such subjective things do not belong to the domain 
of semantics and cognitive significance. Vorstellungen are intersubjectively non-
sharable occurrences, therefore not amenable to thoughts that are shareable entities, 
hence objective. 
 
It seems to me that the answer to this prima facie pressing counter is the following. I 
have already motivated my neurocognitive approach by naturalism (though somewhat 
fleetingly so far). This means, minimally, that any "third realm" postulations are 
strictly unacceptable. The positive side of this naturalism is that thoughts are located in 
the brains of the speakers, together with Vorstellungen. For I am in search for a 
modern scientific version of the sense theory of reference, and because the modern 
ontology of psychology and semantics is unashamedly materialistic, we must find the 
neural reconstructions of the allegedly abstract entities in Frege’s semantics. 
 
What seems to be a more important consequence is that thoughts become also 
subjective in this approach. But it does not follow that they become wholly subjective. 
To begin with it should be realized that Vorstellungen are not wholly subjective either. 
To suppose that they are was Frege´s mistake. The argument for this should proceed 
by each instance of the types of Vorstellungen, by the different perceptual modalities, 
emotive attitudes and so on, but here we have to be content with only a general 
argument. It can be admitted that Vorstellungen are subjective and occurrent events. 
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But this by itself does not preclude sufficiently objective features from being elements 
of them. For instance when two persons perceive a tree up on the hill, their perceptions 
differ from each other because the angles of sight differ respectively. However both 
perceptions are objective because they are of the same tree. Were there any doubts, 
they could approach the tree and meet each other by it. So we see that in fact 
Vorstellungen do not differ qualitatively from more cognitive acts and their contents. 
For after all, as I have emphasized on a couple of occasions before, Frege allowed that 
different persons have distinct senses related to the same referent of a proper name, 
distinct in that they are not grasped by both (though they are graspable by both). This 
means that their respective senses are not the same, but that does not hinder 
sufficiently objective communication and mutual comprehension when the referent is 
the same, as Frege pointed out. 
 
But what about those Vorstellungen which are directed internally and without an 
external object? Are not feelings of, say, anxiety only subjective in the sense Frege 
meant in that they have objects, viz. the feelings themselves, which are not graspable 
by others? For how could anyone grasp another one´s inner feelings? But even here I 
fail to see that the extent of the subjectivity of these cases forecloses them from having 
sufficient degree of mutual comprehensivity resulting in objectivity. The reason is 
rather obvious when one becomes to think of it. It is arguable, and with considerable 
scientific support, that for example emotions and affects are evolutionary products. 
They contribute to the well-being and survival of organisms, at least the "higher" ones. 
(But I surmise that when one accepts biophysiological perspective that is seen to be the 
case with amoebas as well; their emotions are only rather simple, as when the 
detection of some poisonous ingredient in the surrounding water causes internal 
reactions conducive to protection.) Emotions, emotive and affectual information, guide 
our behaviors toward our surroundings at large, and towards or away from particular 
types of events, objects and persons in them. They contribute to the well functioning 
and cohesiveness, as well as to the grounds of joint actions, of groups of peoples. 
Consequently it is very likely that the kinds of emotions like anxiety are 
intersubjective and sufficiently similar biologically. This is sufficient objectivity for 
the semantical purposes.4 
 
Frege held that the senses and the thoughts make up the common stock parts of which 
all competent speakers of a language grasp, this ensuring objectivity of 
communication. Similarly we can state that the particular kinds of underlying 
emotional states (anxiety, fear, happiness, and such) form a common stock for all 
humans to grasp, to experience, so that we can objectively comprehend one another´s 
states of mind and moods.5,6 
 
I think that the cognitive terrain is sufficiently charted by now. So it is time to turn to 
the search for the neural concepts and ideas by which we can begin to provide 
adequate explanations of reference. A motivational reminder: this approach stems 
from the fact, unsatisfactory to my mind that the cognitive models, as well as the neo-
Fregean ones, are built on only unbiological, folk psychological and other such coarse 
and molar concepts. Still, as pointed out above, that does not mean that we should 
adopt exclusively the "neuron talk". Neurons work in concert, so the new 
neurobiological approaches should focus on the network dynamics, and develop new 
images, concepts and structural notions appropriate to these levels of investigation. 
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???????????????????????????
 
I mentioned in passing above that one of the most important questions in the current 
neuroscience is how the perceptions and cognitions emerge to form coherent and 
unified patterns of representations. Why is it that we perceive unified scenes instead of 
fragmented, when the various elements of the information processed lie in distinct 
areas in the brain? This is called the binding problem. Or, rather, there are several 
binding problems to be explained. For although the perceptually unified patterns that 
we studied are mostly visual, no less remarkable are the coherent patterns of the other 
sensory modalities and the cognitive patterns we call thoughts and concepts. Nor 
should it escape our notice that the motor actions and the movements we execute are 
harmonious and "adequate-to-the-aim", not jerks and discontinuous (as they are in 
some severe cases of lesions like dyskinesias). And the emotional patterns like affects 
seem to conform to the binding pattern also. This, at least, is what I propose: bindings 
occur not just within perceptual modalities but within the "conceptual modalities" also, 
as well as within the motor and emotional ones. And even this generalizes: the most 
remarkable binding problem of all (should I say “super binding problem”) is how 
perceptions, cognitions, emotions and motor processes form unified and coherent 
overall patterns so that we are able to adjust ourselves in the changing environments to 
survive and flourish in appropriate ways. "Binding" is a good label in this connection 
even if perforce somewhat metaphorical. "Construction problem" or "emergence 
problem" might be less metaphorical, but "binding" is what has bound researchers to 
itself. The binding problem gets its rationale from the empirical observations that there 
are no "grandmother cells" or "unique central integration areas" in the brain (no 
neurofunctional or anatomical Cartesian Theatres). True, there are integration areas in 
the brain in that large neuronal groups and columns processing similar information are 
clustered together or in one another´s vicinity. This is evident from the processing 
properties of the neurons for instance in the primary sensory areas. These sites are 
required in the neural information processing streams for perceptions to emerge, but 
their activity alone does not suffice for perception. Other areas and the neuronal 
networks linked to them, and the modules processing much more generalized and 
abstracted information (conceptual/cognitive information), must be automatically 
recruited to the processing stream giving rise to the overall activity patterns, to 
cognitions. So how is it that from the sensory stimuli the brain constructs coherent and 
unified representations by binding? Why is it that we see a whole scene, a whole 
apple, a face, and not mere patches of colour? How we grasp concepts like "chess", 
"inquisition" and "bed"? That is, how the neurocognitive information residing in the 
networks gets together in a coherent manner, relevant to the task? In particular how is 
it that when we are talking about a particular person, referring to her, the bits and 
pieces of information get activated and get together to tell us that it is just that person, 
not someone else? 
 
During the last twenty years one kind of general neural mechanism proposed to 
explain the binding problem have gained ground formidably. I will elaborate on this 
mechanism soon, but before that we need to present another seminal idea in the recent 
theoretical neuroscience. The idea is that neurons and larger networks consisting of 
them form reciprocally interacting groups, re-entrant or recurrent networks. The 
patterns of the interactions are dynamical and flexibly changing, which means that the 
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strengths and combinations of the transmitted neural impulses change: sometimes 
some connections remain silent, though they are still functional; new connections are 
formed and others die because prolonged lack of use, lesion or natural cell death. This 
recurrent pattern is hypothesized to pervade through every functional and anatomical 
level in the brain, from the connections between the individual neurons to the 
microcolumns through the macrocolumns to the connections between the specific 
areas within a lobe and from them to the massive interlobe connections and finally to 
the hemispherical connections through corpus callosum. 
 
The synaptic connections of the re-entrant networks form also diverse structural 
patterns. They can be divergent and convergent to different extents; the axon 
collaterals can be arborized to varying degrees; the connections may be layer-specific 
or diffuse. (The cortex has 6 main layers with different and quite celltype-specific 
input-output properties.) There is variability at the biochemical level also. It is typical 
that the action potentials have different pre and postsynaptic chains of effects with 
temporal continuum from microseconds to days, and longer. The amounts of various 
transmitters released relate to the received impulse frequencies and cause the second 
messenger cascades inside the postsynaptic neurons, which in their turn affect the gene 
expression, for example through the CREB family of proteins, leading to 
morphological changes in synapses and transmitter dynamics all over again. The 
current view seems to be that these structural changes contribute to, or even sustain, 
the long term memories in the cortex.7 
 
The other side of the neural coin is the relative morphological stability, or robustness, 
of the basic processing structures (excepting the growth and death of synaptic 
connections and the enlargements of the areas due to the former mechanisms. Much of 
this stability is governed by genes and their expression during ontogenesis (though it is 
now known that experiences can change them to some extent). In part this means that 
the re-entrant projections by the axon collaterals are quite specific and localized in the 
receiving end, for example they are tied to specific cell types and connection layers. 
The generalization that can be drawn from the current state of knowledge is that the 
dynamic processing patterns within the structured neural pathways range from stable 
responses to properties in the environments to even chaotic responses of the networks, 
settling temporarily down to "local minima" or approaching the "basins of attractor". 
(On these chaotic patterns in the brain, see for example (Freeman 1999).). 
 
In this connection let us take a quick look at the functional morphology to give us a 
conception of the levels of processing in the brain. The microcolumns are about 30-50 
micrometers in width and contain around 100 neurons. Their connections are both 
vertical and horizontal, both excitatory (mainly pyramidal cells) and inhibitory (mainly 
basket and double bouquet cells). The inhibitory properties are prominent in forming 
the neural clusters that will form the columns in creating functional borders with 
respect to the specific information processed in the columns. The columns are made up 
of microcolumns, from 100 up to 300 in number. The width of the columns is 300-500 
micrometers in diameter. Their primary pattern of constitution is modality-specific and 
receptive field-specific. For example fast and slowly adapting receptors in the skin are 
segregated within the same neuronal receptive fields in the cortex, i.e. areas in the skin 
that are projected to the neurons in the somatosensory cortex. From these columns is 
constructed the "somatosensory homunculus", the cortical representation of the 
receptor area layout of human body. The same principle applies in all sensory systems 
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with respect to all sensory features processed. But columns are also found in other 
cortical areas. Their processing specificities are more general and abstract features (see 
for instance the "shape columns" in the inferior temporal area in (Mountcastle 1998: 
185-9)). 
 
Columns form macrocolumns (or "hypercolumns") that process different features of 
the modality or task-specific information like that needed for face recognition. The 
primary and the secondary sensory cortices are formed from these different cortical 
areas and regions. The cortical lobes are formed in turn by these informationally 
connected areas. They can also be characterized by the types of information and by the 
tasks they execute. Generally characterized the functions of the frontal lobe relate to 
movements, motor actions, planning of those actions, features of short-term memory, 
and to personality traits (in this case the involved areas are the prefrontal ones with 
connections to the limbic system nuclei). The temporal lobe is primarily engaged in 
processing auditory information, variety of memory representations and language 
functions. The parietal lobe processes somatosensory and spatial information (related 
to movements and actions); and the occipital lobe performs visual tasks. Summarily, 
then, the re-entrant connections run both within all neural assemblies and between 
them from the "higher" regions and assemblies to the "lower" ones, and back again. 
 
???????????????
 
For a quite long time we were without a general but sufficiently detailed theory of the 
ways the brain represents and processes information. Currently this lack has become 
remedied to a reasonable extent. In the last twenty years there have been several 
attempts at such frameworks. The one that seems to me to be the most promising is 
Gerald Edelman´s TNGS (Theory of Neuronal Group Selection). It is a framework to 
explain consciousness by neurocognitive structures and dynamics. But here I adopt for 
my purposes its basic machinery for it can be used to explain the reference of proper 
names (and, by a rather obvious implication, reference in general) - or so I will try to 
show in the following. Consequently I will discuss TNGS quite extensively because 
that is indispensable to get an adequate picture of the neurocognitive approach I am 
arguing for. 
 
The theory is based on the population properties of the neurons and the neural 
networks. The core idea is analogous to Darwinian evolutionary theory: selection upon 
variation (Edelman 1987, 1989).8 One supposition of this theory is that no stimuli from 
both the external environment and the organism´s internal milieu are labeled or 
categorized in advance when they come into the neural processing streams. This is 
contrary both to the practice and some deep-seated assumptions in cognitive science 
and classical AI. Organisms with sufficiently rich nervous systems construct the to-be 
relatively stable categories from the input through the internal processing and motor 
actions, as well as the results of the latter through external feedback. The results of 
these processings are constantly fed back to the wide variety of networks in the 
nervous system. So categorization of the information is generated by the selection 
upon this neuronal variation of and among the neuronal groups. This means that the 
nervous systems i) have to develop in an adaptive fashion through the encounters with 
their surroundings, and ii) being modulated by the internal informational messages. 
Without going into the details it suffices for my purposes to describe shortly the three 
selectionist mechanisms operative in the brain (Edelman 1989: 43-9). 
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The first is a developmental one during which primary connections between the 
neurons and the neuronal groups are established by genetically and molecularly guided 
cell migration, proliferation, cell death and functional synapse formation. Stimuli 
already drive this stage, for it is known that properly functioning networks emerge 
from the interactive but competitive stimulus processing. This overall development 
leads to the primary repertoires: these are the variant neuronal groups within the 
anatomical areas. 
 
The second selectional stage, overlapping with the first, is an experiental one during 
which the neuronal populations of the synapses are strengthened and/or weakened to 
various degrees. It seems that these patterns of activity are most likely responsible for 
the emergence and the stabilization of both the microcolumns and the columns by 
excitatory and surrounding inhibitory connections in the primary repertoires. Note that 
it is still not the stimuli as labeled, as about something outside the organism, that 
drives this process. The signal correlations are statistical, i.e. the establishment and the 
stabilization of the connections is more a mass effect than stimulus specific. The main 
result of this stage is the formation of functional connections between the different and 
distinct areas in the brain. 
 
Only in the third phase the specific informational features of the stimuli become 
central to the processing. This takes place in what Edelman calls "re-entrant 
mappings" (or equivalently: recurrent mappings) that serve the adaptiveness of the 
organism to its environments. The re-entrant mappings create the primary sensory and 
motor representations, or maps, and their mutual interactions. More specifically, this is 
stimulus exchange by re-entry through 
 
"…temporally ongoing parallel signalling between separete maps along ordered 
anatomical connections. Reentrant signalling can take place via reciprocal 
connections between maps…(as seen in corticocortical, corticothalamic, and 
thalamocortical radiations); it can also recur via more complex arrangements such 
as connections among cortex, basal ganglia, and cerebellum." (Edelman 1989: 49) 
 
 
Thus the features and scenes are constructed by the mappings in the visual cortex (and 
connected subcortical nuclei), auditory representations by the mappings in auditory 
cortex (together with some subcortical nuclei), and so on. Once the organism has 
reached this stage in its development, the modules that process sensory and motor 
information are fully functional and the organism is capable of achieving perceptual 
categorizations of both the world outside and of some of its own states. There is 
nothing linguistic in this yet; in humans language develops upon these perceptuo-
motor categorizations, and the recategorizations of them. 
 
The re-entrant mappings are many-many. Distinct neuronal groups within one area 
take part in the processing of the same occurring stimulus features, and one group with 
dynamically varying processing properties (like those in the levels of the synaptic 
activity) takes part in many different but similar stimulus features.9 For instance there 
are many groups that process motion information, and there are groups that process, 
say, orientation and colour information in addition. The same is true of the higher level 
networks, those further up in the processing stream in the “association (tertiary) areas”. 
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These re-entrant many-many mappings Edelman calls "classification couples" and 
"classification n-tuples". Those are formed through the selectional mechanism in 
which one neuronal group in a map is correlated to another group in another map. For 
example a group of visual feature detectors for some specific shapes in a map is 
related to neurons responding to light touches, forming another map through the 
selective re-entrant connections between them. The classifications are not restricted to 
sensory maps but involve motor maps also. Later in the cognitive development of an 
individual the mapping of these maps themselves leads to categorization of the 
information in and between the maps as well as the classifications they embody. 
 
To achieve perceptual categorizations from the re-entrant mappings the formation of 
global mappings of classification couples and n-tuples is required. These create the 
specific spatiotemporal continuity of the representations of external objects and events. 
A global mapping is essentially what the label says: a dynamic structure engaging 
many brain areas within which sensomotor re-entrant mappings interact with other 
regions, but mainly with cerebellum, basal ganglia and hippocampus. The latter are the 
areas that, according to Edelman, provide for the (different kinds of) temporal 
sequential orderings of the representations in the global mappings. The processing in 
these global recurrent systems underlies the categorizations built on the re-entrant 
classification mappings, and even further categorizations and generalizations of them. 
These latter patterns are concepts in Edelman´s framework. Hence in addition to the 
object, action and event representations (categorizations), the relations between these 
become comprehensible. For instance causality is one such categorization from objects 
and events and their mutual relations from rudimentary contacts to the folk concept of 
causality. (The global mappings have also reciprocal connections to the nuclei in the 
limbic system and to the brain stem nuclei, which contribute essentially to keeping the 
organism alive and aware.) In short, global mappings equip the organism with 
spatiotemporally continuous representations of objects, actions, events and the 
relationships between them. The connections to the limbic and brain stem areas 
provide the continuous updating of the value of the categorizations for the organism in 
the sense that the evaluations guide its behavior with respect to its surroundings. Such 
evaluations are not conscious in many cases but "visceral" and neurophysiological in 
that they alarm the organism or direct it towards or away some object or action. The 
limbic system is central in these evaluations. 
 
In this connection I could not resist offering a hypothesis, albeit more on the 
speculative side than (as of yet) based on empirical indications. What if we could have 
a middle ground between totally selected-for neural groups and the dying-out of the 
unused synapses (both during the neuron deaths in early infancy and at later stages in 
life)? That is, what if in addition to the gene expression induced structural changes in 
the neurons and synapses there are “spare synapses” (“sleepy synapses”) and/or 
connections? These would be in silent state – except that to keep them alive and 
healthy they generate spontaneous spikes. In this way it might be possible to explain 
for example the quite quick “one shot” consolidations of memory representations. (The 
gene-induced changes just seem to take much too long time for that.) In general my 
suggestion is, then, that there is some amount of reserve connections ready to be 
activated when the storage and/or functional capacities of the selected networks run 
out or are unable to function for some neurobiological reason. This could also account 
for the fact that the selectional mechanisms allow for the plasticity in terms of the 
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number of the connections, and not just in terms of the modulatory or spike frequency, 
as well as strength effects, among the already selected neuronal groups. 
 
But let us go back to the global mappings. An example helps to comprehend the nature 
of the global mappings. Hearing someone talking about the players of the team Brazil 
activates many distinct but informationally related columns that process the properties 
in the auditory stimuli as words (in the temporal lobe). From these the activation 
spreads to one´s memory items, to the related global mappings or parts thereof, mainly 
in the inferior temporal and occipito-temporal sites. As a result the hearer entertains 
images of the individual players, maybe also memory flashes of Brazil´s games during 
the World Cup, of the technical virtuosity of the individual players and such pieces of 
stored information. These all come together - the meaningfulness of the 
representations emerges - from the categorization and the individuation of these 
elements through the spread of the processing, up to the association areas both in the 
occipito-temporal and inferotemporal regions, and also in the parietal areas (especially 
if one has experiences of playing football). Related experiental information in the 
premotor and supplementary motor areas residing in the frontal lobe may also be 
activated and adding to the somatosensory activation. (The frontal engagement may 
also express cognitive information retrieval (Sergent at al. 1994).) If the whole process 
ends up with a pointing to a particular player - from the information of blue shorts and 
yellow shirt with number 9 on its back and the player pressing forward between the 
defenders - and the speaker uttering "Ronaldo is in top shape again", then the involved 
areas include also the posterior superior temporal gyrus (Brodmann´s area 22) and 
inferior frontal gyrus (area 45), for they are involved with name-familiarity and name-
profession tasks. The neural representation of the proper name resides most likely in 
the left temporal pole (area 38). It is to be noted that the usual feeling of familiarity, 
occurring just before the “popping-out” of the proper name in question, may have 
much to do with the limbic system, and it seems that the emotional colouring comes 
from the subcortical nuclei of this system, especially if one happen to be a football fan. 
This overall processing takes place within 500 milliseconds but the time window is 
taken to involve long-term memory item activations and non-conscious elaborations of 
it. This is quite a long span in neural terms since there are indications that the "pure" 
recognition of an object, say a face, may take only 20-30 milliseconds (Rolls & Tovée 
1994). 
 
If I have understood it correctly this whole processual engagement can form 
assemblies of global mappings, widely distributed and recurrent processing streams 
that the stimuli have prompted. It could also be that when the global mappings are 
processed in concert a couple of times, a more general, or wider, global mapping may 
emerge as a relatively stabilized entity: one’s concept of, say, Ronaldo. The example 
should make it plain that we go through these kinds of engagements of the global 
mappings all the time. They steer us cognitively (including movement patterns and 
emotions). Because of the recurrency between the networks, the informational patterns 
generated in the association areas have their say back on the processings going on in 
the sensory areas. They guide that processing by making the context meaningful (as 
the football event in the example). It must be emphasized that all this takes place 
almost simultaneously and in parallel within the 500 milliseconds range, not as some 
kind of "interpretation" put on distinct sensory materials. The overall pattern of the 
dynamics within the neural architecture indicates that this rather common 
interpretation account is neurofunctionally incorrect. Another corollary is that those 
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theories that see perception, though correctly conceptually molded, based on 
"unconscious inferences" might not be correct either – at least not with respect to the 
rather plain talk of “inferences”. I propose that the activation patterns the global 
mappings embody are not inferential in any extended sense of that notion. Rather they 
might function as informational coherence detectors. By this I mean that because of 
earlier experiences the stimuli spread through the different networks within the global 
mappings informationally engage those parts of the global mappings that sustain the 
coherent and appropriate-for-the-task representations. It is more our persistent habit to 
talk about inferences than what is really going on at the neural level. 
 
Third corollary, and the most important from my view, is that the global mappings 
manifest activation of concepts, including individual concepts of persons and objects, 
as the bearers of proper names, connected to the global mappings via the neural 
representations of the former. These individual concepts are not linguistic in the sense 
that the multitude of the different kinds of neurocognitive information that the global 
mappings engage between the maps, and the specific pieces of information residing in 
them, are not linguistically wholly articulatable. But nevertheless there are no serious 
obstacles to taking the selectional informational connections that form the re-entrant 
categorizations to be individual concepts. The linguistic expressions that are produced 
as the results of these particular (and context dependent) categorizations through the 
global mappings are very compact reports of the informational traffic in the global 
mappings. Consequently the senses of the linguistic expressions, a fortiori proper 
names, are not primarily linguistic - let alone that the Fregean neural senses could be 
identified with linguistic meanings. 
 
Neurocognitive information in the global mappings is engaged into the processing 
stream because it resides in the neuronal groups and is linked and functionally 
correlated to other neuronal groups that are, even if only transiently, selected as active 
due to the similar informational features encoded in them. It seems to me that this is 
the most likely dynamic-cum-structural explanation of why not just the perceptual but 
also the conceptual aspects of cognition form coherent patterns, and not just 
patchworks of representations without meaningfulness. Much of the coherence, and 
unifiedness, is explained by the topographic feature organization in many areas. I 
would not be surprised if such feature clusterings will be found uniformly in the 
association areas also (though they could be in the form of macrocolumns or some 
such higher order processing configurations). The activations of the various portions of 
the global mappings, leading to the associations between the features in those 
mappings, bring with them the power to generalize from experiences. The global 
mappings form also the basis of memory, due to the long-term changes in the 
secondary synaptic connections (as Edelman calls them). That is, the synaptic changes 
within and between the synapses of the neuronal groups (maps) initiated by 
hippocampus result in memories. Most likely the long-term memory storages reside in 
the cortical secondary and tertiary association areas. Because of the on-line activation 
and forming of new synaptic connection strengths and patterns from the portions of the 
previously activated global mappings, memory is not replicative display but 
constructive process. The philosophical relevance of this is that the contents of the 
concepts, the individual concepts included, do not remain the same even 
intrasubjectively (at least for extended temporal intervals). 
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As described above language does not play any central role yet in the beginning of the 
categorizations and forming of the memories and the concepts. On the contrary, the 
development and the proper functioning of all these cognitive functions have to be 
more or less in place before language learning can begin. The following is a very short 
description of Edelman´s story of language development (Edelman 1989: 147-8, 176-
82). Language begins to develop only when presyntax develops. Presyntax is the 
sequential organization of action, in the sense of ordering, in relation to the 
sensomotor re-entrant mappings and global mappings. It engages also subcortical 
structures like the basal ganglia and hippocampus to create spatiotemporally 
continuous representations of objects, actions and events, and their mutual relations. 
When phonetic items appear gradually due to the development of supralaryngeal 
structures, together with the development and the maturing of Broca´s and Wernicke´s 
areas, they become mapped in an orderly way to the previously formed action-object 
and event categorizations. This leads to more constrained patterns in speech through 
the recurrent global activity, and eventually to syntax proper. The appearance of the 
long-term memory, especially in the temporal lobe areas due to the continuous 
dynamic activity of many global mappings via hippocampus, contributes also 
enormously to this developmental process. 
 
Once language has reached the stage where words for concepts are being linked 
regularly to each other, i.e. when the birth of the symbolic function takes place, 
linguistic expressions begin to accelerate the combinations of the conceptual 
resources. Language makes concepts richer and sharpens them through the re-entrant 
mapping combinations that the neural representations of the words connect and 
facilitate, as portions of them but also as wholes. Linguistic expressions are the 
products of those mapping processes that engage speech schemas, but the expressions 
themselves also initiate those processes in their turn. So the overall pattern is parallel 
and simultaneous reciprocal many-level interaction. 
 
I want to propose that this is the stage when an infant has received all he needs to 
master the referential use of language. The neurocognitive information he has in his 
command is in the form of sufficiently rich and refined conceptual structures (though 
still somewhat rudimentary compared to the structures of the adults). Beginning from 
the object-action mappings an infant has advanced a long way and has acquired term-
object, term-action, term-action + object schemas. All of these are capable of creating 
new informational assemblages, some of which are transient and some of which 
become part of the memory stores. At this stage the infant never looks back. In fact he 
could not do so, for there is continuous informational traffic going on in the brain. 
 
Now I propose that the basic schema of reference I postulated earlier, when I criticized 
the intuitive arguments of the direct-causal theorists, is fully functional at this stage of 
the language development. The child has acquired the mastery of the referential use of 
language, not restricted to proper names but involving demonstratives, indexicals, 
pronouns, and referential uses of descriptions. The basic schema engages the widely 
distributed informational-rich global mappings together with the developed syntactic 
abilities that are based on the action-object patterns. Infants acquire perceptual and 
motor patterns of, and related to, objects (but not necessarily always functionally 
interrelated (Spelke et al. 1995)). It seems natural that these kinds of patterns later 
assume also a role in the term-object mappings. The similarity to Edelman´s view is 
clear: sensomotor capacities which form the prelinguistic conceptual core and 
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presyntax are followed by clumsy tries at speaking, which gradually develop to the 
stage of syntactic patterns. When the symbolic function dawns to the child, the 
relationships between the conceptual information and the linguistic expressions burst 
and the entrance to the linguistic community is more or less achieved. 
 
????????
 
I have mentioned schemas in addition to the basic schema of reference. Unlike many 
models in the mainstream cognitive science schemas are not characterized by being 
static. That makes schemas more fruitful constructs to be used in the 
neuroscientifically-oriented studies of the various forms of cognition, including the 
referential use of language. Because that is especially a-very-good-thing from my 
perspective let us see how that fruitfulness begins to show. But first, let me shortly 
review the typical properties of the schemas. 
 
Schemas are usually postulated to explain all the main facets of cognition: in 
perception, thinking and action. The schemas are taken to represent objects as well as 
actions and events. In the typical accounts these functions are merged: schemas are 
postulated as cognitively, or conceptually guided sensomotor items. Generalizing a bit, 
the schemas are perceptual and memory-based action guiding constructs. They are 
present already in rudimentary forms in the infants´ graspings and sucklings, and can 
attain very sophisticated forms in adults, as in the finest sport and intellectual 
achievements (among others). 
 
Most schemas have other schemas as their parts. This constituency is not of static 
nature but flexible in that it depends on the particular occasion in which the schemas 
and the subschemas are activated. When you look at, say, a typical kitchen, the 
structure of schemas-within-schemas displays itself readily in action. You see 
everything from pots and pans to refrigerator and spices, all represented by schemas 
within the (typical) kitchen schema. And the kitchen schema may be, on that occasion, 
a part of a house or a family or a cooking schema. When one begins to show one´s 
culinary aptitudes, more richer perceptual and sensomotor schemas are activated, as 
well as new ones getting constructed along if the occasion differs sufficiently from the 
earlier culinary adventures. 
 
The sensomotor properties of the schemas lead us to put emphasis on their dynamical 
nature. Ulric Neisser speaks frequently of the cycles of schemas in perception in his 
book Cognition and Reality (Neisser 1976), but it seems to me obvious that the motor 
schemas are also involved. In a similar manner Michael Arbib and Mary Hesse 
emphasize both the dynamical nature of the schemas and their abundant schemas-
within-schemas structures: 
 
"We stress that a schema is both a process and a representation. The formation and 
updating of the internal representation, a schema assemblage, are viewed as a 
distributed process, involving the concurrent activity of all those schema 
instantiations that receive appropriately patterned input…We emphasize that the 
current assemblage of active schemas may contain hundred of schema 
instantiations, and the entire stock of knowledge of an individual may reside in a 
vast network of hundreds of thousands of constituent schemas." (Arbib & Hesse 
1986: 54) 
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Apart from proposing any numbers (for hundred of thousands may be an 
understatement!) I endorse fully what is said in the above quotation, especially about 
the processual nature of the schemas. As an abstraction a schema can be considered as 
a snapshot but the recurrent dynamical properties of the neural networks make it rather 
likely that the snapshot view does not correspond to any sound explanatory notion. 
Once the particular cycles of the schemas have begun their run in the specific 
situations, which can also be internal as when one is going down a memory lane, they 
remain in active states due to the recurrent dynamics – or so I propose. In this way 
they also activate expectations that relate closely to the contents of the already active 
schemas; this is the fruit from the shrub of the informational linkage in the global 
mappings. The expectations are presumably other schemas, involved in the processing 
of one´s drives and needs and aims (in the limbic and frontal areas, cortical and 
subcortical sites like amygdala).10 
 
The expectation schemas relate to plans of all kinds. "Little" plans such as those 
leading to immediate motor acts, resulting from sensomotor schemas, are common. 
"Big" plans are multi-layered ones ranging from one´s aims today to career 
expectations and such things. In general we see how flexibly the schemas link together 
from the minutest perceptions via the meaningful features of one´s surroundings to 
one´s varying actions in the temporally extended “action chain” that is supposed to 
fulfill one´s grander aims. This flexibility is neurally manifested in the variable but 
relatively overarching engagement of all the main cortical regions with subcortical 
ones. 
 
For the various reasons mentioned above I take it that the notion of schema is the most 
fruitful postulation with which to explain perception, thinking and behavior in a 
unifying manner. I emphasized above the non-committalness as to the possible neural 
realization of the schemas. Relying in this "open texture" of the schemas I propose a 
two-fold identification. First concepts are identified with schemas and then schemas 
are identified with certain neural processes: the global mappings. The main evidence 
for these identifications is, first, that there are many and diverse perceptual schemas of 
objects, events and persons. This corresponds to the construction of the object, event 
and person representations in the global mappings starting from the primary sensory 
receiving areas and continuing through the secondary regions to the activity in the 
association areas. Secondly, some of those schemas involve also motor information (in 
addition to proprioceptive and kinesthetic information). The global mappings engage 
the motor areas as was briefly described above. That concepts are hypothesized to 
involve motor information is unusual, but not unreasonable. To think otherwise is just 
to clutch to the by now rather old-fashioned conception of concepts as only cognitive 
entities. Thirdly, the schemas contribute to the planning of action and long-term aims. 
In the global mappings this role is assumed by the higher frontal areas, mainly those in 
the prefrontal ones. Especially this shows up in the short-term tasks when something 
has to be kept in memory for successful action to take place. One relevant task of this 
type is keeping information about someone in mind in order to refer to him or her, and 
to understand that what is said is about him or her. So I propose that the engaged 
schemas in these situations are (parts of) the individual concepts of the referents. (The 
schemas are most likely only partially activated, depending on the informational 
impact of the situation.)11 
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Edelman restricts concepts to portions of the global mappings. According to him 
concepts arise from the discriminations, recombinations and (re)categorizations of 
parts of the global mappings, like those distinguishing objects from movements in a 
mapping (Edelman 1989: 144). Note that because portions of the global mappings can 
be recategorized again in the formation of concepts, these basic mechanisms are in 
place when language learning begins, so that through the emergence of the symbolic 
function the conceptual machinery explodes only in quantity. I concur with all this 
except that I would not restrict the concepts as emerging only from the manipulation of 
the portions of the global mappings by other mappings. These mechanisms may be 
what prototypes are, but full-blown concepts require more. This presupposes that 
concepts are perceptuo-cognitive skills, or that they form at least parts of the 
processual phases of those skills. As such they are tailor-made to be identified with the 
global mappings. But this is a healthy presupposition because the views according to 
which concepts express properties and relations, or are individuated by some necessary 
and sufficient criteria, are currently, and deservedly, in disrepute.12 I think that the 
manipulations of the parts of the global mappings is a later stage in concept formation, 
the stage in which more refined concepts through conceptual relations and conceptual 
hierarchies emerge. Through learning the relations between the concepts, their 
hierarchies and interdependencies grow remarkably. 
 
However, and in tune with what I have earlier proposed, I would like to go a little 
further in explicating the schemas as global mappings. In doing so I also take the 
liberty to enlarge Edelman´s theory a bit. The schemas have been typically taken as 
purely cognitive or sensomotor constructs, but as I argued there is no principled reason 
why the emotional and affective features of cognition should be kept out. The type of 
evidence that I gave shows how intimately those features are tied with the perceptual 
and "intellectual" ones. As a short rehearsal, think about thinking about someone. 
Your knowledge of his or her is usually emotionally coloured (to varying extents), 
depending on who that person is, i.e. what you know about his or her doings 
(especially in relation to yourself), character, and such things.13 Your schema 
assemblage of the person in question includes among its subschemas also the ones 
containing emotional information and schemas which dispose you to bring about 
appropriate, or inappropriate, actions were you to meet that person. This is easy to 
explain on the level of the global mappings. In particular the limbic structures and 
nuclei contribute their specific effects on the cortical processes (and vice versa) and 
this brings the emotional ingredients into the whole processing stream of the global 
mapping, the schema assemblage of that person. Consequently I propose that the 
global mappings can include the engagement of the limbic functions as well, and 
especially because they partake in directing one´s thinking and action by the emotional 
and "visceral" evaluations of objects and events. 
 
Another important property of the global mappings is that they enable us to recognize 
individuals. This is mostly due to the perceptual information they embody. As the neo-
Fregeans, notably Evans (Evans 1982: ch. 8), have argued the ability to recognize the 
referent, hence also to reidentify it, is a very important cognitive function. This is 
especially so in those cases when one could not characterize the referent by any 
identifying descriptive means, as the case is often with faces. The global mappings 
explain this feature of the (re)identifying recognition because the information residing 
in them can not be articulated without a remainder, sometimes a considerable one at 
that. But it seems to me that not only the linguistically inarticulatable perceptual 
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information helps in recognition but emotional information is able to do that also. For 
it sometimes happens that one has a feeling which he can not put into words, a feeling 
which tells one whom is the object of one’s experience. For example one might 
vaguely hear a voice and/or noices that have a particular "flash" and that tells one who 
is responsible of those voices and noices. A case in point is an event where one is 
among other boring people and suddenly gets a feeling of warmth and joy upon 
detecting noices made by someone approaching, that someone being your loved one. 
In this case there is the interplay with the perceptual and the emotional information but 
it is the latter which enables one to identify the referent: very similar noices, not 
consciously distinguishable, could have been made by some other person without that 
engaging any emotional reaction. On the basis of this example I dare to propose that 
emotional information is sometimes even capable of executing referential function 
(though of course in relation to the more cognitive senses one possesses). The 
importance of this possibility is that the description theory could not account for it, but 
our (neuronaturalized) Fregean sense theory explains it: some global mappings have 
networks in some limbic nuclei as parts of them, and these contain, or can access 
information, that enables one to single out the referent. In short, and contrary to the 
widely held opinion, emotions and moods can be intentional and even referential. 
 
????????????????????
 
The identification of the schemas with the global mappings reveals the engagement of 
the neurocognitive information in every referential act, whether accompanied by 
external expressions or by only being thought. This is one more species of evidence 
for our neuronaturalized Fregean view that reference takes place only when there is 
information about the referent at the speaker´s disposal, either already possessed or as 
incoming from the communicative situation. 
 
I want to use the first identification above, that of concepts as schemas, to revive the 
old notion of individual concept. Individual concepts can be taken either in an 
ontological or in an epistemical sense. Taken in the ontological sense an individual 
concept contains all the correct information of the referent of the proper name. This 
sense is, if not the same as, at least very similar to Leibniz´ complete concept of an 
entity that contains all true facts about the individual it is the concept of. In the 
epistemic sense individual concept consists of all the information one possesses about 
the referent of the proper name in question, but not all the information of the referent 
there is to be had. Of course the individual concepts in the epistemic sense do vary 
from person to person; trivially, in the case of humans, the individual concept that a 
particular individual has of herself is different from that of someone else’s. And many 
people do not possess that concept for another trivial reason: they do not know 
anything about the individual and have never been in acquaintance with her. I am 
interested only in the epistemic individual concepts here. 
 
Now if a schema, or a schema assemblage, as a global mapping contains information 
about a particular individual, who is the bearer of the proper name "NN", that schema 
contains all information that one has at his disposal in identifying that individual as the 
referent of that name. I propose that this schema is the individual concept one has of 
the individual NN in question. It follows from TNGS that the individual concepts are 
subject-bound and informationally varying, because they are the selectional neural 
processes of the global mappings of objects and persons. But this is no drawback, for it 
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was shown earlier that the informational variance of the senses is perfectly admissible 
feature of the Fregean theory, and one that he acknowledged. 
 
So I take the Fregean senses of proper names to be the individual concepts of the 
bearers of those proper names. Hence I make a third identification, in addition to the 
two earlier (concepts as schemas and schemas as global mappings). This needs some 
qualification, though. The senses as the individual concepts, when they are activated as 
schemas, i.e. as global mappings of the individuals, are usually only partial as tokens, I 
think that this is the most typical mode of the senses of proper names to be entertained. 
For though we can take the sense to be the whole global mapping about an individual a 
speaker possesses, in distinct referential occasions different parts of the information 
about the referent is activated depending on the context, i.e. on the topic of an 
exchange and the information mediated. As I explained in the last chapter, proper 
names as pointers, now seen as entrances to the global mappings of individuals tend to 
activate larger portions of the global mappings than descriptions. But when 
descriptions are used, different descriptions work up different pieces of the 
information about the referent the speaker and the hearer possess; and these processes 
are not informationally uniformly the same in every occasion the referent is being 
talked about (if ever). Therefore differential informational "leakage" takes place that 
affects the content of the particular use of a name or a description. Some subschemas 
that were activated in the previous occasion may get activated again, but they may 
have changed informationally to some extent in respect to that earlier occasion. 
Moreover we should not forget that we tend to forget things. This is in itself always a 
change in the global mapping, hence in the individual concept. 
 
This third identification of the senses of proper names with the (epistemic) individual 
concepts of the bearers of proper names is not entirely new. There are clear 
antecedents of it in for example Rudolf Carnap´s and Alonzo Church´s semantic 
theories. Also Linsky writes about particular individual concepts as being equivalent to 
the senses a speaker has about the referents of expressions (Linsky 1977: 72). My 
point is that by the help of the neurocognitive framework and the specific constructs it 
provides we can unify extensionally many distinct notions. That unification yields also 
a remarkable divident in the form of modernized scientific explanation of the Fregean 
senses of proper names. I consider that to be a progressive step, and this for two 
reasons (at the very least). 1) Frege´s semantic view, being an important part of his 
legacy, is defended in the way that opens up new vistas for research in the current 
semantics and theory of reference; 2) unifications are good in science, they provide 
unexpected explanatory gains and wide range of implications, and even lead to new 
research subjects. In this particular case my humble hope is that the way I have 
connected the neural and the cognitive levels to each other will prove its worth in 
further studies. For taking into account the large-scale nature of the schemas, and the 
schema assemblages, as the global mappings, their relevance is not restricted only to 
the issues in the theory of reference. For instance it obviously leads one to ask the 
question of the nature of the concepts in general, a field that has recently become the 
focus of keen interest in the philosophy of mind and in cognitive science. (Especially 
the involvement of the emotional and the motor elements in the global mappings 
points immediately to the enlargement of our current concept of concepts.) 
 
If my identification of the individual concepts with schemas, hence with global 
mappings, is correct it follows naturally that the individual concepts are likely to 
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become related to, or sometimes even parts of, other schemas and individual concepts. 
As remarked above schemas can get embedded within other schemas by recursive 
operations, or part-whole forming processes, between the global mappings. This 
results in the schema assemblies which Arbib and Hesse postulate. These processes 
can be of short-term nature, restricted to changes in the synaptic activity states of the 
neural networks involved. But it seems that in many cases they result in a long-term 
assemblies due to the gene expression-related morphological changes in the synapses 
in the cortical networks and in hippocampus, i.e. to the pieces of long-term memories 
being parts of the individual concepts. As an example take again my individual 
concept of Josif Stalin (partly presented in chapter 6). Many of the subschemas of my 
schema of Stalin form assemblies with other (sub)schemas of persons, events and 
concepts about, and related, to the historical period of Stalin´s life. This is a general 
feature of many individual concepts, so I try to make it evident in the following 
somewhat more enriched presentation of my individual concept of Stalin. The 
presentation is also affected by the contextuality effect that I argued is part of the 
senses of proper names. In this case it manifests itself in the way that the following 
presentation of my individual concept of Stalin contains some of the main features and 
events of Stalin´s life. If the topic were, say, the Great Patriotic War or Stalin´s 
relationship with Lenin, quite different features and events would be presented. This 
contextuality effect was already explained in the last chapter by the differential 
focusing of the portions of the senses.  (The “…” marks the connections to the 
information about the mentioned individuals.) 
 
STALIN 
"Stalin" since 1913 [the main proper name pointer]; "Josif Vissarionovich 
Dzugashvili" the birth name; "Soso" as a child, "Koba", after a Georgian hero in a 
story [other proper name pointers] 
-born officially 21st December 1879, really 8th December 1878, at Gori, 
Georgia, Russia 
-went to a seminar to become a priest, but was expelled because of his 
political activities 
-met Lenin first at Tampere, Finland, December 1905 at a Bolshevik party 
meeting 
-V. Lenin:… 
-Tampere:… 
-Finland:… 
-Commissar of Nationalities in 1917 
-second wife Nadezda Alliluev (-first wife Jekaterina Svanidze 
-had a son named Jakov 
-killed himself in a German POW 
camp 1943) 
 –had a son named Vasili 1921 and a daughter named 
Svetlana 1926; killed herself at morning 9.11.1932 
-vozhd of the Communist Party and Soviet Union since 1929 after ousting 
Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev and Bukharin; General Secretary of the 
Communist Party of SU 
-Communist Party of the SU:… 
-SU:… 
-L. Trotsky (Bronstein):… 
-L. Kamenev (Rosenfeld):… 
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-G. Zinoviev (Radomylski):… 
-N. Bukharin:… 
-started the first pjatiletka in 1929 
-let few millions of Ukrainians die of hunger 
-worked closely with Molotov 
-Molotov (Skrjabin): shared a room with him in St. 
Petersburg 1912; worked in Pravda; became the foreign 
Minister of SU in spring 1939 
-started the massive campaign to industrialize and dekulakize SU in the 
beginning of 1930s 
- hated peasants and farmers; first pjatiletka 1929-1933; 
famines especially in Ukraine with millions dead 
-originated the purges of the higher party, economic and Red Army 
echelons as his targets in particular in 1936-1938 in the show trials; but 
also lower level party functionaries and other "enemies of the people"; 
signed at least hundreds of liquidation quotas 
-Kamenev, Zinoviev, Bukharin 
-marshal M. Tukhachevskii 
-NKVD 
-G. Iagoda (Eiche):… 
-N. Ezhov:… 
-L. Beria:… 
-negotiated with the Finnish envoys in October and November 1939; as 
the result started the Soviet-Finnish War ("The Winter War") 30.11.1939 
-J.K. Paasikivi:… 
-V. Tanner:… 
-deliberately on purpose let Germany attack SU in 1941 
-the supreme commander (at Stavka) in the "Great Patriotic War"; later 
assumed the title Generalissimus 
-died 5th March 1953 in a dacha at Kuntsevo 
-smoked pipe and tobacco; arranged drinking bouts in his dachas; 
vacations in south, mostly in Georgia and Abhasia; housekeeper Valentina 
Istomina (also his "unofficial wife" since the mid 1930s) 
-vindictive and suspicious personality, perhaps even paranoid; 
occasionally cruel in personal relations; quick mind, exceptional memory 
(which he also valued in other people) 
 
Perceptual information of Stalin (from photographs, news film clips, 
paintings) 
 
Emotional information related to pictorial and film representations and 
knowledge about Stalin 
 
In general, however, people seem to tend to possess somewhat similar individual 
concepts of the same referents. There are two main reasons for that. First is when the 
information content about the referent is "informationally poor", i.e. only a few things 
is known about him or her, but these are widely known among those who know 
anything at all about the referent, the similarities are perforce there. In the second case 
the concepts of the referent are informationally rich, i.e. so much is known about him 
or her, due to many criss-crossing communicative exchanges in a linguistic community 
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(and between communities, especially in our days of extensive attending to mass 
media), that the respective individual concepts tend to get informationally similar.14 
 
I think that it is quite typical that most individual concepts locate somewhere between 
the poor and the rich ones, but maybe towards the poor end of the continuum. 
Especially this is so with the concepts the referents of which one is not acquainted, 
have not been en rapport with. But included are also those concepts the referents of 
which one has no special interests to know of. But that does not affect my point. These 
individual concepts are no less individual concepts than the rich ones. 
 
Individual concepts identified with schemas, and schemas identified with the global 
mappings of the neurocognitive information about the referents, are, then, admirably 
suitable entities for the role of our modernization and neuronaturalization of the 
Fregean senses. Although I concentrate on proper names in this study, the unifying 
explanatory power of the schemas as concepts applies to Frege´s notion of concepts 
and their senses (expressed by predicates). Second corollary is that the "pure" 
description theory of reference, according to which the Fregean senses are expressed 
wholly by linguistic means, by the definite descriptions, is too narrow theory. As we 
have been seeing, the individual concepts include such neurocognitive information 
which could not be linguistically articulatable, but which is functional nevertheless. 
 
????????????????????????????????????
 
The last section concentrated on describing the kinematics of cognition underlying the 
reference of proper names, the neural structures and the connections supporting it. 
Now at last it is time for the dynamics and for the second seminal idea that I 
mentioned at earlier (section 7.3.1). Binding together of the sensory features by 
temporal synchronization of neural impulses to form coherent and unified perceptions 
has become the main subject of research, both in humans and in higher mammals 
(Treisman 1996). But 
 
"…what next? What neural mechanism can be imagined to be sensitive to and 
recognize the presence of synchronization versus its absence? What mechanism can 
identify-i.e. perceive-the pattern of synchronized system activity as that of a 
particular external event? Whatever mechanism is proposed must function across a 
preconscious-conscious divide, still undefined in neural terms, for which no 
presently proposed paradigm presents a rational solution." (Mountcastle 1998: 376) 
 
Essential as Mountcastle´s questions are I do not think that the situation is so meager 
as he makes it seem. First of all the synchronization approach should be pushed further 
both theoretically and experimentally, for how else could we hope for progress?15 
Most of the experimental studies of the neural synchrony have been performed using 
cats. For example, when a light bar is shown to a cat, the firing responses of the 
neurons in the visual cortex are found to be coherent and quite stable (even if 
transient). When the stimulus object is more realistic ecologically it is remarkable that 
in addition to the cortical (columnar) areas the synchronization has been found to take 
place also between distinct cortical regions, even up to the interhemispheric level. The 
mechanism of the synchronization can be considered as a generalization of the well-
known Hebbian mechanism applied to the forming of all kinds of neural 
representations (perceptions and categorizations). According to the Hebbian 
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mechanism the presynaptic and postsynaptic sites of the neurons have to be 
simultaneously active to strengthen their mutual connections in the functional sense. 
Hebb´s original proposal focused more on individual synapses, which is why I spoke 
of generalization of his proposal. Simply, synchronization means coincident and 
connected activity within and between neural groups in the milliseconds range (action 
potentials last typically 1 to 10 milliseconds). The oscillations in the neural activity 
patterns (like the by now notorious 40 Hz) that emerge from these processes may well 
reflect the fact that some of the activated representations are also relatively stable 
processes. Particular objects or topics "linger on", for at least seconds, even if only the 
different specific features of them become focused on. This may explain why our 
cognitive life is at least to some extent coherent in the extended temporal dimension 
and not just snapshot perceptions and thoughts (the coherence of which the 
milliseconds range synchrony takes care). When there is an overall topic of interest, as 
in an ongoing pointed conversation, thoughts stay focused. Or the objects in one´s 
surroundings may play this stabilizing role when one is just looking. But when there is 
no such topic, as when one is just biding his time idly, different thoughts and images 
pop into one´s consciousness. In the former case it might be that the synchronization 
within and between the relevant global mappings forms an informationally coherent 
and unified overall pattern, but in the latter case the pattern is more transient and weak 
in that it "disassembles" and "reassembles" continuously without any strong 
constraints. These processes go well with the recurrent architecture of the neural 
networks. That is because the processes are self-organizing and depend on the 
informational similarity and the functional proximity of the neural impulses. Or rather 
I want to suggest the stronger thesis according to which the synchronization goes well 
with the recurrent architecture because it requires that architecture. Even if input is 
processed in many distinct columns and areas, synchronization – hence 
representational-cum-informational stabilization - is achieved only through the vast 
arrays of the interrelated Hebbian connections in many levels between these columns 
and areas. If there were not these multiply reciprocal connections, temporary 
coincidental processes would be mere distributed and informationally unrelated 
happenings which could not offer us any neurally realistic mechanism for the 
explanation of coherent perception and cognition. 
 
Edelman´s approach requires also these temporal modes (Edelman 1989: 65). 
Therefore I want to suggest further (as I already pointed out in the beginning of the 
section 7.3.1) that the processing of the cognitive features of thinking is basically only 
more of the same as that which takes place in the perceptual bindings. Especially I 
want to suggest that the utilization of information in cognitive processes that 
contribute to speaking, remembering, problem solving and so on, are based on the 
detection and registration of the distributed synchronized events by other synchronized 
events. This overall process may be such in which "higher level" synchronical patterns 
emerge from the "lower level" ones and then take on and engage to guide the 
processing patterns of the latter levels.16,17 
 
As is well known there is no clean boundary between perception and cognition (and, 
for that matter, between sensation and perception, as well as emotion and cognition). 
Perceptions are constituted in part by those conceptual resources called to duty in 
every occasion when sensory material begins to come in. It is a platitude that what one 
knows and therefore expects affects what one sees ("seeing is believing"). This smooth 
merging of perceptual and cognitive factors may now receive the correct explanation 
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by the synchronous processing taking place in the re-entrant networks. But of course it 
is not all the same throughout: the distinct and differentiating features of the different 
types of the perceptual and the cognitive information are there during the processing 
and they bear their marks on the synchronous processes. (The reason may be due to the 
microcolumnar and columnar processing specificities.) Because the overall pattern 
tends to occur as holistically distributed processing, the relevant pieces of information 
are likely to be kept active during the particular perceptual/cognitive tasks. They so to 
speak find their proper places in the recurrent synchronous stream just by being in 
there at the right places at the right time. Most likely, however, the higher-level 
synchronous conceptual bindings are selective. By this I mean that not all and every 
one of the lower level synchronizations are engaged in or that they would become 
parts of the higher patterns of the synchronizations every time. What presumably takes 
place is that some of the lower level synchronizations are engaged (in varying extents) 
depending on the re-entrant connections and their synaptic strengths, which, 
remember, have informational impact (as far as we currently know). I am not claiming 
that there could not be other synchronizing processes simultaneously. It is quite likely 
that there are: one can think of something while looking at something else. That kind 
of diversity is only to be expected if the recurrent architecture of the global mappings 
is on the right explanatory track. 
 
It may be the case that even if the synchronous processes within and between the 
networks through the different complexities and organizational levels are what we call 
mental representations, perceptions, concepts, emotions and plans, i.e. different kinds 
of schemas as global mappings, some of the higher synchronous patterns, even 
mappings of the global mappings, result from what - for want of a better term - I call 
"asynchronous side effects". That is, it may be that the dynamic collections of many of 
the lower level synchronous processes sometimes tend to generate asynchronous 
patterns among them. This may lead or directly cause a new synchronous overall 
pattern in the higher level connections. (Maybe something like this takes place when 
the so-called Gestalt switches take place, or when someone learns or experiences 
something that leads to profound changes in his schemas.) 
 
Consequently the proposal on offer is that the synchronous activity explains why we 
perceive whole and coherent scenes, not patches of unrelated features or objects, even 
though the features are processed in distinct sites in the brain. And I further propose 
that the same mode of processing explains why the cognitive, or conceptual, 
representations, schemas as concepts, are efficient and likewise coherent (in their 
informational complexity). Maybe it should be noted that this mode of binding gets rid 
of any kind of homuncular tendencies because the processes of the recurrent temporal 
synchrony are postulated to be perceptions, imaginings and thinking. At first it may be 
difficult to comprehend that this is so because we are so used to see and think that 
when there is something to be seen or thought about, there is someone or something 
doing that. Maybe a comparison to the familiar and unproblematic identification from 
physical science would help to drive home the point. What is called light is 
electromagnetic radiation (sometimes waves, sometimes photons). That we humans 
are sensitive only to a narrow band of it does not make visible light something over 
and above the electromagnetic radiation (of that particular band of wavelengths). In 
the same way our perceptions and thinkings and other cognitive, as well as emotional 
functions, as coherent wholes are synchronical neural impulse processes in wide 
variety of areas in the brain, where the particular and task-relevant pieces of the 
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neurocognitive information reside. This holds whether they are only transient 
occurrents or consolidated long-term items. 
 
???????????????????????????????????????????
 
Now we can begin to relate the recurrent architecture and the synchronical dynamics 
of the brain to our neurocognitive approach to reference. This proposal is a 
generalization from the studies and ideas presented above, and as such it is a 
somewhat speculative attempt. But that could not be helped at this stage of research if 
we are to take seriously the challenge of explaining reference from the neurocognitive 
perspective - which is the fundamental perspective regarding reference as a form of 
human action. 
 
When someone perceives someone, or something, and eventually produces a linguistic 
expression referring to that individual, what takes place is in outlines the following 
course of events. Information about an object or a person gets processed in parallel and 
in an already connected manner because of the synchrony within and between the 
recurrent neural groups wherein that information resides. This is the individual concept 
as the global mapping (and schema). The neural activation spreads within the global 
mapping in a robust manner within and between the cortical sensory areas, starting 
from microcolumns where lateral inhibition by inhibitory interneurons directs it, as 
well as in the columns and eventually (i.e. well within the 500 milliseconds window) 
in the connected larger cortical sites, up to the relevant areas in the hemispheric lobes, 
most likely the (infero)temporal areas where information about objects and persons 
resides. This build-up is executed in synchronous manner by informational impulse 
correlations. In this same manner the situationally relevant information is bound 
together with the related activated memory representations of the object or the person ( 
exhibiting the informational context dependence). The result of this global process is 
the particular schema or schema assemblage. As already stressed the amount and the 
activation of the "bits and pieces" of the memory information vary depending both on 
the situation and the internal constraints like one’s expectations. As a further example 
of the latter factors the limbic regions partake by providing the emotional colouring 
and evaluation which can direct the selection of the particular linguistic expression 
(description, proper name, indexical or pronoun) which becomes as the result, the 
temporary end point, of this wholesale neural processing. This latter part of the process 
may extend to a few seconds, but with respect to proper names it may take much 
longer as in the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon, when one just cannot recall the name 
although all the relevant information is in an activated state. (On this, see (Young 
1998).). 
 
If one is taking part to a conversation the activated networks, in which the information 
of the referent resides, keep that information "hot" and provide the background from 
which situation-relevant portions of that information I) get selected by extensive 
synchronous bindings and ii) used in one´s subsequent linguistic remarks. This process 
can be likened to the figure-from-ground operations. This overall process is fluent, 
especially when it is established that the participants are talking about the same 
referent. I think that that reflects the large-scale engagement of the global mappings. 
Consequently I dare further to propose that this is what referring is in neural terms. 
Reference is not some cleansed seemingly out-of-cognitive-control-causal-relation 
from the referent to linguistic expressions. To use a slightly grandiose expression, 
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because reference is cognitive, it is also primarily a form of memory. To pre-empt an 
objection, it is easily seen that this holds also of the demonstrative references: the 
short-term and working memory systems are involved in these situations, in relation to 
the information the long-term stores feed into with. In the demonstrative referrings the 
lion´s share of processing goes to the sensory and the higher perceptual networks, 
especially those that are activated by one´s focus on the referent of the demonstrative. 
These are engaged synchronously with the activation of the basic schema of reference, 
this leading to the verbal expression of the demonstrative (and/or to pointing). But still 
these processes are executed by the short-term and working memory. 
 
On the other hand reference being a form of memory may seem nothing but a 
platitude. But my view is different from some resembling views from cognitive 
science and philosophy of language. First, to blaze on it forth again, when put against 
the direct-causal theory, which does allow for cognitive representations associated 
with proper names but no mediating referent determining role for any cognitive 
constructs, I explain reference as being possible only because of the information the 
speakers possess and utilize. And as I have been arguing that mode is cognitive. The 
other difference is that I do not accept the sort of rather linsey-woolsey language-like 
cognitive constructs as lists, encyclopedias, files, dossiers and such, on which the 
mechanisms of search-through-and-hit would generate reference. Besides being too 
metaphorical this mode of operation is also much too stringent. Judged from what we 
currently know the only linguistic items involved are the end products of the 
neurocognitive processing: the neural representations of the linguistic items and the 
vocalizations (and other physical patterns like signs). Thirdly, even if some language-
like representations are involved in the internal processes, the long-term memories 
consist mainly of cognitive, perceptual and emotional information, so the models of 
"pure" language-like cognition would still remain too restricted. 
 
Reference as temporal phenomenon and as species of memory can also be supported 
by a closer look at the very causal links that the direct-causal theorists stick to. Picture 
to yourself what really makes the work, what retains reference, in the causal chains 
arising from the links and nodes. The nodes are occasions of communications between 
people, consulting sources (books, archives, pictures, paints, photographs, whatever). 
The links are the spatiotemporally enduring information stores of the people 
(=memory information) and the sources. When the information that resides in the 
sources is not "tapped" it is not used. When it is tapped, like in conversation, referring 
takes place because of the temporal activation of the relevant information guided by 
the topic and context. In fact this is what creates reference in the conversation also; the 
exchange has also additional functions like checking that the participants are talking 
about the same referent. This mechanism of tapping the information is in outlines just 
what I meant earlier when I said that the referential links are made and retained by us. 
This holds good also for the other sources, for though the information is there, they are 
just dead letters or pictures if no one is attending to them, if no one is bringing one´s 
informational resources to bear upon them. 
 
We should try to get rid of the habit of taking reference as a static phenomenon. When 
the referential use of an expression has an existing object as its target, reference takes 
place if the senses (the individual concepts) single it out. That is the general picture of 
reference. But we may be far better off explanationwise if we can avoid succumbing 
into thinking that it is the target that has the essential role. Information is of the 
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referent, and about it; it derives from it, when it is correct (and even when it is not all 
correct). But it is the utilization of that information that enables us to refer. Referring 
is a fluent phenomenon and so much dependent on the varieties of the neurocognitive 
information that it is the convergence of it to a unique referent that needs explanation, 
for the modes of processing of the neurocognitive information about the same referent 
are not informationally invariant every time they occur. This feature is notable in the 
intersubjective level because speakers must aim at the same referent for the referential 
communication ultimately to succeed. 
 
The essentiality of information to reference allows wider range and flexibility to 
reference research than the direct-causal theory could allow. I mentioned somewhat 
passing in section 4.2.5 that sense theoretically understood reference can cease and be 
re-established. This happens when all correct and sufficiently individuating 
information is lost, but afterwards some of that information, or parts of it or entirely 
new information, about the original referent is acquired and reacquired (maybe by 
being inferred from related sources). Quite the contrary the judgement the direct-
causal theory delivers is that once all causal connections from the original referent are 
cut then references to that individual are irredeemably lost. But it seems to me that 
even without the sense theoretically justified verdict, if one is allowed a recourse to 
referential intuitions in the manner the direct-causal theorists use them, then this type 
of case supports the sense theoretic notion of reference over the direct-causal one. For 
it does seem that after the cut in the informational continuity, we will still be talking 
about the original referent when new information, or the old reacquired, is brought 
bear. So the direct-causal theory is beaten at its own argumentative game. 
 
The intentions to co-refer that the direct-causal theorists have used in their arguments, 
albeit erroneously, are also explained by the global mappings and their interdynamics. 
There are two kinds of intentions relevant here, and being intentions, i.e. action-
conducive, they both belong to the class of executive functions. The intention to 
communicate is a general intention. Into it we can nest the Gricean-like maxims, for 
example "being to the point", "being patient and friendly (to a certain extent, but no 
more)", "keep it simple" (i.e. do not complicate matters unnecessarily), and other such 
maxims that direct the fluent exchanges between people. This is what I called wide 
pragmatics (perhaps not an altogether happy term). Intentions to refer, including 
intentions to co-refer, are less general and more dependent on the particular 
communicative situations but that makes them no less directive of communication. 
However their successful execution requires typically more of the neurocognitive 
information. Looked at from the angle of the global mappings this nesting of the 
intentions is only natural. It is the responsibility of the (pre)frontal areas to direct 
communication, through all the levels in it, from the "little plans" upward (see section 
7.4). As the global mappings are engaged flexibly by the recurrent synchronized 
processing, the interplay between the executive schemas and the informational 
schemas takes place with no gaps. Especially I would like to propose here that the 
basic schema of reference is one such large-scale combined schema, activated in every 
referential act. 
 
I must say a few more things about the role of language in my neurocognitive 
framework. I think it is evident, judged from the cognitive level phenomena, that 
neurally represented linguistic items boost the planning and execution of the schemas 
enormously in that those linguistic items become "basins of attractor", to speak in 
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terms of the chaos theory (Freeman 1999). In other words they tie large chunks of the 
perceptual and the conceptual as well as the motor and the emotional information into 
schema assemblies, hence relating to one another the multiple schemas of objects, 
events and actions. In particular I propose that the referential relations presented 
within those schemas emerge as higher-order schemas from the specific term-object 
associations. Indeed, the very notion of reference itself is such an abstraction. Due to 
the hierarchical higher-level recurrent synchronical bindings, which form the global 
mappings (and presumably mappings of such mappings), which is the mechanism of 
the formation of schemas-within-schemas, the brains are able to represent 
representation relations. An especially prominent function that the recurrency allows is 
what Edelman calls "recursive synthesis". It denotes the mechanism by which the 
higher-order constructions (maps, schemas) are delivered back to the lower-order 
constructions. As far as I can see this recurrent "recycling" can lead to the formation of 
new functions altogether, in particular through the temporal constraints in the 
networks. The recurrent architecture combined with the synchrony is able to perform 
these mechanisms: 
 
"These effects include its correlative, constructive, and associative properties: 
reentrant signaling can modulate the timing of neural responses across neuronal 
groups, generate new response properties, and influence plastic changes by making 
them sensitive to signals from many brain regions." (Tononi & Edelman 1997: 699) 
 
Cognitively speaking this results in schemas being about other schemas. So also the 
executive and the motor schemas could become represented by other schemas, 
referential uses of linguistic expressions being the specific cases of these new 
functions through the basic schema of reference. And even doubly so: 1) the linguistic 
expressions are about something external and represented as external within the 
relevant schemas; and 2) the act of referring by a linguistic expression to an object as 
represented also mesh together in the schema construction, and become part of the 
robust global mappings involved in the reference of proper names. This could also 
contribute to the referential intuition with respect to proper names the direct-causal 
theorists have banked on. That is, reference relation as represented within the 
particular schemas, grounded on the basic schema of reference, contributes the 
intuitive feeling of the referential force of proper names as such. But as I explained 
earlier this is a sort of cognitive illusion. 
 
Presumably the higher-order referential schemas are essentially the interactive parallel 
processes manifest in the frontal executive, the parietal spatial areas, and the relational 
representational functions. There are also indications that the prefrontal areas are more 
involved in the relational processings to the extent that they require schemas (Robin & 
Holyoak 1995). (Recall also the role of Broca´s area in relation ordering (section 
4.2.5).) Lesions provide evidence for the involvement of the prefrontal areas, 
especially dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, in the construction of relational schemas: 
lesions in the mentioned area typically result in impairments of the internal model 
construction of events and relations (Knight & Grabowecky 1995: 1358). The 
involvement of these frontal areas indicates strongly that they are responsible for the 
organizing and ordering of the schemas. In regard of what the delayed-matching-to-
samples experiments have revealed about the role of certain frontal areas in the short-
term (or working) memory tasks it may not be far-fetched to propose that those frontal 
networks keep some portions of the processed information in hold and then let them 
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proceed further in their appropriate order in the ongoing processing stream. (In this 
respect the function is similar to that performed by hippocampus in that the latter 
orders and forwards information to the long-term memory stores in the cortex. Maybe 
there are intimate functional connections between the two regions accounting for their 
functional similarity.) 
 
This then is my neurocognitive framework, or preliminary theory, of the reference, in 
particular of proper names. (Of course it has implications for reference of other 
expressions also, most naturally the natural, artifact and technological kind terms and 
concept words in general.) How much more detailed it can be made is an open 
empirical question. Of course I will welcome every result in that direction, but it 
should be noted that the nature of the subject is such that it could turn out that not too 
much to that direction should presumably be expected. By this I mean that the very 
dynamics and the accompanying structural changes in the neural networks may be 
such that the specific forms of information that are embodied in them could not be 
specified even in synaptical terms (but more likely not in biomolecular terms related to 
the particular structures in the networks, like the influence of the intracellular second 
messenger cascades to Ca2+ concentrations and to resulting amount of gene expression 
to adjust the synaptic receiving areas). It could also be that the specifications at those 
levels are not needed; it may be that the changes that are required for changes in the 
senses (in the individual concepts) are accumulational: it takes many small impacts 
before the "structural-cum-functional dam" breaks resulting in new configuration and 
pattern of dynamics. If it turns out that way, so be it. The more general 
characterizations, i.e. the columns, macrocolumns, recurrent connections between 
various networks in the various areas and the more large-scale connections between 
the regions processing distinct kinds of neurocognitive information are already 
sufficiently detailed to enable us to begin to build an adequate theory of reference from 
the neuroscientific perspective. 
 
Notes 
 
1. I presuppose this metaphysical view, period. I will not explicate it, but suffice it to state 
here that it precludes the supervenience theses currently in vogue. But as well it eschews 
the type identity theory of mental states. If pressed I would state that it does not postulate 
any types of mental states as real existents, if mental states are individuated by their 
content - as is the current view. Mental state types are only instrumental, or fictional, or 
some such convenient coarse-grained taxonomical categorizations, even if not 
explanatorily wholly inadequate. (I am a "neural realist" with eliminative urge, hence 
"mental instrumentalist".) 
 
 
2. I have been using the notion of information throughout this work. As I already stated I 
claim no originality with that at all, for the idea that it is information that turns the 
referential wheels (and identificatory thoughts) has been around for, at least the last 50 
years among the neo-Fregeans. To mention but a few instances, its seeds can be found in 
Strawson´s account (Strawson 1959); information-based thoughts is a core notion in 
Evans´ framework (Evans 1982; see also ch. 11); Recanati´s theory (of neo-Fregean direct 
reference) makes much out of information, and is a descendant from Evans´ account 
(Recanati 1993); and Michael Luntley has argued for the view that the causal links being 
primarily informational explains their referential properties (Luntley 1999). But the 
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modification I made in the beginning of section 4.2.5  - there are no causal links qua 
causal, but only informational ones – seems to me to be somewhat of a contribution to this 
issue. (I do not mean that what are typically called causes but which are information 
transmissions is a new idea. It is not.) 
 
3. I am not saying that only humans are capable of language. As I mentioned the basic 
schema of reference is a phylogenetic structure. Moreover conceptual information is not 
exclusively tied to the language abilities, as will be explained later in this chapter. 
 
4. Hopefully I would be able to present detailed arguments for my proposed enlargement of 
the domain of semantics in some future work. My view seems to have close affinities with 
some phenomenological theorizing, mainly with Merleau-Ponty´s work on the role of the 
body in the constitution of mental phenomena and contents. On the other hand my view 
seems to go "deeper within" biologically but also to be more extensive externally because 
it takes the whole human organism with its surrounding context into account as 
contributing to the constitution of content (remember the contextuality of the Fregean 
senses argued for in chapter 4). It would also be interesting to give an account of what I 
like to call "technological kind terms" partly in terms of the neural motor and action 
pattern information and schemas. The contents of terms like "scalpel", "microscope", 
"magnetic resonance imaging", and such seem to involve a lot of the "practical 
information", so our enlarged semantics could be fruitful in studying the practical features 
of science, both the experimental basic research and applied science. In general I think 
that this would be a natural next step, for the overly linguistic explications of cognition, 
models of scientific research being part of it, have already begun to give room for the non-
linguistic factors. 
 
5. Emotional and affective factors of content must not be left at the level of general remarks. 
But detailed models of their mechanisms and effects on the cognitive and the perceptual 
processes must be developed. On this score I should warn the reader not to conflate my 
proposal with the quite well known associative network model of mood and memory by 
Bower (and its likes) (Bower 1981). His model is of the old "nodes in a semantic network" 
variety in which both concepts and emotions are labeled nodes, which become activated 
(and are recalled). As must have become evident I regard the conceptual and the 
emotional information being distributed through many areas in the brain, and involving, 
on both counts, unarticulatable features (i.e. not node-labeled). Models like that of 
Bower´s are too coarse-grained, too folkish perhaps, to represent accurately the actual 
dynamics of how moods affect cognitive tasks. 
 
6. Frege also held that language is not necessary for the grasping of thoughts; but we humans 
must use it for that purpose. In regard to the emotional states this view amounts to a fact: 
it is evident that many species of animals have similar emotional states as we humans do, 
but the expressions of these need no language. Rather they are "directly comprehended". 
(No commitment to naive empiricism intended; emotions, feelings and moods, as well as 
their expression, must be cognitively learned to some extent.) 
 
7. CREB is "cyclic AMP response element binding protein". For a review of the issue see 
(Yin & Tully 1996). I want to point out that even within single synapses the re-
entrant/recurrent processing pattern can be found, albeit in a much simpler form (though 
the point is controversial (Mountcastle 1998: 150-2)). There has been much talk about 
marks of signals received by the postsynaptic neurons getting back to the presynaptic side. 
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A prominent role has been given to nitric oxide, NO (a gas!). It diffuses to the synaptic 
cleft after the transmitter activity and reaches the presynaptic terminal. What is the 
specific function (or functions) of NO is not yet known. It may be related to the 
informational characteristics involved in synaptic transmission or it may be just a kind of 
confirmation signal telling that the transmission is going on unproblematically (somewhat 
analogously to the confirmation signal one gets into one´s mobile phone after sending text 
message that the message has become received). Anyway my point is to suggest that the 
recurrent processing pattern, as a unifying mode of processing, may be pervasive in the 
sense that it prevails even at the molecular level. About NO see for example (Larkman & 
Jack 1995). (A type of the glia cells, astrocytes, surrounding the presynaptic ends of the 
neurons can provide for another, or an additional, mechanism for the recurrent "micro 
signaling". They can uptake the transmitter released to the synaptic cleft and due to this 
may be able to detect its (relative) amount and signal to the presynaptic end to change the 
amount of transmitter either produced or released or both. But that is speculation on my 
part.) 
 
8. Parts of the theory have also been tested by modeling them with supercomputer and 
robotic constructions (Tononi et al. 1992). This "synthetic neural modeling" approach 
differs from the connectionist modeling because of its much closer adherence to the real 
neural structures and principles of neural dynamics. 
 
9. As told the processing properties of the circuits in the primary sensory areas are quite 
stable, but it is also well documented by now that if some networks lose the flow of their 
specific type of input due to a lesion in the peripheral nerves, plasticity occurs and other 
neurons sprout to the "dried up" areas. 
 
10. The informationally linked schema activation seems to be responsible also for the typical 
effect of facilitation by semantic priming, a phenomenon that can take quite astonishing 
manifestations on some occasions. For instance when one encounters a conversation about 
cosa nostra, and then some time later, even days, is queried about chess openings, the 
very likely first candidate that comes to mind could be Sicilian Defence. 
 
11. Experiments on categorization have shown that various features of different kinds of 
information get encoded as memory representations. In addition to the specific items and 
their structures, what is done with them, how they are memorized and in what context(s) 
and mood(s), all influence their recall (Shanks 1997: 121). These findings support my 
general suggestion of the complexity of the schemas as concepts, and as constitutive of 
the content of thoughts and mental representations. 
 
12. Though the issue is debatable: see Jerry Fodor´s and Ernest Lepore´s joint papers, for 
example (Fodor & Lepore 1996a, 1996b, 1999). Here it is not the place to counter their 
arguments in detail; suffice it to say that they seem both substantially and 
methodologically begging the question in that they presuppose stringent metaphysical 
approach to content and concepts, not naturalistic one. But I could not resist pointing out 
that the identification of concepts with schemas leads to no troubles with 
compositionality, the hobby horse of Fodor and Lepore. Schema construction to form 
schema assemblages is compositional as far as the activation of the subschemas goes. The 
neural mechanisms of the compositions are at least those mentioned in the main text, most 
notably that of recombination. However, it could not be avoided that the schemas change 
to varying extents during the compositional processes. This seems to lead naturally to the 
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view of content similarity. But it can be argued that this view sustains everything that 
successful communication and referential use of language requires, so the strict content 
preserving compositionality need not be respected. The interactive engagement of the 
schemas, as concepts, explains why the demands of the strict individuation are off the 
mark. We can talk about particular schemas, like restaurant schema, but this only means 
that the schema as one’s memory item gets activated anew in every occasion when 
information about restaurants (or related activities) enters one´s brain, or is activated by 
some internal prop like memory. Schemas are not frames or such cognitive constructs 
which have "slots" into which the specific information gets put. The information the 
schemas contain is part of the whole processing stream, which make up the schemas as 
token processes. The frame part can be interpreted as that information which has become 
to form relatively robust core of a particular schema. Compositionality may not survive 
always, either. It is perfectly possible that we have many schemas that have, so to speak, 
dissolved their subschemas of which they were originally composed, and has become to 
functions as units. 
 
13. A simple operationalization to bring this out would be to ask people to rate individuals 
according to some scale as to their "positiveness" and "negativeness" with respect to one 
another. 
 
14. Michael Luntley observes that there is a convention according to which ambiguous proper 
names take the most famous individual with that name to be their primary referent 
(Luntley 1999). But it seems to me that there is no such convention. The extent of 
information about the most famous person (when there clearly such is) in relation to 
temporal circumstances just is such that the individual becomes (has become) the most 
obvious referent of the ambiguous name. For instance we possess so much of information 
about Winston Churchill and about the Second World War that in most cases "Winston 
Churchill" refers to him (the prime minister of Britannia during the hardest years in the 
war), and not to a later MP in the parliament. 
 
15. Of course other proposals should be advocated also; see for instance the open peer review 
to (Phillips & Singer 1997). With regard to synchrony some concise presentations include 
(Shastri & Ajjanagadde 1993), (Llinas & Paré 1996: 8-14), (Singer 1996), (Simmons 
1996: 220-8), (Mountcastle 1998: ch. 12). 
 
16. W. Phillips has pointed out that hierarchical structures could not be formed in the same 
level of synchronization in which their elements reside without destroying the 
synchronization (Phillips 1997: 38). This is correct, and that is why I postulate, or 
speculate, about the higher level synchronization processes. In another publication we 
read: "…information that is conveyed as a number of separate groupings at one level or 
stage of processing may be conveyed as a single coherent grouping at later levels or 
stages." (Phillips & Singer 1997: 679). This is very similar if not the same idea as mine. 
(It may also have much to do in explaining compositionality phenomena in thought.) 
 
17. Oscillatory activity patterns anywhere in the brain may contribute to the facilitation of the 
cognitive processings. At least in me this happens usually when I am walking: my brain 
usually pops out various kinds of little (and even a little bigger) thoughts and ideas 
(compared to, say, when I am reading). (In fact this note is one such result.) This 
neurophysiological explanation, if it is generalizable, of peripateticism - thinking by 
walking - seems to be somewhat puzzling, though. Should it not be that walking increases 
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the utilization of glucose and oxygen in the muscles, robbing them for the brain to use? 
And in the brain the need of them is in the motor areas. But maybe effective synchrony 
requires less activity? That is, maybe thoughts and associations keep popping up just 
because inhibitory processes loosen their grip because of the lessened metabolic activity 
from the normal levels. Or it could be that the oscillatory synchrony creates a relative 
functional divide between the motor (and somatosensory) areas and other areas, thus 
enabling the more efficient use of them all individually. 
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8. THE EXPLANATORY POTENTIAL OF THE NEUROCOGNITIVE 
THEORY 
 
???????????????????????
 
In this chapter we will see how and to what extent my neurocognitive theory of 
reference - modernized Fregeanism - explains the most pressing classical problems in 
the philosophy of language and mind. Because the theory is not yet a tightly knitted 
one, much more work needs to be done. But, as said, let us see how far we can go to 
begin with. 
 
????????????????????????
 
This puzzle is about the informativeness of the identity statements "a is b" (put in the 
formal mode) in comparison to the trivialness of the identity statements "a is a" (or "b 
is b"), when "a" and "b" in fact refer to the same individual. As must surely have 
become obvious by now I think that it is obvious that Frege provided the essentials 
with which to solve this puzzle by his postulation of the senses of proper names. The 
postulation has been extended and naturalized during the course of this work by the 
notion of neurocognitive information embodied in the individual concepts as a 
particular kind of schemas, and their activation in the referential use of language, as 
neurally recurrent synchronously functioning global mappings, or parts thereof, 
together with the basic schema of reference (which, as we saw, also contributes the 
“metaintuition” that something is being talked about (named “NN” or described by 
“the F”). So what is left for us here is to propose some specific mechanisms by which 
the differences in the cognitive significances of the identity statements can be 
explained. 
 
When one hears or receives by other means an expression "a", usually a proper name 
or a description, information is transmitted to and/or activated in one´s brain in the 
way described in the previous chapter. This happens also in the case when one 
acquires "b" but when that information is not linked to the information which "a" 
activates; at least not in such parts which tap the referents neurally represented. But 
when one hears the identity statement "a is b", the neural groups as parts of the global 
mappings get connected to each other, embodying the respective individual concepts 
one has of the referents a and b. This can be seen as a minor Gestalt switch. It may 
take place via, what I like to propose and call a "catalyst network", i.e. a mapping 
between the two global mappings. Because the activation of the neural connection 
happens fastly in the occasion the identity statement is acquired, it could be that it is 
the synchronization between the mappings involved that causes the connection.1 That 
the catalyst network may also be quite extensive in neural terms (for example by the 
count of the synapses involved) is shown by the fact that there typically remains the 
memory feature which can be characterized as "what were earlier kept or taken as 
distinct things have turned out to be identical". That is, if there were not the catalyst 
network(s), the information of the two mappings would just have coalesced with no 
mark of the earlier held informational distinction. (I take it that this feature of the 
catalyst network explanation is more adequate than those given by some neo-Fregeans 
that do not notice that being the result of the combining of the "dossiers".) 
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The specific re-entrant catalyst network connections include most likely those going 
via hippocampus. (Or the informational connection could be made through the “spare 
synapses” I proposed above.) This is also a little speculative on my part but I could not 
help offering it. From experiments we know that long-term potentiation takes place in 
hippocampus. That is, strong presynaptic impulses cause postsynaptic potentiation 
which endures even days in vitro. It is also quite certain that hippocampus receives 
already object- and event-bound information from many sensory and association areas. 
So it seems possible that the hippocampal networks are able to combine the input, the 
content of which is for instance the heard statement "a is b", to the informational 
memory input coming from the association areas in the temporal cortex which are also 
activated upon hearing the statement. The processing loops in hippocampus seem to be 
able to retain the catalyst information in an active state so that it waits until the 
memory information from the association areas, prompted by hearing "a is b", gets 
there. In this way the relatively distinct global mappings of the referents might get 
merged and the knowledge that a is b incorporated. So in hippocampus not just the 
occurrent moment-to-moment bound stimuli from the external objects and events get 
processed, but it would also make it possible to recycle the earlier acquired and 
consolidated memories. 
 
The tetanic nature of this process could be explained by the amount of the information 
in the mappings, i.e. the potentiation may be a mass effect. In more specific terms the 
neural catalytic process may depend also on the frequencies of the action potentials 
and thus of the strength of the postsynaptic dendritic potentials and their efficiency in 
the propagation of the signals toward the somas of the neurons. This creates no traffic 
problems because the neurons partake in the encoding of many informationally similar 
features (the so-called population coding). These changes relate to the synchronous 
bindings in relatively short temporal scale. Long-term effects are mainly caused by the 
neurotransmitters and peptides as modulators (as was mentioned in the previous 
chapter). Later the informational connections between the two global mappings, the 
individual concepts of a and b, may grow richer in the cortical areas due to the gene 
expressions caused by the second messenger cascades. The metamemory feature I 
mentioned (i.e. what were taken distinct things are now seen to be identical) may also 
be explained by this hippocampal involvement. For we know that amnesics with 
lesions in hippocampus are typically unable to consolidate, maybe even to form, 
memories from the short-term encounters. In other words they do not have the normal 
feeling of familiarity that can be expressed as "this is something I have been through 
earlier". (Especially revealing in this respect are those hippocampus patients who have 
learned a motor task or skill but who do not recall at all that they have been through 
even quite demanding training sessions after the injury.) 
 
For symmetry´s sake we must ask what about the reverse phenomenon when there are 
in fact two distinct referents but a person has only one global mapping? In this case 
one´s schema of an individual changes to some extent depending on the new 
information one acquires upon the discovery that there are two distinct individuals. As 
an example, Arnold has seen a very attractive woman around quite often lately. Most 
likely he has observed that she likes to wear rather darkish to emphasize her blond 
hair. Maybe he has also noticed that she does not talk much and seldom smiles. But 
then a friend of Arnold´s tells him that this enchantment of his is in fact identical 
twins. What happens at that instant is that to the global mapping about the blonde is 
added information that there are two of them, and that he has presumably been seeing 
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both of them, separately, without realizing this (and other such "inferences" that dawn 
to him on the spot). Now he has an enriched global mapping with the information that 
it is about two women, twins in fact. But Arnold could not yet tell the difference 
between the twins. In particular he does not know their names (yet), so his global 
mapping does not extend to the temporal area in which proper names reside (area 38). 
As it may happen he gets later to know both twins better, so presumably also their 
names. By then the original global mapping has diverged to two (partially) distinct 
mappings, to two individual concepts (even if the twins happen to have the same 
name). 
 
Here we see in action the neural specification of the mechanisms of the neo-Fregean 
metaphorical postulations like the "labels" of "dossiers" and "files". The labels are the 
neural representations of proper names, and they "call up" (parts) of the information 
about the referent, also the processing of (parts of) that information leading to the 
tokenings of that label, the proper name. (So pace Forbes, a neo-Fregeans himself 
(Forbes 1990), "labels" are not metaphorical any more in the neurocognitive 
framework; in fact "label" is very apt label for the neural representations of proper 
names.) 
 
As a nice example of the relevance of emotional (and in this case even 
endocrinological) information to semantics note that not only the affective information 
from the limbic networks is an intimate ingredient of the global mapping right from 
the start, but so is hormonal information: Arnold’s amazement resulting from being 
told that the blonde is in fact twins would not have been so warmly quivering were this 
not the case, i.e. were not the sensitization of the global mapping so strong. The 
emotional contribution in the now distinct global mappings might change for instance 
by being diminished in the other. Or it might have been the case that though the 
original global mapping was "compact" in the beginning, even then Arnold may have 
had a slight tendency to feel more drawn to the blonde on some occasions than in 
others. That is, his limbic system has been telling the difference between the twins, 
presumably because it is connected re-entrantly to visual information of the subtle 
kinesthetic patterns, facial and mimical features, and so on. That is, the limbic system 
has been sensitizing these parts of the mapping, maybe by differential hormonal 
(peptide) modulation in the neural groups involved. The result may be that in the 
subsequent divergence of the mapping the emotional features of the distinct portions of 
the mappings became readily different. 
 
???????????????
 
I mentioned the importance of the disambiguation of the homonymous proper names 
when I argued against Salmon´s argument from content variance and his caveat of the 
relativization of the use of a proper name. Let us see how the disambiguation goes in 
my framework. Recall that in this case the speaker or the hearer knows to whom a 
particular ambiguous name refers, or who are the respective referents of homonymous 
names (though this is quite an idealized assumption). The first case differs from the 
second only because we have to allow for the possibility that there is only one neural 
representation of, say, "John Smith" in the speaker´s or the hearer´s brain. In the 
second case there is more than one. Let us take the hearer first. The disambiguation 
starts from the activation of the neural representation of the name and proceeds to the 
global mapping related to the representation of the name in the temporal lobe, and at 
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the same time the activation spreads through the global mapping, or only to those 
portions of it informationally relevant in the situation, which encode the information 
about that John Smith. Or if the name is heard for the first time, a proper referent may 
be generated by the guidance of the context. In the speaker´s case we may take this 
process as reversed, the result being an utterance involving the name "John Smith". If 
there are two, or more, neural representations of "John Smith", each tied to its own 
global mapping, distinct from the other mappings about the other John Smiths the 
speaker knows, the process of disambiguation is basically the same.2 
 
 
 
????????????????????????????????
 
Propositional attitudes are described by folk psychological locutions like "believes 
that", "wants to", "imagines that" and such. This is the intensional characterization, the 
linguistic one. The intentional characterization concerns the properties of the states 
themselves. But here this distinction is of no importance for I assume the current 
Gricean consensus that the intensional is derivative from the intentional, that a 
person’s psychological and cognitive states cause and thus explain the linguistic 
properties. The problems the propositional attitudes generate have been extensively 
discussed. Usually they are approached by pointing out that two central principles of 
extensional logic break down in these contexts. The existential generalization states 
that from the fact that a certain individual has some property (a is F) one can infer that 
there actually exists something that has that property, that something is F. The 
substitutivity of identicals salva veritate states that two (or more) co-referring terms 
can be substituted by one another without that changing the truth-value of the whole 
linguistic expressions of which they are parts. However, a child may believe that Santa 
Claus is fat, but it does not follow that Santa exists, contrary to the existential 
generalization. And there may still be people who believe that Morning Star is a planet 
but not believe that Evening Star is a planet, in spite of the fact that Morning Star is 
Evening Star, the planet Venus. Here the substitutivity of identicals (i.e. their names) 
salva veritate is violated, for it is false that those people believe that Evening Star is a 
planet. 
 
There has accumulated an industry of proposals to explain why the two extensional 
principles break down. It should also be noted that the proposed reasons why 
especially the substitutivity fails are many and not nearly uniform. Obviously I could 
not take up here those specific proposals in extension; fortunately that is not needed 
either. That is because virtually all of them more or less do agree that the problem, 
thus the explanation, has to do with cognitive information at the disposal of the person 
suffering from the "defective" beliefs (or other propositional states). 
 
It seems to me that the explanation of the failure of the substitutivity is in effect the 
same as the explanation of the different cognitive significances of the identity 
statements. In effect the situations are the same. The expression "a is b" has cognitive 
significance in contrast to the statement "a is a" because some portions of the 
neurocognitive information a person possesses is linked to "a" and some to "b", but not 
to both. The substitution of "a" by "b", and vice versa does not go through because the 
global mappings related to the neural representations of "a" and "b" remain distinct. 
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That is, as explained they have not become merged through the catalytic information 
that a is b. When the person acquires this information substitution will go through. 
 
The failure of the existential generalization is a little different. Here we need not have 
two or more distinct global mappings, but only one in which resides all the 
information a person has about, say, Santa Claus. In contradistinction to the 
substitutivity case the person does not think that there are two different figures the one 
of whom slides down inside chimneys and the other who keeps on repeating annoying 
"ho, ho, ho" greetings, but only one who does both. Moreover the person keeps on 
purportedly referring to Santa because what is lacking in his neurocognitive repertoire 
is the information to the effect that Santa does not exist. Also as long as he believes in 
the existence of Santa the existential generalization does not fail for him, but it fails to 
hold nonetheless in the extensional sense because it is known that Santa does not exist. 
 
These explanations are quite easy to come by but with the easiness comes a deeper 
insight. If the only piece that makes a difference is the knowledge that Santa does not 
exist, we immediately see that there is not any qualitative distinction between genuine 
and purported reference. The reason is that our subject keeps on purportedly referring 
to Santa as long as he does not become to know the sad news about the non-existence 
of Santa. Indeed we all could have used “Santa” that way, i.e. to have believed that 
Santa existed (but no one has ever seen him). This also supports my hypothesis that 
reference really takes place only in our brains, by being a form of memory in the form 
of neurocognitive representations. To give the most accurate neural account with 
respect to the existential generalization would require laying out the global mappings 
that encode and execute negation operations in the thought processes. But that 
explanation still eludes me, as it does everyone else. The only hunch I can give is to 
look at the frontal areas and, at the cognitive level, to the development of the concept 
of negation in children. But the informational part, the contents of our particular 
subject´s Santa beliefs, is explained in my account by the emergence of the re-entrant 
synchronous patterns encoding such information.3,4 
 
Frege held that in the propositional attitude contexts the Bedeutung of that-clause is 
not the customary Bedeutung but the Sinn, the customary sense (the thought the clause 
expresses). In the attitude contexts the referring terms are not referring primarily to 
their customary referents. (As it is usually said the semantic innocence is lost.) This 
view has generated a controversy, for on the one hand Frege seems to be right: if one 
believes that Hesperus is a planet it does not follow that he also believes that 
Phosphorus is a planet, even though Hesperus is Phosphorus. (The neo-Russellians and 
Millians deny this. But I already argued that their reasons are i) ad hoc, ii) they have to 
invoke the Fregean factors, and iii) the singular, or Russellian, propositions are 
suspicious postulations when it becomes to their explanatory potential in relation to 
our cognitive practices.) The object of the ascription of a belief is one´s thought, not 
the customary referent of the thought, or the referents of the sense elements in it. But 
on the other hand it seems as obvious that the ascription of the belief is about the 
customary referent also, the planet Venus in the example; so the semantic innocence 
seems not lost altogether. 
 
I really have nothing new to say about this problem. (Or problems, for it seems that the 
basic problem is that we are not quite sure what precisely is the problem with the 
propositional attitude contexts – or whether there is the problem; see for example 
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(Sbisá 2003: 156).) But that is just as well because I think that Graeme Forbes has 
dealt with it adequately at least in outlines (Forbes 1987, 1990). So in the following I 
will just go through his general argumentation. Take the sentence 
 
1) Ralph believes that Marilyn Monroe was murdered. 
 
Forbes regiments this as 
 
2) B(Ralph, <Marilyn Monroe was murdered>) 
 
 (I have changed corner quotes to “< >”.)  Forbes says that 2) is wholly specific about 
the content of the proposition Ralph believes (i.e. the Fregean thought). That is, we use 
the same expressions in the ascription as the ascribee does. But when that is not 
possible we loosen the degree of the specificity of the content we ascribe. That is 
achieved by the locution 
 
3) Marilyn Monroe is someone whom Ralph believes to have been murdered. 
 
This ascribes a belief to Ralph about an object but partly also specifies the content. 3) 
can be further analyzed by 
 
4) (∃α)(P(α, MM) & B(Ralph, α ^ <was murdered>)). 
 
Here "B" is a belief relation between believer and a proposition, "Pxy" means "x is a 
mode of presentation of y" and "^" is for the manner of the combination of the senses 
which the "<" and ">" specify. "MM" is abbreviation in 4) and has its customary 
referent, Marilyn Monroe. (One can infer from it, with the premise "MM = Norma 
Jean Baker" that Norma Jean Baker is someone whom Ralph believes to have been 
murdered. And this without ascribing to Ralph a belief that NJB was murdered, for 
Ralph need not have a mode of presentation/sense for NJB.) 
 
But what about the case when the ascriber have different customary sense than the 
ascribee for the that-clause? If 
 
5) Lois believes that Superman can fly and Clark Kent can not 
 
can we identify the Fregean thought, or the proposition, the that-clause expresses? It 
seems that we could not. For from the ascriber´s perspective "Superman" and "Clark 
Kent" have the same sense (assuming that the Superman story is true and that the 
ascriber, among many others, knows that). It seems that the ascriber have said 
something true in saying 5), but it also seems that he has said something contradictory 
because the names he uses have for him the same senses, though they do not have the 
same sense for Lois. Read from the ascribee´s perspective the ascriber is trying to get 
at Lois´ senses of "Superman" and "Clark Kent". But how could he achieve that for he 
may not have any epistemic or cognitive relation to them at all? So the ascribee´s 
perspective is not captured by the belief report. 
 
Fortunately the previous analysis goes through also in this case of the intersubjective 
variation of the senses of proper names. The sentence 
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6) Lois believes that Clark Kent can not fly 
 
is analyzed as 
 
7) Clark Kent is such that for Lois´ so-labelled way of thinking of him α, B(Lois, α ^ 
<can not fly>). 
 
This is Forbes´ logophoric analysis of the attitude reports. Here the ascriber does not 
refer to his or to Lois´ senses of "Clark Kent", so the analysis avoids the above 
mentioned problems. Instead the ascriber says that Lois possesses information 
associated with the proper name "Clark Kent", that information expressing the 
(negative) property "can not fly". In short, a sense of the referent is labelled by a 
proper name (or by some other expression used to refer to that referent) used by the 
ascriber, though not necessarily by the ascribee (though usually they tend to be the 
same). This obviously requires that the referent is the customary referent of the names, 
and relativized to the ascriber and the ascribee. This accounts for the semantic 
innocence of the propositional attitude reports. Note that from 7) it can not be inferred 
that Lois believes that Superman can not fly. The reason is that Lois need not possess 
information labelled by "Superman", or she may have such information but it does not 
express the (negative) property "can not fly" (believed to be true by her of Superman). 
 
As I said I accept this analysis of the propositional attitude reports. The main reason is 
that for all I can see it accords well with the practice of the attitude reports. On the one 
hand we could not (at least not yet for the lack of proper neurotechnological means) 
access the ascribee´s senses directly. On the other hand when we report attitudes we 
try to be as true to (what we take to be) the referential content of the ascribee´s 
attitudes as we can. It could not be avoided that our own senses so to say come the 
way because – trivially – we communicate only by them. But that does not normally 
matter because the senses, though intersubjectively varying, do determine the same 
referents. And when it happens that they do not, and we discover this, we will try to 
sort things out; and if that does not succeed, we just refrain from ascribing any 
referentially determinate attitude to the thinker (with hedges, of course). That just is 
the way it is with the attitude reports. We are usually content with the reports that have 
the referents right and characterized semantically as closely to the ascribee’s concepts 
as we could. It is rather pointless in fact to try to capture the “proposition” the ascribee 
entertains, because it contains variety of informational connections to other senses in 
the ascribee’s representational system (his “surrounding story”). Note that some of 
these informational connections arise at the very occasion the ascribee entertains the 
thought in question. This means that it could involve contextual elements (as 
represented elements, though not necessarily consciously). As many theorists have 
observed this only complicates the search for the “correct” theory of the propositional 
attitude reports and ascriptions. To my mind this search for the general theory is 
doomed to failure for the very reason that we could not attain the richness of the sense 
elements activated in every particular occasion of entertaining a thought. Consequently 
the only thing that needs modification from my perspective is that Forbes uses the 
notion of dossier, as we have seen many neo-Fregeans do. Because I am opting for a 
neuroscientific theory of the senses I have replaced this notion with the notion of 
neurocognitive information in the above characterizations. (The global mappings are 
left implicit here.) But nothing else of essence needs to be changed. 
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However it seems to me that the motivation of avoiding loosing the semantic, i.e. 
referential, innocence that the original Fregean view is alleged to bring with it is in 
general an overreaction. It is true that Frege said that the customary sense becomes to 
be the Bedeutung of the that-clauses in the propositional attitude contexts. But from 
this it does not follow that that sense, i.e. the thought, would somehow cease 
functioning in its normal way. Its sense components (though distinct for the ascriber 
and the ascribee) still usually specify their respective referents for both the believer 
and the ascriber. From the fact that sometimes when someone believes that 
Phosphorus is a planet it could not be inferred that he also believes that Hesperus is a 
planet it does not follow that "Phosphorus" would not refer to Phosphorus (=Venus) in 
the believer´s dialect (or idiolect, if the proper name is such that only he uses). Neither 
does it follow that “Hesperus” does not refer. (If indeed they both do refer.) If the 
ascribee’s sense of “Hesperus” happens to be such that according to it “Hesperus” has 
no referent, then that just is so for him. But that does not affect semantic innocence 
because most people, or the experts anyway, know that “Hesperus” refers. The poor 
asribee can be educated about his ontology. But that we focus on the senses, on the 
cognitive information, the speaker possesses does not stop the referential function of 
those very senses in that occasion of focusing if the ascribee’s sense is not defective. 
Neither did Frege deny that, or imply that it would. (Again: the prevailing of semantic 
innocence can be argued on behalf of Frege on the basis of his Aristotle note where he 
maintains that as long as the referent remains the same the variance in the senses is not 
devastating. Remember that the whole climate in Über Sinn und Bedeutung is related 
to the propositional attitudes. So I conclude that we can have our semantically 
innocent cake and eat the variance of the senses as well.) 
 
????????????
 
Related to what has been said above, the problem of the empty names is best dealt 
with now. The problem is to explain why the use of empty names, names that have no 
actual referents, is cognitively meaningful. In other words i) why have those thoughts 
cognitive content that underlie the uses of the names that do not have referents, and ii) 
why they are used as genuinely referring expressions before their emptiness is 
discovered? Take the sentence "Santa Claus can´t come until we´re all asleep." 
(Recanati 2000: 215) Santa does not exist but it would be extremely implausible to 
explain why the children go to sleep, if that sentence did not express a contentful 
thought. The problem of the empty names is especially pressing to those direct-causal 
theorists, the majority of them in fact, who maintain that no thought (in the sense of 
singular proposition) is expressed if the proper name has no referent. 
 
It seems to me that the most common strategy to explain the meaningfulness of the 
empty names is by invoking pretense attitudes. According to that approach the speaker 
of the above sentence knows that Santa does not exist, hence knows that when her 
children express Santa beliefs, they do not express any singular propositions. 
Therefore she can engage herself in pretense when she utters the sentence. That is, she 
knowingly uses a name that does not refer but as if it refers to Santa. (And her children 
use it as a referring term but without any pretense on their part - and she does not want 
to disillusion them, not yet anyway.) 
 
As I mentioned in chapter 6 Evans put forth a pretense account of the empty names 
(Evans 1982: 353-68). I criticized that account there, but to refresh our memory I will 
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state the main parts of my argument here. Evans account is motivated by his 
background commitments. He endorses Russellian thoughts, and de re senses of which 
the former consist. With respect to the empty names this means that because there 
could not be a Russellian thought expressed by a sentence with an empty name in it, 
because the object-dependent de re sense is lacking, Evans sees as the only plausible 
way to adopt the pretense account. But that move is basically flawed. When we use an 
empty name in ordinary communication we do not engage ourselves in any pretense 
even as long as we do not know it is an empty term. Quite the contrary, we use it as 
genuinely referential expression (like the children above). For example think of how 
"aether" was used in the end of the 19th and in the beginning of the 20th centuries. 
Physicists were talking about the physical properties of aether, its effects on the light 
rays and shortenings of the measuring rods. They had quite elaborate theories of 
aether´s role and effects in electromagnetic phenomena. In short ether was a real entity 
for them. So it is easy to see that the pretense account is clearly beyond any acceptable 
plausibility that even a justifiably ad hoc hypothesis can be granted. In the Santa case 
there is an obvious pretense, but that case is irrelevant because the mother knows that 
Santa does not exist. Instead I claim that the real problem with the empty names arises 
when we use them without knowing that they have no referents. Therefore any 
explanation by conscious pretense is out of place. (And non-conscious pretense – what 
could that be?) 
 
The argument just presented supports again my earlier suggestion that there is no 
qualitative distinction between genuine and purported reference of proper names qua 
referential expressions. For only after we have discovered that the names we have used 
are in fact empty will we engage in pretense (should any needs for that arise after the 
discovery). That is, because of the force of the basic schema of reference - related to 
the information about the proper name emptily used – we have taken it as natural that 
there is the referent. But what we could not appropriately do is to adopt the pretense 
stance as methodologically ex post facto in our theorizing and then claim that it has 
been operative all the time in practice. This move fails because the empirical evidence 
refutes it outright, but also because it manifests the violation of the epistemic 
symmetry principle I argued for earlier. The reason for this is that the pretense 
accounts smuggle in post-discovery knowledge as to the non-existence of the referent 
of the empty name to the pre-discovery situations. That is strictly prohibited by the 
epistemic symmetry principle. 
 
Recanati discusses uses of fictional and metafictional sentences as well as empty 
names (Recanati 2000). He takes up the pretense account, and for most of the time 
manages to keep the issues separate without confusing the innocent uses of the empty 
names to any pretense uses. However his characteristically perceptive and acute 
handling of the tangled issues seems to leave him with respect to empty names. 
Recanati argues that when it turns out that there is no one to whom a proper name 
“NN” was previously used to (purportedly) refer, then the believer can no longer be 
said to believe the singular proposition, say, that NN is F, because there is no such 
singular proposition. Still the believer believes a general proposition that there is an 
individual with such and such properties, who (or what) is also F (Recanati 2000: 225-
6). 
 
Now if we hold on to the believer´s perspective, as I think we should (at least as 
closely epistemically as we can), what we no longer can say is irrelevant in a crucial 
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respect. For as long as the believer himself has no indications to believe otherwise, he 
continues to believe "singularly" of NN that NN is F, for nothing has changed in his 
informational economy with respect to "NN". In other words he uses "NN" innocently 
as a genuinely referring proper name, even when it is an empty one. We see that in 
those situations only the believer´s singular belief explains his behavior, verbal or 
otherwise, but the "general" belief does not. So Recanati´s postulation of "pseudo-
singular belief" as something in between the singular and the general beliefs is not 
required. It should be noted that Recanati does acknowledge the option that we 
"describe the believer as taking herself to believe a singular proposition…while in fact 
there is no such proposition…" (Recanati 2000: 226) But he misaligns this 
immediately to the pretense account (it is as if there is such an individual NN) in 
which the ascriber of the belief fictively ascribes to the believer a singular belief 
concerning NN. But especially with the case of the empty names the ascriber´s 
perspective should be avoided as far as possible when we are making sense of the 
ascribee´s behavior, linguistic behavior included. 
 
So I think that the pretense account will not do. Here we should also register Frege´s 
own and straightforward account on the unproblematical nature of the empty names. It 
is manifest in his statement that we presuppose the existence of the Bedeutungen when 
we use proper names referentially, and that we can be, and sometimes are, mistaken 
when so presupposing (Frege 1997a: 162). 
 
The explanation my neurocognitive theory gives of the empty names is the following. 
The name in question is linked both to the global mapping, as the individual 
schema/concept of the referent, and the basic schema of reference. But usually not 
only that for the global mapping is linked to other global mappings that provide for the 
epistemic "surrounding story" and that story does not involve any piece of information 
that there is no referent. (Or if it does it is then not accessed by the speaker.) Therefore 
the empty names are used as genuinely referring expressions due to the engagement of 
the basic schema of reference and the information the related global mappings contain. 
Thus the empty names are strongly epistemically supported by the surround story. The 
aether case exemplifies clearly this feature of the innocent uses of the empty names (or 
terms in this case). Only when it is discovered that the name has no referent, i.e. when 
that information is fed to the global mapping related to the empty name will its 
innocent uses cease. That happened when the physicists (gradually) became convinced 
that aether is not needed because Einstein´s special theory of relativity has no need for 
that postulation and it explained the electromagnetic and other relevant phenomena as 
well as the aether theories (plus that from it can be derived new predictions, such as 
object´s mass times velocity of light in vacuo equals its energy content). 
 
Fictional characters form another topic that has been quite much discussed. But I fail 
to see why because they are explained by the cognitive mechanisms of the 
construction of the purported referents of the empty names. The only difference is of 
course that we know that the characters are fictional, hence the pretense attitude suits 
the fictional contexts. (And if one does not know that he is talking about a fictional 
entity, my account of the empty names explains that, not the pretense account.)  If that 
were not so, we would regard novels as awkward constructions, especially those which 
blend fact and fiction. As an example of the naturalness of reading novels note that the 
main characters are introduced in piecemeal fashion in most cases, just like we acquire 
information about real persons. This explains also why there are not any pressing 
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problems with the "lacking information", i.e. with the truth-values of such descriptions 
that attribute properties and features to the characters about which the story is silent: 
neither do we have anything approximating a complete knowledge of the real 
referents. And we individually know about some historical figures more than about 
many currently living persons we refer to. (It seems to me that this "uninteresting" 
view of mine about the fictional characters is very similar to Daniel Dennett´s 
(Dennett 1991: 79-80, 365-6).) 
 
Scott Soames, following Salmon´s ideas, tries to save the Millian approach in the case 
of empty names and fictive entities (Soames 2002: 92-3). The crux of his account is 
that we have a sufficient de re contact with both future and merely possible but never 
actualized individuals. This contact is possible when we are able, in principle, to 
observe a sperm cell and an ovum that merge to develop into an individual, or that 
could have merged so to develop. In effect the Soames-Salmon account postulates 
singular propositions consisting of singular propositions of those not-yet-existing and 
the possibly-existing individuals to save the Millian approach. But even if we ignore 
the fact that the Millian view by itself does not require any de re contacts in the 
specification of the semantic values (the referents) of the thoughts (singular 
propositions), what Soames states is incoherent on the very Millian grounds, for it 
requires (previously or currently) existing individuals as the semantic values. In both 
of Soames’ examples there are no really existing individuals (not yet and not ever, 
respectively). In other words, the ontological statuses of the individuals Soames takes 
to exist are individuals only in the sense that we imagine them to be really (actually) 
existing ones. But when something is imagined to exist, it is imagined to exist, i.e. its 
individuation requires conceptual-cum-informational factors. And these pertain to all 
intents and purposes to the Fregean senses (albeit very weakly individuating in 
Soames´ cases). It seems to me to be nothing more again than a mere ad hoc 
postulation to speak about singular propositions being about singular propositions 
consisting of the possible "zygotic" individuals to save the Millian view. 
 
This - pardon me - ontological free-wheeling is carried to its extremes in Soames´ 
handling of the names of the fictional characters. For they are postulated to be "a 
special kind of real, existing object; they, too, are abstract objects." (Soames 2002: 93) 
But fictional is fictional, not really existing; fictional characters are imagined and/or 
conceptual, nothing ontologically stronger need be assumed. The Fregean conceptual 
means are the most that are needed for the individuation of the fictional characters, but 
that implies no ontological status to them in our modern approach. This handling of 
the fictional characters by Soames and Salmon displays clearly the philosophically 
frustrating feature of the platonistic view they endorse: the reifications do not add any 
explanatory power whatsoever, they only double our ontology by pretending 
ontological seriousness. (An apt case of the pretense account, indeed.) And what is 
more, platonism should be argued for, not presupposed, if one could not help using it. 
The obvious reason is that it is an extreme ontological view. (Though as my remarks 
here indicate, I take it really to be not an ontological view at all, but merely an 
expression of mistaking conceptual matters for ontological ones.) 
 
The direct-causal theorists of the neo-Russellian and Millian varieties have proposed 
to solve the problem of the empty names with “gappy propositions” also. (These seem 
in effect similar to Salmon-Soames singular propositions containing singular 
propositions.) A gappy proposition is an abstract structure that contains a “gap” in the 
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place of the referent in the singular proposition. As I am suspicious over the notion of 
singular proposition, the much more I am over the gappy proposition. To keep on 
putting it bluntly it seems to me only a desperate attempt, nothing more. If the referent 
place of the proposition does not tolerate any Fregean mode of presentation why 
would there being nothing in that place be more tolerable? (And please do not say that 
“there is not nothing, there is a gap”.) In other words I just could not take this notion 
seriously. Plainly the gap does not contribute to explain a whit the meaningfulness of 
the thoughts about actually non-existent entities. 
 
Finally, Stuart Brock argues against the actualized descriptions view as providing a 
solution to the problem of the empty names (Brock 2004). If for example the sentence 
like “Santa Claus does not exist” is analyzed according to that view it says something 
like “the actual jolly fat man…”. If so there is the problem that, because actualized 
descriptions are rigid and apply to the actually existing entities just like proper names 
do, it follows that we are to infer that Santa Claus could not possibly have existed. But 
I reject Brock’s claim that the analysis is the correct one. The actualized descriptions 
view should be understood to involve the claim that once it is, or becomes, known that 
there is no referent for the proper name to be about, the actualized descriptions 
analysis reads instead “the…that was incorrectly believed to exist, does not actually 
exist”. That is, the negative existential is the metalevel report about the earlier 
referential beliefs with respect to the proper name in question. And a thought 
expressed by a sentence, say, “Santa Claus is white-bearded”, once it is known that 
Santa does not really exist, becomes indeed Fregean “mock thought”, i.e. a respectable 
thought but known to be about fictional character. And that does not block, either, the 
sound statement that Santa Claus might have existed. So let us turn to the existential 
analyses. 
 
???????????????????????????
 
I propose that the existential statements are plain comments; that is their role in 
discussions. The positive existential statement confirms that, when a speaker uses the 
name "a", he in fact refers to a and that it is correct to refer to a, i.e. that a exists. 
(When one uses a description the situation does not change in any relevant way, as is 
easy to see: one only zooms in on that element of the sense of the proper name that the 
description expresses.) In a way the function of the positive existential statements is 
social; in this it pertains to the division of (referential) linguistic labour. One may use a 
proper name tentatively and ascribe some properties to its purported referent based on 
the neurocognitive information residing in one’s relevant global mapping. But that 
information may not apply, or fit, to anyone or anything, although the name might 
refer to an existing individual. When this inadequacy of the purportedly individuative 
information is discovered someone corrects the speaker by stating the positive 
existential, and maybe offers an adequate description of the referent if it is clear that 
the speaker was after that individual but did not know anything (nontrivial) about the 
referent. Or maybe there is just a disagreement over whether someone named "NN" 
exists or not, and NN is reported by an outside party “in the know” to exist to put the 
matter straight. It must be realized that in these cases the negative existential statement 
is already used implicitly. The person who corrects the wrong individuation made, or 
presupposed, by the speaker could have said that "NN does not exist" precisely 
because there exists no one thus individuated, and it may not be clear that the speaker 
was intending a certain person but had no adequate information about the referent. 
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The existential statements focus on the presuppositions of the referential uses of proper 
names (and other referring expressions) but as Frege held when someone uses a proper 
name referentially he normally believes that the referent exists. When the purported 
referent does not exist, the negative existential statement is usually ventured, thus 
commenting on the speaker´s incorrect beliefs as to the existence of the purported 
referent. In the same vein the positive existential statement is used as a comment when 
it is clear that one is hesitant about whether the purported referent exists or not. 
 
????????????????????????????????
 
De re–de dicto is another distinction about which the philosophers (and the linguists) 
have debated for ages. The issue is not just how to characterize it adequately, with 
possible subcategories like perceptual de re reference, and what that has to do with the 
transparent-opaque distinction (see for example (Recanati 1993, 2000)), but whether 
the very distinction exists at all. Because the material is huge and still keeps coming in 
I propose to distance myself from it by first siding with those skeptical of the viability 
of the distinction and then giving few reasons for my stance. But first let me make an 
explicatory remark. The distinction between de re-de dicto thoughts on the one hand 
and de re-de dicto references on the other does not matter here. It is obvious that when 
the issue is the senses of proper names we are only interested in the thoughts. And 
from this it follows, as should be clear from all that has been argued during this work, 
that the referential speech acts inherit their referential force from the thoughts and 
senses. This includes the demonstrative referrings, for as argued in the previous 
chapter the context is represented in thought and is therefore effective in one´s 
referential thoughts via the basic schema of reference together with the perceptual 
information present in the demonstrative situation. De re reference is indicated when it 
is said of an individual a that it is such-and-such. De dicto reference takes place when 
it is said of whoever (or whatever) that he, she or it is such-and-such. But this does not 
yet say much at all, for it leaves open the relations (semantic and/or epistemic-cum-
cognitive) the speaker bears to the individual in both cases. In the same vein it only 
adds to the problem when one talks about the ascribed propositional attitudes of 
another person. The reason is that it may happen that in those cases what is de re to the 
ascriber may well be de dicto to the person the attitude is ascribed to. So we must turn 
our attention to the semantic and epistemic-cognitive relations instead. 
 
Usually de re reference is said to take place when the genuine, the actual, referent of 
the used expression is intended as the target. When a speaker says "the oldest player in 
this tournament can still beat many of the younger ones", that is a de re mode of 
reference with "the old player" if the speaker has someone particular player in mind 
(presumably by having been in perceptual contact with him). If the speaker intends to 
say merely that whoever is the oldest player, he (or she) can still beat many of the 
younger players, the reference by "the oldest player" is de dicto. But note that the 
description seems to subsume also proper names: if one says that "Viktor Korchnoi 
can still beat many of the younger ones" he may be using the name as the name of the 
grandmaster he has close cognitive-perceptual contact, or he may be using it as a name 
of someone called "Viktor Korchnoi" of whom he only knows that he is a top chess 
player. The speaker is deferring here but his speaker reference has also more of the de 
dicto status than de re because he relates only the general descriptive expression to the 
proper name “Victor Korchnoi”. I do not know if this feature of the de re-de dicto has 
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ever been noticed, but I claim that it is genuine one, and the reason is the informational 
content the senses of proper names and descriptions contain for the speakers. So we 
have here the first sign that de re-de dicto reference may be a continuum of cases and 
therefore has primarily to do with the variety and amount of the information related to 
the referential expressions. 
 
I prefer to restrict de re-de dicto readings of sentences and utterances to the actual 
world. The subject gets more complicated if possible worlds or counterfactual talk is 
taken into account. For in that case de re readings cross-classify the actual world ones. 
In the de re reading both "Aristotle" and "the most famous pupil of Plato" can both 
refer to the actual Aristotle (when the description is actualized). But "the most famous 
pupil of Plato" can also be read de dicto in the possible world contexts. In that case 
one considers any possible world separately and refers to whoever in that world is the 
most famous pupil of Plato, which of course need not be the actual Aristotle. (But 
“Plato” might still be referring de re in that world to the actual Plato). That is the 
predicative reading of the description that I made quite much out of in chapter 5. 
 
I do not think that there is any qualitative difference between the allegedly two 
different modes of reference. As I already hypothesized it is only the amount and 
variety of the neurocognitive information that matters. The cases that are taken to be 
de dicto references the amount of that information is typically rather scarce and more 
conceptual than in those cases where one makes de re references. Thus in the example 
above the speaker may not know anything more about the players than what his 
referential statement expresses (assuming of course that there is the sole oldest player 
in the tournament). The de re references are usually taken to involve some kind of 
causally closer contact between the referent and the speaker. This is likely to lead to a 
controversy over the relevant types of the causal relations in question. But this I take 
rather to suggest that the causal relations as such are not sufficient to guarantee 
successful de re references. In other words, it may be again the case that those 
favouring the causal account of de re references have mistaken informational relations 
for causal relations. For example the speaker may have been in a visual contact with 
all the players, or he may know whom the oldest player is by descriptions drawn from 
a reliable source who has had the required type of informational contact. 
 
But this second alternative again shows the marks of the fragmentation of the de re-de 
dicto distinction. How much is there de re and how much de dicto involved when one 
purports to refer by invoking his memory information acquired via some source, and 
when one purports to refer "on the spot", i.e. by generating a correct description on the 
top of his head? Is the reference de re or de dicto when one has forgotten from whom 
or where he originally got the information about the referent, even when his statement 
is of de dicto type by its linguistic clothes (by being, for example, a general type of 
statement as above and with no close causal connections, let alone direct perceptual 
ones)? What about the cases when the speaker has not been in some kind of direct 
causal contact with the purported referent, but that purported referent the utterance 
specifies is in fact the oldest player and he is referred to by his proper name? We see 
that it is not the causal relation per se that counts but the neurocognitive information 
and the interplay of it with the other pieces of the contextual information that 
contribute to the status of the referential act. 
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The individual concepts as the global mappings embody may contain different 
amounts and kinds of perceptual information. When an individual concept contains no 
such information, when the speaker has not been in any “close” perceptual contact 
(have not been acquainted with the referent), the individual concept is of general or 
descriptive nature. But that does not mean that the individual concept in question is not 
about a definite individual, especially if the speaker can identify or recognize that 
individual, if asked to. That is, I do not see it as being a necessary feature of the 
recognitional reference that there has been perceptual contact earlier; for it is possible 
to recognize someone or something by using only the conception one has about the 
individual. For instance if I have been told only that the oldest player in the 
tournament still can beat many of the younger ones, I am likely to recognize him 
among the players by his appearance. 
 
In light of these questions it seems to me that if the de re-de dicto distinction amounts 
to anything explanatorily, it only marks the two ends of a continuum, not any 
qualitative difference. The actual referential uses of language are in many cases so 
invested in both perceptual (and/or perceptually derived) and non-perceptual 
conceptual information from the surroundings and from the memory stores of the 
speaker, which mesh to varying extents in the global mappings, that to try to find a 
principled boundary between de re and de dicto reference looks futile. Non-perceptual 
conceptual information should be understood in the way that the amount of the 
perceptual information is low and/or not of much relevance contentwise in the 
particular occasion. This caveat is in order because there are no strict perceptual-
conceptual divide either between perceptions and conceptions - as the dynamical 
architecture of the global mappings shows and as is well known from the research in 
cognitive psychology and in philosophy. When the connections from the referent (and 
to the referent by motor actions) have been many, or few but informationally intensive, 
the referential act is quite secure and towards the de re end. But this may also happen 
when one´s knowledge of the referent is extensive and sufficiently detailed although 
one has not had any close causal contact with the referent. 
 
De re can change to de dicto (and of course vice versa). This happens when the 
perceptual information the speaker possesses diminishes and is lost eventually or 
forgotten all at once, leaving only non-perceptual conceptual information (expressible 
by descriptions). It is during this extended phase of losing the perceptual information 
that the direct-causal theory also begins to lose its plausibility as it mainly relies on the 
perceptual information acquired through the demonstrative referential situations. In 
other words, when only non-perceptual information is left about the referent, it is open 
to any new "surrounding story" to become relevant with the result that the conceptual 
information determines a new but epistemically as genuine referent as the earlier de re 
perceptual information. (Why this still might seem “intuitively” askew was explained 
in section 4.2.5.) 
 
Why, then, has de re-de dicto reference distinction been focused rather keenly? I think 
that the main reason is the failure to keep separate the first person and the third person 
perspectives. I take it that what matters to reference is the first person perspective in 
the explanations of reference (and the ascriptions of the propositional attitudes). What 
counts primarily is how the speaker conceives of the entities he purports to refer to, not 
how others, especially we as theorists, see things. That is, though one must adopt the 
theoretician´s perspective on the issues under consideration, one must not adopt the 
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third-person stance exclusively in all issues as the only viable perspective. Here we 
have a clear case in point when the theoretician must adopt the first person 
perspective. And the first-person perspective becomes relevant only when it gets, so to 
speak, "first personalized", i.e. when the speakers involved get to know something 
from which it follows, them being aware of it, that they can change from the de dicto 
towards the de re mode along the continuum of the referential modes. It does not 
matter to the speaker whether or not he has been in some kind of close contact, en 
rapport, with the purported referent if he is not particularly interested in the nature of 
that contact. If he is and comes to know the nature of that contact (for example that he 
has been shaking hands with the referent unbeknownst to him that that individual is the 
referent of the expressions he is using), then from the third-person perspective, which 
the speaker can assume also, we can say that his reference becomes more de re than de 
dicto than it previously was. What is from our omniscient perspective clearly de re 
reference, may well be de dicto reference from the speaker´s perspective for the lack 
of the more "involved" information, information acquired by some more direct means 
than for example by being told that the referent is such and such. 
 
To put this in another way one easily falls prey to the violation of the epistemic 
symmetry principle in confusing the referential interpretation of the contents of the 
speaker´s doxastic states with the referential interpretation of one´s own states. It 
seems to me that many debates of the de re-de dicto references can be dissolved by 
resolving this confusion. 
 
Of course it could be stipulated that de re reference always involves the purported 
referent, even if that referent is not the correct one judged by the content of the 
utterance in which the referring expression surfaces. Then de dicto reference becomes 
conceptual, or "general", in the spirit of Russell´s theory of descriptions: de dicto 
reference is to who or whatever is such and such. (With respect to the descriptions 
invoked it may even be Donnellan´s attributive use.) But I think that the few cases 
above of the interplay between close informational connections, especially perceptual, 
and the descriptive information within a particular context are sufficient to show that 
this stipulation is not explanatorily fruitful.5 
 
????????????????????????
 
Like the previous cases the distinction between the referential and the attributive uses 
of the definite descriptions has been discussed extensively since Keith Donnellan 
proposed it in the middle of the 1960s (Donnellan 1966). According to Donnellan a 
use of the description, say, "the murderer of Smith" in the sentence or utterance 
"Smith´s murderer is insane" is attributive when it applies to whoever it is that 
murdered Smith. The referential use of that description takes place when it is uttered 
with a manifest intention by the speaker to refer to a contextually salient individual, as 
when one says that Smith´s murderer is insane upon witnessing the disturbed behavior 
of the person who stands accused in the court. The motivation behind this distinction 
derives from the observation that in the referential use the description plays no part in 
the truth-conditions of what is said by the utterance (of which it is a part). The 
attributive truth-condition of "Smith´s murderer is insane" includes that person who is 
Smith´s murderer, whoever he or she is, and the utterance is true if that person is 
insane. The truth-condition of the referential use is independent of the description, for 
the description may be incorrect: the accused in the court may be falsely accused, but 
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the utterance is still true of him or her if he or she is insane (or even if he or she only 
behaves insanely there).6 
 
I do not think that the distinction implies anything negative with respect to the Fregean 
sense theory of reference. This conclusion can be reached quite swiftly once we drop, 
as I argued we should, the widely shared but incorrect assumption that the Fregean 
senses are thoroughly descriptional and wholly articulatable without any remainder in 
linguistic terms. If the senses are not thoroughly descriptional, even in the case of 
descriptions, and even if it is accepted that Donnellan´s distinction between the 
referential and the attributive uses of the descriptions provides sound counterexamples 
to the Russellian version of the description theory of reference (as seemed to be 
Donnellan’s at least partial intent), the sense theory of reference remains unscathed. 
 
But does not this argument seem a little bit too swift? Let us suppose that "the 
murderer of Smith" expresses all that someone knows about a certain person. Taken by 
itself this description does not determine any definite person as the sole murderer of 
Smith (assuming the murder was not teamwork like Caesar’s death). The description 
can even be made informationally richer without it still determining the murderer. So 
there we have a possible case where the description expresses a sense, the rudimentary 
individual concept the speaker possesses, but it fails to determine the referent. In 
contrast the referential use of the original, not enriched, description picks up a definite 
individual. Is this not a clear counterexample to the Fregean theory of reference? 
 
It is not. Notice, first, that the fact that the sense does not determine unique referent as 
the murderer could not be soundly used against the Fregean theory. The reason is that 
it misses the intent of that theory. The sense theory of reference by no means requires 
that every sense of every referential expression, however informationally meager it is, 
determines a unique referent. That would be unrealistic on the face of it. As long as the 
sense is not informationally sufficiently rich, i.e. when it does not even purport to 
single out unique individual, it is not in the proper domain of that theory as comes to 
proper names in Frege´s extensive sense including proper names in our sense as well 
as the definite descriptions. As pointed out in section 2.1 the function and the concept 
expressions are a different matter. The individual concept may begin to develop 
around the rudimentary elements that can be given by general concept expressions 
(like "a famous physicist" in Kripke´s well known example). 
 
The second consideration that speaks against the referentially used descriptions being 
counterexamples to the Fregean theory is the following point. The referentially used 
description in the statement "Smith´s murderer is insane" makes a sortal individuation 
to a human being. This expresses a more weighty part of the sense because it is 
understood that only humans can be murderers. (The fact that murderer in trial stand 
accused is obviously another background feature which contribute to the referential 
use of the description.) That this is implicit does not count against my analysis. The 
reason is the factor that creates the referential connection between this implicit sortal 
concept and the intended referent the speaker has in mind. This factor is the perceptual 
information that characterizes the intended referent, the one who stands accused in 
Donnellan´s example. Earlier I argued that perceptual information can be part of the 
sense of a referring expression, part of the global mapping as the individual concept. In 
Donnellan´s example it is just this kind of perceptual information that creates the 
connection from the intended referent to the description used. So it can be maintained 
  227 
that the description "the murderer of Smith" literally understood does not carry any 
referential weight, or if it does that weight is due to the fact that the description 
becomes in effect a pointing expression, a demonstrative. When the person stands 
falsely accused, i.e. when the description fails to be true of him or her, the largely 
irrelevant referential role of the description is explained by the essential role the 
perceptual information assumes in the situation. In effect the description expresses 
only a lesser part of the sense that is about the accused and therefore its falsity does 
not matter. (It may help to understand this by relating it to what I said in section 2.6: 
false descriptions can be used to refer also in non-demonstrative situations.) In short, 
the referential use of the description reduces to all extents and purposes to 
demonstrative reference. (Including the "semi-demonstratives" like "that X" said in the 
absence of that X. But this case can be explained as anaphora – see the next section.) 
That is, if the description does not apply (or applies only to some minimally required 
degree, for instance that the murderer is a person, when the description implicitly 
involves a sortal concept), the pointing function it assumes has the force of the 
demonstrative "that": “that person (the accused murderer) is insane". So I am quite 
ready to accept this line of argument, for it does not have any negative consequences 
in relation to the Fregean sense theory. 
 
It has been debated whether the referential-attributive distinction is semantic or 
(merely) pragmatic one. Here I only state my view. The usual type of argument for the 
pragmatic interpretation is that the referential uses of the descriptions are to be 
explained by the relevant aspects of the context, hence pragmatic factors. The 
attributive use is typically analyzed along the lines of Russell´s theory of the definite 
descriptions and is semantic, having to do with the "standard uses" of the expressions 
(as Luntley, following Kripke, explicates them (Luntley 1999: 53). - Recanati has 
offered a new interesting solution which I will not consider here (Recanati 1989; 
1993).) But if my approach is on the right track the referential uses are also semantic 
for they involve sense-constituting informational factors, even if being perceptual they 
do pertain to the context of use. To make this answer more efficient would require an 
argument to the effect that there is not any such strict distinction between semantics 
and pragmatics that those who invoke it in favour of the pragmatic interpretation seem 
to assume. (It seems that Recanati´s approach provides the beginnings of such 
argument.) What I said about the explanatory non-existence, or at the very least 
relative nature, of the semantics-pragmatics distinction (in the sense of narrow 
pragmatics) in chapter 4 still stands, of course. 
 
?????????
 
As is the case with the propositional attitudes and de re-de dicto reference, in reading 
the literature on anaphora it could not escape one´s notice that there exists a 
respectable amount of explanatory hypotheses and counterexamples to all of them. For 
instance there are different kinds of rules proposed for scopes of quantifiers and 
orderings of expressions, with counterexamples flying criss-cross. I think that the main 
explanation of that quite chaotic state of the anaphora research is the very underlying 
cognitive mechanism of anaphora itself, a mechanism that the theoreticians have failed 
to notice, at least to my knowledge. Let me explain. That one writer can represent 
anaphoric sentences or utterances as examples and another writer other sentences or 
utterances as counterexamples to the first proposed analysis are both dependent on the 
fact that their examples come from real life situations, or from similar but imagined 
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circumstances, in which the sentences or utterances become sufficiently meaningful, 
and being to the point, only when the context of the sentences or utterances is taken 
into acount.7 It seems to me that the criss-cross of the examples and the counters to 
them exemplifies the fact that language is used referentially much more creatively than 
that it would be expected to be used if we relied only on some narrow class of specific 
rules of anaphora. In other words, the examples in the literature are based on the 
already built flexible schemas of communicational situations, which permit the 
presentation of both real and possible situations in which the sentences or utterances 
are, or would be, semantically correct (even when they seem prima facie 
ungrammatical and/or semantically odd). The writers seem to concentrate so much on 
the sentences themselves that this automatic process escapes their notice. 
 
A simple example of the hopelessness of the merely syntactical or grammatical 
analyses is given by the following sentences.8 "Eeva expects that she will get bed early 
tonight." Is anaphora from "she" to Eeva herself or to some other person? It will not 
help to try "The meeting was hell. Eeva expects that she will get bed early tonight.". 
The problem stays, for Eeva may be thinking of the woman who almost went off her 
head in the meeting. No answers will be received without more detailed information 
about the context. Another example, taken from the literature, is the sentence "Most 
men who own a car wash it on Sunday." (Evans 1985b: 138-9) Here "it" is supposed to 
be in an anaphora relation to "a car". But this is only one possibility. Another reading 
is that "it" relates to some other (kind of) object altogether, for example to a garage. 
(As could be the case with “Many new garages are built by the new neighbours. Most 
men who own a car wash it on Sunday.” This sounds little odd but it is not 
anaphorically incomprehensible.) 
 
It can be argued that my criticism misses the mark. For it is presupposed that the 
sentences or utterances under study give all the information relevant to the situation in 
which those sentences or utterances are used. Thus if one says that "Eeva expects that 
she will get bed early tonight", "she" could not but refer to Eeva. Likewise with Evans´ 
example: "it" anaphorically refers to "a car". This is correct but only as far as it goes. 
For I can state my point anew: if the sentences give all the relevant information the 
negative feature of the typical examples is that they handle only very restricted and 
distorted situations. Most of the everyday conversations are much more extended, both 
spatially and temporally. An adequate handling of anaphora as a cognitive and 
memory-based phenomenon would have to take these cases into account as well, but 
those proposing syntactical rules do not ever attempt that. For example two persons 
see something luxurious enough to make them stare at it (and realize that they both do 
that). Then years later the other says "it was a beautiful sight" and the other one knows 
immediately to what the speaker refers, perhaps because the context of that utterance 
provides information which brings to the hearer´s mind the memory of the original 
scene. Notice also that in this case anaphora is not even entirely a linguistic 
phenomenon in the sense that one expression would refer to another. For the two 
spectators may not have uttered a single word in the original circumstances. Here the 
anaphoric relation goes via memory representation to the referent. These types of cases 
may not be very common but that does not affect my argumentative point. 
 
So I do not consider the typical way with anaphora to be a fruitful one to explain it. 
Understood more realistically the anaphoric uses of expressions are heavily context-
dependent. One can read my argument also implying that there is no viable 
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explanatory distinction between sentence semantics and discourse semantics. In the 
same vein the distinction between intrasentential anaphora and intersentential 
anaphora is spurious, if given only a syntactic explanation. Instead I am proposing 
that, despite the immense variety of anaphoric relations discovered, the underlying and 
unifying explanation of them is given by the on-line construction of the schemas from 
the neurocognitive information the speakers and the hearers possess and share in the 
context. (On the complexity of the issues involved in anaphora and in its semantical, or 
information theoretical, treatment, see (Gawrond & Peters 1990).) 
 
Suppose someone says "Eeva is tired. The day had been hectic and she just wants to 
get much sleep." "She" refers anaphorically to "Eeva", we may agree. I want to 
propose that anaphora is adequately understood as a species of internal demonstrative 
reference, requiring working or short-term memory. Though, of course, the 
information it utilizes may be all drawn from the long-term memory as in the example 
above with the two spectators. First of all, anaphoric reference becomes possible only 
when one knows how to use personal pronouns but also other deictic and 
demonstrative expressions, so that my talking about internal demonstrative reference 
should not be taken to imply that only demonstratives are subsumed as the public 
expressions for the internally constructed anaphoric relations in one´s working 
memory and, in many cases, in connection to one´s perceptual processes. The label 
"demonstrative" is to mark the specific feature of the internal schema construction, i.e. 
that the outer linguistic expression of anaphora is the result of the internal schema 
representations of the anaphoric relations. We learn the mechanisms of these uses 
when we begin to learn language and the basic schema of reference develops (although 
personal pronouns are not the first expressions learned). When a child matures to the 
stage when he is competent with pronouns he usually has also his memory abilities 
sufficiently developed. In particular he is able to retain on-line representations of 
events active in the cortical-hippocampal recurrent loops, to which process can be 
added new relevant information from the contextual sources both from the external 
surroundings and the other internal global mappings. This on-line construction of the 
referential and the situational schemas takes the role of the context in which the 
demonstrative references are made. The internality of them can be clearly focused on 
when there is spatiotemporal gap between the original circumstances and the later 
anaphoric references. But in general anaphora is internal in the demonstrative cases 
through the working memory utilization of the schemas constructed “on the spot” 
about the on-going communicative situation.9 
 
So what takes place in the speaker´s brain when he utters the sentences about Eeva 
above is that his global mapping, the individual concept of Eeva, is activated (though 
not necessarily wholly). The perceptual representations of the events of that day during 
which Eeva got exhausted are linked to it. The pronoun "she" refers in that constructed 
internal representation to Eeva by being linked to the global mapping about Eeva and 
by being connected to the basic schema of reference which guides the anaphoric use of 
the pronouns, in relation to earlier expressions in the relevant situation. This way one 
can in principle account for all anaphoric referential relations, even the most complex 
ones. (To test this prediction one could envisage more and more complex sentences 
and see at what point one reaches the limit of one´s processing abilities, i.e. one´s 
comprehension ability of the anaphoric relations the temporal span of one´s working 
memory allows.) 
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The involvement of the working memory in anaphora receives support from event-
related potentials (ERP) studies. The so-called left-anterior negativity during 300 to 
700 milliseconds from the stimulus onset is usually interpreted as representing the 
cognitive processing elicited when a word in a sentence refers back in the sentence 
(Kutas & Dale 1997: 223). According to my framework the activation of the global 
mappings (and presumably the inhibitory mechanisms involved) is responsible for this 
phenomenon. The potential changes recorded are mostly caused by the dendritic 
postsynaptic extracellular potentials of synchronously activated (pyramidal) neurons 
(Martin 1985: 644). But obviously there is no restriction to just one sentence because 
the duration of the short-term or working memory easily extends to several sentences 
and utterances. Presumably this is so because the schema construction is an embedding 
process, i.e. there are synchronizations within the larger mappings (and mappings of 
mappings); schemas are not constructed anew every time with the reception of new 
sentences, or with the production of them. During this neural anaphora construction 
the information that is linked to the referring expressions individuate the primary 
referent for the speaker. Also in the brain of the hearer the referring expression 
launches his neurocognitive schema construction and working memory retention (of 
even long since gone events related to the referent) by the now familiar recurrent 
synchronous mechanisms. ("I saw Eeva too. She looked really tired. I have never seen 
her in such a condition, except once. She was like a living dead.") 
 
It seems to me that precisely because we are able to handle many sentences and 
utterances during a single occasion, and even larger chunks of discussions and 
contexts in the working memory, the syntactical and grammatical analyses are utterly 
on a wrong track (see also (Bach 1987: 224)). To put this suspicion of mine in general 
terms anaphora is not primarily a linguistic phenomenon at all. Sentences and 
utterances are just convenient but very condensed encodings of the informational 
processes that produce them. Of course there are structural similarities between them, 
but as far as the sentences and utterances are only encodings it does not make much 
explanatory sense to try to find only in them the grounds for anaphoric reference. 
 
I want to continue a little on anaphora. I said that the spatiotemporal extension of it has 
not been attempted but that is not wholly correct, for there are steps towards that in an 
innovative and original work (Chastain 1975). Moreover it tallies well with my 
neurocognitive approach to anaphora as schema construction in the contextually 
guided working memory processes, in which the context can be both external and 
internal. Charles Chastain´s seminal notion of anaphoric chains that are preserved 
during the evolution of discourse can be explained in my neurocognitive framework. 
This becomes more important because Chastain himself does not explain our ability to 
construct and retain anaphoric chains. 
 
To give one example out of many in Chastain´s work 
 
"D59:#A squirrel came by a tree. A man fed it some peanuts. He had been eating 
them. The man was sitting underneath the tree.#" (Chastain 1975: 231) 
 
("#" marks a boundary of discourse.) The anaphoric chains are "a squirrel – it", "a tree 
– the tree", "A man – He – The man", and "(some) peanuts – them". As we 
immediately see anaphoric chains are not necessarily (maybe even not normally, see 
later) restricted to single chains, but many of them can be handled cognitively during 
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the same on-going occasion of discourse. Of course such examples can be proliferated 
at will, but I want to point out that they can be extended spatiotemporally by 
"discourse jumps". These are possible because, as explained above, one usually does 
remember the original circumstances and the topics of these discourses. The 
participants - or at any rate those who know what the earlier discourses have been 
about and to what were referred then - can catch up with this discourse even years later 
and continue it as if nothing has happened in between. (Chastain mentions only in 
passing this involvement of memory (Chastain 1975: 251).) For example a participant 
to the discourse D59 above can later ask from the person who told the story what 
happened to that man who ate peanuts underneath the tree. If the person asked knows 
(or if it is just a story, if he can continue telling it) what happened to that man, he will 
most likely tell continuing the memory-based anaphorical chain. 
 
An anaphorical chain typically starts by an encounter with the object(s) and person(s) 
in those occasions where the referential expressions for them are introduced. Namings 
are such typical occasions, but not the only ones, because one may be introduced to a 
new referring expression by being told what or who the referent is and what it is 
called. This involves new anaphorical chains. Hence the anaphorical chains can 
diverge as well as converge (as Chastain also points out (Chastain 1975: 267)). In fact 
the ways in which the anaphorical chains can be instantiated are many and varied, but 
they all can be explained by the Fregean sense theory of reference because they are 
informational. (Chastain also mentions explicitly this information-related feature of 
them more than once in his paper.) So anaphorical chains do not present any 
difficulties to my theory. Chastain does argue by anaphoric examples, however, that 
"denotationism" is false. Chastain takes denotationism as equivalent to the pure 
description theory of reference, not the sense theoretic account. Thus with respect to 
the latter theory nothing untoward follows from Chastain´s arguments. The main 
reason for the failure of the denotationism instead is that it could not handle adequately 
perceptual contexts. According to Chastain what counts in them "is the causal pathway 
along which information passes from the object perceived to the perceptual context; it 
is this which determines the identity of the thing which is seen, heard, touched, 
smelled, etc." (Chastain 1975: 248-9; see also 254) What I argued about the 
contextuality of the Fregean senses in section 4.3.5 and Donnellan´s distinction in the 
previous section enables us even to embrace Chastain´s claim, although it should be 
pointed out again that the causal chain literally is the information that is transmitted. 
 
We can see from Chastain´s perspective that anaphorical chains form a large part of 
the referential uses of language. That is because many (most?) speaker references after 
the introduction of a name, or a borrowing of it, are anaphorical in the extended 
spatiotemporal dimension. This observation also tallies well with my proposal that 
reference is a form of memory. As described above, the schemas and the individual 
concepts the thinkers and speakers have constructed during the earlier referential 
communicative encounters retain the information that is neurocognitively necessary 
for us to be able to use linguistic expressions to refer to anything. Demonstrative, 
ostensive and indexical references are a little different, but not much. That is because 
demonstrative situations will occasionally come along in the already weaved 
anaphorical chain with respect to a particular individual. For instance if you have 
learned to whom the proper name "Sami Hyypiä" refers and have talked about Sami 
Hyypiä in his absence, but when you encounter him "in the flesh" then that perceptual-
cum-demonstrative link in the chain, like when you say "there is Sami Hyypiä", owes 
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much of its referentiality to the very chain which have been retained by the 
information you possess about Sami Hyypiä. 
 
????????? ???????????????
 
The framework of possible world semantics (PWS) has been in vogue for many 
decades now. It is a general framework for many different approaches in studying 
intentional attitudes and reference (among other subjects). It uses tools from model 
theory and logics, mostly from intensional logics. But there are distinct views within it 
that try to remain close to the actual cognitive phenomena as much as possible. In this 
respect Jaakko Hintikka´s approach is the most faithful one, cognitively speaking 
(Hintikka 1969, 1975, 1989). I could not go into all of the aspects of his theorizing, but 
two of them must be discussed here because they are the most germane to my 
framework. They are i) Hintikka´s two methods of individuation/identification and ii) 
the neuroscientific explanation of them. 
 
Hintikka has repeatedly argued against the explanatory viability of the notion of rigid 
designator. (See especially (Hintikka & Sandu 1995), though they ignore the causal 
component of the direct-causal theory.) His general point is that rigid designators do 
"yield" in the propositional attitude contexts. This means that the individual referred to 
must be individuated or identified in those contexts before we can talk about it as that 
particular individual. This is obviously contrary to Kripke´s stipulatory view 
("prefabricated individuals") according to which the individuals talked about are 
unproblematically the ones from our actual world. But according to the Hintikkian 
approach it is us who "draw the transworld heir lines" in the intensional and 
propositional attitude contexts, i.e. we individuate by individuating functions the 
"embodiments", or the "roles" the individuals play, in the courses of events under 
consideration in those contexts (Hintikka 1975a: 30). This view has a certain Kantian 
touch in it: in a sense the individuals we talk about, refer to, are our own constructions 
in that we individuate and identify them by our perceptuo-cognitive apparatus. This is 
very similar to my view from the essential role of the neurocognitive information in 
the use of proper names, and in the referential use of language in general. I would also 
like to point out that the problem of the disambiguation of proper names (equivalent to 
Salmonian relativization of use), which must be solved for the notion of rigid 
designation to be of any use in the case of homonymous names, is a close kin to 
Hintikka´s arguments against the viability of rigidity as an independent phenomenon, 
i.e. as a non-cognitive feature of the referential use of proper names. The differences 
between our respective accounts are mostly found in the details of the mechanisms 
responsible for the individuation and identification of the referents. 
 
It seems to me that the point above can be generalized quite obviously. I have been 
arguing that we need to presuppose some identificatory means, viz. Fregean senses, for 
the rigid designators to get off the ground in the first place. Now the two methods, or 
modes, of cross-identification provide such in general terms. The public method is 
obviously a part of the Fregean notion of sense, but so is the perspectival method. As 
was seen that is shown by Frege´s Ateb-Afla example. Hence in effect Hintikka´s two 
methods of cross-identification are not new to semantics and to the theory of reference 
when correctly understood, although in the contemporary climate in the analytical 
philosophy of language they certainly so seem to be. As Hintikka has pointed out in 
many occasions the perceptual perspectival method is similar to Russell´s knowledge 
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by acquaintance. So I only point out that it is more appropriate to extend the historical 
span here to Frege with respect to both methods. 
 
Let us take a closer look at the two methods of cross-identification and 
reidentification. He calls them public and perspectival or object-centered and subject-
centered modes of identification (Hintikka & Sandu 1995: 274) (but earlier also 
physical or descriptive, and perceptual, demonstrative or contextual (Hintikka 1975)). 
Public identification takes place when a person knows or perceives who a is, i.e. a is 
identified by his known features and properties. For example E. Morse knows that it 
was Sarah Harrison who killed his own mother because the evidence leaves no other 
nearly as reasonable explanation. The public method of identification is akin to 
descriptive identification, but it seems to me that it can contain factors which could not 
be expressed by descriptions but which are well known publicly; for example, and 
most likely, aspects of the outlook of the referent. Perspectival identification takes 
place when one perceives a, i.e. is or has been in perceptual-informational contact with 
the referent. Thus Morse sees a rather slender brunette woman wearing a doctor’s coat. 
This perspectival identification method requires putting the individual in some kind of 
coordinate grid or system within Morse´s perceptual field. (It may be both ego- and 
object-centered.)10 
 
Hintikka argues that the neuroanatomical discovery of the visual ventral and dorsal 
routes supports the existence of his identification methods (Hintikka 1989; Hintikka & 
Symons 2003). According to the common neuroscientific wisdom the ventral route, as 
it is called, goes via those temporal areas, mostly in the inferior temporal lobe, in 
which reside many kinds of information about particular objects and persons. That is 
why the ventral route is also called the "what system" because it tells what or who the 
object or person is one perceives. The dorsal route is involved in location processing 
and putting objects in spatial configurations, ego- and space-centered. In addition to 
the visual areas, the involved areas are found in the parietal lobe, most likely in the 
Brodmann´s area 7 (and its subdivisions). It tells where and in what position the object 
is one is perceiving, hence the name "where system". In the same way in Hintikka´s 
account the ventral system is supposed to take care of the public identification and the 
dorsal route of the perspectival identification (Hintikka 1989: 124-5). 
 
This turning from the abstract intensional logic and model theory to the domain of 
neuroscience in search for the grounding of the explanations of the referential 
language use is very welcome indeed. But having said that and not to take anything 
away from Hintikka’s original work on this matter it must be also realized that it is still 
more a venture than a developed stance by Hintikka. His account simplifies in that it 
keeps the two routes functionally too separate from each other. That is not in 
accordance with the current view in the functional neuroanatomy. As we saw above 
the different processes work in unison and need informational input from one another 
during their activity. That is the very idea of the recurrent synchrony in binding the 
features of the cognitive targets together. It is true that the global mappings, as 
individual concepts, contain networks from the temporal areas that partake in the 
ventral route. Moreover the contextuality of the senses of proper names has process-
wise much to do with the parietal networks engaged in the dorsal route processes. But 
as I have been arguing the individuation and the identification of the referents requires 
also somatosensory, motor and emotional information (at least occasionally) outside 
the two routes for the full identification of the referent, be it thought about or 
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perceived. Therefore I fully endorse Maunsell´s and Ferrera´s point when they say 
"Although the what-where distinction laid out by Ungerleider and Mishkin has proved 
useful for describing the distinctions between the parietal and temporal pathways, it 
would be surprising if such simple terms completely described their functional 
differences." (Maunsell & Ferrera 1995: 458) 
 
Hintikka tends to keep his discussion at the general descriptive level. For example we 
are largely left wondering how the "operationalizations of the meaning functions", 
which are at the core of his theory with the individuative functions, are supposed to be 
realized at the neural level. My point is that although it is fine to find the realizations 
(or implementations) in the ventral and dorsal systems, this has the effect of leaving 
Hintikka’s PWS framework without much explanatory relevance. Another way to say 
this is that, despite the step to the right neural direction, the neuronaturalization of 
PWS still awaits us. (A very interesting subject by itself, though.) There are many 
steps downward from Hintikka´s general PWS to the neurocognitive level proper in 
which the identifications take place. It seems to me that the most obvious way to close 
these gaps and to achieve the neuronaturalization is by assimilating (maybe even 
identifying at some stage) possible worlds/scenarios, as cognitive constructs, with the 
schemas and schemas of schemas (of objects, events and persons). This would have 
the consequence that we will reach the neural level quite quickly, through a unifying 
short cut so to say, if my identification of the schemas with the individual concepts and 
these with the global mappings is correct. Zooming in on the global mappings in 
question can then further specify the individuative and identificatory methods. With 
respect to a particular individual the global mapping, the individual concept of that 
individual, is engaged but normally only different portions of it are activated and 
utilized depending on the situation. Public individuation is typical in non-perceptual 
contexts, perspectival in perceptual contexts. The former type of individuation calls for 
duty more of the non-perceptual portions of the information in the global mapping 
from the temporal areas, the latter more of the perceptual information (in addition to 
what one acquires on the spot in seeing the referent) in the occipital and parietal areas. 
But when the emotional impact is not negligible the subcortical nuclei like amygdala 
and hypothalamus partake in the identificatory processing also. And in those 
identificatory situations that require motor information the frontal motor areas are 
engaged (think for example being in a dark room when you have to recognize some 
object only by the way it functions). As pointed out, and as is well known, it is quite 
unlikely that there are distinctively pure cases: perceptions are concept-laden, and due 
to the recurrent architecture conceptual thoughts about the referents involve perceptual 
information when the global mapping contains it. (Though Hintikka is aware of that, 
for he analyzes the sentence "a sees who b is" along the lines that there is a physically 
and publicly individuated x such that a sees that b is x, i.e. b is a "perspectival 
individual" (Hintikka 1975b: 18-19).) 
 
To illuminate a little more how the neuronaturalization of PWS would go, the 
technical-metaphorical notion of diverging, or branching, and converging world lines 
in doxastic possible worlds can be explained by the separateness of two distinct global 
mappings (individual concepts) upon receiving the information that there are (at least) 
two distinct individuals, not only one as the person has believed. In converging there is 
merging of (at least) two global mappings through the neural catalyst network(s), 
which contains the information or has the effect that the person becomes to know (or 
believe) that what was believed, i.e. that there are distinct referents of the two proper 
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names, is in fact only one individual. In essence these processes (convergence and 
divergence of the world lines of individuals) were described in neural terms in section 
8.1.1. 
 
Hintikka argues that individuating functions form a subclass of the individual concepts 
(in Carnap´s sense), from which it follows that the extension-intension (sense) 
dichotomy is not theoretically satisfying (Hintikka 1975c: 89-92). But individuating 
functions and individual concepts in my sense are functionally, thus explanatorily, 
equivalent notions: they are both individuative. The latter pick up the same individual 
in all relevant scenarios (epistemic and doxastic possible worlds) as well as do the 
former. That is, when the latter fail the former could not succeed, for both "give us the 
referents of our individual expressions" (Hintikka 1975c: 91). Hintikka´s argument 
against the viability of the extension-intension dichotomy seems to be based on a 
misreading of Frege. Hintikka claims that there seems to be no inkling of the idea of 
functionality of the senses in Frege´s writings (Hintikka 1975c: 89). But surely the 
Fregean senses of proper names are functional, i.e. pertaining to functions singling out 
individually particular Bedeutungen. One should not be mislead by the partly 
metaphorical expression of the sense as the "mode of presentation" of the referent, or 
“ways of being given”, as Hintikka evidently does when he distinguishes the Fregean 
senses from his individuative functions by claiming in effect that the former do not 
involve the individuative element (Hintikka 1969a: 105). It seems that Hintikka has 
even misconceived the function of the Fregean senses with respect to referring 
expressions when he says that “Substitutivity of identity is restored, in brief, not by 
requiring that our singular terms refer to the entities postulated by the so-called theory 
of meaning, but by requiring…that they really succeed in specifying uniquely the kind 
of ordinary individual…” (Hintikka 1969: 108). Clearly the singular terms do not refer 
to the senses in Frege’s theory but to the very same ordinary individuals as they do in 
Hintikka’s account. They do that via the senses, as they do that via the “individuative 
functions”. So there is no relevant functional-cum-semantical difference between them 
whatsoever. Moreover the linguistic expressions for the Fregean senses are concept 
expressions “saturated” by arguments (in most cases the ordinary proper names) in the 
form of the definite descriptions (though, as we have been seeing, not exclusively). 
This linguistic garment enables us to see how the senses are functions in being 
individuative/identificatory. For example "the most famous pupil of Plato" is a 
function expression the extension of which is Aristotle (the Bedeutung being the 
concept the most famous pupil of Plato). ("_ is the most famous pupil of Plato", 
instead, is an "unsaturated" expression, i.e. functional expression the Bedeutung of 
which is a truth-value, true or false, when it is "saturated", i.e. in the place of "_" an 
expression of a proper name is inserted. And the sense of the sentence is the thought it 
expresses, i.e. that Aristotle is the most famous pupil of Plato.) 
 
Hintikka also faults Frege´s approach on intensions, i.e. the senses, on a par with 
faulting Carnap´s approach on them. But it is very much arguable that Carnap´s notion 
and grasp of intensions was not sufficiently Fregean, let alone the same as Frege´s, for 
such equivalence being justified. In particular it does not seem to follow from Frege´s 
semantics that the senses of proper names could not be restricted to epistemic and/or 
doxastic attitudes (possible worlds), unlike Carnap´s intensions (Hintikka 1975c: 86-
7). (I say “follows” because Frege did not discuss epistemic issues in terms of possible 
worlds or any equivalent notions.) Consequently PWS does not have an explanatory 
upper hand on the epistemic and doxastic attitudes. On the contrary it is only natural to 
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take the senses to be so restricted by Frege when he discusses propositional attitudes in 
Über Sinn und Bedeutung. 
 
It may be that Hintikka is led to criticize Frege on the manner he does, i.e. to see 
individual concept as more general notion than individuating functions because he is 
interested in intensional logics and their semantics, whereas Frege was not. That is, if 
one puts possible worlds and their individuals first, it is easy to think that the Fregean 
senses and individual concepts are not sufficiently strict in individuative terms, for 
they seem to leave it open that in some worlds they do not pick up the very same 
individual as in some others.11 But this is an unfair view for two reasons. First, and as I 
already pointed out, Frege was not interested in possible worlds. (Though he was 
interested in intensional concepts like propositional attitudes with respect to the 
senses.) Second, the Fregean senses can be taken to be sufficiently individuative with 
respect to the actual world. When it is realized that proper names are ordinarily used 
with the actualized-rigidified force, the senses are individuative also in the way that 
Hintikka’s individuative functions work. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1. This seems to be tantamount to, if not the same as, the triangle pattern of re-entry 
(Edelman 1989: 65). 
 
2. It can be a little more complex, as for example in the case when one hears "John Smith" 
but the disambiguation leads first to a wrong referent, which the context may soon reveal. 
Or this may happen because the neural representations of "John Smith" are so close to one 
another in the temporal area for proper names that they easily activate the global 
mappings as it were in a random fashion. The phenomenon of the divided reference, when 
a speaker refers to two (or more) individuals by one name at the same time because the 
information he possesses is not sufficiently detailed to separate the referents 
(unbeknownst to the speaker) is then a residual effect of the failure to disambiguate. Igal 
Kvart has discussed the issues (Kvart 1989). The cases Kvart presents as evidence for his 
account are mostly based on original encounters with the referents (perceptual and 
causally close ones). But the explanation of the divided reference stems from the 
informational "cluster" view given by Kvart, similar to the other neo-Fregean models in 
the literature, which allows him to enlarge his account to non-demonstrative cases. As 
with the file and dossier accounts, Kvart´s account is at best another subtheory explained 
by my neurocognitive theory (for example Kvart´s notion of cluster is, as is typical with 
such notions, left at the purely intuitive or phenomenological level). In particular it seems 
to me that his account of the divided reference can be given in neurocognitive terms along 
the lines in section 8.1.1. 
 
3. By the way, it seems to me that the usual talk of extensional versus intensional (and 
intentional) contexts denotes not a qualitative distinction but a distinction of degree only. 
The intensional contexts are those involving beliefs and other propositional attitudes (but 
also alethic and other modalities). The extensional contexts can be characterized by the 
feature that in them the referents of the terms are at our disposal qua themselves. Hence 
"Morning Star is Venus" is an extensional statement, but when one believes that "Morning 
Star is Venus" then it is intensional because it is possible that one did not believe it, 
therefore the substitutivity of the two expressions could fail for one. However the 
  237 
statement that Morning Star is Venus as such is as intensional as it is in the explicitly 
propositional context. The reason is that it is known (or at least "strongly believed") that 
the expression "Morning Star" refers to the same individual that "Venus" refers to. Here 
we see that the only difference is a difference in the epistemic (or doxastic) degree of the 
justifiedness or entrenchment of the identity statement. (Ditto for any other declarative 
sentences). That something is known makes it no less intensional, and intentional. This 
may have been lost in sight just because we take some statements as unproblematically 
true and widely known (as established facts). Therefore the propositional operator has 
been dropped. But it is there tacitly for it may happen that we will discover that even the 
most cherished parts of our knowledge turn out to be false. The tacit 
intensionality/intentionality is explained because knowledge is informational business, 
thus cognitive. And as all human behavior has cognitive element, no "pure" extensionality 
could ever be distilled from our knowledge. (The shortest argument here is the following: 
the extensional contexts are at least sometimes knowledge-based, knowledge requires 
reference, the latter is intentional, so is the former.) 
 
4. In the discussions of the contents of the thoughts and the propositional attitude contexts 
Kripke´s "puzzles" about belief ascriptions are often mentioned (Kripke 1979). Kripke´s 
argument is that there is something wrong with the very practices of ascribing beliefs to 
other speakers in that they sometimes lead to contradictory results like that one says both 
that “X believes that a is F”, and that “X also believes that a is not F”. If this is so, Kripke 
states, the blame for these results can not be put on the Millian approach, and in favour of 
the Fregean one, as is usually done. But I fail to see what is supposed to be the force of 
Kripke´s examples because they are rather underdescribed. Kripke fails to take into 
account that the belief ascriptions, as he gives them, can be naturally further specified 
with the result that the contradictory ascriptions do not follow. Especially Graeme Forbes 
has argued that this, in fact, is what our normal practices of belief ascriptions allow for, 
and even require when there arises the danger of contradictions in the ascriptions (Forbes 
1990: 356-63). 
 
5. De re-de dicto references have usually been discussed with respect to descriptions. But as 
indicated in the text it seems to me that there are both uses of proper names as well. De re 
use of a proper name takes place when the speaker knows who the referent is by a close 
connection ("acquaintance" seems to capture this mode of referential contact). De dicto 
reference takes place when the individual concept the speaker possesses about the referent 
includes only information that is not acquired by acquaintance, or when it does the 
speaker does not know that (as in the hand shaking example in the text). This last 
possibility seems to indicate that there is a continuum from de dicto to de re with respect 
to proper names also. But this should be no news by now because what matters to 
reference is the amount and kinds of information one possesses, not the causal contacts 
qua causal with the referent. 
 
6. Note that the referential-attributive distinction seems not to be same as the de re-de dicto 
distinction. When someone thinks, upon seeing Smith´s mutilated corpse, "Smith´s 
murderer is insane" that thought is attributive in Donnellan´s sense but also somewhat de 
re in the sense that there is a rather close evidential (causal/informational) connection 
from the corpse to the murderer. 
 
7. To my experience it is rather common that the evidential bases of the theoreticians´ claims 
are suspicious in that some sentences are judged ungrammatical according to the rules the 
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writer proposes, but the very sentences seem not to be ungrammatical, or misconstruals, at 
all; especially not if one can imagine a larger context which enables one to make perfect 
sense of the "ungrammatical" sentences. 
 
8. Another example is the type of outright question begging in anaphora studies. As Jaroslav 
Peregrin points out, the formal semanticians are not really allowed to presuppose co-
indexing to have taken place before they get to work on anaphoric cross-references 
(Peregrin 2000: 274). 
 
9. For a short account of "world knowledge" (in my framework schemas constructed from 
the neurocognitive information, and other previously constructed and consolidated 
schemas) in constructing anaphoric references in mental models see (Garnham 1997: 160-
1). 
 
10. The characters are from Colin Dexter’s completely superb, occasionally dejected and 
definitely irrevocable The Remorseful Day (1999). 
 
11. That my reading is correct is supported by what Hintikka says in another paper: “Arbitrary 
functions of the former kind are essentially what many philosophers call individual 
concepts, while the latter, the narrower set of ‘individuating functions’ essentially 
represents the totality of the well-defined individuals we speak of.” (Hintikka 1969b: 
137). And as to the functional equivalence of the Fregean senses and the individuative 
functions, there is a revealingly innocent remark by Hintikka: “Admittedly some further 
questions may still persist, for instance questions pertaining to the nature of individuating 
functions naturally used in our ordinary discourse. I shall by-pass them here, although 
they certainly need further attention.” (ibid.) They certainly do, as we have been seeing. 
Hintikka also speaks in quite many occasions of the sorts of criteria the individuative 
functions have to fulfill, like similarities between worlds (for according to his view the 
identities of the individuals may depend on the whole world) and the spatiotemporal 
continuity of the individuals. But these sorts of criteria are not banned from the Fregeans 
to invoke. 
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9. REFERENCE 
 
?????????????????????????????
 
Towards concluding this work a few general comments about reference are in order. 
Linguistic reference is the phenomenon that makes us able to talk about objects, 
persons, events, properties, relations and other things. Put in abstract terms reference is 
some kind of relation between the referent and the referring expression. But this is also 
a mere platitude that in itself tells us nothing that would be of explanatory value. 
Moreover it characterizes reference as static. The prevailing direct-causal picture of 
the reference of proper names (and the natural kind terms) is also such a static one. As 
we saw the relations from the referents to the uses of the expressions referring to them 
are highly idealized and tend to be taken as unproblematically and intactly given. The 
source of this staticness can be traced to the plain generalization from demonstrative 
references, and to the coarse-grained and idealized conception of the causal-
communicative relations (as was argued in section 4.2.5). True, that the direct-causal 
theory takes into account the communicative events, reference borrowings gives it 
dynamical flavour but only to a minimally required degree: without that modicum of 
dynamic elements no theory of reference could be adequate for reference is a form of 
human action. So contrary to what the common view of the direct-causal theory seems 
to suggest, the picture which that theory draws of reference is not sufficiently 
dynamic. The main reason for this is that it does not take into account the essential 
roles that information plays in every occasion of referential language use. As I have 
been arguing it is only by studying these roles that we are able to construct the 
adequate theory of reference. 
 
While accepting the abstract image of reference presented in the beginning of this 
section, according to which linguistic reference is some kind of relation between 
referents and expressions, it helps to conceive of reference as a continuum along the 
distance between the referent and the user of the referring expression. That continuum 
begins with the shortest distance, the null distance. This is the case when the user is the 
referent: uses of "I" to refer to oneself. From these cases the distance lengthens, when 
indexicals and demonstratives ("you", "this", "that", and such expressions) are used.1 
Another way to conceive of this end of the continuum is to realize that in the case of 
"I" its reference and context are the same, so that no referential mistakes are made. 
With the other indexicals and demonstratives there is always such a gap, therefore the 
contextual aspects must be observed. For example in the case of two very similar 
objects standing side by side, then individuating them must invoke their relations to 
other "landmarks" in their vicinity, or at least to some of their mutual relations (for 
example being left of the other). 
 
Towards the other end of the continuum reside proper names and the definite 
descriptions (not in such Donnellanian referential uses which are essentially 
demonstrative like "that man drinking martini", or a proper name functioning as a 
demonstrative, as in "Eeva is sleepy" when one perceives Eeva). The role of the 
conceptual information in the sense of non-perceptual information is of paramount 
importance in these cases: references to the long since dead historical figures are 
representative cases. It is also typical of these cases that the context in which the 
referents are located becomes internal. Of course it is obviously understood that the 
expressions refer to the individuals in their contemporary circumstances, but what I 
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mean is that those circumstances, the contexts, are represented in the speaker´s brain 
by the information and the schemas constructed of the information the speaker 
possess. As earlier described the global mappings enable us to represent the referential 
relations within other mappings (schemas-within-schemas). In many cases the 
represented circumstances are parts of the senses of the referents, even the individual 
concepts as global mappings). I argued for this nature of the Fregean senses in section 
4.3.5 and in chapter 6. The cases toward this end of the referential continuum manifest 
most clearly the dependency of reference on information. By the same token these 
cases make the strongest case for the cognitive and epistemic nature of reference. 
 
However it is not the case that in the two former types of reference the context could 
not also be internal; rather it is also internal, neurocognitively perforce so. Every 
perceptual situation gets represented in the brain. With "I" this is obvious, for so much 
of I-senses are internal; though of course the surroundings one perceives do 
occasionally accompany one´s I-sense, i.e. one´s brain locates and relocates "its I" all 
the time spatiotemporally. What is going on is that the context is represented in one´s 
brain but at the same time it is also represented as being the external context. The best 
way I can formulate this is that in and during the process in which the context is 
represented it is also tacitly represented to the organism as being external to the 
organism. The secret of this may well reside in the dynamics of the mappings of the 
spatiotemporal global mappings (schemas-within-schemas). Also the basic schema of 
reference presumably plays a role in learning to distinguish oneself from one´s 
surroundings. It seems, then, that especially here the theory of reference and the theory 
of consciousness could meet each other. (In addition to Edelman´s account see 
(Damasio 1999) for a philosophically very intriguing account of the neural 
construction of representations within representations, or rather oneself being 
represented within a neural representation in which that being-within is also 
represented.) 
 
One can maintain also that proper names are minitheories. When we use a proper 
name “NN” purportedly (and non-demonstratively) to refer we in effect put forth a 
hypothesis that the features and the properties encoded in the neurocognitive 
information, the sense as the individual concept about NN, will get verified in the 
communicative situations. When that does not happen we either drop the hypothesis 
(“NN does not exist") or modify it (“NN is such-and-such, but not so-and-so"). The 
verification of the senses of proper names is quite a common phenomenon. Not only 
the reference fixings but also the intermittent but continual contacts with the external 
reality keep the grid of the referential parts of language in check. But there is always 
another type of check going on. In the conversational situations in which the non-
demonstrative (purported) references are being made, it is the "meeting" of the mutual 
information the participants bring to bear which checks the coherence and 
cohesiveness of that information, hence the sameness of the referents the participants 
are talking about. 
 
This property of proper names is sometimes noted; for example Evans mentions proper 
names as hypotheses (Evans 1982: 392). I want to emphasize this because it helps us 
to realize more clearly that the use of proper names as a form of human action ties 
them to our overall being as the creatures we are as informavores. However there is a 
deeper cognitive-evolutionary point behind considering proper names as minitheories. 
For it is obvious that we, as language using animals, have evolved to the current stage 
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with its abundance of the scientific and other theories from the rudimentary 
information that contains accounts of the first referring expressions (or vocal grunts 
pointing other´s attention to their mutual vicinity). In this way the referring 
expressions acquired rudimentary senses from the very start. That is how our 
perceptuo-cognitive apparatus functions; the later theories – including those of 
individuals via the senses - only build on that, with their rich structures, ramifications 
and all. 
 
In the end of chapter 4 I maintained that reference is intentional in being cognitive and 
epistemic because it is informational. Now, after all we have been through in the last 
two chapters, I think it is sufficiently argued that reference is primarily a biological 
phenomenon. Reference takes place only within our brains. As I argued reference is a 
form of memory, when memory is explained in the neurocognitive terms. I do not 
think that the insistence on the general static picture of reference according to which 
reference is only some kind of general, even if “causal”, relation between the referring 
expression and the referent suffices for explanatory purposes; that relation must be 
dismantled to its functioning elements. With respect to proper names the relation is 
informational and intentional, and as we saw it is made up of many different 
neurocognitive elements, both in the transient sense as in demonstrative situations and 
in the spatiotemporally extended sense as the sources of the information concerning 
the referents from past. The basic mistake of the direct-causal theory of reference is 
then not so much that it insists on the general static picture but that it insists on a very 
simplified form of it: that there are causal links which safely keep proper names 
together with their referents. That picture we should reject. But I am willing to go all 
the way for this opens up a profound ontological consequence. Because reference is so 
complex phenomenon - both synchronically in that it taxes brain´s neurocognitive 
resources and diachronically because the "nodes" of the information transmission 
routes are many and varied - maybe we should also give up conceiving reference 
primarily in relational terms. Or if one could not do that, maybe he should try and 
conceive reference as being a relation only in a secondary sense, the primary element 
in reference being informational. Of course reference as an intentional phenomenon 
has the connotation that it is relational (for after all in intending someone intends 
something), but it is right here that the modern Fregean neurocognitive approach helps 
to loosen the grip of the relational picture. The senses of proper names qua 
informational processes carry the main explanatory burden: they are the mechanisms 
of reference. The relationality of reference is only a residual effect, so to speak. As I 
speculated above, the abstracted and generalized representations of the referential 
situations – schemas-within-schemas – and one being conscious of that representing of 
representing might explain the relational grip (together with the demonstrative 
Dasein). Anyway I hope that I have succeeded in arguing for the attitude and the 
consequent approach that we not only can but should begin to see reference from the 
new neurocognitive perspective; a major Gestalt switch indeed. 
 
What makes this a theoretical Gestalt switch is that the referential and the 
communicative phenomena do not change. The switch is instead back to the internal 
perspective, but a richer one which easily accounts for the features responsible for the 
social aspects of the referential use of language: it is a switch which takes reference as 
internal into our brains. What do change, however, are the methodological and the 
"metaphysical" presuppositions. No strict semantic equivalences between the senses 
(expressed by descriptions) and proper names are required; no unscrutinized intuitions 
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are accepted as evidence, so the "one-shot counterexample" strategy, so dear to 
philosophers, is rejected. Reference is seen as a form of neurocognitive information-
based action through language use, not an abstract picture, a mere (causal) relation 
between a term and an object. These are manifestations of the typical effects of the 
kinds of general changes in the interpretation of phenomena that characterize 
theoretical Gestalt switches. 
 
The results of this particular switch seem also to be characteristic to such switches, 
though they may not so seem from the start. I dare to claim that for the first time now 
we have the beginnings of a unifying framework under which the diverse phenomena 
can be subsumed. For instance the distinction genuine reference-purported reference is 
seen to be not so important explanatorily (recall the case of the empty names). 
Important old problems retain in essence their sense theoretic explanations (the "four 
puzzles"). Some problems are seen not to be such at all, for instance the 
counterexamples proposed by the direct-causal theorists fail, and their prima facie 
force can be explained by the basic schema of reference, the practice of deference and 
the epistemic symmetry principle. And finally, what is left of the direct-causal theory 
of reference becomes, or rather is seen to have always been, part of the Fregean sense 
theory of reference. The causal relations from the referents are informational and as 
such have never been in dispute by the sense theorists. The real question is: what kinds 
of causal relations are referential? The answer the neuronaturalized sense theory of 
reference delivers is: the neurobiologically based perceptuo-cognitive information 
processings (with motor and emotional informational elements). These internal schema 
representations conceived as relations are of course also causal, in the common way of 
speaking, but it is their informationality that counts explanatorily, as it counts with the 
external causal relations outside one´s brain. 
 
Moreover our "inside the skull" view has in fact overwhelming evidence in its favour. 
We have been staring at it all the time. It goes on automatically, and only occasionally 
is there an error (an incorrect description or piece of information). This is the point I 
raised earlier that the senses expressed by the descriptions have been serving us so 
well as the vehicles of reference that the concocted and rare types of cases of alleged 
reference failure the direct-causal theorists have imagined to be relevant can be put 
aside. We communicate and refer to individuals, events, natural and technological 
kinds, concepts and so on fluently as if it were our second nature. Instead it is our first 
nature, I should think, as the cognitive animals that we are. The naturalness of my 
framework should be seen against this background. We live in it, in the continuous 
pulses of the tremendous amounts of neurocognitive information in the intentional-
cum-biological acts, and because of that also in the referential acts, in the one essential 
element of our neuronaturalistic Dasein. 
 
 
Notes 
1. Though there are "deviant" uses of these expressions, for example when one can refer to a 
certain pudding years after eating it by saying "that plum pudding was delicious". 
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